2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 #include <openssl/dh.h>
120 #include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
124 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
134 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data={
137 tls1_setup_key_block,
138 tls1_generate_master_secret,
139 tls1_change_cipher_state,
140 tls1_final_finish_mac,
141 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
142 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
143 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
146 tls1_export_keying_material,
148 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
149 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
153 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data={
156 tls1_setup_key_block,
157 tls1_generate_master_secret,
158 tls1_change_cipher_state,
159 tls1_final_finish_mac,
160 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
161 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
162 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
163 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
165 tls1_export_keying_material,
166 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
167 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
168 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
172 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data={
175 tls1_setup_key_block,
176 tls1_generate_master_secret,
177 tls1_change_cipher_state,
178 tls1_final_finish_mac,
179 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
180 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
181 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
182 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
184 tls1_export_keying_material,
185 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
186 |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
187 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
188 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
192 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
194 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
195 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
201 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
202 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
206 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
209 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
211 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
217 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
220 s->version = s->method->version;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
227 int nid; /* Curve NID */
228 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
229 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
232 #define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
233 #define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
235 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] =
237 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163k1 (1) */
238 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r1 (2) */
239 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect163r2 (3) */
240 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r1 (4) */
241 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect193r2 (5) */
242 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233k1 (6) */
243 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect233r1 (7) */
244 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect239k1 (8) */
245 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283k1 (9) */
246 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect283r1 (10) */
247 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409k1 (11) */
248 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect409r1 (12) */
249 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571k1 (13) */
250 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2},/* sect571r1 (14) */
251 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160k1 (15) */
252 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r1 (16) */
253 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp160r2 (17) */
254 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192k1 (18) */
255 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp192r1 (19) */
256 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224k1 (20) */
257 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp224r1 (21) */
258 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256k1 (22) */
259 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp256r1 (23) */
260 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp384r1 (24) */
261 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* secp521r1 (25) */
262 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
263 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
264 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME},/* brainpool512r1 (28) */
268 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
270 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
271 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
272 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
275 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
277 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
278 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
279 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
280 0,28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
281 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
282 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
283 0,27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
284 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
285 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
286 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
287 0,26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
288 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
289 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
290 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
291 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
292 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
293 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
294 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
295 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
296 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
297 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
298 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
299 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
300 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
301 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
302 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
303 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
304 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
307 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
309 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
310 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
313 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
315 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
316 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
317 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
319 return nid_list[curve_id-1].nid;
322 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
324 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
327 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
329 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
331 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
333 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
335 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
337 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
339 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
341 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
343 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
345 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
347 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
349 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
351 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
353 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
355 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
357 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
359 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
361 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
363 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
365 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
367 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
369 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
371 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
373 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
375 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
377 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
379 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
381 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
388 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
390 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
391 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
392 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
393 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
394 * lists in the first place.
395 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
396 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
397 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
399 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
400 const unsigned char **pcurves,
403 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
406 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
407 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
411 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
412 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
414 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
415 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
416 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
419 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
420 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
424 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
425 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
429 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
430 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
434 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
435 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
439 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
442 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
448 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
453 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
454 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
456 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
459 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] >
460 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
462 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1]-1];
463 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
464 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
467 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
470 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
471 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
473 const unsigned char *curves;
474 size_t num_curves, i;
475 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
476 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
478 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
481 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
484 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
486 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
489 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
491 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
494 else /* Should never happen */
497 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
499 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2)
501 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
502 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
508 * Return |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef if there is no match.
509 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
510 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
511 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
513 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
515 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
516 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
518 /* Can't do anything on client side */
525 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
526 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
529 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
530 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
531 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
532 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
533 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
534 /* Should never happen */
537 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
541 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
542 * but s->options is a long...
