2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
248 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
249 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
250 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
254 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
256 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
257 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
258 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
261 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
263 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
264 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
265 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
266 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
268 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
269 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
270 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
271 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
272 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
273 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
274 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
275 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
276 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
277 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
278 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
279 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
280 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
281 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
282 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
283 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
285 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
286 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
287 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
288 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
289 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
290 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
293 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
295 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
296 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
299 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
301 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
302 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
303 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
305 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
308 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
310 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
313 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
315 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
317 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
319 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
321 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
323 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
325 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
327 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
329 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
331 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
333 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
335 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
337 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
339 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
341 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
343 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
345 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
347 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
349 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
351 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
353 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
355 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
357 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
359 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
361 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
363 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
365 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
367 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
373 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
376 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
377 const unsigned char **pcurves,
382 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
383 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
386 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
387 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
389 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
390 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
391 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
394 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
395 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
399 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
400 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
404 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
405 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
409 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
410 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
413 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
414 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
416 const unsigned char *curves;
418 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
419 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
421 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
424 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
427 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
429 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
432 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
434 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
437 else /* Should never happen */
440 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
441 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
443 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
449 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
450 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
454 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
456 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
457 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
459 /* Can't do anything on client side */
466 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
467 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
470 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
471 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
472 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
473 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
474 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
475 /* Should never happen */
478 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
481 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
483 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
488 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
490 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
491 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
493 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
497 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
498 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
509 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
510 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
512 unsigned char *clist, *p;
514 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
515 * while curve ids < 32
517 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
518 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
521 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
523 unsigned long idmask;
525 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
527 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
538 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
542 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
547 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
550 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
552 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
556 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
558 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
560 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
562 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
563 if (nid == NID_undef)
564 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
565 if (nid == NID_undef)
566 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
567 if (nid == NID_undef)
569 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
570 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
572 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
575 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
576 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
581 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
585 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
587 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
588 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
593 const EC_METHOD *meth;
596 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
597 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
600 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
603 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
607 /* Determine curve ID */
608 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
609 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
610 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
614 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
626 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
628 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
631 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
633 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
636 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
640 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
641 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
642 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
644 const unsigned char *p;
647 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
648 * is supported (see RFC4492).
650 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
652 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
653 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
654 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
664 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
665 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
667 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
668 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
670 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
675 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
682 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
685 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
687 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
689 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
690 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
694 *pformats = ecformats_default;
695 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
697 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
699 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
703 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
704 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
706 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
708 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
711 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
714 /* If not EC nothing to do */
715 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
720 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
724 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
725 * supported curves extension.
727 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
730 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
731 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
733 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
740 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
741 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
742 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
743 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
744 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
746 return 0; /* Should never happen */
747 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
748 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
750 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
754 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
755 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
757 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
762 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
763 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
765 unsigned char curve_id[2];
766 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
767 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
768 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
769 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
772 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
773 * no other curves permitted.
777 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
778 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
779 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
780 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
781 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
785 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
786 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
788 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
789 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
791 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
794 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
797 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
799 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
805 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
807 /* Need a shared curve */
808 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
814 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
819 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
821 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
825 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
831 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
836 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
840 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
841 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
844 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
845 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
847 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
850 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
851 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
853 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
856 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
857 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
859 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
862 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
863 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
864 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
865 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
867 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
869 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
870 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
872 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
873 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
874 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
877 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
881 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
882 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
883 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
886 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
888 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
892 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
894 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
895 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
896 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
898 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
899 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
902 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
903 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
907 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
908 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
910 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
911 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
913 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
915 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
916 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
920 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
921 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
924 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
925 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
927 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
928 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
930 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
931 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
932 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
933 /* Should never happen */
936 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
937 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
943 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
945 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
946 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
947 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
949 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
954 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
959 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
961 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
964 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
968 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
970 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
973 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
981 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
985 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
986 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
987 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
989 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
992 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
993 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
998 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1004 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1007 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1008 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1011 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1012 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1013 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1014 * session and not global settings.
1017 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1020 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1021 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1022 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1025 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1026 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1027 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1030 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1031 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1034 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1035 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1040 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1044 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1045 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1050 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1056 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1057 * signature algorithms.
1061 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1062 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1066 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1067 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1071 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1072 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1075 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1077 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1078 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1082 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1083 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1085 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1086 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1088 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1092 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1095 unsigned char *ret = p;
1096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1097 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1099 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1102 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1103 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1105 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1107 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1109 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1110 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1111 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1112 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1121 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1122 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1123 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1128 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1130 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1132 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1133 unsigned long size_str;
1136 /* check for enough space.
