1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 /* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
119 # include <openssl/dh.h>
120 # include <openssl/bn.h>
122 #include "ssl_locl.h"
123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
124 # include <openssl/ct.h>
127 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
128 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
129 SSL_SESSION **psess);
130 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
131 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
133 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
136 tls1_setup_key_block,
137 tls1_generate_master_secret,
138 tls1_change_cipher_state,
139 tls1_final_finish_mac,
140 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
141 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
144 tls1_export_keying_material,
146 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
147 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
151 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
154 tls1_setup_key_block,
155 tls1_generate_master_secret,
156 tls1_change_cipher_state,
157 tls1_final_finish_mac,
158 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
159 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
160 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
162 tls1_export_keying_material,
163 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
164 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
165 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
169 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
172 tls1_setup_key_block,
173 tls1_generate_master_secret,
174 tls1_change_cipher_state,
175 tls1_final_finish_mac,
176 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
177 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
178 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
180 tls1_export_keying_material,
181 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
182 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
183 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
184 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
188 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
191 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
192 * http, the cache would over fill
194 return (60 * 60 * 2);
201 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
205 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
207 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
211 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
214 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
215 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
217 s->version = s->method->version;
220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
223 int nid; /* Curve NID */
224 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
225 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
228 /* Mask for curve type */
229 # define TLS_CURVE_TYPE 0x3
230 # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
231 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
232 # define TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM 0x2
235 * Table of curve information.
236 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
237 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
239 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
240 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
241 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
242 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
243 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
244 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
245 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
246 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
247 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
248 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
249 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
250 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
251 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
252 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
253 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
254 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
255 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
256 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
257 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
258 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
259 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
260 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
261 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
262 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
263 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
264 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
265 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
266 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
267 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
269 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM},
272 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
273 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
274 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
275 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
278 /* The default curves */
279 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
280 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
281 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
282 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
283 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
286 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
287 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
288 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
289 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
290 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
291 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
292 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
293 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
296 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
297 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
299 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
300 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
301 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
302 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
303 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
304 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
305 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
306 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
307 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
308 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
309 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
310 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
311 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
312 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
313 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
314 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
315 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
316 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
317 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
318 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
319 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
320 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
324 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
325 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
326 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
329 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
331 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
332 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
334 return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
337 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
340 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
341 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
348 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
350 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
351 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
352 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
353 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
354 * lists in the first place.
355 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
356 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
357 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
359 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
360 const unsigned char **pcurves,
363 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
365 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
366 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
368 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
369 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
370 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
371 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
372 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
375 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
376 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
380 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
381 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
385 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
386 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
389 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
390 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
394 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
395 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
396 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
400 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
405 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
406 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
408 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
411 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
413 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
414 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
415 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
418 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
421 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
422 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
424 const unsigned char *curves;
425 size_t num_curves, i;
426 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
427 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
429 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
431 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
434 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
435 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
437 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
438 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
440 } else /* Should never happen */
443 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
445 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
446 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
447 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
453 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
454 * if there is no match.
455 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
456 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
457 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
459 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
461 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
462 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
464 /* Can't do anything on client side */
468 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
470 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
471 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
473 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
474 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
475 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
476 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
477 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
478 /* Should never happen */
481 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
485 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
486 * but s->options is a long...
488 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
489 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
491 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
492 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
493 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
494 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
496 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
499 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
502 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
504 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
505 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
506 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
508 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
512 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
513 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
514 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
515 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
516 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
519 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
520 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
528 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
532 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
533 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
535 unsigned char *clist, *p;
538 * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
541 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
542 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
545 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
546 unsigned long idmask;
548 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
550 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
559 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
563 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
567 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
570 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
572 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
578 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
580 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
582 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
584 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
585 if (nid == NID_undef)
586 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
587 if (nid == NID_undef)
588 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
589 if (nid == NID_undef)
591 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
592 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
594 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
598 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
599 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
604 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
608 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
611 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
612 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
619 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
620 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
623 /* Determine curve ID */
624 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
625 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
626 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
630 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
632 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
634 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
635 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
637 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
638 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
640 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
646 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
647 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
648 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
650 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
651 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
654 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
655 * supported (see RFC4492).
