2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
144 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
145 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
149 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data={
152 tls1_setup_key_block,
153 tls1_generate_master_secret,
154 tls1_change_cipher_state,
155 tls1_final_finish_mac,
156 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
157 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
158 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
159 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
161 tls1_export_keying_material,
162 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
163 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
164 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
168 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data={
171 tls1_setup_key_block,
172 tls1_generate_master_secret,
173 tls1_change_cipher_state,
174 tls1_final_finish_mac,
175 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
176 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
190 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
191 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
197 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
198 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
202 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
204 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
205 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
209 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
213 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
216 s->version = s->method->version;
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
221 static int nid_list[] =
223 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
224 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
225 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
226 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
227 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
228 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
232 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
233 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
234 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
235 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
236 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
237 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
238 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
239 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
240 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
241 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
242 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
243 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
244 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
245 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
246 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
247 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
248 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
249 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
250 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
254 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
256 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
257 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
258 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
261 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
263 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
264 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
265 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
266 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
267 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
268 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
269 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
270 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
271 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
272 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
273 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
274 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
275 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
276 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
277 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
278 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
279 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
280 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
281 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
282 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
283 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
284 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
285 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
286 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
287 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
288 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
289 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
290 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
293 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
295 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
296 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
300 /* Brainpool not allowed in FIPS mode */
301 static const unsigned char fips_curves_default[] =
303 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
304 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
305 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
306 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
307 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
308 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
309 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
310 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
311 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
312 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
313 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
314 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
315 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
316 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
317 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
318 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
319 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
320 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
321 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
322 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
323 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
324 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
325 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
326 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
327 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
331 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
333 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
334 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
335 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
337 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
340 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
342 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
345 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
347 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
349 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
351 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
353 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
355 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
357 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
359 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
361 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
363 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
365 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
367 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
369 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
371 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
373 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
375 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
377 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
379 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
381 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
383 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
385 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
387 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
389 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
391 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
393 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
395 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
397 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
399 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
405 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
408 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
409 const unsigned char **pcurves,
414 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
415 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
418 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
419 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
421 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
422 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
423 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
426 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
427 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
431 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
432 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
436 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
437 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
444 *pcurves = fips_curves_default;
445 *pcurveslen = sizeof(fips_curves_default);
449 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
450 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
453 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
454 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
456 const unsigned char *curves;
458 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
459 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
461 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
464 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
467 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
469 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
472 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
474 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
477 else /* Should never happen */
480 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
481 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
483 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
489 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
490 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
494 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
496 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
497 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
499 /* Can't do anything on client side */
506 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
507 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
510 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
511 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
512 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
513 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
514 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
515 /* Should never happen */
518 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
521 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
523 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
528 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
530 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
531 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
533 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
537 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
538 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
549 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
550 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
552 unsigned char *clist, *p;
554 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
555 * while curve ids < 32
557 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
558 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
561 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
563 unsigned long idmask;
565 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
567 /* NB: 25 is last curve ID supported by FIPS module */
568 if (FIPS_mode() && id > 25)
575 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
586 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
590 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
595 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
598 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
600 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
604 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
606 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
608 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
610 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
611 if (nid == NID_undef)
612 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
613 if (nid == NID_undef)
614 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
615 if (nid == NID_undef)
617 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
618 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
620 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
623 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
624 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
629 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
633 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
635 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
636 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
641 const EC_METHOD *meth;
644 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
645 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
648 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
651 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
655 /* Determine curve ID */
656 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
657 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
658 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
662 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
674 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
676 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
679 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
681 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
684 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
688 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
689 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
690 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
692 const unsigned char *p;
695 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
696 * is supported (see RFC4492).
698 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
700 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
701 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
702 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
712 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
713 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
715 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
716 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
718 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
723 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
730 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
733 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
735 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
737 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
738 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
742 *pformats = ecformats_default;
743 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
745 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
747 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
751 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
752 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
754 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
756 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
759 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
762 /* If not EC nothing to do */
763 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
768 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
772 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
773 * supported curves extension.
