1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 /* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/conf.h>
118 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
120 #include <openssl/dh.h>
121 #include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
123 #include <openssl/ct.h>
125 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
126 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
127 SSL_SESSION **psess);
128 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
129 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
131 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
134 tls1_setup_key_block,
135 tls1_generate_master_secret,
136 tls1_change_cipher_state,
137 tls1_final_finish_mac,
138 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
158 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
160 tls1_export_keying_material,
161 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
162 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
163 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
167 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
170 tls1_setup_key_block,
171 tls1_generate_master_secret,
172 tls1_change_cipher_state,
173 tls1_final_finish_mac,
174 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
175 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
176 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 tls1_export_keying_material,
179 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
180 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
181 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
182 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
186 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
189 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
190 * http, the cache would over fill
192 return (60 * 60 * 2);
199 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
203 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
205 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
212 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
213 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
215 s->version = s->method->version;
218 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 int nid; /* Curve NID */
222 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
223 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
226 /* Mask for curve type */
227 # define TLS_CURVE_TYPE 0x3
228 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
229 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
230 # define TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM 0x2
233 * Table of curve information.
234 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
235 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
237 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
238 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
239 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
240 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
241 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
242 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
243 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
244 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
245 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
246 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
247 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
248 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
249 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
250 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
251 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
252 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
253 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
254 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
255 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
256 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
257 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
258 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
259 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
260 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
261 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
262 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
265 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM},
270 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
273 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
276 /* The default curves */
277 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
278 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
279 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
280 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
281 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
284 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
285 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
286 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
287 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
288 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
289 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
290 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
291 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
294 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
295 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
297 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
298 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
299 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
300 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
301 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
302 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
303 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
304 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
305 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
306 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
307 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
308 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
309 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
310 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
311 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
312 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
313 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
314 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
315 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
316 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
317 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
318 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
322 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
323 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
324 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
327 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
329 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
330 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
332 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
335 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
338 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
339 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
346 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
348 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
349 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
350 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
351 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
352 * lists in the first place.
353 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
354 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
355 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
357 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
358 const unsigned char **pcurves,
361 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
363 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
364 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
366 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
367 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
368 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
369 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
370 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
373 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
374 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
378 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
379 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
383 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
384 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
387 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
388 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
392 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
393 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
394 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
398 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
403 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
404 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
406 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
409 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
411 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
412 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
413 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
416 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
419 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
420 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
422 const unsigned char *curves;
423 size_t num_curves, i;
424 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
425 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
427 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
429 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
432 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
433 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
435 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
436 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
438 } else /* Should never happen */
441 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
443 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
444 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
445 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
451 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
452 * if there is no match.
453 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
454 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
455 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
457 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
459 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
460 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
462 /* Can't do anything on client side */
466 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
468 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
469 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
471 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
472 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
473 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
474 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
475 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
476 /* Should never happen */
479 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
483 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
484 * but s->options is a long...
486 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
487 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
489 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
490 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
491 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
492 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
494 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
497 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
500 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
502 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
503 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
504 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
506 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
510 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
511 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
512 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
513 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
514 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
517 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
518 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
526 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
530 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
531 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
533 unsigned char *clist, *p;
536 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
539 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
540 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
543 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
544 unsigned long idmask;
546 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
548 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
557 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
561 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
565 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
568 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
570 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
576 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
578 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
580 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
582 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
583 if (nid == NID_undef)
584 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
585 if (nid == NID_undef)
586 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
587 if (nid == NID_undef)
589 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
590 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
592 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
596 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
597 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
602 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
606 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
609 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
610 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
617 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
618 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
621 /* Determine curve ID */
622 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
623 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
624 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
628 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
630 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
632 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
633 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
635 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
636 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
638 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
644 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
645 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
646 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
648 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
649 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
652 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
653 * supported (see RFC4492).
655 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
656 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
657 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
658 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
659 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
662 if (i == num_formats)
667 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
668 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
669 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
671 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
673 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
674 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
675 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
676 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
677 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
681 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
682 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
687 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
694 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
698 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
700 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
701 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
702 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
704 *pformats = ecformats_default;
705 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
707 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
709 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
714 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
715 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
717 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
719 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
722 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
725 /* If not EC nothing to do */
726 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
728 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
732 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
735 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
739 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
740 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
742 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
748 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
749 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
750 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
751 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
752 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
754 return 0; /* Should never happen */
755 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
756 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
758 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
760 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
761 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
762 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
764 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
770 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
772 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
774 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
776 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
777 * is compatible with the client extensions.