544 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
546 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
547 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
548 if(!tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
550 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
552 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref+=2)
554 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
555 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp+=2)
557 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
559 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
563 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
564 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
572 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
576 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
577 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
579 unsigned char *clist, *p;
581 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
582 * while curve ids < 32
584 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
585 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
588 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
590 unsigned long idmask;
592 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
594 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
605 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
609 #define MAX_CURVELIST 28
614 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
617 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
619 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
623 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
625 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
627 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
629 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
630 if (nid == NID_undef)
631 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
632 if (nid == NID_undef)
633 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
634 if (nid == NID_undef)
636 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
637 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
639 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
642 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
643 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
648 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
652 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
654 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
655 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
660 const EC_METHOD *meth;
663 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
664 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
667 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
670 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
674 /* Determine curve ID */
675 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
676 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
677 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
681 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
693 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
695 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
698 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
700 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
703 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
707 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
708 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
709 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
711 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
712 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
714 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
715 * is supported (see RFC4492).
717 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
719 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
720 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
721 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++)
723 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
726 if (i == num_formats)
731 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
732 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
734 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
736 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2)
738 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] &&
739 pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
744 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
751 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
754 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
756 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
758 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
759 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
763 *pformats = ecformats_default;
764 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
766 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
768 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
772 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
773 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
775 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
777 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
780 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
783 /* If not EC nothing to do */
784 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
789 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
793 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
794 * supported curves extension.
796 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
799 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
800 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
802 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
809 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
810 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
811 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
812 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
813 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
815 return 0; /* Should never happen */
816 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
817 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
819 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
823 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
824 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
826 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
831 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
832 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
833 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
835 unsigned char curve_id[2];
836 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
837 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
838 /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
839 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
842 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
843 * no other curves permitted.
847 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
848 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
849 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
850 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
851 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
855 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
856 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
858 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
859 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
861 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
864 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
867 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
869 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
875 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
877 /* Need a shared curve */
878 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
884 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
889 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
891 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
895 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
898 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
902 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
907 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
911 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
912 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
915 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
916 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
918 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
921 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
922 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
924 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
927 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
928 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
930 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
933 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
934 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
935 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
936 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
938 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
939 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
940 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
941 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
944 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
945 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
947 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
948 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
951 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
952 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
953 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
954 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
957 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
959 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
963 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
965 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
966 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
967 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
969 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
970 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
973 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
974 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
978 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
979 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
981 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
982 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
984 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
986 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
987 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
991 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
992 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
995 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
996 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
998 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
999 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1001 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
1002 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
1003 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
1004 /* Should never happen */
1007 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
1008 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
1010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1013 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1014 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1016 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
1017 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
1018 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
1020 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1025 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
1030 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
1032 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1035 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1039 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
1041 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
1043 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1044 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
1052 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
1056 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1057 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
1058 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
1060 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
1063 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1064 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1069 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
1072 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1075 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
1076 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1077 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1083 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
1086 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
1087 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
1091 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
1092 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
1093 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
1094 * session and not global settings.
1097 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1102 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
1103 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1104 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1107 ssl_set_sig_mask(&c->mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1108 /* Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate
1109 * signature algorithms.
1111 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
1112 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1113 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aDSS)
1114 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1115 if (c->mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1116 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1118 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1120 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1121 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1125 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1126 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1128 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1129 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1131 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1133 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP))
1135 c->mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1136 c->mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1142 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1145 if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a)
1147 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1150 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1152 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1154 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1157 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1160 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1161 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1163 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1165 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
1168 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1169 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1171 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1173 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1175 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1176 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1177 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1178 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1189 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1191 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1196 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1202 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1204 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1207 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1215 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1216 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1219 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1221 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1222 unsigned long size_str;
1226 * check for enough space.
1227 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1228 * 2 for servernamelist length
1229 * 1 for the hostname type
1230 * 2 for hostname length
1234 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1235 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1238 /* extension type and length */
1239 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1240 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1242 /* length of servername list */
1243 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1245 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1246 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1248 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1253 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1254 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1255 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1257 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1258 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1265 * check for enough space.