1137 4 for the servername type and entension length
1138 2 for servernamelist length
1139 1 for the hostname type
1140 2 for hostname length
1144 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1145 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1148 /* extension type and length */
1149 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1150 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1152 /* length of servername list */
1153 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1155 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1156 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1158 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1162 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1167 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1173 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1175 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1178 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1188 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1189 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1190 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1192 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1193 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 /* check for enough space.
1200 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1201 1 for the srp user identity
1202 + srp user identity length
1204 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1206 /* fill in the extension */
1207 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1208 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1209 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1210 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1218 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1220 const unsigned char *plist;
1223 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1225 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1226 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1234 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1235 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1236 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1239 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1240 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1241 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1243 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1244 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1245 if (plistlen > 65532)
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1251 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1252 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1254 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1255 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1256 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1257 * resolves this to two bytes.
1260 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1263 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1265 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1268 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1269 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1270 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1271 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1273 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1274 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1275 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1277 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1278 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1280 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1284 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1285 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1287 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1290 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1291 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1295 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1301 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1304 const unsigned char *salg;
1305 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1306 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1308 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1309 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1311 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1315 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1316 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1318 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1320 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1322 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1325 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1328 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1333 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1336 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1340 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1342 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1343 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1349 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1351 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1358 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1359 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1360 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1362 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1363 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1365 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1367 /* save position of id len */
1368 unsigned char *q = ret;
1369 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1370 /* skip over id len */
1372 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1378 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1382 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1383 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1386 * 1: peer may send requests
1387 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1389 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1390 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1392 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1396 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1398 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1399 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1400 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1402 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1407 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1409 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1411 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1412 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1413 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1414 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1415 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1416 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1419 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1423 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1425 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1427 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1430 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1438 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1439 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1442 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1444 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1446 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1447 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1449 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1450 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1451 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1455 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1459 return NULL; /* error */
1460 if (cb_retval == -1)
1461 continue; /* skip this extension */
1463 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1465 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1467 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1471 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1472 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1475 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_padding
1476 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1477 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-02
1479 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1480 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1483 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1484 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the
1485 * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c does
1487 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1489 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1491 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1497 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1499 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1505 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1512 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1515 unsigned char *ret = p;
1516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1517 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1519 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1520 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1521 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1522 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1523 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1525 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1526 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1530 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1532 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1534 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1536 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1540 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1544 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1550 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1552 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1555 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1567 const unsigned char *plist;
1569 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1572 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1574 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1575 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1578 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1582 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1583 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1584 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1585 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1589 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1590 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1592 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1593 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1595 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1596 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1600 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1602 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1603 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1607 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1608 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1610 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1612 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1614 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1617 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1620 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1629 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1631 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1633 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1636 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1644 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1645 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1646 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1647 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1648 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1649 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1650 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1651 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1652 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1653 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1654 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1660 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1661 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1663 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1666 * 1: peer may send requests
1667 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1669 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1670 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1672 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1678 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1679 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1680 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1682 const unsigned char *npa;
1683 unsigned int npalen;
1686 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1687 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1689 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1690 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1692 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1694 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1699 /* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
1700 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
1704 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
1707 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1709 for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
1711 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
1712 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
1714 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1715 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1718 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1721 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1725 return NULL; /* error */
1726 if (cb_retval == -1)
1727 break; /* skip this extension */
1728 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1730 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1732 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1739 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1740 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1742 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
1743 * to disable for other ciphersuites too.
1745 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
1746 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1749 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1755 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1757 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1758 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1760 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1762 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1766 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1770 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1777 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1779 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1780 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1781 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1784 * returns: 0 on success. */
1785 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1786 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1790 const unsigned char *selected;
1791 unsigned char selected_len;
1794 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1800 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1801 * length-prefixed strings. */
1802 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1803 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1812 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1814 proto_len = data[i];
1820 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1826 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1827 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1828 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1829 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1830 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1831 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1832 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1834 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1837 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1838 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1843 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1847 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1848 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1849 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1850 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1855 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1856 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1857 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1858 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1860 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1861 unsigned short type, size;
1862 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1863 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1864 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1865 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1866 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1867 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1868 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1870 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1871 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1872 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1873 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1876 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1877 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1878 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1879 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1880 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1881 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1882 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1883 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1884 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1885 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1888 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1897 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1900 if (data+size > d+n)
1904 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1906 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1907 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1909 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1911 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1913 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1918 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1920 if (data + len != d+n)
1922 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1926 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1928 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1930 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1932 unsigned short type;
1933 unsigned short size;
1935 unsigned char *data = *p;
1936 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1939 s->servername_done = 0;
1940 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1941 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1942 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1945 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1947 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1948 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1951 /* Clear observed custom extensions */
1952 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count = 0;
1953 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types != NULL)
1955 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_custom_types);
1956 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = NULL;
1959 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1960 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1961 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1965 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1966 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1967 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1969 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1970 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1972 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1973 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1975 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1976 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1978 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1979 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1981 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1982 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1984 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1985 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1988 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1989 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1992 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1996 if (data > (d+n-len))
1999 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2004 if (data+size > (d+n))
2007 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2009 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2010 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2011 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2012 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
2014 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2015 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2016 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2017 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2018 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2019 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2020 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2021 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2022 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2023 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2024 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2025 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2026 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2027 the value of the Host: field.
