2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
37 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
38 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
40 tls1_export_keying_material,
42 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
43 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
47 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
51 tls1_generate_master_secret,
52 tls1_change_cipher_state,
53 tls1_final_finish_mac,
54 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
55 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
56 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
58 tls1_export_keying_material,
59 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
60 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
61 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
65 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
69 tls1_generate_master_secret,
70 tls1_change_cipher_state,
71 tls1_final_finish_mac,
72 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
73 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
74 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
76 tls1_export_keying_material,
77 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
78 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
79 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
80 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
84 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
87 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
88 * http, the cache would over fill
97 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
101 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
103 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
107 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
110 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
111 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
113 s->version = s->method->version;
116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
119 int nid; /* Curve NID */
120 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
121 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
124 /* Mask for curve type */
125 # define TLS_CURVE_TYPE 0x3
126 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
127 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
128 # define TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM 0x2
131 * Table of curve information.
132 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
133 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
135 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
136 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
137 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
138 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
139 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
140 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
141 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
142 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
143 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
144 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
145 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
146 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
147 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
148 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
149 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
150 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
151 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
152 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
153 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
154 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
155 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
156 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
157 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
158 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
159 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
160 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
161 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
162 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
163 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
165 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM},
168 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
169 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
170 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
171 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
174 /* The default curves */
175 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
176 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
177 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
178 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
179 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
182 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
183 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
184 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
185 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
186 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
187 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
188 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
189 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
192 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
193 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
195 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
196 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
197 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
198 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
199 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
200 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
201 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
202 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
203 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
204 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
205 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
206 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
207 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
208 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
209 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
210 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
211 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
212 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
213 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
214 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
215 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
216 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
220 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
221 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
222 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
225 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
227 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
228 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
230 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
233 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
236 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
237 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
244 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
246 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
247 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
248 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
249 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
250 * lists in the first place.
251 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
252 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
253 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
255 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
256 const unsigned char **pcurves,
259 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
261 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
262 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
264 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
265 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
266 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
267 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
268 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
271 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
272 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
276 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
277 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
281 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
282 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
285 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
286 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
290 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
291 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
292 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
296 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
301 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
302 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
304 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
307 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
309 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
310 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
311 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
314 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
317 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
318 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
320 const unsigned char *curves;
321 size_t num_curves, i;
322 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
323 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
325 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
327 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
330 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
331 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
333 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
334 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
336 } else /* Should never happen */
339 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
341 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
342 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
343 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
349 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
350 * if there is no match.
351 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
352 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
353 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
355 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
357 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
358 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
360 /* Can't do anything on client side */
364 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
366 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
367 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
369 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
370 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
371 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
372 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
373 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
374 /* Should never happen */
377 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
381 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
382 * but s->options is a long...
384 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
385 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
387 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
388 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
389 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
390 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
392 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
395 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
398 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
400 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
401 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
402 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
404 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
408 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
409 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
410 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
411 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
412 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
415 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
416 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
424 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
428 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
429 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
431 unsigned char *clist, *p;
434 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
437 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
438 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
441 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
442 unsigned long idmask;
444 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
446 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
455 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
459 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
463 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
466 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
468 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
474 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
476 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
478 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
480 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
481 if (nid == NID_undef)
482 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
483 if (nid == NID_undef)
484 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
485 if (nid == NID_undef)
487 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
488 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
490 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
494 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
495 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
500 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
504 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
507 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
508 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
515 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
516 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
519 /* Determine curve ID */
520 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
521 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
522 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
526 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
528 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
530 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
531 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
533 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
534 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
536 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
542 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
543 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
544 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
546 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
547 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
550 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
551 * supported (see RFC4492).
553 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
554 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
555 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
556 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
557 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
560 if (i == num_formats)
565 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
566 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
567 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
569 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
571 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
572 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
573 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
574 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
575 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
579 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
580 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
585 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
592 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
596 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
598 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
599 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
600 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
602 *pformats = ecformats_default;
603 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
605 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
607 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
612 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
613 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
615 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
617 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
620 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
623 /* If not EC nothing to do */
624 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
626 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
630 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
633 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
637 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
638 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
640 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
646 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
647 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
648 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
649 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
650 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
652 return 0; /* Should never happen */
653 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
654 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
656 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
658 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
659 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
660 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
662 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
668 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
670 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
672 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
674 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
675 * is compatible with the client extensions.