779 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
781 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
784 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
787 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
788 unsigned char curve_id[2];
789 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
790 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
791 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
792 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
793 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
797 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
798 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
802 /* Need a shared curve */
803 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
807 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
811 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
816 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
819 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
820 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
823 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
824 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
826 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
829 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
830 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
832 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
836 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
838 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
841 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
842 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
843 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
844 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
846 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
847 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
848 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
849 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
850 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
851 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
853 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
854 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
855 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
860 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
861 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
862 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
865 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
868 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
871 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
872 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
873 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
874 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
875 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
877 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
878 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
881 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
882 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
886 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
887 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
888 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
889 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
890 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
891 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
892 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
894 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
895 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
900 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
901 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
903 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
904 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
906 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
907 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
908 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
909 /* Should never happen */
912 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
913 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
914 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
917 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
918 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
919 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
920 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
921 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
923 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
924 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
927 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
928 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
931 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
932 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
933 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
934 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
937 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
938 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
940 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
946 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
950 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
951 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
952 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
953 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
956 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
957 if (i == sent_sigslen
958 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
959 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
960 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
963 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
965 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
968 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
969 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
970 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
976 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
978 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
983 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
984 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
985 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
987 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
990 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
992 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
994 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
995 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
996 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
997 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
998 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
999 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1000 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1001 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1002 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1004 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1005 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1006 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1007 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1008 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1014 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1015 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1016 * @c: cipher to check
1017 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1019 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1021 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1023 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1024 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1026 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
1028 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
1029 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
1031 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
1032 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
1035 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1038 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1040 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1042 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1045 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2) {
1046 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
1047 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
1057 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
1058 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
1059 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
1060 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
1061 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
1064 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet) {
1065 PACKET extensions = *packet;
1066 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
1067 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
1070 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
1071 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
1074 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
1075 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1081 if (num_extensions <= 1)
1084 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
1085 if (extension_types == NULL) {
1086 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1090 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
1091 extensions = *packet;
1092 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1094 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
1095 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1096 /* This should not happen. */
1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1102 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1106 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1107 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1108 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1109 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1114 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1118 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1119 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1122 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1123 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1125 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1127 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1129 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1130 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1132 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1133 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1135 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1136 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1137 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1138 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1149 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1151 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1152 if (s->renegotiate) {
1155 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1160 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1163 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1166 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1173 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1174 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1177 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1178 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1179 unsigned long size_str;
1183 * check for enough space.
1184 * 4 for the servername type and extension length
1185 * 2 for servernamelist length
1186 * 1 for the hostname type
1187 * 2 for hostname length
1191 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1193 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1196 /* extension type and length */
1197 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1198 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1200 /* length of servername list */
1201 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1203 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1204 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1206 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1210 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1211 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1212 * Client Hello message */
1214 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1215 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1221 * check for enough space.