775 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
778 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
779 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
781 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
788 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
789 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
790 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
791 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
792 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
794 return 0; /* Should never happen */
795 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
796 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
798 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
802 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
803 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
805 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
810 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
811 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
813 unsigned char curve_id[2];
814 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
815 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
816 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
817 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
820 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
821 * no other curves permitted.
825 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
826 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
827 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
828 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
829 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
833 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
834 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
836 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
837 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
839 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
842 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
845 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
847 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
853 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
855 /* Need a shared curve */
856 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
862 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
867 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
869 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
873 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
879 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
884 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
888 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
889 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
892 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
893 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
895 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
898 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
899 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
901 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
904 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
905 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
907 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
910 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
911 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
912 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
913 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
915 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
916 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
917 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
918 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
921 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
922 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
924 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
925 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
929 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
930 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
931 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
934 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
936 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
939 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
940 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
942 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
943 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
944 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
946 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
947 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
950 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
951 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
955 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
956 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
958 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
959 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
961 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
963 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
964 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
968 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
969 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
972 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
973 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
975 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
976 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
978 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
979 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
980 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
981 /* Should never happen */
984 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
985 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
987 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
991 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
993 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
994 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
995 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
997 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
999 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1002 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1007 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
1009 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1012 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1016 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1018 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1020 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1021 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1029 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1033 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1034 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1035 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1037 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1040 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1041 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1043 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1046 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1052 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1055 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1056 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1059 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1060 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1061 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1062 * session and not global settings.
1065 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1068 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1069 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1070 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
1073 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1074 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1075 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1078 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
1079 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
1082 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
1083 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
1087 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1088 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
1092 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1093 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
1097 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
1098 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
1104 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1105 * signature algorithms.
1109 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
1110 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1114 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1115 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1119 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1120 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1123 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1125 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1126 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1129 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1130 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1131 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1133 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1134 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1136 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1138 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1140 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1141 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1147 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1150 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1151 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1152 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1153 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1155 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1158 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1159 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1161 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1163 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1165 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1166 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1167 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1168 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1177 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1178 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1179 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1184 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1186 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1188 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1189 unsigned long size_str;
1192 /* check for enough space.
1193 4 for the servername type and entension length
1194 2 for servernamelist length
1195 1 for the hostname type
1196 2 for hostname length
1200 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1201 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1204 /* extension type and length */
1205 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1206 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1208 /* length of servername list */
1209 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1211 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1212 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1214 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1218 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1223 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1229 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1231 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1234 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1243 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1244 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1245 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1246 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1248 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1249 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1255 /* check for enough space.
1256 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1257 1 for the srp user identity
1258 + srp user identity length
1260 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1262 /* fill in the extension */
1263 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1264 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1265 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1266 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1271 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1274 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1276 const unsigned char *plist;
1279 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1281 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1282 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1289 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1290 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1291 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1292 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1295 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1296 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1297 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1299 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1300 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1301 if (plistlen > 65532)
1303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1307 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1308 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1310 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1311 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1312 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1313 * resolves this to two bytes.