657 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
658 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
659 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
660 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
661 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
664 if (i == num_formats)
669 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
670 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
671 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
673 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
675 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
676 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
677 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
678 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
679 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
683 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
684 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
689 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
696 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
700 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
702 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
703 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
704 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
706 *pformats = ecformats_default;
707 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
709 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
711 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
716 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
717 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
719 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
721 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
724 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
727 /* If not EC nothing to do */
728 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
730 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
734 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
737 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
741 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
742 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
744 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
750 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
751 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
752 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
753 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
754 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
756 return 0; /* Should never happen */
757 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
758 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
760 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
762 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
763 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
764 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
766 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
772 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
774 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity
776 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
778 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
779 * is compatible with the client extensions.
781 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
783 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
786 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
789 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
790 unsigned char curve_id[2];
791 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
792 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
793 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
794 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
795 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
799 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
800 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
804 /* Need a shared curve */
805 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
809 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
813 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
818 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
821 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
822 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
825 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
826 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
828 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
831 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
832 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
834 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
838 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
840 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
843 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
844 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
845 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
846 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
848 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
849 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
850 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
851 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
852 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
853 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
855 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
856 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
857 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
861 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
862 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
863 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
864 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
867 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
870 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
873 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
874 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
875 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
876 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
877 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
879 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
880 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
883 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
884 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
888 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
889 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
890 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
891 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
892 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
893 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
894 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
896 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
897 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
902 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
903 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
905 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
906 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
908 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
909 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
910 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
911 /* Should never happen */
914 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
915 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
916 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
920 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
921 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
922 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
923 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
925 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
929 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
930 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
933 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
934 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
936 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
939 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
940 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
942 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
948 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
952 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
953 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
954 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
955 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
958 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
959 if (i == sent_sigslen
960 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
961 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
965 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
967 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
970 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
971 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
972 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
974 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
978 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
980 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
985 * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
986 * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
987 * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
990 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
992 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
993 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
994 /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
995 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
996 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
998 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
999 /* Disable TLS 1.0 ciphers if using SSL v3 */
1000 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1001 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1;
1002 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1003 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1004 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1005 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1006 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1007 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1009 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1010 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1011 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1012 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1013 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1018 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
1020 if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl
1021 || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
1022 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
1024 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1027 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1029 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1031 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1034 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2) {
1035 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
1036 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
1046 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
1047 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
1048 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
1049 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
1050 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
1053 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet) {
1054 PACKET extensions = *packet;
1055 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
1056 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
1059 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
1060 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
1063 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
1064 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1070 if (num_extensions <= 1)
1073 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
1074 if (extension_types == NULL) {
1075 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1079 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
1080 extensions = *packet;
1081 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1083 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
1084 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1085 /* This should not happen. */
1086 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1091 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1092 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1095 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1096 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1097 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1098 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1103 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1107 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1108 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1111 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1112 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1113 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1114 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1116 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1118 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1119 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1121 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1122 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1124 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1125 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1126 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1127 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1138 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1140 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1141 if (s->renegotiate) {
1144 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1149 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1152 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1155 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1162 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1163 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1166 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1167 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1168 unsigned long size_str;
1172 * check for enough space.
1173 * 4 for the servername type and entension length
1174 * 2 for servernamelist length
1175 * 1 for the hostname type
1176 * 2 for hostname length
1180 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1182 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1185 /* extension type and length */
1186 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1187 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
1189 /* length of servername list */
1190 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
1192 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1193 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1195 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1199 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1200 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
1201 * Client Hello message */
1203 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1204 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1210 * check for enough space.