1222 * 4 for the srp type type and extension length
1223 * 1 for the srp user identity
1224 * + srp user identity length
1226 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1229 /* fill in the extension */
1230 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1231 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1232 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1233 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1238 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1241 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1244 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1245 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1247 unsigned char *etmp;
1249 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1251 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1253 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1255 if (num_formats > 255) {
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1260 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1261 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1262 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1263 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1264 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1268 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1270 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1271 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1274 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1276 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1278 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1283 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1285 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1286 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1287 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1288 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1289 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1293 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1295 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1296 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1297 ret += curves_list_len;
1299 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1301 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1303 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1304 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1305 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1306 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1307 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1308 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1309 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1311 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1312 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1313 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1316 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1317 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1320 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1323 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1325 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1328 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1334 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1336 const unsigned char *salg;
1337 unsigned char *etmp;
1338 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1339 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1341 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1343 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1345 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1346 /* Fill in lengths */
1347 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1353 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1355 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1359 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1360 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1361 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1367 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1368 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1374 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1376 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1377 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1379 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1380 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1382 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1383 /* save position of id len */
1384 unsigned char *q = ret;
1385 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1386 /* skip over id len */
1388 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1394 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1398 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1399 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1400 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1402 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1406 * 1: peer may send requests
1407 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1409 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1410 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1412 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1416 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1417 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1419 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1420 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1422 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1424 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1430 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1431 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1432 * (see longer comment below)
1434 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1435 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1437 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1438 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1439 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1440 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1441 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1442 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1444 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1445 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1448 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1449 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1450 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1454 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1457 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1460 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1467 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1468 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1469 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1471 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1472 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1476 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1477 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, ret);
1481 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1485 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1486 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1487 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1490 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1491 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1493 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1494 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1500 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1502 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1509 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1512 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1516 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1517 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1520 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1521 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1522 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1523 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1525 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1526 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1527 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1528 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1529 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1534 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1536 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1539 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1544 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1547 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1550 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1551 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1558 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1559 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1562 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1563 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1564 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1567 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1572 const unsigned char *plist;
1575 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1579 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1581 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1583 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1585 if (plistlen > 255) {
1586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1590 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1591 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1592 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1593 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1598 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1601 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1603 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1604 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1606 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1610 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1611 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1613 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1617 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1618 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1621 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1622 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1623 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1626 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1629 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1632 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1640 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1641 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1642 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1643 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1644 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1645 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1646 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1647 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1648 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1649 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1651 if (limit - ret < 36)
1653 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1658 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1659 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1660 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1662 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1666 * 1: peer may send requests
1667 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1669 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1670 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1672 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1678 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1679 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1680 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1681 const unsigned char *npa;
1682 unsigned int npalen;
1685 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1687 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1688 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1689 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1691 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1693 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1695 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1699 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1701 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1702 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1704 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1705 * for other cases too.
1707 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1708 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1709 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1710 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1711 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1713 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1718 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1719 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1723 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1724 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1725 unsigned int len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1727 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1729 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1733 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1739 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1742 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1747 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1748 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1749 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1750 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1752 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1754 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1756 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1758 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1759 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1763 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1765 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1766 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1767 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1770 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1772 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1773 &s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1774 &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1775 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1783 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1784 * ret: a pointer to the TLSEXT return value: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_*
1785 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1786 * returns 1 on success, 0
1788 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *ret, int *al)
1790 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1791 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1793 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1794 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1795 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1796 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1797 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1799 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1800 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1801 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1802 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1803 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1804 *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1807 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1809 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1810 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1813 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1814 *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1822 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1824 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1825 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1826 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1831 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1832 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1833 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1834 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1836 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1842 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1843 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1844 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1845 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1846 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1847 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1848 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1850 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1851 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1852 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1853 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1854 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1855 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1856 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1857 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1858 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1859 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1860 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1861 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1862 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1865 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1866 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1870 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1871 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1872 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1876 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1879 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1880 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1882 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1885 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1888 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1889 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1891 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1892 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1895 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1896 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1898 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1901 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1904 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1905 s->servername_done = 0;
1906 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1907 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1908 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1911 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1912 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1913 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1914 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1915 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1916 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1917 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1918 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1919 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1923 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1924 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1925 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1927 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1928 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1929 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1930 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1931 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1935 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1936 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1939 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1941 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1944 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1947 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1951 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1952 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1955 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1957 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1960 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1961 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1962 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1963 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1965 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1966 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1968 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1969 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1972 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1974 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1975 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1976 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1977 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1978 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1979 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1980 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1981 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1982 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1983 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1984 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1985 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1986 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1987 * the value of the Host: field.
1988 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1989 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1990 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1992 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1996 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1997 unsigned int servname_type;
1998 PACKET sni, hostname;
2000 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
2001 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
2002 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
2007 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
2008 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
2009 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
2011 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
2012 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
2013 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
2015 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
2016 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
2018 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
2019 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
2020 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
2025 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2026 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2030 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
2031 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2035 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
2036 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2040 s->servername_done = 1;
2043 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
2044 * fall back to a full handshake.
