2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include "ssl_locl.h"
119 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
122 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
123 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
124 SSL_SESSION **psess);
127 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
130 tls1_setup_key_block,
131 tls1_generate_master_secret,
132 tls1_change_cipher_state,
133 tls1_final_finish_mac,
134 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
135 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
136 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
137 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
141 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
143 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
144 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
150 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
151 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
155 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
158 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
160 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
162 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
166 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
169 s->version = s->method->version;
172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
173 static int nid_list[] =
175 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
176 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
177 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
178 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
179 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
180 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
181 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
182 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
183 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
184 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
185 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
186 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
187 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
188 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
189 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
190 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
191 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
192 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
193 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
194 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
195 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
196 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
197 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
198 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
199 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
202 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
204 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
205 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
206 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
208 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
211 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
213 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
216 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
218 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
220 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
222 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
224 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
226 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
228 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
232 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
234 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
236 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
238 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
240 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
242 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
244 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
246 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
248 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
250 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
252 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
254 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
256 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
258 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
260 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
262 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
264 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
270 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
274 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
275 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
278 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
279 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
281 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
284 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
285 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
287 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
290 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
291 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
293 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
296 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
297 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
298 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
299 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
301 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
303 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
304 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
306 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
307 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
308 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
311 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
313 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
314 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
318 int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
320 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
322 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
327 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
331 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
334 unsigned char *ret = p;
336 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
337 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
338 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
343 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
345 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
347 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
348 unsigned long size_str;
351 /* check for enough space.
352 4 for the servername type and entension length
353 2 for servernamelist length
354 1 for the hostname type
355 2 for hostname length
359 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
360 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
363 /* extension type and length */
364 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
367 /* length of servername list */
370 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
371 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
373 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
377 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
382 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
388 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
390 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
393 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
402 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
403 #define MIN(x,y) (((x)<(y))?(x):(y))
404 /* we add SRP username the first time only if we have one! */
405 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
406 {/* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
407 int login_len = MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) + 1, 255);
410 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
411 if (login_len > lenmax) return NULL;
414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
417 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
418 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
420 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login), 254);
421 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, MIN(strlen(s->srp_ctx.login), 254));
426 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
427 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
428 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
430 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
433 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
434 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
435 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
441 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
442 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
443 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
444 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
445 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
447 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
448 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
450 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
453 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
454 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
455 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
461 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
462 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
464 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
465 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
466 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
467 * resolves this to two bytes.
469 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
470 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
471 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
473 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
475 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
478 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
479 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
480 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
481 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
483 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
484 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
485 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
487 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
488 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
490 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
494 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
495 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
497 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
500 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
501 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
505 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
511 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
513 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
515 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
516 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
517 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
518 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
519 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
522 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
523 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
524 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
526 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
528 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
530 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
533 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
536 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
541 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
542 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
545 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
549 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
551 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
552 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
558 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
560 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
567 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
568 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
569 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
571 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
572 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
574 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
576 /* save position of id len */
577 unsigned char *q = ret;
578 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
579 /* skip over id len */
581 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
587 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
590 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
591 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
593 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
594 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
595 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
597 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
602 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
609 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
612 unsigned char *ret = p;
613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
614 int next_proto_neg_seen;
617 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
618 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
622 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
624 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
626 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
628 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
632 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
636 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
642 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
644 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
647 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
649 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
656 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
657 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
658 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
660 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
663 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
664 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
665 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
667 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
671 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
672 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
673 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
674 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
675 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
678 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
679 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
681 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
682 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
684 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
685 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
689 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
691 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
692 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
696 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
697 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
698 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
700 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
702 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
704 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
707 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
710 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
714 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
715 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
716 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
717 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
718 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
719 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
720 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
721 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
722 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
723 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
724 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
730 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
731 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
732 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
734 const unsigned char *npa;
738 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
739 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
741 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
742 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
744 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
746 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
751 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
758 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
763 unsigned char *data = *p;
764 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
767 s->servername_done = 0;
768 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
774 if (data > (d+n-len))
777 while (data <= (d+n-4))
782 if (data+size > (d+n))
785 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
787 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
788 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
789 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
790 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
792 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
793 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
794 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
795 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
796 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
797 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
798 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
799 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
800 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
801 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
802 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
803 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
804 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
805 the value of the Host: field.
