2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
20 #include "internal/nelem.h"
22 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
28 tls1_generate_master_secret,
29 tls1_change_cipher_state,
30 tls1_final_finish_mac,
31 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
32 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
34 tls1_export_keying_material,
36 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
37 tls_close_construct_packet,
41 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
45 tls1_generate_master_secret,
46 tls1_change_cipher_state,
47 tls1_final_finish_mac,
48 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
49 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
51 tls1_export_keying_material,
52 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
53 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
54 tls_close_construct_packet,
58 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
62 tls1_generate_master_secret,
63 tls1_change_cipher_state,
64 tls1_final_finish_mac,
65 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
66 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
68 tls1_export_keying_material,
69 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
70 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
71 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
72 tls_close_construct_packet,
76 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
79 tls13_setup_key_block,
80 tls13_generate_master_secret,
81 tls13_change_cipher_state,
82 tls13_final_finish_mac,
83 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
84 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
86 tls13_export_keying_material,
87 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
88 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
89 tls_close_construct_packet,
93 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
96 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
97 * http, the cache would over fill
106 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
112 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
114 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
118 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
123 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
124 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
126 s->version = s->method->version;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 * Table of curve information.
135 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
136 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
138 static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list[] = {
139 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
140 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
141 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
142 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
143 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
144 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
145 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
146 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
147 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
148 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
149 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
150 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
151 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
152 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
153 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
154 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
155 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
156 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
157 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
158 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
159 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
160 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
161 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
162 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
163 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
164 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
165 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
166 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
167 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
168 {EVP_PKEY_X448, 224, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X448 (30) */
171 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
172 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
173 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
174 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
177 /* The default curves */
178 static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = {
179 29, /* X25519 (29) */
180 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
182 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
183 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
186 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
191 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t group_id)
193 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
194 if (group_id < 1 || group_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list))
196 return &nid_list[group_id - 1];
199 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
202 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
203 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
204 return (uint16_t)(i + 1);
210 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
211 * the number of groups supported.
213 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
217 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
218 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
219 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
220 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
221 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
224 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
225 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
229 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
230 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
235 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
236 *pgroups = eccurves_default;
237 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(eccurves_default);
239 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
240 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
246 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
247 int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t curve, int op)
249 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *cinfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(curve);
250 unsigned char ctmp[2];
254 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
255 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
258 ctmp[0] = curve >> 8;
259 ctmp[1] = curve & 0xff;
260 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)ctmp);
263 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
264 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
267 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
274 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
275 * if there is no match.
276 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
277 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
278 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
280 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
282 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
283 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
286 /* Can't do anything on client side */
290 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
292 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
293 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
295 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
297 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
298 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
299 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
300 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
301 /* Should never happen */
304 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
308 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
309 * otherwise peer decides.
311 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
312 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
313 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
315 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
316 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
319 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
320 uint16_t id = pref[i];
322 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
323 || !tls_curve_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
331 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
335 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
336 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
341 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
344 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
346 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
347 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
350 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
351 unsigned long idmask;
353 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
354 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
356 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
369 # define MAX_CURVELIST OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)
373 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
376 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
378 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
384 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
386 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
388 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
390 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
391 if (nid == NID_undef)
392 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
393 if (nid == NID_undef)
394 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
395 if (nid == NID_undef)
397 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
398 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
400 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
404 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
405 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
409 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
413 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
415 /* Return group id of a key */
416 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
418 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
423 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
424 return tls1_nid2group_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp));
427 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
428 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
432 unsigned char comp_id;
435 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
436 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
438 ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
439 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
441 /* Get required compression id */
442 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
443 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
444 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
446 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
451 int field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp));
453 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
454 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
455 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
456 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
461 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
462 * supported (see RFC4492).
464 if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats == NULL)
467 for (i = 0; i < s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len; i++) {
468 if (s->session->ext.ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
474 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
475 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
477 const uint16_t *groups;
483 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
484 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
485 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
487 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
488 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
490 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
491 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
494 /* Should never happen */
499 if (check_own_groups) {
500 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
501 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
502 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
506 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
509 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
513 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
514 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
517 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
518 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
519 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
520 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
524 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
527 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
531 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
533 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
534 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
535 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
537 *pformats = ecformats_default;
538 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
540 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
542 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
547 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
548 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
550 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
554 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
557 /* If not EC nothing to do */
558 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
560 /* Check compression */
561 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
563 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
565 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
568 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
571 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
574 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
579 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
580 if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
581 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
582 else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
583 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
585 return 0; /* Should never happen */
586 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
587 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
596 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
598 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
600 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
601 * is compatible with the client extensions.