1211 * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1212 * 1 for the srp user identity
1213 * + srp user identity length
1215 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
1218 /* fill in the extension */
1219 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
1220 s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
1221 (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
1222 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1227 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1230 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1233 const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
1234 size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
1236 unsigned char *etmp;
1238 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1240 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1242 if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
1244 if (num_formats > 255) {
1245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1249 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1250 /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
1251 s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
1252 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
1253 memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
1257 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
1259 pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1260 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
1263 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
1265 if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
1267 if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
1268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1272 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
1274 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1275 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1276 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1277 *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
1278 *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
1282 curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
1284 s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
1285 s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
1286 ret += curves_list_len;
1288 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1290 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1292 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1293 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1294 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1295 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1296 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1297 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1298 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
1300 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1301 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1302 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1305 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1306 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1309 * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
1312 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
1314 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1317 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1323 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1325 const unsigned char *salg;
1326 unsigned char *etmp;
1327 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1328 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1330 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
1332 /* Skip over lengths for now */
1334 salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
1335 /* Fill in lengths */
1336 s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
1341 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1343 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1347 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1348 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1349 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1355 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1356 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1362 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
1364 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1365 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1367 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1368 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1370 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1371 /* save position of id len */
1372 unsigned char *q = ret;
1373 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1374 /* skip over id len */
1376 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1382 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1385 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1386 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1387 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1389 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1393 * 1: peer may send requests
1394 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1396 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1397 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1399 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1403 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1404 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1406 * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
1407 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1409 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1411 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1417 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1418 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1419 * (see longer comment below)
1421 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1422 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1424 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1425 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1426 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
1427 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
1428 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
1429 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1432 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1435 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1436 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1441 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1444 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1447 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1454 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1455 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1456 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
1458 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1459 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1463 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1464 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, ret);
1468 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1472 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1473 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1474 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1477 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1478 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1480 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1481 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1487 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
1489 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
1496 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1499 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1503 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
1504 unsigned char *limit, int *al)
1507 unsigned char *orig = buf;
1508 unsigned char *ret = buf;
1509 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1510 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1512 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1513 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1514 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1515 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1516 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1521 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1523 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
1526 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1531 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1534 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
1537 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1545 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1546 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1549 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1550 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1551 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1554 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
1557 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1559 const unsigned char *plist;
1562 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1566 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1568 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
1570 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
1572 if (plistlen > 255) {
1573 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1577 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1578 s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
1579 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
1580 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1585 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1588 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1590 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1591 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1593 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1597 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1598 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
1600 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1604 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1605 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1608 /* Returns 0 on success!! */
1609 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
1610 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1613 if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
1616 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1619 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1620 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1627 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1628 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1629 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1630 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1631 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1632 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1633 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1634 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1635 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1636 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1638 if (limit - ret < 36)
1640 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
1644 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1645 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1646 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
1647 if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
1649 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
1653 * 1: peer may send requests
1654 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1656 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1657 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1659 *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1664 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1665 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1666 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1667 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1668 const unsigned char *npa;
1669 unsigned int npalen;
1672 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1674 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1675 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1676 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
1678 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1680 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1682 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1686 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
1688 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1689 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1691 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1692 * for other cases too.
1694 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1695 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1696 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1697 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1698 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1700 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
1705 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1706 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
1710 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1711 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1712 unsigned int len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1714 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1716 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1720 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1726 if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
1729 s2n(extdatalen, orig);
1734 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1735 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1736 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1737 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1739 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1741 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1743 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1745 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1746 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1750 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1752 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1753 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1754 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1757 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1759 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1760 &s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1761 &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1762 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1770 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1771 * ret: a pointer to the TLSEXT return value: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_*
1772 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1773 * returns 1 on success, 0
1775 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *ret, int *al)
1777 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1778 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1780 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1781 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1782 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1783 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1784 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1786 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1787 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1788 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1789 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1790 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1791 *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1794 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1796 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1797 *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1807 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1808 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
1809 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1814 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1815 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1816 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1817 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1819 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
1825 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1826 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1827 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1828 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1829 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1830 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1831 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1833 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1834 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1835 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1836 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1837 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1838 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1839 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1840 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1841 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1842 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1843 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1844 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1845 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1848 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1849 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1853 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1854 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1855 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1859 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1862 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1863 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1865 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1868 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1871 * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
1872 * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
1874 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
1875 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
1878 * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
1879 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
1881 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1884 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1887 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1888 s->servername_done = 0;
1889 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1891 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1894 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1895 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1896 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1897 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1898 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1902 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1903 ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
1904 # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1906 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1907 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
1908 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1909 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
1910 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1913 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1914 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
1915 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
1918 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
1920 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
1923 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
1926 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
1930 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
1931 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
1934 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
1936 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
1939 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1940 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
1941 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
1942 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1944 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1945 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
1947 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1948 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
1951 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
1953 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1954 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1955 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1956 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1957 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1958 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1959 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1960 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1961 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1962 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1963 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1964 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1965 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1966 * the value of the Host: field.
1967 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1968 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
1969 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
1971 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1975 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1976 unsigned int servname_type;
1977 PACKET sni, hostname;
1979 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
1980 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
1981 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
1986 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
1987 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
1988 * syntax inextensibly and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
1990 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
1991 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
1992 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
1994 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
1995 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
1997 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
1998 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
1999 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
2004 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2005 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2009 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
2010 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2014 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
2015 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2019 s->servername_done = 1;
2022 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
2023 * fall back to a full handshake.