1316 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1319 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1321 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1324 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1325 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1326 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1327 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1329 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1330 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1331 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1333 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1334 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1336 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1340 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1341 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1343 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1346 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1347 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1351 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1357 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1360 const unsigned char *salg;
1361 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1362 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1364 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1365 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1367 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1371 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1372 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1374 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1376 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1378 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1381 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1384 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1389 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1392 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1396 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1398 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1399 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1405 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1407 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1414 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1415 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1416 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1418 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1419 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1421 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1423 /* save position of id len */
1424 unsigned char *q = ret;
1425 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1426 /* skip over id len */
1428 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1434 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1437 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1438 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1439 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1441 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1444 * 1: peer may send requests
1445 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1447 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1448 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1450 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1454 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1456 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1457 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1458 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1460 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1465 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1467 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1469 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1470 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1471 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1472 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1473 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1474 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1477 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1481 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1483 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1485 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1488 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1490 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1495 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1496 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1497 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1500 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1501 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1503 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1504 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1506 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1508 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1509 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1510 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1511 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1513 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1515 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1517 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1523 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1525 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1530 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1533 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1537 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1540 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1541 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1543 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1546 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1547 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1548 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1549 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1551 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1552 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1556 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1558 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1560 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1562 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1566 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1570 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1576 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1578 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1581 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1590 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1593 const unsigned char *plist;
1595 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1598 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1600 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1601 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1608 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1609 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1610 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1611 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1615 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1616 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1618 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1619 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1621 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1622 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1626 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1628 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1629 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1633 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1634 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1636 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1638 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1640 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1643 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1646 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1651 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
1655 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1657 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1659 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1662 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1664 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1670 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1671 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1672 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1673 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1674 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1675 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1676 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1677 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1678 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1679 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1680 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1685 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1686 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1687 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1689 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1691 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1694 * 1: peer may send requests
1695 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1697 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1698 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1700 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1706 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1707 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1708 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1710 const unsigned char *npa;
1711 unsigned int npalen;
1714 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1715 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1717 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1718 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1720 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1722 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1726 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1729 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1731 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1732 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1734 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1736 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1740 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1744 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1747 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1752 /* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1753 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1754 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1759 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1760 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1761 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1762 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1764 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1765 unsigned short type, size;
1766 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1767 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1768 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1769 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1770 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1771 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1772 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1774 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1775 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1776 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1777 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1780 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1781 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1782 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1783 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1784 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1785 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1786 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1787 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1788 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1789 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1792 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1801 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1804 if (data+size > d+n)
1808 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1810 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1811 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1813 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1815 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1817 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1822 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1824 if (data + len != d+n)
1826 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1830 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1832 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1834 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1836 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1837 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1838 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1841 * returns: 0 on success. */
1842 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1843 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1847 const unsigned char *selected;
1848 unsigned char selected_len;
1851 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1857 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1858 * length-prefixed strings. */
1859 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1860 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1869 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1871 proto_len = data[i];
1877 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1883 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1884 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1885 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1886 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1887 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1888 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1889 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1891 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1894 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1895 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1900 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1904 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1906 unsigned short type;
1907 unsigned short size;
1909 unsigned char *data = *p;
1910 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1912 s->servername_done = 0;
1913 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1914 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1915 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1918 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1920 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1921 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1924 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1925 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1926 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1929 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1930 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1931 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1932 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1934 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1935 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1937 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1938 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1941 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1945 if (data > (d+n-len))
1948 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1953 if (data+size > (d+n))
1956 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1958 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1959 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1960 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1961 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1963 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1964 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1965 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1966 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1967 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1968 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1969 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1970 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1971 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1972 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1973 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1974 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1975 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1976 the value of the Host: field.
1977 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1978 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1979 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1980 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1984 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1986 unsigned char *sdata;
1992 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1999 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2006 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2012 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2015 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2016 switch (servname_type)
2018 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2021 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2023 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2026 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2028 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2031 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2033 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2036 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2037 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2038 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2039 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2040 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2041 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2044 s->servername_done = 1;
2048 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2049 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2050 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2062 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2067 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2068 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2070 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2072 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2075 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2077 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2080 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2082 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2083 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2085 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2087 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2093 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2094 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2096 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2097 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2099 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2100 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2102 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2107 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2109 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2110 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2112 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2113 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2115 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2118 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2119 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2122 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2123 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2124 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2125 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2126 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2129 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2131 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2132 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2133 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2135 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2136 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
2138 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2143 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2145 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2148 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2149 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2151 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2154 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2155 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2158 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2159 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2160 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2161 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2162 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2165 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2166 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2167 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2169 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2173 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2176 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2177 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2179 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2183 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2184 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2185 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2186 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2188 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2189 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2191 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2196 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2198 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2199 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2201 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2205 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2207 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2209 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2211 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2214 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2216 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2221 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2223 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2226 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2228 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2232 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2237 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2241 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2243 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2245 const unsigned char *sdata;
2247 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2252 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2261 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2265 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2269 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2274 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2278 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2283 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2284 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2287 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2288 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2289 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2291 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2292 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2295 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2296 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2298 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2299 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2304 /* Read in request_extensions */
2307 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2314 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2320 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2322 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2323 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2326 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2327 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2329 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2330 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2332 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2337 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2341 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2343 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2344 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2348 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2349 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2351 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2352 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2353 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2355 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2360 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2361 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2362 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2363 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2365 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2368 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2369 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2370 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2371 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2372 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2373 * anything like that, but this might change).