677 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
679 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
682 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
685 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
686 unsigned char curve_id[2];
687 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
688 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
689 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
690 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
691 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
695 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
696 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
700 /* Need a shared curve */
701 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
705 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
709 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
714 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
717 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
718 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
721 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
722 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
724 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
727 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
728 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
730 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
734 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
736 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
739 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
740 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
741 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
742 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
744 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
745 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
746 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
747 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
748 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
749 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
751 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
752 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
753 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
757 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
758 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
759 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
760 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
763 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
766 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
769 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
770 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
771 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
772 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
773 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
775 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
776 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
779 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
780 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
784 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
785 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
786 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
787 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
788 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
789 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
790 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
792 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
793 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
798 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
799 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
801 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
802 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
804 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
805 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
806 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
807 /* Should never happen */
810 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
811 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
812 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
816 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
817 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
818 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
819 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
821 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
822 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
825 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
826 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
829 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
830 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
832 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
835 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
836 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
838 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
844 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
848 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
849 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
850 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
851 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
854 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
855 if (i == sent_sigslen
856 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
857 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
858 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
861 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
863 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
866 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
867 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
868 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
870 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
874 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
876 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
881 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
882 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
883 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
885 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
888 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
890 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
892 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
893 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
894 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
895 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
896 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
897 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
898 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
899 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
900 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
902 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
903 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
904 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
905 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
906 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
912 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
913 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
914 * @c: cipher to check
915 * @op: Security check that you want to do
917 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
919 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
921 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
922 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
924 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
926 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
927 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
929 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
930 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
933 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
936 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
938 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
940 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
943 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2) {
944 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
945 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
955 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
956 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
957 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
958 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
959 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
962 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet) {
963 PACKET extensions = *packet;
964 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
965 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
968 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
969 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
972 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
973 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
979 if (num_extensions <= 1)
982 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
983 if (extension_types == NULL) {
984 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
988 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
989 extensions = *packet;
990 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
992 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
993 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
994 /* This should not happen. */
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1000 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1004 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1005 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1006 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1007 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1012 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1016 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1017 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1020 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1021 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1022 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1023 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1025 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1027 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1028 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1030 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1031 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1033 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1034 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1035 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1036 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1047 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1049 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1050 if (s->renegotiate) {
1053 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1058 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1061 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1064 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1071 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1072 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1075 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1076 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1077 unsigned long size_str;
1081 * check for enough space.
1082 * 4 for the servername type and extension length
1083 * 2 for servernamelist length
1084 * 1 for the hostname type
1085 * 2 for hostname length
1089 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1091 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1094 /* extension type and length */
1095 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1096 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1098 /* length of servername list */
1099 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1101 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1102 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1104 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1107 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1108 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1109 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1110 * Client Hello message */
1112 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1113 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1119 * check for enough space.