2025 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2026 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2027 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
2030 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2031 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2034 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
2037 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
2041 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
2042 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
2044 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
2045 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2051 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2052 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2053 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
2055 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension,
2056 &ec_point_format_list)
2057 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
2062 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
2063 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2064 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2065 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2069 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
2070 PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
2072 /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
2073 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension,
2074 &elliptic_curve_list)
2075 || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
2076 || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
2081 if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
2082 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
2083 &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
2084 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2089 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2090 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2091 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2092 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
2093 PACKET_remaining(&extension),
2094 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
2095 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2098 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2099 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2101 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
2102 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2103 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2108 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2109 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2113 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2114 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2116 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
2117 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2121 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2122 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2123 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &responder_id_list))
2126 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2128 PACKET responder_id;
2129 const unsigned char *id_data;
2131 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2133 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2137 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL
2138 && (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2139 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()) == NULL) {
2140 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2144 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2145 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2146 PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2150 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2151 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2155 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2156 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2157 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2162 /* Read in request_extensions */
2163 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
2166 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2167 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2168 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2169 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2170 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2171 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2172 PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2173 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2174 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2179 * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
2182 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2186 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2187 unsigned int hbtype;
2189 if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
2190 || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
2191 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2195 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2196 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2198 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2199 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2200 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2203 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2208 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2209 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2210 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
2211 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2213 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2216 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2217 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2218 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2219 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2220 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2221 * anything like that, but this might change).
2223 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2224 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2225 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2226 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2227 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2229 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2233 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
2234 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2235 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
2237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2238 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
2239 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2243 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2244 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2245 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2246 && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2247 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
2251 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2252 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
2253 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2256 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2257 * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
2261 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2262 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2263 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2264 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2265 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2268 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
2269 PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
2274 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2275 /* tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens. */
2276 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2282 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2284 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2285 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2286 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2287 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2288 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2293 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2294 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2295 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2296 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2301 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2304 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2305 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2306 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2309 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2318 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2319 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2320 * fill the length of the block.
2322 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2326 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2327 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len)
2328 || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len))
2336 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2338 unsigned int length, type, size;
2339 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2340 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2343 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2345 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2347 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2348 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2350 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2351 SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2354 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2355 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2358 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2360 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2363 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2364 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2368 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2369 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2373 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2374 const unsigned char *data;
2377 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2378 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2381 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2382 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2384 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2385 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2387 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2388 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2389 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2390 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2391 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2394 tlsext_servername = 1;
2396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2397 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2398 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2399 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2400 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2401 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2405 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2406 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2407 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2408 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2409 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2412 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2413 ecpointformatlist_length;
2414 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2415 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2416 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2417 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2423 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2425 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2426 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2427 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2428 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2430 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2433 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2434 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2437 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2439 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2441 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2444 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2445 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2448 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2449 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2451 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2453 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2454 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2455 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2457 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2458 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2459 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2460 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2461 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2462 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2464 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2466 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2467 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2468 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2471 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2475 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2476 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2477 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2478 unsigned char *selected;
2479 unsigned char selected_len;
2480 /* We must have requested it. */
2481 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2482 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2485 /* The data must be valid */
2486 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2487 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2491 ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2493 s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2494 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2495 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2498 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2499 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2500 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2503 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2504 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2505 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2509 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2511 /* We must have requested it. */
2512 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2513 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2517 * The extension data consists of:
2518 * uint16 list_length
2519 * uint8 proto_length;
2520 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2522 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2523 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
2524 || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2525 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2526 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2529 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2530 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2531 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2532 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2535 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2536 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2539 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2542 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
2543 unsigned int hbtype;
2544 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
2545 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2549 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2550 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2552 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2553 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2554 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2557 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2562 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2563 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2564 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2568 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2569 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2570 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2571 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2572 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2573 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2576 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
2577 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2579 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2582 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2583 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2585 else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2589 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2590 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2594 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2595 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2596 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2597 s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2598 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2599 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2603 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2612 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2613 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2614 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2615 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2616 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
2617 * initial connect only.