1266 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1267 * 1 for the srp user identity
1268 * + srp user identity length
1270 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1272 /* fill in the extension */
1273 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1274 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1275 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1276 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1284 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1286 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1287 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1289 unsigned char *etmp;
1291 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1293 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1294 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1295 if (num_formats > 255)
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1301 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1302 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1303 s2n(num_formats + 1,ret);
1304 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats ;
1305 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1308 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1309 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1310 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1313 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1314 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2) return NULL;
1315 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2)
1317 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1322 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1324 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1325 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2)
1327 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1329 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1330 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1334 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1336 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1337 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1338 ret += curves_list_len;
1340 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1342 if (tls_use_ticket(s))
1345 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1346 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1347 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1348 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1350 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1351 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1352 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1354 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1355 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1357 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1361 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1362 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1364 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1367 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1368 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1372 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1378 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1381 const unsigned char *salg;
1382 unsigned char *etmp;
1383 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1384 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1386 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1388 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1390 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1391 /* Fill in lengths */
1392 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1397 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1398 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1400 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1402 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col) < 0)
1404 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1407 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1410 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1415 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1418 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1422 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1424 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1425 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1431 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1433 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1440 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1441 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1442 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1444 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1445 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1447 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1449 /* save position of id len */
1450 unsigned char *q = ret;
1451 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1452 /* skip over id len */
1454 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1460 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1464 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1465 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1467 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1471 * 1: peer may send requests
1472 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1474 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1475 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1477 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1480 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1481 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1483 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1484 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1485 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1487 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1492 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1494 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1496 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1497 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1498 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
1499 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1500 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1501 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1504 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1508 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1510 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1512 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1515 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1522 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1523 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1524 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1526 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1527 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1531 /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
1532 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
1534 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
1535 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
1537 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
1539 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1540 /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
1541 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
1542 * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
1544 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1546 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
1548 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1554 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1556 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1563 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1566 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1570 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1573 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1574 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1575 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1576 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1579 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1580 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1581 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1582 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1586 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1588 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1592 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1598 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1600 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1603 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1612 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1613 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1616 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1618 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1620 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1624 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1627 const unsigned char *plist;
1629 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1632 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1634 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1635 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1642 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1643 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1644 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1645 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1649 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1650 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1652 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s))
1654 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1655 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1659 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1661 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1662 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1666 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1667 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1669 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1671 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1673 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1676 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1679 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1684 if(SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile)
1688 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1690 if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1692 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1695 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1703 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1704 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1705 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1706 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1707 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1708 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1709 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1710 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1711 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1712 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1713 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1719 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1720 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1722 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1724 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1728 * 1: peer may send requests
1729 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1731 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1732 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1734 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1739 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1740 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1741 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1742 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1744 const unsigned char *npa;
1745 unsigned int npalen;
1748 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1749 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1751 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1752 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1754 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1756 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1760 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1762 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1763 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1765 /* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4
1766 * might want to disable for other cases too.
1768 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1769 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
1770 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1773 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
1779 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1781 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1782 unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1784 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1786 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
1790 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1796 if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
1799 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1803 /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1805 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1806 * data_len: the number of bytes in |data|
1807 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1810 * returns: 0 on success. */
1811 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1812 unsigned data_len, int *al)
1816 const unsigned char *selected;
1817 unsigned char selected_len;
1820 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1826 /* data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1827 * length-prefixed strings. */
1828 i = ((unsigned) data[0]) << 8 |
1829 ((unsigned) data[1]);
1838 for (i = 0; i < data_len;)
1840 proto_len = data[i];
1846 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1852 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
1853 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1854 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1855 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1856 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1857 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1858 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
1860 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1863 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1864 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1869 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1873 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1875 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1876 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1877 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1882 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1883 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1884 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1885 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1887 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
1888 unsigned short type, size;
1889 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1890 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1891 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1892 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1893 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1894 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1895 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1897 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1898 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1899 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1900 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1903 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1904 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1905 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1906 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1907 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1908 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1909 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1910 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1911 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1912 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1915 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1924 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1927 if (data+size > d+n)
1931 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1933 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1934 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1936 if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
1938 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1940 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1945 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1947 if (data + len != d+n)
1949 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1953 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1955 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1958 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1960 unsigned short type;
1961 unsigned short size;
1963 unsigned char *data = *p;
1964 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1966 s->servername_done = 0;
1967 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1969 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1972 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
1974 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1975 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1978 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1979 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1980 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1983 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1984 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1985 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1986 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1988 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1989 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1991 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1992 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1995 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1996 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1999 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2000 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2002 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
2003 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
2007 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
2009 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2013 if (data > (d+n-len))
2016 while (data <= (d+n-4))
2021 if (data+size > (d+n))
2024 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
2026 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2027 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
2028 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2029 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2031 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2033 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2035 else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2038 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
2040 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2041 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2042 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2043 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2044 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2045 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2046 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2047 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2048 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2049 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2050 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2051 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2052 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2053 * the value of the Host: field.
