2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
21 #include <openssl/ct.h>
23 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
24 const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
26 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
27 static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
29 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
33 tls1_generate_master_secret,
34 tls1_change_cipher_state,
35 tls1_final_finish_mac,
36 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
37 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
39 tls1_export_keying_material,
41 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
42 tls_close_construct_packet,
46 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
50 tls1_generate_master_secret,
51 tls1_change_cipher_state,
52 tls1_final_finish_mac,
53 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
54 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
56 tls1_export_keying_material,
57 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
58 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
59 tls_close_construct_packet,
63 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
67 tls1_generate_master_secret,
68 tls1_change_cipher_state,
69 tls1_final_finish_mac,
70 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
73 tls1_export_keying_material,
74 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
75 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
76 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
77 tls_close_construct_packet,
81 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
85 tls1_generate_master_secret,
86 tls1_change_cipher_state,
87 tls1_final_finish_mac,
88 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
89 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
91 tls1_export_keying_material,
92 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
93 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
94 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
95 tls_close_construct_packet,
99 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
102 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
103 * http, the cache would over fill
105 return (60 * 60 * 2);
112 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
116 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
118 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
122 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
125 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
126 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
128 s->version = s->method->version;
131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
134 int nid; /* Curve NID */
135 int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */
136 unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
140 * Table of curve information.
141 * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
142 * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
144 static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
145 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
146 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
147 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
148 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
149 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
150 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
151 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
152 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
153 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
154 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
155 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
156 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
157 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
158 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
159 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
160 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
161 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
162 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
163 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
164 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
165 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
166 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
167 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
168 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
169 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
170 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
171 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
172 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
173 {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
176 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
177 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
178 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
179 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
182 /* The default curves */
183 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
184 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
185 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
186 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
187 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
190 static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
191 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
192 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
193 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
194 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
195 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
196 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
197 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
200 * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
201 * via an explicit callback or parameters.
203 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
204 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
205 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
206 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
207 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
208 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
209 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
210 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
211 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
212 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
213 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
214 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
215 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
216 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
217 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
221 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
222 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
223 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
224 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
227 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
228 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
229 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
232 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
234 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
235 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
236 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
238 cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
240 *pflags = cinfo->flags;
244 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
247 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
248 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
255 * Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
257 * Sets |num_curves| to the number of curves in the list, i.e.,
258 * the length of |pcurves| is 2 * num_curves.
259 * Returns 1 on success and 0 if the client curves list has invalid format.
260 * The latter indicates an internal error: we should not be accepting such
261 * lists in the first place.
262 * TODO(emilia): we should really be storing the curves list in explicitly
263 * parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
264 * so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
266 static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
267 const unsigned char **pcurves, size_t *num_curves)
269 size_t pcurveslen = 0;
271 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
272 pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
274 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
275 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
276 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
277 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
278 pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
281 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
282 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
286 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
287 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
291 *pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
292 pcurveslen = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
295 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
296 pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
300 /* We do not allow odd length arrays to enter the system. */
301 if (pcurveslen & 1) {
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
306 *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
311 /* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
312 static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
314 const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
317 if ((curve[1] < 1) || ((size_t)curve[1] > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
319 cinfo = &nid_list[curve[1] - 1];
320 # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
321 if (cinfo->flags & TLS_CURVE_CHAR2)
324 return ssl_security(s, op, cinfo->secbits, cinfo->nid, (void *)curve);
327 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
328 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
330 const unsigned char *curves;
331 size_t num_curves, i;
332 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
333 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
335 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
337 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
340 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
341 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
343 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
344 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
346 } else /* Should never happen */
349 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &num_curves))
351 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, curves += 2) {
352 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
353 return tls_curve_allowed(s, p + 1, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK);
359 * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
360 * if there is no match.
361 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
362 * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
363 * an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
365 int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
367 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
368 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
370 /* Can't do anything on client side */
374 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
376 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
377 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
379 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
380 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
381 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
382 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
383 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
384 /* Should never happen */
387 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
391 * Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
392 * but s->options is a long...