2046 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2047 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2048 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
2051 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2052 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2055 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
2058 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
2062 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
2063 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
2065 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
2066 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2072 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2073 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2074 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
2076 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension,
2077 &ec_point_format_list)
2078 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
2083 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
2084 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2085 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2086 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2090 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2091 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
2093 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
2094 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension,
2095 &elliptic_curve_list)
2096 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
2097 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
2102 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
2103 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2104 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2105 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2110 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2111 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2112 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2113 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
2114 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
2115 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
2116 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2119 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2120 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2122 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
2123 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2124 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2129 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2130 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2134 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2135 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
2136 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2141 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2142 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2143 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2144 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &responder_id_list))
2147 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2149 PACKET responder_id;
2150 const unsigned char *id_data;
2152 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2154 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2158 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL
2159 && (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2160 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()) == NULL) {
2161 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2165 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2166 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2167 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2171 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2172 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2176 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2177 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2178 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2183 /* Read in request_extensions */
2184 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2187 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2188 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2189 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2190 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2191 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2192 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2193 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2194 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2195 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2203 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2205 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2209 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2210 unsigned int hbtype;
2212 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2213 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2214 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2218 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2219 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2221 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2222 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2223 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2226 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2231 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2232 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2233 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2235 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2238 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2239 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2240 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2241 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2242 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2243 * anything like that, but this might change).
2245 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2246 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2247 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2248 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2249 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2251 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2255 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2256 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2257 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2261 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2263 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2264 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2265 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2269 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2270 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2271 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2274 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2275 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2279 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2280 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2281 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2282 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2283 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2286 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2287 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2292 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2293 /* tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens. */
2294 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2300 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2302 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2303 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2304 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2305 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2306 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2311 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2312 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2313 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2314 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2319 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2322 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2323 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2324 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2327 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2336 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2337 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2338 * fill the length of the block.
2340 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2342 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2344 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2345 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2346 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2354 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2356 unsigned int length, type, size;
2357 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2358 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2361 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2363 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2365 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2366 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2368 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2369 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2372 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2373 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2376 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2378 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2381 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2382 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2386 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2387 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2391 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2392 const unsigned char *data;
2395 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2396 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2399 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2400 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2402 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2403 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2405 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2406 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2407 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2408 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2409 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2412 tlsext_servername = 1;
2414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2415 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2416 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2417 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2418 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2419 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2423 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2424 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2425 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2426 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2427 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2430 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2431 ecpointformatlist_length;
2432 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2433 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2434 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2435 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2441 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2443 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2444 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2445 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2446 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2448 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2451 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2452 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2455 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2457 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2459 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2462 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2463 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2466 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2467 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2471 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2472 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2473 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2475 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2476 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2477 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2478 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2479 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2480 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2482 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2484 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2485 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2486 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2489 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2493 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2494 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2495 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2496 unsigned char *selected;
2497 unsigned char selected_len;
2498 /* We must have requested it. */
2499 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2500 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2503 /* The data must be valid */
2504 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2505 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2509 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2511 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2512 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2513 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2516 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2517 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2518 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2521 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2522 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2523 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2527 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2529 /* We must have requested it. */
2530 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2531 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2535 * The extension data consists of:
2536 * uint16 list_length
2537 * uint8 proto_length;
2538 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2540 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2541 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
2542 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2543 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2544 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2547 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2548 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2549 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2550 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2553 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2554 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2557 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2560 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2561 unsigned int hbtype;
2562 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2563 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2567 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2568 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2570 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2571 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2572 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2575 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2581 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2582 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2586 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2587 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2588 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2589 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2590 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2591 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2594 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2595 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2597 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2600 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2601 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2603 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2607 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2608 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2612 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2613 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2614 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2615 s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2616 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2617 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2621 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2630 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2631 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2632 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2633 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2634 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2635 * initial connect only.