2054 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2055 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2056 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2058 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2062 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2064 unsigned char *sdata;
2070 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2077 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2084 servname_type = *(sdata++);
2090 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2093 if (s->servername_done == 0)
2094 switch (servname_type)
2096 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
2099 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2101 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2104 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
2106 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2109 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2111 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2114 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
2115 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
2116 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
2117 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
2118 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
2119 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2122 s->servername_done = 1;
2126 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2127 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
2128 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
2140 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2145 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2146 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
2148 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
2150 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2153 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
2155 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2158 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
2160 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
2161 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
2163 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
2165 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2172 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2174 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2175 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2177 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
2178 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
2180 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2185 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
2187 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2188 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
2190 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2191 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2193 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2196 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2197 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2200 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
2201 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2202 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2203 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2204 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2207 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
2209 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2210 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
2211 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
2213 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
2214 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 ||
2215 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */
2216 ellipticcurvelist_length & 1)
2218 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2223 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
2225 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2228 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
2229 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
2231 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2234 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
2235 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
2238 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
2239 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
2240 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
2241 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2242 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2245 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2246 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2247 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2249 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2253 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2256 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2257 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2259 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2263 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2264 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2265 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2266 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2268 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
2269 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2271 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2276 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2278 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2279 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2281 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2285 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
2288 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
2290 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2295 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
2297 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2300 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2302 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2306 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2311 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2315 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2317 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2319 const unsigned char *sdata;
2321 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2326 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2335 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2339 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2343 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2348 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2352 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2357 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2358 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2361 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2362 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2363 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2365 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2366 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2369 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2370 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2372 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2373 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2378 /* Read in request_extensions */
2381 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2388 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2394 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2396 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2397 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2400 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2401 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2403 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2404 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2406 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2411 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2415 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2417 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2418 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2422 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2423 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2425 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2426 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2427 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2429 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2435 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2436 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2437 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
2440 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2443 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2444 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2445 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2446 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2447 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2448 * anything like that, but this might change).
2450 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2451 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2452 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2453 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2454 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2456 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2460 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2461 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
2462 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2464 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data, size, al) != 0)
2466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2467 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2468 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2472 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2473 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2474 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2476 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2480 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2481 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2482 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2484 /* If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is
2485 * a nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a
2486 * custom TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if
2487 * so call the callback and record the extension number so that
2488 * an appropriate ServerHello may be later returned.
2492 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2503 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2505 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2506 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2508 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2510 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2517 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2520 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2521 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2523 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2527 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2529 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2536 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2537 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2538 * the length of the block. */
2539 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2541 unsigned int off = 0;
2555 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2557 unsigned short length;
2558 unsigned short type;
2559 unsigned short size;
2560 unsigned char *data = *p;
2561 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2562 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2565 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2567 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2569 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2571 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2572 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2575 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2576 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2577 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2580 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2581 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2584 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2588 if (data+length != d+n)
2590 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2594 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2599 if (data+size > (d+n))
2602 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2603 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2604 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2607 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2609 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2611 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2613 else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2615 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2617 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2619 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2622 tlsext_servername = 1;
2625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2626 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
2628 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2629 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2631 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2633 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2638 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2639 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2640 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2642 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2645 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2646 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2649 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2650 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2651 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2652 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2653 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2656 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2658 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2660 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2661 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2663 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2666 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0))
2668 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2671 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2673 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2674 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input)
2676 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2680 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2683 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2684 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2686 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2690 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2691 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2692 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2693 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2695 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2697 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2699 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2704 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
2706 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2707 * a status request message.