2375 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2376 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2377 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2378 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2379 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2380 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2384 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2385 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2386 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2388 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2390 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2391 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2392 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2396 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2397 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2398 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2400 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2412 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2414 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2415 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2417 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2418 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2419 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2427 * Parse any custom extensions found. "data" is the start of the extension data
2428 * and "limit" is the end of the record. TODO: add strict syntax checking.
2431 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *limit, int *al)
2433 unsigned short type, size, len;
2434 /* If resumed session or no custom extensions nothing to do */
2435 if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
2438 if (data >= limit - 2)
2442 if (data > limit - len)
2445 while (data <= limit - 4)
2450 if (data+size > limit)
2452 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2461 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2464 unsigned char *ptmp = *p;
2466 * Internally supported extensions are parsed first so SNI can be handled
2467 * before custom extensions. An application processing SNI will typically
2468 * switch the parent context using SSL_set_SSL_CTX and custom extensions
2469 * need to be handled by the new SSL_CTX structure.
2471 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2473 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2477 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2483 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2484 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(s, ptmp, d + n, &al) <= 0)
2486 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2493 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2494 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2495 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2496 * the length of the block. */
2497 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2499 unsigned int off = 0;
2513 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2515 unsigned short length;
2516 unsigned short type;
2517 unsigned short size;
2518 unsigned char *data = *p;
2519 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2520 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2522 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2523 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2526 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2528 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2529 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2533 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2534 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2537 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2541 if (data+length != d+n)
2543 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2547 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2552 if (data+size > (d+n))
2555 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2556 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2557 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2559 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2561 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2563 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2566 tlsext_servername = 1;
2569 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2570 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2572 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2573 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2575 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2577 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2582 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2583 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2584 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2586 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2589 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2590 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2593 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2594 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2595 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2596 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2597 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2600 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2602 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2604 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2605 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2607 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2610 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2613 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2616 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2618 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2619 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2621 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2625 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2628 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2629 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2631 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2635 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2636 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2637 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2638 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2640 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2642 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2644 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2649 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2651 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2652 * a status request message.
2654 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2656 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2659 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2660 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2663 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2664 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2666 unsigned char *selected;
2667 unsigned char selected_len;
2669 /* We must have requested it. */
2670 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2672 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2675 /* The data must be valid */
2676 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2678 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2681 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2683 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2686 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2687 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2689 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2692 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2693 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2694 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2698 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2702 /* We must have requested it. */
2703 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2705 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2710 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2713 /* The extension data consists of:
2714 * uint16 list_length
2715 * uint8 proto_length;
2716 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
2720 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2722 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2726 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2728 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2731 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2732 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2733 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2734 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2736 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2739 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2740 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2743 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2745 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2747 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2750 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2754 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2755 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2757 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2758 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2759 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2761 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2766 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2768 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2772 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2773 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2775 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2783 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2787 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2789 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2791 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2793 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2794 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2796 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2802 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2812 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2813 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2814 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2815 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2816 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2817 * absence on initial connect only.
2819 if (!renegotiate_seen
2820 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2821 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2823 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2824 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2825 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2833 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2836 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2840 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2842 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2847 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2849 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2850 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2852 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2853 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2855 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2856 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2858 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2861 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2865 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2866 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2873 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2878 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2880 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2881 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2883 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2884 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2885 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2887 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2888 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2892 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2893 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2894 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2895 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2897 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2899 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2900 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2901 * so this has to happen here in
2902 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2906 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2908 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2911 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2912 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2917 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2918 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2919 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2921 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2923 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2924 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2926 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2927 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2929 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2930 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2932 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2933 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2935 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2936 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2939 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2943 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2945 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2946 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2947 * abort the handshake.