2619 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2620 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2621 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2622 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2623 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2629 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2632 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2633 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2634 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2635 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2643 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2645 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2649 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2654 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2656 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2657 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2661 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2662 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2665 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2666 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2670 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2672 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2673 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2674 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2675 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2677 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2679 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2682 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2683 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2686 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2687 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2690 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2691 s->servername_done = 0;
2696 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2697 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2699 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2700 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2701 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2703 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2704 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2705 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2707 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2708 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2710 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2711 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2713 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2714 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2715 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2716 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2720 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2724 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
2725 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2726 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2727 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2728 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2729 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2730 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2731 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2734 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2735 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2736 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2737 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2738 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2741 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2742 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2743 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2744 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2745 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2749 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2753 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2757 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2759 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2760 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2763 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2764 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2765 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2766 * influence which certificate is sent
2768 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2770 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2771 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2772 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2773 if (certpkey == NULL) {
2774 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2778 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2779 * et al can pick it up.
2781 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2782 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2784 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2785 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2786 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2788 /* status request response should be sent */
2789 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2790 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2791 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2793 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2795 /* something bad happened */
2796 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2797 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2798 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2802 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2804 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, &ret, &al)) {
2810 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2811 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2814 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2815 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2823 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2825 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2826 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2828 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2830 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2831 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
2832 * must contain uncompressed.
2834 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2835 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2836 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2837 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2838 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
2839 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
2840 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2841 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2843 unsigned char *list;
2844 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2845 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2846 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2847 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2848 found_uncompressed = 1;
2852 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2853 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2854 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2858 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2859 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2861 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2863 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2864 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2865 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2866 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2868 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2870 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2873 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
2874 * that we don't receive a status message
2876 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2877 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2878 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2881 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2882 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2885 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2886 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2889 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2890 s->servername_done = 0;
2896 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2899 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2901 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
2902 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2906 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
2907 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2914 * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2915 * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
2916 * need to be handled at the same time.
2918 * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
2921 * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
2922 * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
2923 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2924 * point to the resulting session.
2926 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2927 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2928 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2931 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2932 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2933 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2934 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2935 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2936 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2937 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2940 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2941 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2942 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2943 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2944 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2945 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2947 * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
2950 int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
2951 const PACKET *session_id,
2955 PACKET local_ext = *ext;
2958 int have_ticket = 0;
2959 int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
2962 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2963 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2966 * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
2969 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
2972 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
2976 while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
2977 unsigned int type, size;
2979 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
2980 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
2981 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
2985 if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
2989 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
2991 const unsigned char *etick;
2993 /* Duplicate extension */
2994 if (have_ticket != 0) {
3002 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3005 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3009 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3011 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3012 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3013 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3014 * calculate the master secret later.
3019 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
3020 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3024 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
3025 PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
3027 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3028 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3031 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3034 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3035 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3038 default: /* fatal error */
3044 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
3045 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3046 if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
3052 if (have_ticket == 0)
3059 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3061 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3062 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3063 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3064 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3065 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3066 * point to the resulting session.
3069 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3070 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3071 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3072 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3073 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3075 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3076 int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3077 int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3080 unsigned char *sdec;
3081 const unsigned char *p;
3082 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
3083 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3084 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3085 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
3086 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3087 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3090 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3091 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3094 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3099 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3100 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3101 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3112 /* Check key name matches */
3113 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) {
3117 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3118 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3119 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3120 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3126 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3129 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3134 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3135 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3136 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3139 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3140 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3141 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3144 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3145 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3146 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3147 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3148 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3150 || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
3151 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3154 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
3155 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3160 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3164 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3168 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3169 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3170 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3174 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3175 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3184 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3188 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3189 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3193 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3200 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3201 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3202 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3203 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3204 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3205 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3206 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3207 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3208 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3209 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3212 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3213 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3214 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3215 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3216 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3217 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3218 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3221 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3224 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3225 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3231 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3234 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3235 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3236 return table[i].nid;
3241 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
3247 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3250 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3253 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3254 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3258 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3260 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3267 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3270 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3271 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3272 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3273 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3274 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3275 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3276 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3277 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3278 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3279 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3282 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3288 for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
3290 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3291 return tls12_md_info + i;
3297 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3299 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3300 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3302 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3305 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3308 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3311 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3312 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3313 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3316 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3317 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3319 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3320 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3321 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3323 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3324 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3325 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3327 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3328 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3330 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3331 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3337 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3338 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3339 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3341 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3342 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3344 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3345 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3347 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3349 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3350 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3352 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3354 if (psignhash_nid) {
3355 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3356 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
3358 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3362 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3363 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3365 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3366 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3367 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3369 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3370 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3372 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3373 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3377 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3378 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3382 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3384 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3385 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3386 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3388 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3389 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3390 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3392 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3393 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3394 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3395 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3396 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3397 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3401 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3402 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3403 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3408 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3409 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3416 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3418 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3420 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3423 size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
3424 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3426 unsigned char *tmpout = out;
3428 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3429 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3430 *tmpout++ = psig[0];
3431 *tmpout++ = psig[1];
3434 return tmpout - out;
3437 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3438 static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3439 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3440 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3442 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3443 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3444 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3445 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3446 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3448 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3449 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3452 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3453 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3454 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3456 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3466 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3467 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3469 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3470 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3472 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3474 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3476 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3477 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3478 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3479 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3480 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3481 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3482 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3483 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3484 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3485 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3487 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3488 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3491 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3492 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3496 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3497 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3499 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3501 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3504 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3508 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3509 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3513 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3515 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3518 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3519 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3521 /* Should never happen */
3525 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3526 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3527 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3529 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3530 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3534 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3539 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3540 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3542 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3543 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3546 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3547 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3548 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3549 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3550 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3552 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3553 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3554 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3555 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3561 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3562 * the certificate for signing.