394 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
395 (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
397 /* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
398 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
399 if (!tls1_get_curvelist
400 (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
401 return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
404 * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
407 if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
409 num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
410 } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
411 (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
413 num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
417 for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
418 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
419 for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
420 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
421 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
424 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
425 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
433 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
437 int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
438 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
440 unsigned char *glist, *p;
443 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
446 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
447 glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
450 for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
451 unsigned long idmask;
453 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
454 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
456 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
465 *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
469 # define MAX_CURVELIST 28
473 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
476 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
478 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
484 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
486 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
488 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
490 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
491 if (nid == NID_undef)
492 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
493 if (nid == NID_undef)
494 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
495 if (nid == NID_undef)
497 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
498 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
500 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
504 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
505 int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
509 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
513 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
516 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
517 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
524 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
525 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
528 /* Determine curve ID */
529 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
530 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
531 /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
535 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
537 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
539 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
540 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
542 if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
543 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
545 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
551 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
552 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
553 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
555 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurves;
556 size_t num_formats, num_curves, i;
559 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
560 * supported (see RFC4492).
562 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
563 pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
564 num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
565 for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
566 if (*comp_id == *pformats)
569 if (i == num_formats)
574 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
575 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
576 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &pcurves, &num_curves))
578 if (j == 1 && num_curves == 0) {
580 * If we've not received any curves then skip this check.
581 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
582 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
583 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the elliptic curves
584 * extension, so num_curves == 0 always means no extension.
588 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
589 if (pcurves[0] == curve_id[0] && pcurves[1] == curve_id[1])
594 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
601 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
605 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
607 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
608 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
609 *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
611 *pformats = ecformats_default;
612 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
614 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
616 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
621 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
622 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
624 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
626 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
629 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
632 /* If not EC nothing to do */
633 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
635 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
639 * Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a supported
642 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
646 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
647 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
649 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
655 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
656 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
657 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
658 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
659 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
661 return 0; /* Should never happen */
662 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
663 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
665 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
667 if (set_ee_md == 2) {
668 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
669 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
671 s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
677 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
679 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
681 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
683 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
684 * is compatible with the client extensions.
686 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
688 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
691 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
694 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
695 unsigned char curve_id[2];
696 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
697 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
698 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
699 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
700 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
704 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
705 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
709 /* Need a shared curve */
710 if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
714 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
718 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
723 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
726 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
727 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
730 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
731 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
733 # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
736 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
737 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
739 # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
743 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
745 # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
748 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
749 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
750 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
751 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
753 static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
754 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
755 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
756 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
757 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
758 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
759 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
760 TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
761 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
762 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
767 static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
768 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
769 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
772 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
775 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
779 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
780 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
781 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
782 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
784 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
785 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
788 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
789 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
793 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
794 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
795 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
796 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
797 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
798 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
799 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
801 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
802 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
807 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
808 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
810 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
811 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
813 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
814 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
815 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
816 /* Should never happen */
819 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
820 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
825 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
826 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
827 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
828 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
830 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
834 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
835 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
838 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
839 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
841 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
844 } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
845 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
847 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
853 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
857 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
858 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
859 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
860 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
863 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
864 if (i == sent_sigslen
865 && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
866 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
870 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
875 /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
876 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
877 EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
882 * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
884 s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
889 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
890 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
891 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
893 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
896 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
898 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
900 s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
901 s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
902 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
903 ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
905 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
906 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
907 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
908 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
910 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
911 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
912 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
913 s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
914 s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
920 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
921 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
922 * @c: cipher to check
923 * @op: Security check that you want to do
925 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
927 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
929 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
930 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
932 if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
934 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
935 || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
937 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
938 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
941 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
944 static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
946 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET || SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
948 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
951 static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
953 unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
954 unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
964 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
965 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
966 * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
967 * out. It returns 1 if all extensions are unique, and 0 if the extensions