2028 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2029 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
2030 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
2031 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2035 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2037 unsigned char *sdata;
2043 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2050 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2057 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2063 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2066 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2067 switch (servname_type)
2069 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2072 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2074 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2077 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2079 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2082 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2084 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2087 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2088 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2089 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2090 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2091 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2092 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2095 s->servername_done = 1;
2099 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2100 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2101 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2113 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2119 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2121 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2123 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2126 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2128 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2131 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2133 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2134 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2136 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2138 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2145 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2147 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2148 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2150 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2151 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2153 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2158 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2160 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2161 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2163 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2164 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2166 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2169 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2170 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2173 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2174 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2175 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2176 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2177 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2180 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2182 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2183 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2184 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2186 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2187 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2189 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2194 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2196 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2199 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2200 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2202 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2205 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2206 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2209 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2210 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2211 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2212 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2213 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2216 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2217 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2218 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2220 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2224 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2227 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2228 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2230 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2234 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2235 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2236 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2237 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2239 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2240 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2242 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2247 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2249 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2250 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2252 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2256 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2258 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2260 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2262 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2265 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2267 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2272 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2274 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2277 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2279 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2282 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2285 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2288 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2289 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2293 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2298 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2302 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2304 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2306 const unsigned char *sdata;
2308 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2313 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2322 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2326 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2330 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2335 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2339 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2344 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2345 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2348 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2349 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2350 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2352 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2353 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2356 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2357 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2359 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2360 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2365 /* Read in request_extensions */
2368 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2375 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2381 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2383 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2384 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2387 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2388 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2390 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2391 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2393 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2398 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2402 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2405 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2409 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2410 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2412 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2413 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2414 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2416 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2421 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2422 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2423 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2424 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2426 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2429 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2430 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2431 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2432 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2433 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2434 * anything like that, but this might change).
2436 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2437 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2438 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2439 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2440 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2441 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2445 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2446 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2447 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2449 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2451 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2452 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2453 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2457 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2458 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2460 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2464 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2465 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2466 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2467 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2468 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2470 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2472 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2474 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2476 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2477 if (type == record->ext_type)
2481 /* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
2482 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
2484 if (type == s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j])
2486 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2491 /* NULL callback still notes the extension */
2492 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2495 /* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
2496 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
2497 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
2498 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
2499 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count * 2);
2500 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
2502 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
2503 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2506 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
2507 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count - 1] = type;
2511 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2512 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2513 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2523 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2525 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2526 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2528 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2530 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2533 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2534 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2535 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2540 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2543 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2545 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2549 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2558 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2559 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2560 * the length of the block. */
2561 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2563 unsigned int off = 0;
2577 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2579 unsigned short length;
2580 unsigned short type;
2581 unsigned short size;
2582 unsigned char *data = *p;
2583 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2584 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2587 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2590 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2592 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2593 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2597 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2598 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2601 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2602 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2605 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2609 if (data+length != d+n)
2611 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2615 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2620 if (data+size > (d+n))
2623 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2624 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2625 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2627 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2629 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2631 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2634 tlsext_servername = 1;
2637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2638 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2640 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2641 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2643 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2645 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2648 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2649 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2650 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2652 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2655 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2656 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2658 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2659 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2660 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2661 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2662 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2665 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2667 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2669 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2670 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2672 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2675 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2678 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2681 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2683 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2684 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2686 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2690 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2693 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2694 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2696 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2700 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2701 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2702 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2703 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2705 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2707 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2709 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2714 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2716 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2717 * a status request message.
