1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 /* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
112 #include <openssl/objects.h>
113 #include <openssl/evp.h>
114 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
115 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
116 #include <openssl/rand.h>
117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
118 # include <openssl/dh.h>
119 # include <openssl/bn.h>
121 #include "ssl_locl.h"
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
129 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
132 tls1_setup_key_block,
133 tls1_generate_master_secret,
134 tls1_change_cipher_state,
135 tls1_final_finish_mac,
136 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
142 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
143 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
147 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
150 tls1_setup_key_block,
151 tls1_generate_master_secret,
152 tls1_change_cipher_state,
153 tls1_final_finish_mac,
154 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
155 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
156 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
158 tls1_export_keying_material,
159 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
160 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
161 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
165 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
168 tls1_setup_key_block,
169 tls1_generate_master_secret,
170 tls1_change_cipher_state,
171 tls1_final_finish_mac,
172 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
173 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
174 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
176 tls1_export_keying_material,
177 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
178 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
179 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
180 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
184 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
187 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
188 * http, the cache would over fill
190 return (60 * 60 * 2);
197 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
201 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
203 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
207 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
210 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
211 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
213 s->version = s->method->version;
216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
219 int nid; /* Curve NID */
220 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
221 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
224 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
225 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
227 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
228 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
229 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
230 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
231 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
232 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
233 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
234 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
235 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
236 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
237 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
238 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
239 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
240 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
241 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
242 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
243 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
244 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
245 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
246 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
247 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
248 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
249 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
250 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
251 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
252 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
253 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
254 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
255 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
258 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
259 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
260 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
261 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
264 /* The default curves */
265 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
266 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
267 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
268 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
269 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
270 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
271 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
272 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
273 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
274 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
275 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
276 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
277 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
278 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
279 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
280 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
281 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
285 /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
286 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
287 /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
288 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
289 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
290 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
291 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
292 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
293 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
294 /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
295 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
296 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
297 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
298 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
299 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
300 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
302 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
303 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
305 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
306 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
307 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
308 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
309 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
310 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
311 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
312 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
313 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
314 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
315 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
316 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
317 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
318 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
319 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
323 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
324 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
325 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
328 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
330 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
331 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
333 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
336 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
338 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
340 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
342 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
344 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
346 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
348 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
350 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
352 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
354 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
356 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
358 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
360 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
362 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
364 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
366 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
368 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
370 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
372 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
374 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
376 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
378 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
380 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
382 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
384 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
386 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
388 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
390 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
392 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
394 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
402 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
404 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
405 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
406 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
407 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
408 * lists in the first place.
409 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
410 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
411 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
413 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
414 const unsigned char **pcurves,
417 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
419 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
420 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
422 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
423 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
424 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
425 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
426 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
429 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
430 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
434 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
435 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
439 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
440 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
443 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
444 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
448 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
449 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
450 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
454 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
459 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
460 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
462 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
465 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
467 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
468 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
469 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
472 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
475 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
476 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
478 const unsigned char *curves;
479 size_t num_curves, i;
480 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
481 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
483 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
485 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
488 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
489 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
491 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
492 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
494 } else /* Should never happen */
497 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
499 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
500 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
501 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
507 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
508 * if there is no match.
509 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
510 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
511 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
513 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
515 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
516 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
518 /* Can't do anything on client side */
522 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
524 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
525 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
527 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
528 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
529 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
530 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
531 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
532 /* Should never happen */
535 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
539 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
540 * but s->options is a long...
542 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
543 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
545 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
546 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
547 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
548 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
550 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
553 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
556 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
558 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
559 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
560 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
562 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
566 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
567 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
568 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
569 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
570 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
573 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
574 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
582 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
586 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
587 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
589 unsigned char *clist, *p;
592 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
595 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
596 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
599 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
600 unsigned long idmask;
602 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
604 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
613 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
617 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
621 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
624 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
626 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
632 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
634 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
636 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
638 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
639 if (nid == NID_undef)
640 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
641 if (nid == NID_undef)
642 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
643 if (nid == NID_undef)
645 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
646 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
648 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
652 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
653 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
658 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
662 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
665 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
666 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
671 const EC_METHOD *meth;
674 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
675 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
678 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
681 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
685 /* Determine curve ID */
686 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
687 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
688 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
691 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
700 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
702 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
704 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
706 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
708 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
713 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
714 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
715 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
717 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
718 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
721 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
722 * supported (see RFC4492).