1120 * 4 for the srp type type and extension length
1121 * 1 for the srp user identity
1122 * + srp user identity length
1124 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1127 /* fill in the extension */
1128 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1129 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1130 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1131 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1136 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1139 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1142 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1143 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1145 unsigned char *etmp;
1147 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1149 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1151 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1153 if (num_formats > 255) {
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1158 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1159 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1160 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1161 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1162 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1166 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1168 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1169 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1172 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1174 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1176 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1181 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1183 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1184 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1185 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1186 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1187 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1191 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1193 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1194 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1195 ret += curves_list_len;
1197 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1199 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1201 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1202 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1203 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1204 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1205 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1206 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1207 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1209 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1210 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1211 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1214 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1215 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1218 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1221 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1223 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1226 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1232 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1234 const unsigned char *salg;
1235 unsigned char *etmp;
1236 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1237 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1239 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1241 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1243 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1244 /* Fill in lengths */
1245 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1250 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1251 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1253 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1257 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1258 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1259 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1265 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1266 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1272 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1274 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1275 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1277 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1278 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1280 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1281 /* save position of id len */
1282 unsigned char *q = ret;
1283 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1284 /* skip over id len */
1286 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1292 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1296 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1297 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1298 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1300 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1304 * 1: peer may send requests
1305 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1307 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1308 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1310 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1314 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1315 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1317 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1318 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1320 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1322 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1328 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1329 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1330 * (see longer comment below)
1332 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1333 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1335 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1336 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1337 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1338 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1339 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1340 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1343 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1346 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1347 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1352 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1355 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1358 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1365 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1366 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1367 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1369 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1372 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1373 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, ret);
1377 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1381 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1382 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1383 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1386 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1387 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1389 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1390 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1398 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1405 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1408 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1412 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1413 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1416 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1417 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1419 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1421 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1422 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1423 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1424 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1425 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1430 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1432 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1435 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1440 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1443 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1446 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1447 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1454 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1455 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1458 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1459 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1460 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1463 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1468 const unsigned char *plist;
1471 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1475 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1477 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1479 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1481 if (plistlen > 255) {
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1486 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1487 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1488 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1489 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1494 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1497 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1499 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1500 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1502 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1505 /* if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket later */
1506 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1509 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1510 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1512 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1517 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1520 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1521 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1525 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1528 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1531 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1532 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1539 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1540 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1541 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1542 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1543 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1544 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1545 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1546 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1547 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1548 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1550 if (limit - ret < 36)
1552 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1556 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1557 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1558 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1559 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1561 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1565 * 1: peer may send requests
1566 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1568 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1569 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1571 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1577 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1578 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1579 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1580 const unsigned char *npa;
1581 unsigned int npalen;
1584 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1586 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1587 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1588 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1590 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1592 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1594 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1598 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1600 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1602 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1603 * for other cases too.
1605 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1606 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1607 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1608 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1609 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1611 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1615 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1616 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1620 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1621 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1622 unsigned int len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1624 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1626 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1630 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1636 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1639 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1644 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1645 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1646 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1647 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1649 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1651 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1653 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1655 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1656 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1660 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1662 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1663 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1664 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1667 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1669 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1670 &s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1671 &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1672 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1680 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1681 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1682 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1684 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1686 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1687 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1689 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1690 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1691 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1692 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1693 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1695 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1696 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1697 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1698 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1699 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1702 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1703 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1704 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1705 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1708 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1716 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1718 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1719 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1720 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1725 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1726 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1727 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1728 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1730 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1736 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1737 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1738 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1739 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1740 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1741 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1742 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1744 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1745 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1746 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1747 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1748 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1749 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1750 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1751 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1752 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1753 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1754 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1755 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1756 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1759 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1760 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1764 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1765 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1766 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1770 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1773 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1774 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1776 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1779 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1782 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1783 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1785 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1786 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1789 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1790 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1792 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1795 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1798 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1799 s->servername_done = 0;
1800 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1801 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1802 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1805 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1806 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1807 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
1808 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
1809 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
1810 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
1811 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1812 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1813 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1816 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1817 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1818 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1819 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1821 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1822 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1823 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1824 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1826 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1827 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1828 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1831 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1833 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1836 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1839 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1843 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1844 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1847 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1849 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1852 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1853 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1854 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1855 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1857 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1858 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1860 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1861 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1864 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1866 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1867 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1868 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1869 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1870 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1871 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1872 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1873 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1874 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1875 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1876 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1877 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1878 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1879 * the value of the Host: field.
1880 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1881 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1882 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1884 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1888 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1889 unsigned int servname_type;
1890 PACKET sni, hostname;
1892 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
1893 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1894 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1899 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1900 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1901 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1903 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1904 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1905 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1907 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1908 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1910 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
1911 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
1912 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
1917 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1918 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1922 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
1923 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1927 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
1928 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1932 s->servername_done = 1;
1935 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
1936 * fall back to a full handshake.