2719 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2721 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2724 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2725 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2728 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2729 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2731 unsigned char *selected;
2732 unsigned char selected_len;
2734 /* We must have requested it. */
2735 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2737 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2740 /* The data must be valid */
2741 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2743 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2746 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2748 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2751 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2752 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2754 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2757 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2758 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2759 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2763 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2767 /* We must have requested it. */
2768 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2770 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2775 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2778 /* The extension data consists of:
2779 * uint16 list_length
2780 * uint8 proto_length;
2781 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2785 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2787 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2791 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2793 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2796 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2797 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2798 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2799 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2801 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2804 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2805 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2808 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2810 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2812 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2815 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2819 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2820 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2822 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2823 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2824 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2826 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2831 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2833 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2837 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2838 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2840 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2843 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2845 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2847 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2848 if (record->ext_type == type)
2850 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2856 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2857 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2859 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2860 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
2861 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2870 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2874 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2876 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2878 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2880 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2881 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2883 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2889 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2899 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2900 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2901 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2902 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2903 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2904 * absence on initial connect only.
2906 if (!renegotiate_seen
2907 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2908 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2910 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2911 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2912 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2920 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2923 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2927 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2929 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2934 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2936 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2937 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2939 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2940 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2942 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2943 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2948 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2952 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2953 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2960 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2965 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2967 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2968 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2970 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2971 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2972 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2974 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2975 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2979 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2980 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2981 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2982 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2984 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2986 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2987 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2988 * so this has to happen here in
2989 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2993 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2995 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2998 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2999 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3004 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
3005 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
3006 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
3008 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3010 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
3011 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
3013 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
3014 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
3016 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3017 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3019 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3020 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3022 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3023 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3026 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3030 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3032 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3033 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3034 * abort the handshake.
3036 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3037 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3045 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3046 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3049 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3050 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3053 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3054 s->servername_done=0;
3060 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3062 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3065 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3066 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3067 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3068 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3070 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3073 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3074 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3075 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3076 if (certpkey == NULL)
3078 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3081 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3082 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3084 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3085 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3088 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3089 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3090 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3092 /* status request response should be sent */
3093 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3094 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3095 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3097 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3099 /* something bad happened */
3100 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3101 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3102 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3107 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3112 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3113 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3116 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3117 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3125 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3127 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3128 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3131 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3132 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3133 * it must contain uncompressed.
3135 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3136 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3137 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3138 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3139 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3141 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3143 unsigned char *list;
3144 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3145 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3146 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3148 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3150 found_uncompressed = 1;
3154 if (!found_uncompressed)
3156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3160 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3161 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3163 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3164 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3165 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3166 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3168 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3169 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3171 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3172 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3174 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3176 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3177 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3180 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3181 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3182 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3183 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3185 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3186 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3191 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3194 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3195 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3198 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3199 * there is no response.
3201 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3203 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3204 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3206 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3207 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3210 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3211 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3215 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3216 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3222 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3223 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3226 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3227 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3230 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3231 s->servername_done=0;
3237 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3240 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3242 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3244 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3248 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3256 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3257 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3258 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3260 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3261 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3262 * extension, if any.
3263 * len: the length of the session ID.
3264 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3265 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3266 * point to the resulting session.
3268 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3269 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3270 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3273 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3274 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3275 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3276 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3277 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3278 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3279 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3282 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3283 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3284 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3285 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3286 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3287 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3289 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3290 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3292 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3293 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3297 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3299 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3300 * to permit stateful resumption.
3302 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3304 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3308 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3316 /* Skip past cipher list */
3321 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3326 /* Now at start of extensions */
3327 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3330 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3332 unsigned short type, size;
3335 if (p + size > limit)
3337 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3342 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3343 * currently have one. */
3344 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3347 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3349 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3350 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3351 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3352 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3353 * calculate the master secret later. */
3356 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3359 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3360 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3362 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3364 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3365 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3367 default: /* fatal error */
3376 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3378 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3379 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3380 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3381 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3382 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3383 * point to the resulting session.
3386 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3387 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3388 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3389 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3391 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3392 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3393 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3396 unsigned char *sdec;
3397 const unsigned char *p;
3398 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3399 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3402 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3403 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3406 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3407 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3408 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3409 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3411 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3412 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3423 /* Check key name matches */
3424 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3426 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3427 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3428 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3429 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3431 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3432 * integrity checks on ticket.
3434 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3437 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3441 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3442 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3443 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3444 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3445 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3447 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3448 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3449 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3450 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3451 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3454 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3457 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3458 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3461 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3464 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3468 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3469 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3470 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3471 * as required by standard.