3564 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3566 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3567 * supported it stays as NULL.
3569 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3570 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3571 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3573 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3574 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3575 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3576 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3580 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3581 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3583 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3584 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3585 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3586 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3587 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3588 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3589 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3595 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3596 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3597 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3599 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3604 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3611 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3613 return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3616 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3617 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3618 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3620 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3621 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3625 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3627 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3629 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3631 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3633 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3634 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3637 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3641 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3644 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3646 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3647 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3648 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3649 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3650 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3651 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3653 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3654 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3655 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3659 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3661 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3664 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3667 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3669 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3671 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3673 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3681 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3682 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3684 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3687 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3688 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3691 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3692 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3697 * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3698 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3700 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3704 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3708 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3711 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
3714 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3719 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3720 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3722 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3723 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3724 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3726 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3733 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3734 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3735 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3737 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3738 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3739 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3745 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3749 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3753 if (default_nid == -1)
3755 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3757 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3758 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3759 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3764 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3765 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3769 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3770 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3771 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3778 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
3779 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
3780 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
3781 * attempting to use them.
3784 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3786 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3787 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3788 /* Strict mode flags */
3789 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3790 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3791 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3793 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3798 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3799 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3802 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3803 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3805 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3808 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3810 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3811 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3813 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3815 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3816 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3822 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3825 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
3827 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3828 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3830 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3837 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3838 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3839 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
3840 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3841 else if (!check_flags)
3846 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
3847 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
3849 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
3851 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3852 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
3854 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3857 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3858 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3859 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3860 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3863 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3864 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3865 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3869 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3870 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3873 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
3874 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
3875 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
3878 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
3879 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
3880 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
3883 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
3884 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
3885 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
3894 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
3895 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
3897 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
3899 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3900 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
3901 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3904 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
3911 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3912 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
3916 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3917 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3918 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3919 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
3921 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3928 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3929 else if (check_flags)
3930 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3932 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3933 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3934 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3935 else if (!check_flags)
3938 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3939 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3940 else if (strict_mode) {
3941 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3942 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3943 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3944 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
3946 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3953 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
3954 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3956 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
3958 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3961 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3964 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
3968 const unsigned char *ctypes;
3972 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
3974 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
3975 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
3977 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
3978 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
3979 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3983 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
3986 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
3988 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
3990 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
3991 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3993 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3994 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
3995 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
3997 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
3998 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
3999 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4000 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4001 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4006 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4009 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4011 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4012 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4016 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4017 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4018 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4019 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4020 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4022 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4025 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4029 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4032 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4033 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4040 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4041 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4043 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4044 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4045 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4046 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4047 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4048 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4049 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4052 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4053 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4055 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4059 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4060 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4062 int dh_secbits = 80;
4063 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4064 return DH_get_1024_160();
4065 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4066 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4071 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4072 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4075 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4081 BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
4082 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4083 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4085 dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4086 if (dhp->p == NULL || dhp->g == NULL) {
4092 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4093 return DH_get_2048_224();
4094 return DH_get_1024_160();
4098 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4101 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4104 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4105 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4106 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4107 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4109 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4112 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4114 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4117 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4119 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4120 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4121 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4122 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4124 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4125 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4127 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4128 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4131 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4133 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4136 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4139 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4141 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4142 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4144 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4145 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4147 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4148 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4153 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4154 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4155 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4158 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4160 int rv, start_idx, i;
4162 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4167 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4171 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4172 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4173 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);