1938 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1939 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
1940 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
1943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1944 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
1947 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
1950 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
1954 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
1955 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
1957 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
1958 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1964 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1965 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
1966 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
1968 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension,
1969 &ec_point_format_list)
1970 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
1975 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
1976 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
1977 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
1978 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1982 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
1983 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
1985 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1986 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension,
1987 &elliptic_curve_list)
1988 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
1989 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
1994 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
1995 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
1996 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
1997 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2002 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2003 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2004 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2005 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
2006 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
2007 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
2008 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2011 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2012 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2014 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
2015 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2016 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2021 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2022 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2026 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2027 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
2028 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2032 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2033 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2034 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2035 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2036 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &responder_id_list))
2039 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2041 PACKET responder_id;
2042 const unsigned char *id_data;
2044 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2046 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2050 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL
2051 && (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2052 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()) == NULL) {
2053 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2057 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2058 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2059 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2063 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2064 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2068 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2069 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2070 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2075 /* Read in request_extensions */
2076 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2079 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2080 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2081 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2082 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2083 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2084 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2085 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2086 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2087 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2095 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2097 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2100 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2101 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2102 unsigned int hbtype;
2104 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2105 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2106 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2110 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2111 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2113 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2114 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2115 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2118 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2124 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2125 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2127 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2130 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2131 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2132 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2133 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2134 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2135 * anything like that, but this might change).
2137 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2138 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2139 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2140 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2141 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2143 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2147 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2148 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2149 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2153 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2155 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2156 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2157 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2161 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2162 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2164 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2165 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2169 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2170 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2171 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2172 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2173 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2176 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2177 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2182 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2183 /* tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens. */
2184 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2190 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2192 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2193 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2194 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2196 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2201 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2202 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2203 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2204 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2209 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2212 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2213 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2214 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2217 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2224 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2226 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2227 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2228 * fill the length of the block.
2230 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2232 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2234 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2235 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2236 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2244 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2246 unsigned int length, type, size;
2247 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2248 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2250 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2251 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2253 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2255 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2256 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2257 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2258 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2259 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2262 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2264 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2266 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2269 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2270 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2274 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2275 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2279 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2280 const unsigned char *data;
2283 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2284 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2287 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2288 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2290 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2291 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2293 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2294 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2295 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2296 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2297 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2300 tlsext_servername = 1;
2302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2303 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2304 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2305 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2306 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2307 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2311 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2312 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2313 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2314 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2315 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2318 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2319 ecpointformatlist_length;
2320 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2321 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2322 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2323 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2329 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2331 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2332 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2333 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2334 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2336 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2339 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2340 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2343 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2345 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2347 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2350 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2351 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2354 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2355 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2359 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2360 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2361 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2363 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2364 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2365 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2366 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2367 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2368 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2370 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2372 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2373 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2374 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2377 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2381 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2382 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2383 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2384 unsigned char *selected;
2385 unsigned char selected_len;
2386 /* We must have requested it. */
2387 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2388 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2391 /* The data must be valid */
2392 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2393 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2397 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2399 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2400 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2401 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2404 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2405 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2406 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2409 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2410 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2411 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2415 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2417 /* We must have requested it. */
2418 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2419 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2423 * The extension data consists of:
2424 * uint16 list_length
2425 * uint8 proto_length;
2426 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2428 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2429 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
2430 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2431 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2432 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2435 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2436 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2437 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2438 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2441 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2442 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2445 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2448 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2449 unsigned int hbtype;
2450 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2451 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2455 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2456 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2458 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2459 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2460 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2463 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2468 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2469 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2470 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2474 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2475 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2476 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2477 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2478 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2480 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2481 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2483 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2486 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2487 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2489 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2493 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2494 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2498 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2499 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2500 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2501 s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2502 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2503 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2507 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2516 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2517 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2518 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2519 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2520 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2522 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2523 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2524 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2525 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2526 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2532 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2535 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2536 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2537 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2546 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2548 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2552 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2557 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2559 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2560 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2562 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2564 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2565 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2568 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2569 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2573 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2575 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2576 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2577 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2578 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2580 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2582 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2585 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2586 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2589 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2590 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2593 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2594 s->servername_done = 0;
2599 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2600 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2602 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2604 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2606 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2607 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2608 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2610 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2611 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2614 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2617 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2618 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2619 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2623 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2628 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2629 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2630 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2631 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2632 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2633 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2634 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2635 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2638 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2639 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2640 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2641 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2642 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2645 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2646 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2647 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2648 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2649 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2653 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2657 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2662 * Upon success, returns 1.