724 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
725 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
726 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
727 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
728 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
731 if (i == num_formats)
736 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
737 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
738 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
740 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
742 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
743 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
744 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
745 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
746 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
750 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
751 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
756 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
763 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
767 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
769 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
770 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
771 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
773 *pformats = ecformats_default;
774 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
776 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
778 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
783 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
784 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
786 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
788 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
791 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
794 /* If not EC nothing to do */
795 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
797 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
801 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
804 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
808 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
809 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
811 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
817 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
818 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
819 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
820 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
821 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
823 return 0; /* Should never happen */
824 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
825 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
827 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
829 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
830 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
831 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
833 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
839 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
841 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity
843 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
845 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
846 * is compatible with the client extensions.
848 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
850 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
852 # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
853 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
854 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
858 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
861 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
862 unsigned char curve_id[2];
863 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
864 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
865 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
866 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
867 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
871 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
872 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
876 /* Need a shared curve */
877 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
881 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
885 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
890 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
893 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
894 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
897 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
898 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
900 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
903 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
904 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
906 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
910 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
912 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
915 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
916 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
917 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
918 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
920 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
921 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
922 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
923 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
924 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
925 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
926 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
927 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
928 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
929 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
933 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
934 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
935 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
936 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
939 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
942 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
946 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
947 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
948 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
949 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
951 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
952 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
955 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
956 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
960 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
961 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
962 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
963 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
964 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
965 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
966 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
968 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
969 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
974 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
975 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
977 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
978 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
980 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
981 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
982 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
983 /* Should never happen */
986 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
987 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
992 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
993 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
994 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
995 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
997 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1001 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1002 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1005 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
1006 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
1007 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1008 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1011 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
1012 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
1013 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1014 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1020 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1024 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1025 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1026 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
1027 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1030 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1031 if (i == sent_sigslen
1032 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
1033 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1037 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1042 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1043 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1044 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1046 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1050 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
1052 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
1057 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1058 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
1059 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
1062 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1064 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1065 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1066 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1067 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1068 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1070 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1071 /* Disable TLS 1.0 ciphers if using SSL v3 */
1072 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1073 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1;
1074 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1076 * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
1079 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1080 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHr;
1081 if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1082 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1083 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1084 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1085 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1086 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1087 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1089 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1091 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1092 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1093 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1098 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1100 if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl
1101 || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1102 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1104 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1107 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1109 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1111 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1114 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1115 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1118 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1119 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1120 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1121 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1123 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1125 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1126 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1128 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1129 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1131 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1132 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1133 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)
1134 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
1145 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1147 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1148 if (s->renegotiate) {
1151 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1156 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1159 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1162 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1163 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1169 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1170 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1173 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1174 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1175 unsigned long size_str;
1179 * check for enough space.
1180 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1181 * 2 for servernamelist length
1182 * 1 for the hostname type
1183 * 2 for hostname length
1187 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1189 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1192 /* extension type and length */
1193 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1194 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1196 /* length of servername list */
1197 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1199 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1200 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1202 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1206 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1207 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1208 * Client Hello message */
1210 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1211 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1217 * check for enough space.