2709 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2711 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2714 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2715 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2718 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2719 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2721 unsigned char *selected;
2722 unsigned char selected_len;
2724 /* We must have requested it. */
2725 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
2727 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2730 /* The data must be valid */
2731 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2733 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2736 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2738 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2741 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2742 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2744 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2747 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2748 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2749 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2753 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
2757 /* We must have requested it. */
2758 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
2760 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2765 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2769 * The extension data consists of:
2770 * uint16 list_length
2771 * uint8 proto_length;
2772 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2777 if (len != (unsigned) size - 2)
2779 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2783 if (len != (unsigned) size - 3)
2785 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2788 if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
2789 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2790 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2791 if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
2793 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2796 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
2797 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2799 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2800 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2804 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2805 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2807 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2808 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2809 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2811 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2816 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2818 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2822 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2823 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2825 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2826 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2827 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2828 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2831 /* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but
2832 * matches a custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c
2834 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2842 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2846 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2848 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2850 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2852 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2853 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2855 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2861 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2871 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2872 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2873 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2874 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2875 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2876 * absence on initial connect only.
2878 if (!renegotiate_seen
2879 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2880 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2882 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2883 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2884 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2892 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2895 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2899 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2901 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2906 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2908 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2909 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2911 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2912 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2914 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2915 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2917 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2920 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2924 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2925 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2932 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2937 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2939 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2940 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2943 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2944 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2946 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2947 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2951 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2952 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2953 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2954 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2956 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2958 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2959 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2960 * so this has to happen here in
2961 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2965 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2967 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2970 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2971 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2976 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2977 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2978 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2980 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2982 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2983 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2985 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2986 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2988 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2989 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2991 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2992 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2994 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2995 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2998 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
3002 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3004 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
3005 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
3006 * abort the handshake.
3008 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3009 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3017 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3018 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3021 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3022 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3025 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3026 s->servername_done=0;
3032 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3036 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
3037 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3039 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
3040 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3042 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
3043 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
3045 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
3046 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
3049 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
3050 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
3052 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s))
3054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3055 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3056 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3059 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
3060 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
3062 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
3063 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
3064 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3069 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
3072 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3076 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
3078 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3081 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
3082 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
3083 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
3084 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
3086 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3089 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
3090 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3091 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
3092 if (certpkey == NULL)
3094 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3097 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
3098 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
3100 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3101 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3104 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3105 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3106 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3108 /* status request response should be sent */
3109 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3110 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3111 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3113 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3115 /* something bad happened */
3116 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3117 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3118 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3123 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3128 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3129 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3132 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3133 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3141 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3143 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3144 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3146 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3147 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3148 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
3149 * it must contain uncompressed.
3151 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3152 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3153 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3154 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
3155 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
3157 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3159 unsigned char *list;
3160 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3161 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3162 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
3164 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
3166 found_uncompressed = 1;
3170 if (!found_uncompressed)
3172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3176 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3177 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3179 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3180 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3181 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3182 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3184 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
3185 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
3187 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
3188 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
3190 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
3192 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3193 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3196 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
3197 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
3198 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
3199 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
3201 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3202 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3207 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
3210 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
3211 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
3214 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
3215 * there is no response.
3217 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3219 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3220 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3222 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
3223 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3226 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
3227 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3231 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3232 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
3238 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3239 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3242 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3243 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
3246 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3247 s->servername_done=0;
3253 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
3256 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3258 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
3260 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3264 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
3266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3273 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
3274 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
3275 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
3277 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
3278 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
3279 * extension, if any.
3280 * len: the length of the session ID.
3281 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
3282 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3283 * point to the resulting session.
3285 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3286 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3287 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3290 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3291 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3292 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3293 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3294 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3295 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3296 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3299 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3300 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3301 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3302 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3303 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3304 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3306 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
3307 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
3309 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
3310 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
3314 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3316 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
3317 * to permit stateful resumption.
3319 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
3321 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
3325 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
3333 /* Skip past cipher list */
3338 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3343 /* Now at start of extensions */
3344 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3347 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3349 unsigned short type, size;
3352 if (p + size > limit)
3354 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3359 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3360 * currently have one. */
3361 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3364 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3366 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3367 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3368 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3369 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3370 * calculate the master secret later. */
3373 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3376 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3377 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3379 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3381 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3382 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3384 default: /* fatal error */
3394 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3396 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3397 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3398 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3399 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3400 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3401 * point to the resulting session.
3404 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3405 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3406 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3407 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3409 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3410 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3411 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3414 unsigned char *sdec;
3415 const unsigned char *p;
3416 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3417 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3420 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3421 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3424 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3425 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3426 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3427 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3429 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3430 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3441 /* Check key name matches */
3442 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3444 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3445 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3446 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3447 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3449 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3450 * integrity checks on ticket.