2637 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2638 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2639 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2640 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2641 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2647 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2650 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2651 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2652 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2653 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2661 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2663 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2667 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2672 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2674 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2675 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2679 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2680 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2683 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2684 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2688 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2690 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2691 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2692 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2693 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2695 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2697 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2700 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2701 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2704 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2705 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2708 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2709 s->servername_done = 0;
2714 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2715 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2717 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2719 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2721 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2722 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2723 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2725 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2726 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2728 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2729 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2731 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2732 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2733 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2734 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2738 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2743 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2744 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2745 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2746 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2747 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2748 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2749 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2750 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2753 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2754 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2755 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2756 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2757 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2760 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2761 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2763 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2764 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2768 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2772 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2776 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2778 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2779 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2782 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2783 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2784 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2785 * influence which certificate is sent
2787 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2789 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2790 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2791 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2792 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2793 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2797 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2798 * et al can pick it up.
2800 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2801 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2803 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2804 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2805 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2807 /* status request response should be sent */
2808 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2809 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2810 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2812 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2814 /* something bad happened */
2815 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2816 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2817 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2821 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2823 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, &ret, &al)) {
2829 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2830 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2833 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2834 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2842 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2844 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2845 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2847 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2849 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2850 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2851 * must contain uncompressed.
2853 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2854 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2855 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2856 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2857 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2858 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2859 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2860 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2862 unsigned char *list;
2863 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2864 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2865 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2866 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2867 found_uncompressed = 1;
2871 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2872 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2873 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2877 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2878 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2880 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2882 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2883 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2884 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2885 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2887 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2889 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2892 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2893 * that we don't receive a status message
2895 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2896 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2897 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2900 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2901 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2904 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2905 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2908 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2909 s->servername_done = 0;
2915 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2918 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2920 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2921 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2925 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2926 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2933 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2934 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2935 * need to be handled at the same time.
2937 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2940 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2941 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2942 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2943 * point to the resulting session.
2945 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2946 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2947 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2950 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2951 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2952 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2953 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2954 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2955 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2956 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2959 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2960 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2961 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2962 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2963 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2964 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2966 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2969 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2970 const PACKET *session_id,
2974 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2977 int have_ticket = 0;
2978 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2981 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2982 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2985 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2988 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2991 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2995 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2996 unsigned int type, size;
2998 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2999 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
3000 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3004 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
3008 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
3010 const unsigned char *etick;
3012 /* Duplicate extension */
3013 if (have_ticket != 0) {
3021 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3024 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3028 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3030 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3031 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3032 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3033 * calculate the master secret later.
3038 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
3039 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3043 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
3044 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
3046 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3047 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3050 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3053 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3054 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3057 default: /* fatal error */
3063 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
3064 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3065 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
3071 if (have_ticket == 0)
3078 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3080 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3081 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
3082 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3083 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3084 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3085 * point to the resulting session.
3088 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3089 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3090 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3091 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3092 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3094 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3095 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3096 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3099 unsigned char *sdec;
3100 const unsigned char *p;
3101 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
3102 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3103 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3104 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
3105 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3106 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3109 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3110 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3113 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3118 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3119 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3120 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3131 /* Check key name matches */
3132 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) {
3136 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3137 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3138 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3139 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3145 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3148 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3153 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3154 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3155 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3158 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3159 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3160 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3163 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3164 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3165 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3166 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3167 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3169 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3170 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3174 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3175 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3180 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3184 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3188 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3189 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3190 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3194 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3195 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3204 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3208 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3209 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3213 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3220 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3221 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3222 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3223 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3224 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3225 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3226 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3227 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3228 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3229 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3232 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3233 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3234 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3235 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3236 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3237 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3238 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3241 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3244 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3245 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3251 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3254 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3255 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3256 return table[i].nid;
3261 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3267 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3270 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3273 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3274 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3278 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3280 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3287 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3290 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3291 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3292 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3293 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3294 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3295 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3296 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3297 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3298 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3299 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3302 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3308 for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
3310 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3311 return tls12_md_info + i;
3317 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3319 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3320 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3322 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3325 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3328 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3332 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3333 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3335 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3336 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3337 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3339 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3340 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3341 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3343 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3344 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3345 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3347 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3348 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3350 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3351 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3357 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3358 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3359 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3361 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3362 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3364 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3365 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3367 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3369 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3370 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3372 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3374 if (psignhash_nid) {
3375 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3376 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
3378 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3382 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3383 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3385 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3386 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3387 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3389 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3390 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3392 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3393 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3397 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3398 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3402 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3404 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3405 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3406 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3408 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3409 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3410 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3412 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3413 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3414 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3415 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3416 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3417 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3421 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3422 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3423 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3427 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3428 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3429 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3436 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3438 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3440 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3443 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3444 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3446 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3448 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3449 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3450 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3451 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3454 return tmpout - out;
3457 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3458 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3459 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3460 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3462 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3463 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3464 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3465 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3466 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3468 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3469 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3472 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3473 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3474 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3476 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3486 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3487 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3489 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3490 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3492 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3494 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3496 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3497 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3498 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3499 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3500 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3501 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3502 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3503 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3504 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3505 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3507 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3508 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3511 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3512 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3516 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3517 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3519 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3521 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3524 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3528 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3529 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3533 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3535 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3538 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3539 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3541 /* Should never happen */
3545 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3546 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3547 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3549 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3550 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3554 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3559 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3560 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3562 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3563 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3566 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3567 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3568 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3569 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3570 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3572 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3573 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3574 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3575 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3581 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3582 * the certificate for signing.