2949 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2950 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2958 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2959 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2962 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2963 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2966 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2967 s->servername_done=0;
2973 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2975 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2979 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2980 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2981 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2982 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2984 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2987 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2988 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2989 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2990 if (certpkey == NULL)
2992 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2995 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2996 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2998 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2999 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3002 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3003 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3004 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3006 /* status request response should be sent */
3007 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3008 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3009 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3011 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3013 /* something bad happened */
3014 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3015 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3016 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3021 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3023 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
3024 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3026 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
3027 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3029 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
3030 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
3032 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
3033 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
3036 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
3037 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
3039 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s))
3041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT_LATE,
3042 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3043 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3044 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3047 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
3048 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT_LATE,
3051 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3052 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3053 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3058 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3063 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3064 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3067 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3068 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3076 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3078 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3079 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3082 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3083 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3084 * it must contain uncompressed.
3086 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3087 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3088 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3089 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3090 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3092 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3094 unsigned char *list;
3095 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3096 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3097 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3099 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3101 found_uncompressed = 1;
3105 if (!found_uncompressed)
3107 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3111 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3112 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3114 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3115 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3116 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3117 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3119 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3120 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3122 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3123 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3125 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3127 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3128 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3131 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3132 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3133 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3134 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3136 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3137 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3142 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3145 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3146 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3149 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3150 * there is no response.
3152 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3154 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3155 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3157 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3158 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3161 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3162 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3166 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3167 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3173 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3174 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3177 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3178 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3181 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3182 s->servername_done=0;
3188 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3191 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3193 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3195 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3199 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3207 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3208 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3209 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3211 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3212 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3213 * extension, if any.
3214 * len: the length of the session ID.
3215 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3216 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3217 * point to the resulting session.
3219 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3220 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3221 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3224 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3225 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3226 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3227 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3228 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3229 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3230 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3233 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3234 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3235 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3236 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3237 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3238 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3240 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3241 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3243 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3244 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3248 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3250 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3251 * to permit stateful resumption.
3253 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
3255 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3259 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3267 /* Skip past cipher list */
3272 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3277 /* Now at start of extensions */
3278 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3281 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3283 unsigned short type, size;
3286 if (p + size > limit)
3288 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3293 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3294 * currently have one. */
3295 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3298 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3300 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3301 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3302 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3303 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3304 * calculate the master secret later. */
3307 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3310 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3311 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3313 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3315 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3316 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3318 default: /* fatal error */
3327 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3329 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3330 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3331 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3332 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3333 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3334 * point to the resulting session.
3337 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3338 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3339 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3340 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3342 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3343 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3344 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3347 unsigned char *sdec;
3348 const unsigned char *p;
3349 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3350 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3353 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3354 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3357 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3358 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3359 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3360 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3362 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3363 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3374 /* Check key name matches */
3375 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3377 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3378 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3379 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3380 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3382 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3383 * integrity checks on ticket.
3385 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3388 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3392 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3393 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3394 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3395 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3396 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3398 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3401 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3402 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3403 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3404 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3405 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3408 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3411 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3412 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3414 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3419 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3422 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3426 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3427 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3428 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3429 * as required by standard.
3432 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3433 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3441 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3446 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3454 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3455 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3456 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3457 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3458 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3459 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3460 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3463 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3464 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3465 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3466 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3469 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3472 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3474 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3480 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3483 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3485 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3486 return table[i].nid;
3491 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3496 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3497 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3500 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3503 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3504 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3508 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3510 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3511 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3514 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3518 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3519 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3526 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3527 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3531 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3532 return EVP_sha224();
3534 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3535 return EVP_sha256();
3537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3538 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3539 return EVP_sha384();
3541 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3542 return EVP_sha512();
3550 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3555 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3556 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3558 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3559 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3560 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3562 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3563 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3564 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3570 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3571 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3572 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3574 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3575 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3577 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3579 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3580 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3582 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3584 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3586 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3587 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3589 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3593 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3594 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3595 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3597 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3600 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3601 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3602 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3603 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3605 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3606 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3607 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3609 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3610 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3612 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3614 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3616 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3621 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3622 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3623 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3625 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3636 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3637 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3639 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3640 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3642 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3644 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3645 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3647 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3648 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3650 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3651 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3653 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3654 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3656 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3658 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3659 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3662 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3663 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3667 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3668 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3674 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3675 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3677 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3680 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3683 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3684 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3685 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3690 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3692 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3695 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3696 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3698 /* Should never happen */
3702 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3703 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3704 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3705 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3707 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3708 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3712 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3718 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3719 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3722 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3723 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3725 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3726 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3728 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3730 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3732 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3735 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3736 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3737 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3738 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3739 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3741 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3742 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3748 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3749 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3751 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3752 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3754 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3755 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3756 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3757 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3759 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3760 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3765 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3766 * use the certificate for signing.