603 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
605 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
607 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
609 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
611 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
614 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
615 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 1);
616 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
617 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384, 1);
624 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
629 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
631 /* Default sigalg schemes */
632 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
634 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
635 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
636 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
637 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
641 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
642 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
643 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
644 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
645 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
646 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
648 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
649 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
650 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
652 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
653 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
654 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
656 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
657 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
659 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
660 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
662 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
663 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
664 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
666 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
667 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
668 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
669 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
674 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
675 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
676 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
680 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
681 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
682 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
683 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
684 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
685 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
686 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
687 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
688 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
689 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
690 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
691 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
692 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
693 NID_undef, NID_undef},
694 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
695 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
696 NID_undef, NID_undef},
697 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
698 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
699 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef},
700 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
701 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
702 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
704 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
705 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
706 NID_undef, NID_undef},
707 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
708 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
709 NID_undef, NID_undef},
710 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
711 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
712 NID_undef, NID_undef},
713 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
714 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
715 NID_undef, NID_undef},
716 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
717 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
718 NID_undef, NID_undef},
719 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
720 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
721 NID_undef, NID_undef},
722 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
723 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
724 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
725 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
726 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
727 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
728 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
729 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
730 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
731 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
732 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
733 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
734 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
735 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
736 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
738 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
739 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
740 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
741 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
742 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
743 NID_undef, NID_undef},
744 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
745 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
746 NID_undef, NID_undef},
747 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
748 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
749 NID_undef, NID_undef},
750 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
751 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
752 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
755 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
756 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
757 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
758 NID_undef, NID_undef},
759 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
760 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
761 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
762 NID_undef, NID_undef},
763 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
764 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
765 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
766 NID_undef, NID_undef}
769 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
770 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
771 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
772 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
773 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
778 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
779 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
781 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
782 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
783 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
784 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
785 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
786 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
787 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
788 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
789 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
790 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
793 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
794 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
797 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
799 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
801 if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
806 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
807 int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
812 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
813 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
816 md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
826 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
828 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
829 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
830 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
832 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
833 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(const RSA *rsa, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
839 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md) || md == NULL)
841 if (RSA_size(rsa) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
847 * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
848 * is fixed by the certificate type.
850 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
856 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
857 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
858 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
860 if (clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
867 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
869 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
872 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
874 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
881 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
884 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
886 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
887 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
889 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
893 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
895 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
896 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
899 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
901 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
903 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
906 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
910 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
913 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
917 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
918 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
919 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
920 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
922 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
923 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
926 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
927 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
932 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
933 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
934 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
936 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
937 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
938 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
939 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
940 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
941 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
943 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
944 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
949 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
950 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
953 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
955 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
956 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
958 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
959 int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
960 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
962 /* Should never happen */
965 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
966 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
967 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
968 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
969 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
972 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
973 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
974 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
976 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
978 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
979 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
982 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
983 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
984 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
985 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
986 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
989 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
990 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
992 /* Check point compression is permitted */
993 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
994 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
995 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
996 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1000 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1001 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1002 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
1003 int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
1005 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1006 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1007 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1011 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1012 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1013 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1014 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1015 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1018 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1019 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1020 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1021 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1022 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1023 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1024 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1029 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1030 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1031 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1036 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1037 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1038 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1039 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1042 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1043 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1044 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1045 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1046 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1049 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
1050 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1051 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1056 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1057 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1059 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1060 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1061 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1062 EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
1063 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1064 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1065 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1069 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1070 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1074 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1076 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1078 *pnid = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1083 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1084 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1085 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1087 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1090 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1092 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1094 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
1095 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
1096 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1097 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver,
1098 &s->s3->tmp.max_ver) != 0)
1100 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1101 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1102 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1103 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1104 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1106 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1107 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1108 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1109 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1110 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1117 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1118 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1119 * @c: cipher to check
1120 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1121 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1123 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1125 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1127 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1128 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1130 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
1132 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1133 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1136 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1137 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1139 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1140 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1141 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1143 if ((min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver))
1146 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
1147 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
1150 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1153 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1155 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1157 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1160 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1164 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1165 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1166 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1167 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1168 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1169 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1170 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1172 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1173 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1175 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1176 && s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1177 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1178 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1180 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1181 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1186 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1187 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1188 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1189 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1197 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1198 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1199 SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1202 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1205 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1206 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1207 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1212 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1214 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1215 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1216 * point to the resulting session.