3452 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3455 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3459 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3460 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3461 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3462 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3463 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3465 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3468 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3469 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3470 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3471 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3472 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3475 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3478 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3479 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3481 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3486 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3489 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3493 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3494 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3495 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3496 * as required by standard.
3499 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3500 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3508 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3513 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3521 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3522 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3523 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3524 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3525 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3526 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3527 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3530 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3531 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3532 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3533 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3536 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3539 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3541 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3547 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3550 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3552 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3553 return table[i].nid;
3558 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3563 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3564 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3567 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3570 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3571 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3575 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3577 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3578 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3585 const EVP_MD *(*mfunc)(void);
3588 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3589 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3592 {NID_md5, 64, EVP_md5},
3594 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3597 {NID_sha1, 80, EVP_sha1},
3599 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3600 {NID_sha224, 112, 0},
3601 {NID_sha256, 128, 0},
3603 {NID_sha224, 112, EVP_sha224},
3604 {NID_sha256, 128, EVP_sha256},
3606 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3607 {NID_sha384, 192, 0},
3608 {NID_sha512, 256, 0}
3610 {NID_sha384, 192, EVP_sha384},
3611 {NID_sha512, 256, EVP_sha512}
3615 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3619 if (hash_alg > sizeof(tls12_md_info)/sizeof(tls12_md_info[0]))
3621 return tls12_md_info + hash_alg - 1;
3624 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3626 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3627 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3629 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3630 if (!inf || !inf->mfunc)
3632 return inf->mfunc();
3635 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3640 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3641 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3644 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3645 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3647 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3648 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3649 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3655 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3656 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3657 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3659 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3660 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3662 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3664 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3665 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3667 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3669 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3671 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3672 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3674 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3678 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3679 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3680 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3682 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3685 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3686 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3688 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3689 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3690 if (!hinf || !hinf->mfunc)
3692 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3693 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3695 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3696 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3699 /* Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported
3700 * signature algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA
3701 * then RSA is disabled.
3704 void ssl_set_sig_mask(unsigned long *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3706 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3707 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3708 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3709 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
3710 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
3711 * TLS 1.2. To keep down calls to security callback only check
3714 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3715 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
3719 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3720 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3721 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3725 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3726 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3727 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3731 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3732 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3733 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3740 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3742 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3744 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3747 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3748 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3750 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3752 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2)
3754 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig))
3756 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3757 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3760 return tmpout - out;
3763 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3764 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3765 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3766 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3768 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3769 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3770 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3772 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3773 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3775 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3777 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3782 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3783 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3784 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3786 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3797 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3798 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3800 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3801 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3803 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3805 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3806 if (c->shared_sigalgs)
3808 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3809 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3811 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3812 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3814 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3815 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3817 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3819 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3820 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3823 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3824 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3828 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3829 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3835 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3836 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3838 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3841 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3844 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3845 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3846 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3851 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3853 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3856 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3857 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3859 /* Should never happen */
3863 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3864 OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
3865 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3866 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3868 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3869 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3873 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3879 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3880 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3883 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3884 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
3886 /* Use first set signature preference to force message
3887 * digest, ignoring any peer preferences.
3889 const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
3891 sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
3893 sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
3896 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
3897 md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
3898 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3899 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3900 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3902 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3903 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3909 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3910 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3912 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3913 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3915 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3916 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3917 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3918 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3920 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3921 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3926 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3927 * use the certificate for signing.
3929 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3931 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3932 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3935 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3936 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3939 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3941 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3942 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3946 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3947 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3954 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3955 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3956 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3958 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3964 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3971 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3973 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3976 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3977 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3978 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3980 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3981 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3985 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3987 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3989 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3991 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3993 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3994 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3998 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
4000 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4002 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
4003 unsigned short hbtype;
4004 unsigned int payload;
4005 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4007 if (s->msg_callback)
4008 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4009 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
4010 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4012 /* Read type and payload length first */
4013 if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
4014 return 0; /* silently discard */
4017 if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
4018 return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
4021 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
4023 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
4026 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
4027 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
4028 * payload, plus padding
4030 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PROCESS_HEARTBEAT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4038 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
4039 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
4041 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
4043 /* Random padding */
4044 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
4046 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
4048 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
4049 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4050 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
4051 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4053 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
4058 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
4062 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
4063 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
4064 * sequence number */
4067 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
4070 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
4078 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
4080 unsigned char *buf, *p;
4082 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
4083 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
4085 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
4086 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
4087 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
4089 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
4093 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
4094 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
4096 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
4100 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
4101 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
4103 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
4107 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
4108 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
4110 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
4113 * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
4114 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
4115 * some random stuff.
