2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
145 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
147 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
148 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
154 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
155 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
159 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
162 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
164 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
166 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
170 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
173 s->version = s->method->version;
176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
178 static int nid_list[] =
180 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
181 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
182 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
183 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
184 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
185 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
186 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
187 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
188 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
189 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
190 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
191 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
192 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
193 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
194 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
195 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
196 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
197 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
198 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
199 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
200 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
201 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
202 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
203 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
204 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
208 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
210 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
211 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
212 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
215 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
217 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
218 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
219 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
220 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
221 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
222 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
223 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
224 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
225 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
226 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
227 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
228 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
231 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
232 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
235 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
236 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
237 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
238 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
239 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
240 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
241 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
244 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
246 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
247 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
250 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
252 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
253 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
254 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
256 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
259 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
261 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
264 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
266 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
268 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
270 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
272 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
274 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
276 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
278 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
280 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
282 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
286 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
288 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
290 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
292 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
294 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
296 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
298 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
300 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
302 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
304 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
306 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
308 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
310 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
312 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
318 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
321 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
322 const unsigned char **pcurves,
327 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
328 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
331 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
332 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
334 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
335 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
336 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
339 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
340 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
344 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
345 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
349 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
350 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
354 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
355 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
358 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
359 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
361 const unsigned char *curves;
363 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
364 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
366 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
369 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
372 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
374 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
377 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
379 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
382 else /* Should never happen */
385 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
386 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
388 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
394 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
395 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
399 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
401 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
402 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
404 /* Can't do anything on client side */
411 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
412 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
415 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
416 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
417 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
418 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
419 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
420 /* Should never happen */
423 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
426 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
428 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
433 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
435 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
436 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
438 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
442 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
443 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
454 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
455 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
457 unsigned char *clist, *p;
459 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
460 * while curve ids < 32
462 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
463 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
466 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
468 unsigned long idmask;
470 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
472 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
483 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
487 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
492 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
495 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
497 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
501 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
503 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
505 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
507 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
508 if (nid == NID_undef)
509 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
510 if (nid == NID_undef)
511 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
512 if (nid == NID_undef)
514 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
515 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
517 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
520 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
521 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
526 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
528 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
530 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
531 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
537 const EC_METHOD *meth;
540 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
541 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
542 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
545 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
548 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
552 /* Determine curve ID */
553 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
554 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
555 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
559 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
571 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
574 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
576 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
579 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
583 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
584 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
585 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
587 const unsigned char *p;
590 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
591 * is supported (see RFC4492).
593 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
595 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
596 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
597 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
607 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
608 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
610 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
611 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
613 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
618 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
625 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
628 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
630 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
632 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
633 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
637 *pformats = ecformats_default;
638 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
640 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
642 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
646 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
647 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
649 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
651 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
654 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
657 /* If not EC nothing to do */
658 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
663 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
667 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
668 * supported curves extension.
670 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
673 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
674 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
676 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
683 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
684 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
685 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
686 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
687 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
689 return 0; /* Should never happen */
690 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
691 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
693 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
697 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
698 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
700 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
705 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
706 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
708 unsigned char curve_id[2];
709 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
710 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
711 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
712 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
715 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
716 * no other curves permitted.
720 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
721 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
722 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
723 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
724 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
728 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
729 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
731 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
732 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
734 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
737 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
740 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
742 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
748 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
750 /* Need a shared curve */
751 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
757 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
762 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
764 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
768 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
774 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
779 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
781 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
783 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
784 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
787 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
788 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
790 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
793 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
794 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
796 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
799 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
800 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
802 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
805 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
806 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
807 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
808 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
810 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
811 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
812 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
813 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
816 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
817 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
820 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
822 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
823 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
826 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
827 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
828 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
829 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
832 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
834 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
837 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
838 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
840 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
841 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
842 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
844 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
845 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
848 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
849 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
853 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
854 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
856 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
857 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
859 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
861 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
862 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
866 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
868 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
870 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
873 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
876 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
877 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
879 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
880 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
882 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
883 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
884 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
885 /* Should never happen */
888 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
889 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
891 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
895 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
897 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
898 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
899 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
901 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
903 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
906 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
911 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
913 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
915 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
916 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
920 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
922 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
924 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
925 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
933 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
937 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
938 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
939 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
941 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
944 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
945 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
950 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
953 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
956 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
959 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
960 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
963 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
964 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
965 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
966 * session and not global settings.