2663 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2665 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2667 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2670 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2671 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2672 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2673 * influence which certificate is sent
2675 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2677 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2678 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2679 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2680 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2682 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2683 * et al can pick it up.
2685 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2686 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2688 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2689 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2690 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2692 /* status request response should be sent */
2693 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2694 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2695 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2697 /* something bad happened */
2698 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2700 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2706 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
2713 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2715 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2716 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2720 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2721 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2722 * must contain uncompressed.
2724 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2725 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2726 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2727 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2728 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2729 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2730 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2731 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2733 unsigned char *list;
2734 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2735 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2736 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2737 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2738 found_uncompressed = 1;
2742 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2744 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2748 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2749 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2751 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2753 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2754 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2755 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2756 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2758 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2760 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2763 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2764 * that we don't receive a status message
2766 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2767 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2768 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2771 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2772 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2775 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2776 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2779 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2780 s->servername_done = 0;
2786 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2789 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2791 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2792 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2796 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2804 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2805 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2806 * need to be handled at the same time.
2808 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2811 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2812 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2813 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2814 * point to the resulting session.
2816 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2817 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2818 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2821 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2822 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2823 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2824 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2825 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2826 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2827 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2830 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2831 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2832 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2833 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2834 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2835 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2837 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2840 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2841 const PACKET *session_id,
2845 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2848 int have_ticket = 0;
2849 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2852 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2853 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2856 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2859 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2862 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2866 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2867 unsigned int type, size;
2869 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2870 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2871 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2875 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2879 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2881 const unsigned char *etick;
2883 /* Duplicate extension */
2884 if (have_ticket != 0) {
2892 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
2895 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2899 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2901 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
2902 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
2903 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
2904 * calculate the master secret later.
2909 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
2910 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2914 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
2915 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
2917 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2918 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2921 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2924 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2925 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2928 default: /* fatal error */
2934 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
2935 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2936 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
2942 if (have_ticket == 0)
2949 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2951 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2952 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
2953 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2954 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2955 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2956 * point to the resulting session.
2959 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
2960 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2961 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2962 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2963 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2965 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
2966 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
2967 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2970 unsigned char *sdec;
2971 const unsigned char *p;
2972 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
2973 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2974 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2975 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2976 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2977 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2980 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2981 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2984 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2989 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2990 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2991 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3002 /* Check key name matches */
3003 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3004 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
3008 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3009 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3010 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3011 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3012 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3013 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <= 0) {
3018 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3021 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3026 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3027 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3028 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3031 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3032 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3033 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3036 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3037 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3038 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3039 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3040 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3042 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3043 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3047 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3048 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3053 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3057 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3061 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3062 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3063 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3067 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3068 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3077 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3081 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3082 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3086 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3093 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3094 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3095 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3096 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3097 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3098 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3099 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3100 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3101 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3102 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3105 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3106 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3107 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3108 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3109 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3110 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3111 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3114 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3117 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3118 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3124 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3127 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3128 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3129 return table[i].nid;
3134 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3140 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3143 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3146 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3147 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3151 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3153 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3160 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3163 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3164 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3165 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3166 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3167 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3168 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3169 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3170 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3171 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3172 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3175 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3181 for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
3183 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3184 return tls12_md_info + i;
3190 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3192 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3193 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3195 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3198 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3201 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3205 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3206 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3209 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3210 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3213 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3214 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3216 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3217 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3218 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3220 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3221 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3223 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3224 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3230 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3231 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3232 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3234 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3235 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3237 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3238 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3240 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3242 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3243 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3245 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3247 if (psignhash_nid) {
3248 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3249 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
3251 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3255 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3256 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3258 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3259 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3260 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3262 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3263 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3265 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3266 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3270 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3271 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3275 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3277 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3278 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3279 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3281 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3282 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3283 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3285 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3286 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3287 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3288 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3289 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3290 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3294 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3295 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3296 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3300 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3301 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3302 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3309 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3311 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3313 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3316 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3317 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3319 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3321 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3322 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3323 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3324 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3327 return tmpout - out;
3330 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3331 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3332 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3333 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3335 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3336 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3337 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3338 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3339 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3341 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3342 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3345 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3346 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3347 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3349 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3359 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3360 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3362 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3363 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3365 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3367 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3369 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3370 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3371 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3372 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3373 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3374 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3375 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3376 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3377 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3378 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3380 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3381 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3384 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3385 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3389 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3390 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3392 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3394 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3397 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3401 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3402 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3406 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3408 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3411 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3412 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3414 /* Should never happen */
3418 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3419 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3420 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3422 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3423 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3427 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3432 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3433 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3435 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3436 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3439 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3440 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3441 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3442 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3443 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3445 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3446 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3447 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3448 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3454 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3455 * the certificate for signing.