3584 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3586 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3587 * supported it stays as NULL.
3589 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3590 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3591 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3594 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3595 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3596 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3600 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3601 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3603 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3604 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3605 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3606 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3607 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3608 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3609 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3615 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3616 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3617 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3619 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3624 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3631 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3633 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3636 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3637 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3638 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3640 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3641 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3645 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3647 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3649 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3651 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3653 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3654 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3657 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3661 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3664 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3666 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3667 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3668 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3669 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3670 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3671 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3673 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3674 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3675 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3679 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3681 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3684 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3687 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3689 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3691 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3693 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3701 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3702 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3704 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3707 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3708 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3711 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3712 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3717 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3718 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3720 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3724 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3728 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3731 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3734 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3739 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3740 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3742 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3743 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3744 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3746 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3753 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3754 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3755 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3757 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3758 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3759 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3765 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3769 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3773 if (default_nid == -1)
3775 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3777 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3778 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3779 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3784 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3785 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3789 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3790 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3791 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3798 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3799 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3800 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3801 * attempting to use them.
3804 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3806 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3807 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3808 /* Strict mode flags */
3809 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3810 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3811 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3813 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3818 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3819 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3822 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3823 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3825 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3828 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3830 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3831 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3833 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3835 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3836 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3842 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3845 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3847 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3848 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3850 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3857 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3858 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3859 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3860 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3861 else if (!check_flags)
3866 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3867 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3869 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3871 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3872 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3874 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3877 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3878 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3879 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3880 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3883 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3884 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3885 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3889 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3890 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3893 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3894 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3895 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3898 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3899 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3900 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3903 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3904 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3905 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3914 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3915 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3917 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3919 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3920 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3921 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3924 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3931 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3932 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3936 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3937 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3938 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3939 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3941 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3948 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3949 else if (check_flags)
3950 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3952 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3953 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3954 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3955 else if (!check_flags)
3958 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3959 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3960 else if (strict_mode) {
3961 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3962 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3963 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3964 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3966 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3973 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3974 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3976 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3978 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3981 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3984 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3988 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3992 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3994 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3995 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3997 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3998 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3999 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4003 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4006 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4008 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4010 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4011 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4013 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4014 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4015 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4017 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4018 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4019 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4020 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4021 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4026 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4029 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4031 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4032 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4036 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4037 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4038 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4039 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4040 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4042 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4045 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4049 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4052 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4053 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4060 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4061 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4063 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4064 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4065 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4066 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4067 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4068 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4069 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4072 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4073 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4075 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4079 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4080 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4082 int dh_secbits = 80;
4083 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4084 return DH_get_1024_160();
4085 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4086 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4091 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4092 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4095 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4103 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4104 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4106 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4107 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4115 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4116 return DH_get_2048_224();
4117 return DH_get_1024_160();
4121 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4124 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4127 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4128 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4129 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4130 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4132 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4135 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4137 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4140 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4142 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4143 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4144 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4145 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4147 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4148 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4150 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4151 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4154 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4156 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4159 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4162 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4164 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4165 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4167 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4168 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4170 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4171 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4176 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4177 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4178 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4181 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4183 int rv, start_idx, i;
4185 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4190 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4194 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4195 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4196 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);