969 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
972 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
973 size_t i, sigalgslen;
974 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
977 /* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
978 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
979 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
982 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
983 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
986 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
987 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
992 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
996 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
997 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1001 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1002 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1008 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1009 * signature algorithms.
1013 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1014 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1018 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1019 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1023 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1024 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1026 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1027 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1029 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1030 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1033 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1034 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1035 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1037 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1038 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1040 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1044 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1045 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1047 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1048 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1057 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1060 unsigned char *ret = p;
1061 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1062 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1064 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
1067 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1068 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1070 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1072 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1074 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1075 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1076 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1077 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1086 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1087 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1088 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1093 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1095 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1097 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1098 unsigned long size_str;
1101 /* check for enough space.
1102 4 for the servername type and entension length
1103 2 for servernamelist length
1104 1 for the hostname type
1105 2 for hostname length
1109 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1110 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1113 /* extension type and length */
1114 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1115 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1117 /* length of servername list */
1118 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1120 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1121 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1123 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1127 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1132 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1138 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1140 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1143 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1152 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1153 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1154 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1155 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1157 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1158 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1164 /* check for enough space.
1165 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1166 1 for the srp user identity
1167 + srp user identity length
1169 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1171 /* fill in the extension */
1172 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1173 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1174 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1175 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1183 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1185 const unsigned char *plist;
1188 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1190 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1191 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1198 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1199 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1200 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1201 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1204 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1205 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1206 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1208 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1209 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1210 if (plistlen > 65532)
1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1216 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1217 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1219 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1220 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1221 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1222 * resolves this to two bytes.
1225 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1228 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1230 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1233 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1234 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1235 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1236 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1238 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1239 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1240 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1242 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1243 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1245 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1249 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1250 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1252 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1255 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1256 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1260 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1266 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1269 const unsigned char *salg;
1270 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1271 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1273 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1274 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1276 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1280 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1281 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1282 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1284 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1286 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1288 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1291 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1294 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1299 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
1300 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1303 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1307 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1309 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1310 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1316 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1318 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1325 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1326 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1327 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1329 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1330 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1332 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1334 /* save position of id len */
1335 unsigned char *q = ret;
1336 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1337 /* skip over id len */
1339 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1345 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1349 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1350 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1353 * 1: peer may send requests
1354 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1356 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1357 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1359 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1362 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1363 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1365 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1366 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1367 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1369 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1374 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1376 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1378 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1379 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1380 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1381 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1382 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1383 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1386 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1390 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1392 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1394 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1397 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1405 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1406 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1407 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1408 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1409 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1410 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1412 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1413 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1415 if (limit < ret + 6)
1418 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1419 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1421 *(ret++) = list_len;
1422 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1425 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1426 if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
1429 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
1431 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
1433 const unsigned char* out = NULL;
1434 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1436 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
1437 /* NULL callback sends empty extension */
1438 /* -1 from callback omits extension */
1442 cb_retval = record->fn1(s, record->ext_type,
1446 return NULL; /* error */
1447 if (cb_retval == -1)
1448 continue; /* skip this extension */
1450 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1452 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1454 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1459 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1466 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1469 unsigned char *ret = p;
1470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1471 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1473 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1474 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1475 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1476 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1477 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1479 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1480 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1484 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1486 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1488 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1490 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1494 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1498 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1504 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1506 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1509 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1518 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1519 if (using_ecc && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1521 const unsigned char *plist;
1523 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1526 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1528 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1529 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1536 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1537 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1538 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1539 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1543 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1544 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1546 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1547 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1549 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1550 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1554 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1556 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1557 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1561 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1562 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1563 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1565 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1567 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1569 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1572 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1575 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1584 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1586 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1588 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1591 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1593 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1599 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1600 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1601 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1602 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1603 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1604 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1605 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1606 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1607 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1608 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1609 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1614 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1615 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1616 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1618 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1621 * 1: peer may send requests
1622 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1624 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1625 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1627 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1633 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1634 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1635 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1637 const unsigned char *npa;
1638 unsigned int npalen;
1641 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1642 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1644 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1645 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1647 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1649 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1654 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1656 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1658 size_t authz_length;