968 * contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
971 static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
973 PACKET extensions = *packet;
974 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
975 unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
978 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
979 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
982 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
983 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
989 if (num_extensions <= 1)
992 extension_types = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(unsigned int) * num_extensions);
993 if (extension_types == NULL) {
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
998 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
999 extensions = *packet;
1000 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1002 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
1003 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
1004 /* This should not happen. */
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1010 if (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) != 0) {
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHECK_DUPLICATE_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1014 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
1015 qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(unsigned int), compare_uint);
1016 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
1017 if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i])
1022 OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
1026 int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1029 const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL;
1030 size_t num_curves = 0;
1033 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1034 if ((s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1035 || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1037 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1038 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1040 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
1041 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1043 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1044 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1045 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
1046 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
1051 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1053 * TODO(TLS1.3): We always use ECC for TLSv1.3 at the moment. This will
1054 * change if we implement DH key shares
1059 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1060 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1066 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1067 if (s->renegotiate) {
1068 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1069 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1070 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1071 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1072 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1077 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1078 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
1081 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1082 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1083 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1084 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
1085 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1086 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
1087 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1088 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
1089 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
1090 strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
1091 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1092 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1097 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1098 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1099 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
1100 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1101 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
1102 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1103 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1104 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
1105 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1106 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
1107 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
1108 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1109 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1119 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
1121 const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurvestmp;
1125 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
1127 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1128 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
1129 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1130 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
1131 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1137 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
1139 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
1140 pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
1141 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1145 pcurvestmp = pcurves;
1147 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1148 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1149 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1150 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1154 /* Copy curve ID if supported */
1155 for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
1156 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1157 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0])
1158 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) {
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1160 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1165 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1170 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1172 if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1174 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1175 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1176 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1177 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
1178 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1179 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1180 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1184 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1185 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
1186 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1189 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1190 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1193 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1194 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1202 if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1204 const unsigned char *salg;
1206 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1208 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1209 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
1210 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1211 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
1212 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1213 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
1214 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1215 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1221 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1224 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1225 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
1226 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1227 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1228 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
1229 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
1234 unsigned char *idbytes;
1238 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1239 idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1241 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
1242 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
1243 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1248 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1249 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1253 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1254 unsigned char *extbytes;
1255 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1261 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
1262 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1268 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1276 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1278 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
1279 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
1281 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1282 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1290 * finish_md_len is non-zero during a renegotiation, so
1291 * this avoids sending ALPN during the renegotiation
1292 * (see longer comment below)
1294 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
1295 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1296 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1297 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
1298 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1299 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
1300 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
1301 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1305 s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
1307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1308 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
1309 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1310 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1313 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1314 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
1315 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1316 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
1317 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1318 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1321 ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
1322 for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
1323 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1324 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
1325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1329 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1330 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
1331 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1332 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1338 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
1339 /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
1340 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
1341 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1345 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
1346 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1347 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1354 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1355 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
1356 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1363 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1364 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1369 /* TLS1.3 specific extensions */
1370 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1371 int min_version, max_version, reason, currv;
1372 size_t i, sharessent = 0;
1374 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Should we add this extension for versions < TLS1.3? */
1375 /* supported_versions extension */
1376 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1377 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1378 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1382 reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, reason);
1388 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter
1389 * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
1392 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
1393 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
1394 if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1395 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1397 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1400 } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
1401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1405 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1411 /* key_share extension */
1412 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1413 /* Extension data sub-packet */
1414 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1415 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
1416 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1422 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
1423 * now, just send one
1425 for (i = 0; i < num_curves && sharessent < 1; i++, pcurves += 2) {
1426 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1427 unsigned int curve_id = 0;
1428 EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
1431 if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
1434 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1435 /* Shouldn't happen! */
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1437 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1441 /* Generate a key for this key_share */
1442 curve_id = (pcurves[0] << 8) | pcurves[1];
1443 key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
1444 if (key_share_key == NULL) {
1445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1449 /* Encode the public key. */
1450 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
1452 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1454 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1458 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
1459 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
1460 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
1461 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1462 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1463 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
1464 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1469 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
1470 * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
1471 * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
1473 s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
1474 s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
1476 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1478 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1485 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
1486 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
1487 * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
1490 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
1491 unsigned char *padbytes;
1494 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
1495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1499 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
1500 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
1506 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
1507 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
1508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1511 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
1520 * Add the key_share extension.