1218 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1219 * 1 for the srp user identity
1220 * + srp user identity length
1222 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1225 /* fill in the extension */
1226 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1227 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1228 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1229 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1234 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1237 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1240 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1241 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1243 unsigned char *etmp;
1245 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1247 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1249 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1251 if (num_formats > 255) {
1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1256 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1257 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1258 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1259 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1260 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1264 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1266 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1267 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1270 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1272 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1274 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1279 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1281 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1282 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1283 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1284 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1285 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1289 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1291 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1292 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1293 ret += curves_list_len;
1295 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1297 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1299 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1300 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1301 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1302 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1303 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1304 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1305 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1307 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1308 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1309 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1312 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1313 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1316 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1319 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1321 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1324 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1330 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1332 const unsigned char *salg;
1333 unsigned char *etmp;
1334 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1335 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1337 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1339 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1341 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1342 /* Fill in lengths */
1343 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1348 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1350 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1354 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1355 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1356 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1362 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1363 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1369 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1371 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1372 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1374 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1375 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1377 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1378 /* save position of id len */
1379 unsigned char *q = ret;
1380 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1381 /* skip over id len */
1383 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1389 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1392 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1393 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1395 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1399 * 1: peer may send requests
1400 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1402 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1403 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1405 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1409 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1411 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1412 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1414 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1416 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1421 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1422 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1424 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1425 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1426 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1427 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1428 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1430 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1431 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1434 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1435 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1440 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1443 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1446 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1453 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1454 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1455 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1457 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1458 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1461 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1465 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1466 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1467 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1470 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1471 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1473 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1474 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1480 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1482 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1489 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1492 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1496 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1497 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1500 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1501 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1502 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1503 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1506 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1507 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1508 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
1509 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1510 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1515 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1517 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1520 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1525 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1528 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1531 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1539 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1540 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1543 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1544 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1545 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1548 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1551 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1553 const unsigned char *plist;
1556 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1560 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1562 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1564 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1566 if (plistlen > 255) {
1567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1571 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1572 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1573 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1574 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1579 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1582 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1584 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1585 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1587 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1591 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1592 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1594 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1599 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1602 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1603 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1607 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1610 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1613 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1621 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1622 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1623 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1624 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1625 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1626 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1627 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1628 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1629 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1630 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1632 if (limit - ret < 36)
1634 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1638 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1639 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1640 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) {
1641 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1643 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1647 * 1: peer may send requests
1648 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1650 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1651 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1653 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1659 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1660 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1661 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1662 const unsigned char *npa;
1663 unsigned int npalen;
1666 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1668 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1669 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1670 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1672 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1674 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1676 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1680 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1682 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1683 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1685 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1686 * for other cases too.
1688 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1689 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1690 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1691 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1692 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1694 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1699 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1700 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1704 if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
1705 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1706 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1708 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1710 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1714 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1720 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1723 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1728 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1729 * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
1730 * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
1731 * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
1734 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1736 unsigned int data_len;
1737 unsigned int proto_len;
1738 const unsigned char *selected;
1739 const unsigned char *data;
1740 unsigned char selected_len;
1743 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1747 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1748 * length-prefixed strings.
1750 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &data_len)
1751 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != data_len
1752 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, data_len))
1756 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &proto_len)
1758 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, proto_len))
1760 } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt));
1762 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1763 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1764 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1765 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1766 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1767 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1768 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1771 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1772 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1777 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1781 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1783 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1784 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1785 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1790 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1791 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1792 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1793 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1795 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1797 unsigned int type, size;
1798 const unsigned char *eblock1, *eblock2;
1801 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1802 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1803 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1804 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1805 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1806 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1807 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1809 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1810 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1811 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1812 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1815 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1816 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1817 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1818 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1819 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1820 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1821 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1822 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1823 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1824 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1829 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1830 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1831 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &size)
1832 || !PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, size))
1835 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1838 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1839 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1840 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1842 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len1)
1843 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock2, len2)
1844 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1846 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1848 if (memcmp(eblock2, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1851 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1853 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len)
1854 || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
1856 if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1860 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1862 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1864 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1869 const unsigned char *data;
1870 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1872 s->servername_done = 0;
1873 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1874 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1875 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1878 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1879 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1880 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1881 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1882 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1885 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1886 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1887 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1888 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1890 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1891 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1892 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1893 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1894 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1897 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1898 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1899 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1902 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1904 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1907 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len))
1910 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len)
1913 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
1916 if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, size))
1919 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1920 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1922 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, size))
1925 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1926 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
1928 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1929 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1932 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1934 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1935 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1936 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1937 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1938 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1939 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1940 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1941 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1942 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1943 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1944 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1945 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1946 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1947 * the value of the Host: field.