1659 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1660 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1661 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1662 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1663 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1665 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1667 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1668 * uint8_t authz_type
1670 * uint8_t data[length]
1672 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1673 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1675 unsigned short length;
1679 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1681 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1685 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1693 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1694 * 2 bytes for extension type
1695 * 2 bytes for extension length
1696 * 1 byte for the list length
1697 * n bytes for the list */
1698 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1700 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1701 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1703 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1704 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1708 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1710 unsigned short length;
1715 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1717 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1720 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1727 /* If custom types were sent in ClientHello, add ServerHello responses */
1728 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count)
1732 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; i++)
1735 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
1737 for (j = 0; j < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; j++)
1739 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[j];
1740 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[i] == record->ext_type)
1742 const unsigned char *out = NULL;
1743 unsigned short outlen = 0;
1746 /* NULL callback or -1 omits extension */
1749 cb_retval = record->fn2(s, record->ext_type,
1753 return NULL; /* error */
1754 if (cb_retval == -1)
1755 break; /* skip this extension */
1756 if (limit < ret + 4 + outlen)
1758 s2n(record->ext_type, ret);
1760 memcpy(ret, out, outlen);
1768 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1770 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1771 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1773 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1775 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1779 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1783 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1790 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1792 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1793 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1794 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1797 * returns: 0 on success. */
1798 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1799 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1803 const unsigned char *selected;
1804 unsigned char selected_len;
1807 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1813 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1814 * length-prefixed strings. */
1815 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1816 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1825 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1827 proto_len = data[i];
1833 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1839 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1840 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1841 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1842 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1843 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1844 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1845 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1847 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1850 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1851 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1856 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1860 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1862 unsigned short type;
1863 unsigned short size;
1865 unsigned char *data = *p;
1866 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1869 s->servername_done = 0;
1870 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1872 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1875 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1877 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1878 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1881 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1882 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1883 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1885 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1886 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1888 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1889 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1891 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1892 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1894 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1895 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1897 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1898 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1900 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1901 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1904 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1908 if (data > (d+n-len))
1911 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1916 if (data+size > (d+n))
1919 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1921 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1922 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1923 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1924 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1926 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1927 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1928 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1929 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1930 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1931 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1932 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1933 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1934 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1935 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1936 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1937 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1938 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1939 the value of the Host: field.
1940 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1941 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1942 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1943 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1947 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1949 unsigned char *sdata;
1955 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1962 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1969 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1975 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1978 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1979 switch (servname_type)
1981 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1984 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1986 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1989 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1991 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1994 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1996 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1999 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2000 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2001 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2002 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2003 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2004 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2007 s->servername_done = 1;
2011 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2012 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2013 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2025 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2030 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2031 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2033 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2035 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2038 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2040 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2043 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2045 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2046 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2048 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2050 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2056 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2057 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
2058 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2060 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2061 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2063 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2064 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2066 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2071 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2073 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2074 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2076 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2077 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2079 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2082 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2083 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2086 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2087 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2088 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2089 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2090 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2093 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
2094 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2096 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2097 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2098 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2100 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2101 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2103 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2108 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2110 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2113 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2114 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2116 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2119 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2120 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2123 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2124 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2125 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2126 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2127 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2130 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2131 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2132 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2133 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2135 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2139 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2142 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2143 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2145 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2149 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2150 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2151 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2152 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2154 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2155 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2157 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2162 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2164 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2165 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2167 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2171 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2173 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2175 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2177 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2180 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2182 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2187 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2189 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2192 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2194 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2197 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2200 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2203 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2204 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2208 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2209 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2214 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2218 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2220 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2222 const unsigned char *sdata;
2224 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2229 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2238 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2242 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2246 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2251 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2255 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2260 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2261 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2264 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2265 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2266 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2268 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2269 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2272 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2273 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2275 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2276 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2281 /* Read in request_extensions */
2284 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2291 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2297 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2299 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2300 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2303 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2304 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2306 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2307 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2309 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2314 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2318 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2320 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2321 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2325 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2326 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2328 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2329 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2330 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2332 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2337 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2338 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2339 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2340 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2342 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2345 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2346 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2347 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2348 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2349 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2350 * anything like that, but this might change).