4116 * - Message Type, 1 byte
4117 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
4118 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
4119 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
4122 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
4125 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
4130 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
4131 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
4133 /* Sequence number */
4134 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
4135 /* 16 random bytes */
4136 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
4138 /* Random padding */
4139 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
4141 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
4144 if (s->msg_callback)
4145 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
4146 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
4147 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
4149 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
4158 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
4163 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
4166 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
4168 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
4171 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
4172 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
4174 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
4176 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
4178 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
4186 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
4187 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
4188 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
4189 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
4190 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
4191 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
4194 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
4195 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4196 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
4197 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
4200 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
4202 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
4203 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
4206 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
4207 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
4211 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
4212 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
4213 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
4217 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
4221 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
4224 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
4226 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
4231 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
4232 if (sigalgs == NULL)
4234 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
4236 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
4237 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4238 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
4239 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
4241 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
4249 if (c->client_sigalgs)
4250 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
4251 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4252 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
4256 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
4257 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
4258 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
4259 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
4265 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
4269 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
4273 if (default_nid == -1)
4275 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4277 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
4278 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
4279 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
4283 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
4284 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
4288 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
4289 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
4291 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4297 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
4298 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
4299 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
4300 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
4303 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4305 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4306 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4307 /* Strict mode flags */
4308 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4309 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4310 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4312 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4317 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4318 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4320 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4321 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4324 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4328 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
4331 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4333 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4335 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4336 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4339 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
4340 /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
4341 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
4343 rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_VALID|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4344 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4353 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4356 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4357 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4358 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4360 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4368 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4369 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4370 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4371 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4372 else if (!check_flags)
4376 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
4377 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
4380 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
4383 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4384 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
4386 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4391 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4392 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4393 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
4394 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4395 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4398 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4399 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
4400 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4401 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4405 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4406 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4414 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
4415 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
4418 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
4421 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4422 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
4424 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4427 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
4435 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4436 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
4438 if (!check_flags) goto end;
4441 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4442 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4443 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4445 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
4450 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4458 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4459 else if(check_flags)
4460 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4462 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4463 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4464 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4465 else if (!check_flags)
4468 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4469 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4470 else if (strict_mode)
4472 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4473 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4475 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4476 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
4480 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4488 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
4490 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4495 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4498 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4501 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4506 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4507 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4508 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4509 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4510 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4515 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4520 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4524 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4525 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4527 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4529 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4531 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4535 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4539 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4542 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4544 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4545 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4547 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4549 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4550 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4552 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4554 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4556 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4557 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4559 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4564 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4568 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4570 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4571 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4575 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4577 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4578 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4579 else if (cpk->digest)
4580 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4583 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4585 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4586 * if the chain is invalid.
4590 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4591 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4594 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4595 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4602 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4603 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4605 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4606 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4607 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4608 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4609 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4610 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4612 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4613 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4615 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4621 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4623 int dh_secbits = 80;
4624 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4625 return DH_get_1024_160();
4626 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
4628 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4635 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4636 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4639 if (dh_secbits >= 128)
4646 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4647 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4648 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4650 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4651 if (!dhp->p || !dhp->g)
4658 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4659 return DH_get_2048_224();
4660 return DH_get_1024_160();
4664 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4667 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
4670 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4671 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
4676 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4678 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4681 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4683 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4684 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4685 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4686 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL))
4689 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4690 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4693 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4695 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4698 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4701 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4704 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4705 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4709 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4710 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4712 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4713 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4717 /* Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate
4718 * then x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and
4719 * not sending one to the peer.
4720 * Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4723 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4725 int rv, start_idx, i;
4728 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4734 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4738 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
4740 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4741 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);