806 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
807 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
808 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
809 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
813 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
815 unsigned char *sdata;
821 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
828 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
835 servname_type = *(sdata++);
841 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
844 if (s->servername_done == 0)
845 switch (servname_type)
847 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
850 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
852 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
855 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
857 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
860 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
862 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
865 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
866 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
867 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
868 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
869 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
870 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
873 s->servername_done = 1;
877 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
878 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
879 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
891 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
896 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
897 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
902 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
904 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
905 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
910 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
911 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
912 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
914 unsigned char *sdata = data;
915 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
917 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
919 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
924 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
926 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
927 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
929 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
930 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
932 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
935 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
936 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
939 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
940 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
941 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
942 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
943 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
946 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
947 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
949 unsigned char *sdata = data;
950 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
951 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
953 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
955 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
960 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
962 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
965 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
966 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
968 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
971 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
972 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
975 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
976 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
977 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
978 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
979 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
982 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
983 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
984 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
985 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
987 unsigned char *sdata = data;
991 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
994 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
995 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
997 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1001 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1002 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1003 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1004 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1006 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1007 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1009 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1014 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1016 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1017 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1019 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1023 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1025 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1027 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1029 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1032 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
1034 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1040 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
1042 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1045 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1047 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1051 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1052 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1057 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1061 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1063 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1065 const unsigned char *sdata;
1067 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1072 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1081 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1085 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1089 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1094 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1098 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1103 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1104 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1107 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1108 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1109 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1111 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1112 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1115 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1116 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1118 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1119 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1124 /* Read in request_extensions */
1127 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1134 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1140 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1141 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1143 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1144 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1146 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1151 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1155 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1158 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1159 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1161 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1164 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1165 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1166 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1167 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1168 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1169 * anything like that, but this might change).
1171 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1172 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1173 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1174 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1175 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1176 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1180 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1188 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1190 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1191 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1193 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1195 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1202 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1203 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1204 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1205 * the length of the block. */
1206 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1208 unsigned int off = 0;
1222 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1224 unsigned short length;
1225 unsigned short type;
1226 unsigned short size;
1227 unsigned char *data = *p;
1228 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1229 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1231 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1235 if (data+length != d+n)
1237 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1241 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1246 if (data+size > (d+n))
1249 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1250 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1251 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1253 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1255 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1257 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1260 tlsext_servername = 1;
1263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1264 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1265 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1267 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1268 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1270 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1272 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1275 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1276 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1277 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1279 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1282 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1283 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1285 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1286 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1287 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1288 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1289 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1292 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1294 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1296 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1297 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1299 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1302 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1305 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1308 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1310 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1311 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1312 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1314 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1318 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1321 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1322 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1324 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1328 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1329 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1330 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1331 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1333 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1335 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1337 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1342 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1343 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1345 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1346 * a status request message.
1348 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1350 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1353 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1354 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1356 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1357 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1359 unsigned char *selected;
1360 unsigned char selected_len;
1362 /* We must have requested it. */
1363 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
1365 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1368 /* The data must be valid */
1369 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1371 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1374 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1376 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1379 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1380 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1382 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1385 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1386 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1389 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1391 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1393 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1400 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1404 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1406 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1408 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1410 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1411 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1413 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1419 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1429 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1430 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1431 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1432 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1433 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1434 * absence on initial connect only.
1436 if (!renegotiate_seen
1437 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1438 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1440 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1441 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1442 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1450 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1453 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1454 * and elliptic curves we support.
1459 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1460 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1462 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1464 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1466 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1467 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1468 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1474 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1477 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1478 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1483 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1484 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1485 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1486 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1488 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
1489 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1490 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]) * 2;
1491 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1493 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1497 for (i = 1, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <=
1498 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++)
1501 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1503 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1507 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1509 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1514 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1516 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1517 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1519 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1520 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1522 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1523 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1525 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1528 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1532 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1533 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1540 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1543 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1544 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1545 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1548 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1549 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1550 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1551 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1555 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1556 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1558 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1561 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1562 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1563 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1564 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1566 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1571 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1573 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1574 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1577 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1578 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1580 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1581 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1585 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1586 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1587 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1588 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1590 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1591 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1592 * the certificate has changed.