1948 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1949 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1950 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1952 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1956 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1957 const unsigned char *sdata;
1958 unsigned int servname_type;
1962 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
1963 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
1966 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) > 3) {
1967 if (!PACKET_get_1(&ssubpkt, &servname_type)
1968 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &len)
1969 || PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < len)
1972 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1973 switch (servname_type) {
1974 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1976 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1979 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1980 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1983 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1984 OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
1985 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1988 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ssubpkt,
1989 (unsigned char *)s->session
1992 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1995 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
1996 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1997 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1998 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1999 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2002 s->servername_done = 1;
2005 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &sdata, len)) {
2006 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2009 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2010 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2011 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2012 (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2021 /* We shouldn't have any bytes left */
2022 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) != 0)
2026 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2027 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2028 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &len)
2029 || s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2032 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
2034 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, (unsigned char *)s->srp_ctx.login,
2037 s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
2039 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len
2040 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt))
2045 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2046 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2047 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2049 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2050 || ecpointformatlist_length == 0)
2054 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2055 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2056 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2057 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2058 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2059 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2062 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2063 ecpointformatlist_length;
2064 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2065 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2066 ecpointformatlist_length))
2068 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2071 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2072 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2073 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2076 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2077 unsigned int ellipticcurvelist_length;
2079 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1 */
2080 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &ellipticcurvelist_length)
2081 || ellipticcurvelist_length == 0
2082 || (ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) != 0)
2086 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2089 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2090 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
2091 OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
2092 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2095 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
2096 ellipticcurvelist_length;
2097 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
2098 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2099 ellipticcurvelist_length))
2101 } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2104 /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
2105 if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2109 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2110 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2111 if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, size)
2112 || (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2113 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2114 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))) {
2115 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2118 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2121 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs
2122 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2125 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2126 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != 0
2127 || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
2130 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2133 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt,
2134 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type))
2137 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2138 const unsigned char *sdata;
2140 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2141 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2142 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
2145 while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt)) {
2147 unsigned int idsize;
2149 if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < 4
2150 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &idsize)
2151 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &data, idsize)) {
2156 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
2159 if (data != sdata) {
2160 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2163 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2164 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2165 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
2166 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2167 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2170 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2171 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2172 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2177 /* Read in request_extensions */
2178 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
2179 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
2180 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2185 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2186 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2187 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2188 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
2189 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
2194 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2197 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2199 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2200 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2201 unsigned int hbtype;
2203 if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &hbtype)
2204 || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
2205 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2209 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2210 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2212 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2213 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2214 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2217 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2222 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2223 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2224 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2225 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2227 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2230 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2231 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2232 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2233 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2234 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2235 * anything like that, but this might change).
2237 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2238 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2239 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2240 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2241 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2243 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2247 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2248 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2249 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &subpkt, al) != 0)
2251 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2252 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2253 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2257 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2259 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2260 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2261 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
2265 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2266 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2267 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2270 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2271 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2275 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2276 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2277 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2278 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2279 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2282 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2287 /* Spurious data on the end */
2288 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0)
2293 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2295 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2296 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2297 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2299 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2305 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2309 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2312 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2313 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2314 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2318 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2325 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2327 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2328 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2329 * fill the length of the block.