3457 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3459 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3460 * supported it stays as NULL.
3462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3463 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3464 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3467 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3468 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3469 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3473 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3474 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3476 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3477 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3478 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3479 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3480 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3481 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3482 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3488 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3489 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3490 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3492 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3497 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3504 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3506 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3509 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3510 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3511 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3513 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3514 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3518 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3520 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3522 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3524 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3526 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3527 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3530 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3534 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3537 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3539 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3540 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3541 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3542 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3543 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3544 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3546 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3547 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3548 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3552 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3554 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3557 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3560 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3562 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3564 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3566 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3574 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3575 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3577 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3580 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3581 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3584 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3585 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3590 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3591 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3593 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3597 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3601 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3604 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3607 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3612 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3613 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3615 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3616 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3617 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3619 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3626 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3627 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3628 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3630 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3631 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3632 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3638 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3642 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3646 if (default_nid == -1)
3648 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3650 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3651 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3652 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3657 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3658 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3662 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3663 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3664 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3671 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3672 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3673 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3674 * attempting to use them.
3677 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3679 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3680 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3681 /* Strict mode flags */
3682 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3683 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3684 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3686 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3691 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3692 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3695 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3696 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3698 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3701 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3703 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3704 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3706 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3708 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3709 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3715 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3718 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3720 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3721 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3723 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3730 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3731 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3732 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3733 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3734 else if (!check_flags)
3739 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3740 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3742 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3744 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3745 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3747 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3750 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3751 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3752 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3753 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3756 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3757 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3758 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3762 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3763 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3766 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3767 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3768 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3771 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3772 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3773 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3776 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3777 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3778 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3787 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3788 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3790 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3792 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3793 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3794 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3797 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3804 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3805 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3809 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3810 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3811 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3812 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3814 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3821 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3822 else if (check_flags)
3823 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3825 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3826 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3827 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3828 else if (!check_flags)
3831 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3832 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3833 else if (strict_mode) {
3834 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3835 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3836 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3837 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3839 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3846 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3847 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3849 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3851 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3854 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3857 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3861 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3865 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3867 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3868 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3870 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3871 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3872 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3876 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3879 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3881 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3883 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3884 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3886 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3887 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3888 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3890 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3891 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3892 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3893 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
3894 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3899 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
3902 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3904 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
3905 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
3909 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
3910 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
3911 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3912 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
3913 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
3915 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3918 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
3922 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
3925 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
3926 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3933 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
3934 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
3936 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
3937 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
3938 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
3939 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
3940 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
3941 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
3942 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
3945 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
3946 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
3948 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
3952 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3953 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
3955 int dh_secbits = 80;
3956 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
3957 return DH_get_1024_160();
3958 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
3959 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
3964 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3965 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
3968 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
3976 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
3977 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
3979 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
3980 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
3988 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
3989 return DH_get_2048_224();
3990 return DH_get_1024_160();
3994 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
3997 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4000 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4001 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4002 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4003 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4005 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4008 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4010 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4013 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4015 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4016 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4017 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4018 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4020 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4021 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4023 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4024 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4027 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4029 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4032 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4035 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4037 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4038 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4040 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4041 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4043 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4044 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4049 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4050 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4051 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4054 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4056 int rv, start_idx, i;
4058 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4063 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4067 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4068 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4069 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);