1218 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1222 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1225 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1228 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1229 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1232 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1233 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1235 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1236 if (!ticketext->present)
1237 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1239 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1241 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1242 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1246 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1248 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1249 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1250 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1251 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1254 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1255 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1256 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1257 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1258 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1259 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1261 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1262 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1263 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1264 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1265 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1266 * point to the resulting session.
1268 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1269 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1270 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1272 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1273 unsigned char *sdec;
1274 const unsigned char *p;
1275 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1276 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1278 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1279 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1280 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1281 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1283 if (eticklen == 0) {
1285 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1286 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1288 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1291 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1293 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1294 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1295 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1296 * calculate the master secret later.
1298 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1302 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1303 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1304 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1308 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1309 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1311 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1314 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1316 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1319 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
1320 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1321 int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
1322 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1325 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1329 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1335 /* Check key name matches */
1336 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1337 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1338 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1341 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1342 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1343 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1344 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1345 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1346 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1347 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1350 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1354 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1357 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1359 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1363 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1365 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1366 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1370 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1371 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1372 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1373 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1377 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1378 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1381 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1382 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1383 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1384 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1385 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1386 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1387 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1389 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1392 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1394 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1400 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1404 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1406 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1408 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1412 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1413 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1414 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1418 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1419 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1422 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1424 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1429 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1431 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1434 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1435 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1438 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1439 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1440 * performs any action
1442 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
1443 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1444 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1445 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1446 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
1447 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
1450 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
1451 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
1452 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
1454 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
1456 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
1457 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1460 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
1461 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1462 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1466 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
1467 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1468 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1469 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
1470 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1474 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
1475 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
1476 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1477 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
1478 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1479 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
1480 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1482 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1486 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1490 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1492 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1493 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1494 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
1495 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1504 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1505 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1507 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1510 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1511 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
1513 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1514 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1516 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1517 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
1518 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1519 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1520 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
1523 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1524 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx))
1527 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
1528 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
1529 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
1530 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
1531 if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1534 && s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1535 && s->s3->tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1537 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1540 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
1541 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
1542 * ciphersuites enabled.
1545 if (s->s3->tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
1548 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1549 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
1550 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
1551 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1553 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1554 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
1555 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
1558 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kGOST) != 0)
1566 if (lu->hash == NID_undef)
1568 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1569 secbits = EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu->hash_idx)) * 4;
1570 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1571 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
1572 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
1573 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
1577 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1578 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1582 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1584 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1585 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1586 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
1588 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1591 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1592 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
1593 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
1594 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1599 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
1603 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1604 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
1605 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1606 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
1608 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
1611 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1612 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1617 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1618 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1620 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1622 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1625 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1626 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1628 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1629 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
1630 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
1631 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
1635 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
1639 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1640 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
1641 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1642 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1644 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
1645 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1646 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1647 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
1649 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1650 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
1652 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1653 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1664 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1665 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1667 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
1668 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1670 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1672 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1674 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
1675 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1676 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1677 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1678 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1679 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1680 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1681 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1682 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1683 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1685 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1686 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1689 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1690 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1694 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1695 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1697 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1699 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1703 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1707 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1708 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1712 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
1718 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1720 /* Invalid data length */
1721 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
1726 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1730 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1738 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
1745 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
1747 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1748 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1750 /* Should never happen */
1751 if (s->cert == NULL)
1755 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
1756 &s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
1758 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs,
1759 &s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
1763 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1765 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1768 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
1771 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1774 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1777 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1778 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs[i];
1779 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
1781 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1782 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1784 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1785 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx))
1786 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1791 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1792 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1793 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1795 uint16_t *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1796 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1797 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1800 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1802 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
1806 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
1808 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
1809 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1811 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
1813 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
1814 if (psignhash != NULL)
1815 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
1817 return (int)numsigalgs;
1820 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1821 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1822 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1824 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
1825 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs == NULL
1827 || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
1828 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1830 shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[idx];
1832 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
1834 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
1835 if (psignhash != NULL)
1836 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
1838 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
1840 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
1841 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
1844 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1845 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1849 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
1850 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
1853 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
1855 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1856 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1857 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
1858 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1859 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
1860 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1861 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1862 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1864 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
1865 if (*phash == NID_undef)
1866 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
1869 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1870 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1872 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
1874 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
1876 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
1877 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
1878 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
1881 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
1883 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
1885 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
1887 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
1889 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
1890 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
1891 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
1892 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
1893 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
1894 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
1898 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1900 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
1901 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
1905 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1912 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
1913 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
1914 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
1916 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1918 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
1919 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
1923 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
1927 /* Reject duplicates */
1928 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
1929 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
1938 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
1939 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
1941 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
1945 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
1949 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
1952 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
1957 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
1958 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1961 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
1964 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
1965 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1966 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
1968 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
1969 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
1970 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
1976 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
1978 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
1983 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
1984 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1987 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
1989 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
1990 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
1991 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
1993 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
1995 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
1996 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2001 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2006 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2007 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2008 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2010 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2011 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2012 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2018 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2022 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2026 if (default_nid == -1)
2028 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2030 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2031 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
2032 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
2037 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2038 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2042 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2043 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2044 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2051 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2052 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2053 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2054 * attempting to use them.