3474 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3475 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3483 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3488 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3496 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3497 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3498 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3499 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3500 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3501 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3502 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3505 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3506 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3507 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3508 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3511 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3514 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3516 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3522 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3525 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3527 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3528 return table[i].nid;
3533 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3538 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3539 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3542 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3545 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3546 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3550 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3552 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3553 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3556 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3560 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3561 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3568 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3569 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3573 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3574 return EVP_sha224();
3576 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3577 return EVP_sha256();
3579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3580 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3581 return EVP_sha384();
3583 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3584 return EVP_sha512();
3592 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3596 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3597 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3598 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3600 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3601 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3602 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3604 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3605 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3606 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3612 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3613 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3614 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3616 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3617 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3619 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3621 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3622 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3624 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3626 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3628 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3629 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3631 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3635 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3636 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3637 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3639 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3642 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3643 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3644 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3645 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3647 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3648 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3649 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3651 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3652 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3654 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3656 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3658 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3663 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3664 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3665 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3667 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3678 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3679 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3681 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3682 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3684 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3686 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3687 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3688 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3690 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3691 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3693 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3695 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3696 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3699 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3700 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3704 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3705 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3711 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3712 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3714 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3717 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3720 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3721 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3722 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3727 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3729 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3735 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3736 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3737 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3739 /* Should never happen */
3743 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3744 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3746 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3747 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3749 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3751 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3752 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3754 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3755 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3757 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3759 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3761 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3764 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3765 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3766 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3767 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3768 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3770 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3771 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3777 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3778 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3780 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3781 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3783 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3784 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3785 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3786 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3788 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3789 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3794 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3795 * use the certificate for signing.
3797 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3799 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3800 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3802 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3803 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3804 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3806 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3807 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3809 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3810 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3814 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3815 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3822 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3823 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3824 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3826 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3832 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3839 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3841 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3844 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3845 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3846 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3848 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3849 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3853 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3855 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3857 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3859 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3861 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3862 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3866 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3868 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3870 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3871 unsigned short hbtype;
3872 unsigned int payload;
3873 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3875 /* Read type and payload length first */
3880 if (s->msg_callback)
3881 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3882 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3883 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3885 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3887 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3890 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3891 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3892 * payload, plus padding
3894 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3897 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3898 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3900 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3902 /* Random padding */
3903 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3905 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3907 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3908 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3909 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3910 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3912 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3917 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3921 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3922 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3923 * sequence number */
3926 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3929 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3937 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3939 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3941 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3942 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3944 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3945 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3946 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3952 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3953 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3955 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3959 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3960 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3966 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3967 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3969 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3971 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3972 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3973 * some random stuff.
3974 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3975 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3976 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3977 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3980 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3983 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3984 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3986 /* Sequence number */
3987 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3988 /* 16 random bytes */
3989 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3991 /* Random padding */
3992 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3994 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3997 if (s->msg_callback)
3998 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3999 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4000 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4002 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4011 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4016 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4019 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4021 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4024 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4025 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4027 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4029 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4031 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4039 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4040 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4041 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4042 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4043 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4044 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4047 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4048 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4049 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4050 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4053 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4055 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4056 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4059 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4060 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4064 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4065 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4066 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4070 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4074 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4077 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4079 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4084 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4085 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4087 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4089 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4090 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4091 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4092 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4094 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4102 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4103 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4104 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4105 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4109 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4110 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4111 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4112 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4118 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4122 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4126 if (default_nid == -1)
4128 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4130 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4131 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4132 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4136 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4137 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4141 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4142 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4144 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4150 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4151 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4152 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4153 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4156 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4158 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4159 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4160 /* Strict mode flags */
4161 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4162 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4163 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4165 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4170 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4171 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4173 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4174 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4177 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4181 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4184 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4186 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4188 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4189 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4192 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4193 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4194 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4196 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4197 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4206 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4209 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4210 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4211 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4213 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4221 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4222 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4223 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4226 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4232 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4233 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4236 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4239 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4240 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4242 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4247 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4248 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4249 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4250 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4251 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4254 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4255 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4256 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4257 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4261 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4262 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4270 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4271 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4274 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4277 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4278 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4280 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4283 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4291 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4292 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4294 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4297 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4298 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4299 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4301 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4306 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4314 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4315 else if(check_flags)
4316 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4318 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4319 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4320 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4321 else if (!check_flags)
4324 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4325 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4326 else if (strict_mode)
4328 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4329 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4331 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4332 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4336 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4344 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4346 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4351 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4354 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4357 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4362 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4363 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4364 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4365 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4366 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4371 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4376 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4380 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4381 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4383 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4385 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4387 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4391 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4395 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4398 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4400 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4401 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4403 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4405 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4406 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4408 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4410 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4412 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4413 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4415 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4420 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4424 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4426 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4427 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4431 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4433 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4434 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4435 else if (cpk->digest)
4436 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4439 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4441 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4442 * if the chain is invalid.
4446 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4447 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4450 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4451 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4458 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4459 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4461 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4462 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4463 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4464 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4465 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4466 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4468 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4469 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4471 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);