3768 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3770 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3771 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3774 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3775 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3777 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3778 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3780 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3781 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3784 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3785 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3786 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3793 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3794 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3795 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3797 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3803 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3810 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3812 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3815 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3816 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3817 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3819 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3820 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3824 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3826 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3828 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3830 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3832 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3833 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3837 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3839 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3841 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3842 unsigned short hbtype;
3843 unsigned int payload;
3844 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3846 if (s->msg_callback)
3847 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3848 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3849 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3851 /* Read type and payload length first */
3852 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3853 return 0; /* silently discard */
3856 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
3857 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
3860 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3862 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3865 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3866 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3867 * payload, plus padding
3869 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3872 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3873 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3875 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3877 /* Random padding */
3878 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3880 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3882 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3883 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3884 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3885 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3887 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3892 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3896 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3897 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3898 * sequence number */
3901 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3904 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3912 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3914 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3916 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3917 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3919 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3920 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3921 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3923 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3927 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3928 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3930 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3934 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3935 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3937 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3941 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3942 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3944 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3946 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3947 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3948 * some random stuff.
3949 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3950 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3951 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3952 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3955 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3958 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3959 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3961 /* Sequence number */
3962 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3963 /* 16 random bytes */
3964 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3966 /* Random padding */
3967 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3969 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3972 if (s->msg_callback)
3973 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3974 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3975 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3977 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3986 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3991 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3994 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3996 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3999 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4000 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4002 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4004 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4006 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4014 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4015 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4016 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4017 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4018 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4019 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4022 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4023 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4024 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4025 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4028 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4030 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4031 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4034 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4035 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4039 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4040 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4041 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4045 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4049 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4052 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4054 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4059 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4060 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4062 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4064 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4065 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4066 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4067 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4069 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4077 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4078 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4079 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4080 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4084 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4085 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4086 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4087 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4093 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4097 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4101 if (default_nid == -1)
4103 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4105 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4106 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4107 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4111 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4112 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4116 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4117 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4119 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4125 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4126 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4127 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4128 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4131 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4133 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4134 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4135 /* Strict mode flags */
4136 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4137 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4138 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4140 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4145 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4146 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4148 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4149 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4152 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4156 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4159 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4161 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4163 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4164 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4167 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4168 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4169 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4171 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4172 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4181 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4184 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4185 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4186 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4188 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4196 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4197 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4198 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
4201 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4207 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4208 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4211 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4214 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4215 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4217 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4222 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4223 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4224 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4225 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4226 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4229 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4230 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4231 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4232 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4236 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4237 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4245 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4246 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4249 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4252 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4253 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4255 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4258 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4266 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4267 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4269 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4272 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4273 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4274 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4276 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4281 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4289 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4290 else if(check_flags)
4291 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4293 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4294 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4295 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4296 else if (!check_flags)
4299 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4300 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4301 else if (strict_mode)
4303 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4304 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4306 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4307 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4311 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4319 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4321 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4326 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4329 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4332 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4337 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4338 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4339 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4340 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4341 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4346 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4351 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4355 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4356 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4358 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4360 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4362 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4366 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4370 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4373 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4375 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4376 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4378 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4380 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4381 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4383 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4385 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4387 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4388 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4390 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4395 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4399 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4401 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4402 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4406 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4408 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4409 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4410 else if (cpk->digest)
4411 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4414 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4416 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4417 * if the chain is invalid.
4421 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4422 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4425 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4426 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4433 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4434 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4436 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4437 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4438 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4439 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4440 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4441 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4443 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4444 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4446 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);