2331 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2335 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2336 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len)
2337 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len))
2345 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2347 unsigned int length, type, size;
2348 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2349 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2351 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2352 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2354 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2356 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2357 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2359 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2360 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2363 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2364 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2367 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2369 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2372 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2373 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2377 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2378 const unsigned char *data;
2381 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2382 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2385 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2386 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2388 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2389 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2391 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2392 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2393 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2394 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2395 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2398 tlsext_servername = 1;
2400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2401 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2402 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2403 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2404 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2405 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2409 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2410 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2411 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2412 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2413 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2416 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2417 ecpointformatlist_length;
2418 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2419 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2420 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2421 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2427 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2429 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2430 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2431 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2432 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2434 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2437 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2438 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2441 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2443 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2445 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2448 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2449 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2452 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2453 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2456 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2457 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2458 unsigned char *selected;
2459 unsigned char selected_len;
2460 /* We must have requested it. */
2461 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2462 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2465 /* The data must be valid */
2466 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2467 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2471 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2473 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2474 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2475 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2478 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2479 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2480 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2483 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2484 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2485 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2489 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2491 /* We must have requested it. */
2492 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
2493 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2497 * The extension data consists of:
2498 * uint16 list_length
2499 * uint8 proto_length;
2500 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2502 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2503 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
2504 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2505 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2506 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2509 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2510 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2511 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2512 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2515 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2516 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2519 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2522 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2523 unsigned int hbtype;
2524 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2525 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2529 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2530 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2532 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2533 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2534 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2537 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2543 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2544 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2548 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2549 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2550 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2551 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2552 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2553 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2556 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2557 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2559 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2562 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2563 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2565 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2569 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2570 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2574 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2575 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2576 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2577 s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2578 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2579 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2583 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2592 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2593 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2594 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2595 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2596 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2597 * initial connect only.
2599 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2600 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2601 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2603 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2609 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2612 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2613 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2614 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2623 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2629 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2634 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2636 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2637 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2641 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2642 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2645 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2646 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2650 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2652 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2653 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2654 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2655 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2657 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2659 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2662 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2663 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2666 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2667 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2670 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2671 s->servername_done = 0;
2676 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2677 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2679 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2681 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2683 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2684 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2685 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2687 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2688 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2690 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2691 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2694 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2695 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2696 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2700 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2704 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2705 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2706 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2707 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2708 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2709 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2710 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2711 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2714 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2715 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2716 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2717 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2718 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2721 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2722 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2723 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2724 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2725 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2729 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2733 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2737 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2739 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2740 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2743 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2744 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2745 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2746 * influence which certificate is sent
2748 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2750 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2751 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2752 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2753 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2754 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2758 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2759 * et al can pick it up.
2761 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2762 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2764 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2765 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2766 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2768 /* status request response should be sent */
2769 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2770 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2771 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2773 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2775 /* something bad happened */
2776 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2777 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2778 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2782 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2786 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2787 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2790 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2791 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2799 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2801 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2802 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2806 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2807 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2808 * must contain uncompressed.
2810 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2811 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2812 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2813 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2814 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2815 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2816 && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
2817 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2818 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2820 unsigned char *list;
2821 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2822 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2823 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2824 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2825 found_uncompressed = 1;
2829 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2831 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2835 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2836 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2838 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2840 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2841 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2842 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2843 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2845 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2847 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2850 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2851 * that we don't receive a status message
2853 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2854 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2855 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2858 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2859 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2862 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2863 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2866 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2867 s->servername_done = 0;
2873 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2876 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2878 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2879 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2883 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2884 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2891 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2892 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2893 * need to be handled at the same time.
2895 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2898 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2899 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2900 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2901 * point to the resulting session.
2903 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2904 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2905 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2908 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2909 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2910 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2911 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2912 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2913 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2914 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2917 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2918 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2919 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2920 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2921 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2922 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2924 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2927 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2928 const PACKET *session_id,
2932 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2935 int have_ticket = 0;
2936 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2939 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2940 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2943 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2946 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2949 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2953 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2954 unsigned int type, size;
2956 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2957 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2958 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2962 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2966 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2968 const unsigned char *etick;
2970 /* Duplicate extension */
2971 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2979 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2982 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2986 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2988 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2989 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2990 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2991 * calculate the master secret later.