2057 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2059 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2060 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2061 /* Strict mode flags */
2062 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2063 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2064 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2066 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
2071 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2072 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2075 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2076 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2078 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2081 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2083 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2084 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2086 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2088 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2089 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2098 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2101 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2103 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2104 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2106 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2113 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2114 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2115 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2116 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2117 else if (!check_flags)
2122 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2123 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2125 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
2128 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2129 || s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2131 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2135 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2136 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2139 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2140 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2141 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2145 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2146 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2149 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2150 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2151 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2154 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2155 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2156 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2159 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2160 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2161 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2170 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2171 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2173 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2175 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2176 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2177 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
2179 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2182 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2189 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2190 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
2194 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2195 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2196 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2197 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2199 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2206 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2207 else if (check_flags)
2208 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2210 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2211 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2212 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2213 else if (!check_flags)
2216 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2217 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2218 else if (strict_mode) {
2219 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2220 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2221 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2222 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2224 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2231 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2232 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2234 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2236 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2239 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2242 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2246 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3->tmp.ctype;
2249 for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2250 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2251 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2255 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2258 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2261 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names;
2263 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2264 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2266 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2267 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2268 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2270 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2271 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2272 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2273 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2274 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2279 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2282 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2284 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2285 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2289 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2290 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2292 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2295 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2299 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2302 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2303 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2310 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2311 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2313 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2314 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2315 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2316 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2317 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2318 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2319 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2320 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2321 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2324 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2325 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2327 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2331 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2333 int dh_secbits = 80;
2334 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2335 return DH_get_1024_160();
2336 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2337 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2342 if (s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL)
2344 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey);
2347 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2353 if (g == NULL || !BN_set_word(g, 2)) {
2358 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2359 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2361 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2362 if (p == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2370 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2371 return DH_get_2048_224();
2372 return DH_get_1024_160();
2376 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2379 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2382 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2383 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2384 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2385 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2387 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2390 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2392 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2395 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2397 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2398 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2399 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2400 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2402 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2404 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2405 if (nid == NID_undef)
2408 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2410 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2413 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2416 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2418 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2419 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2421 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2422 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2424 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2425 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2430 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2431 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2432 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2435 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2437 int rv, start_idx, i;
2439 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2444 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2448 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2449 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2450 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
2458 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2459 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2462 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2464 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2465 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
2467 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2468 if (clu == NULL || !(clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth))
2471 return s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
2475 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
2476 * with signature scheme |sig|.
2477 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
2478 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
2479 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
2481 static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
2483 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2487 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override lu->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
2490 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
2492 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2493 for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
2494 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
2496 || !X509_get_signature_info(s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509, &mdnid,
2497 &pknid, NULL, NULL))
2500 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
2501 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
2502 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
2503 * signing certificate.
2505 if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
2514 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2515 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2517 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
2518 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
2520 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2521 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2522 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2524 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
2526 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2529 s->s3->tmp.cert = NULL;
2530 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = NULL;
2532 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2534 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2538 /* Look for a certificate matching shared sigalgs */
2539 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2540 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2543 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2544 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
2545 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
2546 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
2547 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2549 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
2550 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL) || !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
2552 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2555 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2557 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2559 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
2564 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2565 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2568 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
2569 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey), lu))
2574 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2577 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2578 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2582 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2583 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
2585 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
2588 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2590 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2594 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2595 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
2596 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2597 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2604 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2607 for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2608 lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
2611 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
2614 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
2616 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2617 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
2620 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
2621 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
2623 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2624 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2625 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
2627 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey), lu))
2630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2631 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
2635 if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
2638 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2639 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2644 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2646 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2647 size_t sent_sigslen;
2649 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2652 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2653 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2657 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2658 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
2659 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
2660 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
2661 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
2664 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
2667 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2668 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2669 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2674 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2677 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2678 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2684 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2685 s->s3->tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
2686 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
2687 s->s3->tmp.sigalg = lu;
2691 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
2693 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2694 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
2696 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
2700 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
2704 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
2706 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2707 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
2708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
2709 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
2713 ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
2717 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
2719 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;