2352 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2353 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2354 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2355 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2356 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2357 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2361 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2362 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2363 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2365 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2367 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2368 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2371 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2372 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2374 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2379 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2381 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2382 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2386 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2390 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2392 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2394 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2398 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2399 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2400 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2403 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2404 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2405 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2406 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2407 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2409 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2413 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2414 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2415 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2417 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2419 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2420 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2421 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2422 1 /* element size */,
2425 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2428 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2429 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2431 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2438 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2439 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2440 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2441 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2442 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2444 else if (!s->hit && s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count)
2446 custom_srv_ext_record *record;
2448 for (i=0; i < s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records_count; i++)
2450 record = &s->ctx->custom_srv_ext_records[i];
2451 if (type == record->ext_type)
2455 /* Error on duplicate TLS Extensions */
2456 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count; j++)
2458 if (type == s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[j])
2460 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2465 /* NULL callback still notes the extension */
2466 if (record->fn1 && !record->fn1(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2469 /* Add the (non-duplicated) entry */
2470 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count++;
2471 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = OPENSSL_realloc(
2472 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types,
2473 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count * 2);
2474 if (s->s3->tlsext_custom_types == NULL)
2476 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types = 0;
2477 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2480 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types[
2481 s->s3->tlsext_custom_types_count - 1] = type;
2493 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2495 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2496 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2498 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2500 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2503 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2504 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2505 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2510 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2513 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2515 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2519 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2528 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2529 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2530 * the length of the block. */
2531 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2533 unsigned int off = 0;
2547 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2549 unsigned short length;
2550 unsigned short type;
2551 unsigned short size;
2552 unsigned char *data = *p;
2553 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2554 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2557 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2560 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2562 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2563 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2567 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2568 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2571 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2575 if (data+length != d+n)
2577 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2581 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2586 if (data+size > (d+n))
2589 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2590 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2591 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2593 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2595 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2597 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2600 tlsext_servername = 1;
2603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2604 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
2605 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2607 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2608 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2610 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2612 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2615 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2616 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2617 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2619 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2622 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2623 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2625 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2626 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2627 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2628 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2629 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2632 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2634 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2636 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2637 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2639 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2642 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2645 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2648 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2650 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2651 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2652 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2654 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2658 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2661 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2662 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2664 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2668 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2669 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2670 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2671 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2673 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2675 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2677 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2682 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2683 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2685 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2686 * a status request message.
2688 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2690 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2693 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2694 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2697 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2698 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2700 unsigned char *selected;
2701 unsigned char selected_len;
2703 /* We must have requested it. */
2704 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2706 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2709 /* The data must be valid */
2710 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2712 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2715 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2717 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2720 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2721 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2723 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2726 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2727 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2728 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2732 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2736 /* We must have requested it. */
2737 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2739 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2744 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2747 /* The extension data consists of:
2748 * uint16 list_length
2749 * uint8 proto_length;
2750 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2754 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2756 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2760 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2762 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2765 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2766 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2767 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2768 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2770 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2773 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2774 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2777 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2779 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2781 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2783 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2784 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2788 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2789 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2791 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2792 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2793 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2795 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2800 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2802 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2807 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2809 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2810 * an authz hello extension if the client
2811 * didn't request a proof. */
2812 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2813 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2815 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2817 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2823 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2827 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2828 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2830 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2834 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2835 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2836 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2837 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2839 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2843 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2846 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2847 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2849 else if (s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count)
2852 custom_cli_ext_record* record;
2854 for (i = 0; i < s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records_count; i++)
2856 record = &s->ctx->custom_cli_ext_records[i];
2857 if (record->ext_type == type)
2859 if (record->fn2 && !record->fn2(s, type, data, size, al, record->arg))
2871 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2875 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2877 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2879 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2881 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2882 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2884 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2890 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2900 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2901 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2902 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2903 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2904 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2905 * absence on initial connect only.