2996 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2997 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3001 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
3002 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
3004 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3005 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3008 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3011 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3012 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3015 default: /* fatal error */
3021 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
3022 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3023 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
3029 if (have_ticket == 0)
3036 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3038 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3039 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3040 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3041 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3042 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3043 * point to the resulting session.
3046 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3047 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3048 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3049 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3050 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3052 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3053 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3054 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3057 unsigned char *sdec;
3058 const unsigned char *p;
3059 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3060 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3061 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3062 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
3063 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3064 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3067 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3068 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3071 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3072 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3073 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3074 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3083 /* Check key name matches */
3084 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3086 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3087 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3088 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3089 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3095 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3098 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3103 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3104 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3105 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3108 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3109 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3110 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3113 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3114 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3115 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3116 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3117 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3119 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3120 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3123 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3124 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3129 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3133 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3137 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3138 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3139 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3143 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3144 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3153 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3157 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3158 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3162 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3169 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3170 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3171 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3172 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3173 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3174 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3175 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3176 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3177 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3178 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3181 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3182 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3183 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3184 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3185 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3186 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3187 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3190 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3193 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3194 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3200 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3203 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3204 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3205 return table[i].nid;
3210 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3216 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3219 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3222 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3223 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3227 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3229 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3236 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3239 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3240 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3241 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3242 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3243 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3244 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3245 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3246 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3247 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3248 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3251 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3257 for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
3259 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3260 return tls12_md_info + i;
3266 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3268 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3269 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3271 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3274 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3277 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3280 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3281 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3282 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3284 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3285 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3286 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3288 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3289 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3290 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3292 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3293 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3294 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3296 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3297 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3299 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3300 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3306 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3307 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3308 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3310 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3311 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3313 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3314 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3316 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3318 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3319 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3321 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3323 if (psignhash_nid) {
3324 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3325 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
3327 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3331 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3332 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3334 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3335 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3336 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3338 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3339 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3341 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3342 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3346 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3347 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3351 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3353 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3354 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3355 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3357 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3358 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3359 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3361 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3362 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3363 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3364 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3365 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3366 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3370 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3371 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3372 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3377 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3378 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3385 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3387 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3389 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3392 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3393 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3395 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3397 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3398 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3399 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3400 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3403 return tmpout - out;
3406 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3407 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3408 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3409 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3411 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3412 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3413 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3414 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3415 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3417 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3418 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3421 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3422 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3423 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3425 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3435 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3436 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3438 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3439 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3441 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3443 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3445 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3446 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3447 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3448 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3449 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3450 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3451 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3452 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3453 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3454 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3456 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3457 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3460 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3461 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3465 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3466 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3468 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3470 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3473 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3477 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3478 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3482 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3484 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3487 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3488 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3490 /* Should never happen */
3494 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3495 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3496 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3498 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3499 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3503 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3508 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3509 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3511 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3512 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3515 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3516 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3518 * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
3519 * ignoring any peer preferences.
3521 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3523 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3525 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3527 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3528 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3530 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3531 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3532 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3533 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3539 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3540 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3541 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3542 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3543 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3545 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3546 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3547 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3548 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3554 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3555 * the certificate for signing.
3557 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3559 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3560 * supported it stays as NULL.
3562 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3563 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3564 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3567 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3568 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3569 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3572 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3573 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3574 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3576 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3577 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3578 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3579 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3580 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3581 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3582 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3588 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3589 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3590 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3592 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3597 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3604 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3606 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3609 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3610 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3611 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3613 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3614 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3618 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3620 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3622 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3624 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3626 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3627 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3631 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length)
3634 unsigned short hbtype;
3635 unsigned int payload;
3636 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3638 if (s->msg_callback)
3639 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3641 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3643 /* Read type and payload length first */
3644 if (1 + 2 + 16 > length)
3645 return 0; /* silently discard */
3648 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > length)
3649 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3652 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
3653 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3657 * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type,
3658 * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding
3660 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3661 if (buffer == NULL) {
3662 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3667 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3668 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3670 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3672 /* Random padding */
3673 if (RAND_bytes(bp, padding) <= 0) {
3674 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3678 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer,
3679 3 + payload + padding);
3681 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3682 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3683 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3684 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3686 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3690 } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) {
3694 * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16
3695 * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number
3699 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) {
3701 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3708 int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3710 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3712 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3713 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3715 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3716 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3717 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) {
3718 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3722 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3723 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
3724 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3728 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3729 if (SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
3730 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3735 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3736 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3737 * some random stuff.