1594 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1597 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1600 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1601 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1602 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1604 /* status request response should be sent */
1605 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1606 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1607 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1609 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1611 /* something bad happened */
1612 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1613 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1614 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1619 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1621 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1623 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1624 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1625 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
1629 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1631 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1634 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1635 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1640 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1641 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1642 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1644 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1646 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1647 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1649 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1650 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1652 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1653 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1655 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1656 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1658 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1659 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1662 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1666 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1668 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1669 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1670 * abort the handshake.
1672 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1673 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1681 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1682 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1685 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1686 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1689 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1690 s->servername_done=0;
1696 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1698 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1699 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1702 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
1703 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
1704 * it must contain uncompressed.
1706 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1707 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1708 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1709 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1710 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1712 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
1714 unsigned char *list;
1715 int found_uncompressed = 0;
1716 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1717 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1719 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
1721 found_uncompressed = 1;
1725 if (!found_uncompressed)
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
1731 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1732 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1734 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1735 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1736 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1737 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1739 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1740 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
1742 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
1743 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
1745 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1747 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1748 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1751 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
1752 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
1753 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
1754 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
1756 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1757 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1762 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
1765 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
1766 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1769 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
1770 * there is no response.
1772 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1774 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
1775 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
1777 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
1778 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1781 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
1782 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1786 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1787 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1793 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1794 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1797 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1798 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1801 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1802 s->servername_done=0;
1808 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client
1809 * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS
1810 * session ticket extension at the same time.
1813 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
1814 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
1816 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
1817 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
1820 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
1821 * to permit stateful resumption.
1823 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1826 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
1830 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
1831 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1838 /* Skip past cipher list */
1843 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
1848 /* Now at start of extensions */
1849 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
1852 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
1854 unsigned short type, size;
1857 if (p + size > limit)
1859 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1861 /* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will
1862 * trigger a full handshake
1864 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1866 /* If zero length note client will accept a ticket
1867 * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake
1871 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1872 return 0; /* Cache miss */
1874 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1876 /* Indicate cache miss here and instead of
1877 * generating the session from ticket now,
1878 * trigger abbreviated handshake based on
1879 * external mechanism to calculate the master
1883 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len,
1891 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
1892 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
1893 SSL_SESSION **psess)
1896 unsigned char *sdec;
1897 const unsigned char *p;
1898 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
1899 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1902 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
1903 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
1906 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1907 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
1908 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
1909 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
1911 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1912 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1923 /* Check key name matches */
1924 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
1926 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
1927 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
1928 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
1929 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
1931 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
1932 * integrity checks on ticket.
1934 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
1937 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1941 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1942 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
1943 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
1944 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
1945 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
1947 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1948 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1949 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
1950 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
1951 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1954 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1957 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
1958 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
1961 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1964 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1968 /* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to
1969 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
1970 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
1971 * as required by standard.
1974 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1975 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1977 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
1980 /* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to
1984 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1988 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
1996 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
1997 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
1998 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2000 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2001 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2004 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2005 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2007 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2008 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2009 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2013 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2014 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2015 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2017 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2018 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2020 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2021 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2025 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2028 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2030 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2036 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2039 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2041 if (table[i].id == id)
2042 return table[i].nid;
2048 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2051 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2052 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2055 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2058 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2059 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2063 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2065 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2066 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2069 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2073 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2074 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
2081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2082 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2085 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2086 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2087 return EVP_sha224();
2089 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2090 return EVP_sha256();
2092 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2093 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2094 return EVP_sha384();
2096 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2097 return EVP_sha512();
2105 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2107 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2112 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2113 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2115 /* Should never happen */
2119 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2120 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2121 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2122 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2124 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
2126 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
2130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2131 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2132 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2135 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2136 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2137 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2141 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2149 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
2151 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
2154 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2155 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2156 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2163 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2164 * supported it stays as NULL.
2166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2167 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2168 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_dss1();
2170 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2171 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
2173 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2174 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2177 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2178 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2179 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_ecdsa();