2907 if (!renegotiate_seen
2908 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2909 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2911 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2912 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2913 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2921 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2924 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2928 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2930 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2935 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2937 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2938 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2940 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2941 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2943 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2944 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2949 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2953 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2954 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2961 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2966 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2968 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2969 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2971 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2972 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2973 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2975 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2976 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2980 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2981 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2982 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2983 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2985 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2987 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2988 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2989 * so this has to happen here in
2990 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2994 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2996 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2999 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3000 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3005 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
3006 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
3007 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
3009 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
3011 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
3012 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
3014 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
3015 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
3017 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
3018 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
3020 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
3021 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3023 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3024 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3027 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3031 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3033 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3034 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3035 * abort the handshake.
3037 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3038 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3046 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3047 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3050 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3051 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3054 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3055 s->servername_done=0;
3061 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3063 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3066 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3067 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3068 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3069 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3071 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3074 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3075 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3076 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3077 if (certpkey == NULL)
3079 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3082 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3083 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3085 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3086 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3089 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3090 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3091 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3093 /* status request response should be sent */
3094 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3095 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3096 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3098 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3100 /* something bad happened */
3101 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3102 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3103 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3108 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3113 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3114 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3117 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3118 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3126 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3128 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3129 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3132 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3133 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3134 * it must contain uncompressed.
3136 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3137 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3138 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3139 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3140 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3142 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3144 unsigned char *list;
3145 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3146 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3147 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3149 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3151 found_uncompressed = 1;
3155 if (!found_uncompressed)
3157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3161 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3162 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3164 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3165 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3166 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3167 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3169 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3170 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3172 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3173 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3175 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3177 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3178 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3181 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3182 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3183 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3184 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3186 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3187 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3192 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3195 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3196 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3199 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3200 * there is no response.
3202 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3204 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3205 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3207 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3208 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3211 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3212 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3216 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3217 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3223 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3224 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3227 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3228 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3231 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3232 s->servername_done=0;
3238 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3241 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3243 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3245 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3249 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3257 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3258 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3259 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3261 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3262 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3263 * extension, if any.
3264 * len: the length of the session ID.
3265 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3266 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3267 * point to the resulting session.
3269 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3270 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3271 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3274 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3275 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3276 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3277 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3278 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3279 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3280 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3283 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3284 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3285 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3286 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3287 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3288 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3290 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3291 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3293 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3294 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3298 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3300 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3301 * to permit stateful resumption.
3303 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3305 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3309 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3310 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
3317 /* Skip past cipher list */
3322 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3327 /* Now at start of extensions */
3328 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3331 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3333 unsigned short type, size;
3336 if (p + size > limit)
3338 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3343 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3344 * currently have one. */
3345 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3348 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3350 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3351 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3352 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3353 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3354 * calculate the master secret later. */
3357 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3360 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3361 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3363 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3365 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3366 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3368 default: /* fatal error */
3377 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3379 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3380 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3381 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3382 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3383 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3384 * point to the resulting session.
3387 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3388 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3389 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3390 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3392 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3393 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3394 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3397 unsigned char *sdec;
3398 const unsigned char *p;
3399 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3400 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3403 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3404 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3407 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3408 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3409 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3410 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3412 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3413 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3424 /* Check key name matches */
3425 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3427 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3428 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3429 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3430 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3432 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3433 * integrity checks on ticket.
3435 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3438 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3442 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3443 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3444 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3445 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3446 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3448 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3449 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3450 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3451 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3452 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3455 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3458 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3459 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3462 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3465 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3469 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3470 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3471 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3472 * as required by standard.
3475 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3476 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3484 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3489 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3497 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3498 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3499 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3500 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3501 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3502 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3503 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3506 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3507 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3508 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3509 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3512 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3515 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3517 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3523 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3526 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3528 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3529 return table[i].nid;
3534 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3539 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3540 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3543 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3546 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3547 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3551 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3553 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3554 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3557 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3561 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3562 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3569 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3570 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3573 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3574 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3575 return EVP_sha224();
3577 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3578 return EVP_sha256();
3580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3581 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3582 return EVP_sha384();
3584 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3585 return EVP_sha512();
3593 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3598 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3599 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3602 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3603 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3605 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3606 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3607 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3613 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3614 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3615 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3617 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3618 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3620 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3622 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3623 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3625 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3627 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3629 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3630 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3632 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3636 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3637 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3638 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3640 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3643 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3644 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3645 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3646 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3648 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3649 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3650 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3652 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3653 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3655 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3657 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3659 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3664 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3665 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3666 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3668 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3679 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3680 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3682 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3683 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3685 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3687 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3688 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3689 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3691 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3692 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3694 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3696 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3697 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3700 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3701 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3705 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3706 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3712 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3713 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3715 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3718 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3721 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3722 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3723 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3728 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3730 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3736 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3737 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
3738 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
3740 /* Should never happen */
3744 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3745 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3747 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3748 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3750 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3752 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3753 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3755 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3756 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3758 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3760 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3762 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3765 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3766 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3767 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3768 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3769 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3771 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3772 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3778 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3779 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3781 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3782 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3784 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3785 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3786 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3787 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3789 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3790 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3795 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3796 * use the certificate for signing.