3738 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3739 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3740 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3741 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3744 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3746 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3751 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3752 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3754 /* Sequence number */
3755 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3756 /* 16 random bytes */
3757 if (RAND_bytes(p, 16) <= 0) {
3758 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3762 /* Random padding */
3763 if (RAND_bytes(p, padding) <= 0) {
3764 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3768 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3770 if (s->msg_callback)
3771 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3772 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3773 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3775 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3784 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3788 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3791 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3793 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3794 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3795 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3796 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3797 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3798 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3800 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3801 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3802 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3806 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3808 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3811 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3814 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3816 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3818 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3820 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3828 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3829 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3831 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3834 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3835 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3838 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3839 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3844 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3845 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3847 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3851 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3855 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3858 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3861 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3866 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3867 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3869 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3870 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3871 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3873 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3880 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3881 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3882 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3884 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3885 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3886 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3892 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3896 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3900 if (default_nid == -1)
3902 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3904 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3905 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3906 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3911 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3912 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3916 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3917 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3918 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3925 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3926 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3927 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3928 * attempting to use them.
3931 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3933 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3934 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3935 /* Strict mode flags */
3936 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3937 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3938 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3940 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3945 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3946 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3949 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3950 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3952 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3955 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3957 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3958 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3960 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3962 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3963 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3966 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3967 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
3968 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
3969 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
3970 CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3978 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3981 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3983 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3984 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3986 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3993 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3994 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3995 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3996 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3997 else if (!check_flags)
4002 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4003 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4005 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4007 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4008 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
4010 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4013 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4014 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4015 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4016 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4019 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4020 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4021 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4025 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4026 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4029 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
4030 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
4031 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
4034 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
4035 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
4036 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
4039 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
4040 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
4041 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
4050 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4051 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4053 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4055 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4056 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4057 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4060 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4067 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4068 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4072 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4073 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4074 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4075 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4077 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4084 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4085 else if (check_flags)
4086 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4088 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4089 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4090 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4091 else if (!check_flags)
4094 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4095 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4096 else if (strict_mode) {
4097 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4098 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4099 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4100 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4102 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4109 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4110 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4112 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
4114 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4117 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4120 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4124 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4128 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4130 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4131 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4133 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4134 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4135 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4139 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4142 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4144 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4146 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4147 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4149 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4150 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4151 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4153 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4154 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4155 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4156 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4157 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4162 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4165 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4167 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4168 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4172 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4173 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4174 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4175 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4176 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4178 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4181 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4185 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4188 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4189 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4196 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4197 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4199 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4200 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4201 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4202 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4203 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4204 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4205 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4208 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4209 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4211 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4215 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4216 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4218 int dh_secbits = 80;
4219 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4220 return DH_get_1024_160();
4221 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4222 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4227 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4228 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4231 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4237 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4238 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4239 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4241 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4242 if (dhp->p == NULL || dhp->g == NULL) {
4248 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4249 return DH_get_2048_224();
4250 return DH_get_1024_160();
4254 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4257 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4260 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4261 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4262 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4263 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4265 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4268 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4270 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4273 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4275 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4276 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4277 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4278 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4280 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4281 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4284 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4286 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4289 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4292 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4294 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4295 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4297 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4298 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4300 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4301 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4306 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4307 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4308 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4311 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4313 int rv, start_idx, i;
4315 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4320 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4324 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4325 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4326 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);