3798 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3800 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3801 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3804 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3805 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3808 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3810 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3811 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3815 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3816 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3823 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3824 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3825 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3827 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3833 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3840 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3842 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3845 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3846 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3847 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3849 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3850 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3854 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3856 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3858 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3860 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3862 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3863 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3867 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3869 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3871 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3872 unsigned short hbtype;
3873 unsigned int payload;
3874 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3876 /* Read type and payload length first */
3881 if (s->msg_callback)
3882 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3883 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3884 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3886 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3888 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3891 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3892 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3893 * payload, plus padding
3895 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3898 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3899 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3901 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3903 /* Random padding */
3904 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3906 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3908 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3909 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3910 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3911 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3913 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3918 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3922 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3923 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3924 * sequence number */
3927 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3930 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3938 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3940 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3942 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3943 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3945 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3946 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3947 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3953 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3954 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3960 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3961 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3967 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3968 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3970 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3972 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3973 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3974 * some random stuff.
3975 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3976 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3977 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3978 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3981 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3984 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3985 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3987 /* Sequence number */
3988 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3989 /* 16 random bytes */
3990 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3992 /* Random padding */
3993 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3995 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3998 if (s->msg_callback)
3999 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4000 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4001 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4003 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4012 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4017 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4020 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4022 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4025 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4026 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4028 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4030 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4032 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4040 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4041 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4042 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4043 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4044 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4045 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4048 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4049 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4050 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4051 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4054 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4056 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4057 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4060 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4061 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4065 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4066 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4067 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4071 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4075 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4078 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4080 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4085 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4086 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4088 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4090 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4091 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4092 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4093 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4095 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4103 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4104 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4105 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4106 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4110 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4111 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4112 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4113 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4119 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4123 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4127 if (default_nid == -1)
4129 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4131 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4132 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4133 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4137 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4138 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4142 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4143 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4145 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4151 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4152 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4153 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4154 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4157 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4159 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4160 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4161 /* Strict mode flags */
4162 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4163 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4164 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4166 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4171 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4172 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4174 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4175 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4178 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4182 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4185 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4187 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4189 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4190 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4193 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4194 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4195 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4197 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4198 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4207 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4210 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4211 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4212 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4214 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4222 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4223 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4224 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4227 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4233 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4234 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4237 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4240 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4241 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4243 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4248 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4249 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4250 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4251 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4252 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4255 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4256 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4257 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4258 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4262 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4263 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4271 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4272 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4275 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4278 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4279 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4281 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4284 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4292 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4293 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4295 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4298 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4299 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4300 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4302 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4307 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4315 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4316 else if(check_flags)
4317 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4319 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4320 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4321 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4322 else if (!check_flags)
4325 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4326 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4327 else if (strict_mode)
4329 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4330 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4332 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4333 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4337 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4345 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4347 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4352 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4355 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4358 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4363 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4364 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4365 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4366 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4367 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4372 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4377 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4381 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4382 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4384 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4386 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4388 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4392 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4396 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4399 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4401 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4402 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4404 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4406 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4407 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4409 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4411 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4413 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4414 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4416 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4421 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4425 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4427 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4428 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4432 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4434 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4435 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4436 else if (cpk->digest)
4437 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4440 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4442 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4443 * if the chain is invalid.
4447 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4448 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4451 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4452 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4459 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4460 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4462 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4463 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4464 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4465 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4466 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4467 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4469 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4470 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4472 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);