1522 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1524 static int add_client_key_share_ext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1526 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1527 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1528 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1535 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1536 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1537 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1542 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1544 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1545 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
1546 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1547 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1548 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1552 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1553 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1554 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1555 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1556 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1559 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1561 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
1562 s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
1563 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
1564 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1565 SSLerr(SSL_F_ADD_CLIENT_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1572 int ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
1574 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1575 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1578 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1579 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1580 int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1581 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1584 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1585 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
1586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1590 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1591 !ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, pkt)) {
1592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1596 /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
1597 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1600 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
1601 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
1602 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1603 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1610 const unsigned char *plist;
1613 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
1615 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1617 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1618 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1619 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1620 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1626 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1629 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1631 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1632 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1633 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1639 * if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket
1642 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1645 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1646 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1647 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1648 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1652 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1653 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1654 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1655 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1656 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1657 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1658 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1659 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1666 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
1667 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
1668 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1669 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1670 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1671 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1672 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1673 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1674 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1675 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1677 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1683 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1684 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1685 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1686 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1687 const unsigned char *npa;
1688 unsigned int npalen;
1691 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1693 ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1694 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1695 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1696 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1700 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1705 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->hit && !add_client_key_share_ext(s, pkt, al))
1708 if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, pkt, al)) {
1709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1713 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
1715 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1716 * for other cases too.
1718 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1719 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1720 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1721 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
1722 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
1724 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1725 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1726 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1731 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
1732 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1733 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1739 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1740 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1741 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1742 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1743 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1744 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1745 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1746 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1747 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1754 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1762 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1763 * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
1764 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1765 * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
1767 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1769 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
1771 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1773 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
1774 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
1778 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
1780 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
1781 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
1782 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
1785 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
1787 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
1788 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
1789 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1797 * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
1798 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
1799 * returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
1801 static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *al)
1803 const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
1804 unsigned char selected_len = 0;
1806 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
1807 int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1808 s->s3->alpn_proposed,
1809 (unsigned int)s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
1810 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1812 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1813 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1814 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
1815 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1816 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1819 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1820 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1821 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1822 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1825 *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
1833 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1835 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1836 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1837 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1842 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1843 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1844 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1845 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1847 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1853 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1854 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1855 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1856 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1857 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1858 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1859 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1861 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1862 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1863 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1864 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1865 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1866 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1867 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1868 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1869 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1870 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1871 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1872 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1873 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1876 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1877 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1879 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1881 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1882 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1883 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1887 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1890 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1891 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1893 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1896 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1900 * Process the supported_groups extension if present. Returns success if the
1901 * extension is absent, or if it has been successfully processed.
1903 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
1905 static int tls_process_supported_groups(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1907 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1908 PACKET supported_groups_list;
1909 RAW_EXTENSION *suppgroups = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
1910 hello->num_extensions,
1911 TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups);
1913 if (suppgroups == NULL)
1916 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
1917 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&suppgroups->data,
1918 &supported_groups_list)
1919 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
1920 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
1925 && !PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
1926 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist,
1927 &s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length)) {
1935 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
1936 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
1937 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
1938 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
1940 static int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id,
1941 const unsigned char *groups, size_t num_groups,
1946 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
1949 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) {
1950 unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]);
1952 if (group_id == share_id
1953 && (!checkallow || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups,
1954 SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
1959 /* If i == num_groups then not in the list */
1960 return i < num_groups;
1964 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
1965 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1966 * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
1968 static int process_key_share_ext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1970 unsigned int group_id;
1971 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
1972 const unsigned char *clntcurves, *srvrcurves;
1973 size_t clnt_num_curves, srvr_num_curves;
1974 int group_nid, found = 0;
1975 unsigned int curve_flags;
1978 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
1979 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1980 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1984 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
1985 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1986 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
1987 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1991 /* Get our list of supported curves */
1992 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &srvrcurves, &srvr_num_curves)) {
1993 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1994 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
1995 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1999 /* Get the clients list of supported curves */
2000 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) {
2001 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2002 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2003 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2007 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
2008 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
2009 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
2010 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
2011 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2012 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2013 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2018 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
2019 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
2024 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
2025 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 0)) {
2026 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2027 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2028 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
2032 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
2033 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrcurves, srvr_num_curves, 1)) {
2034 /* Share not suitable */
2038 group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
2040 if (group_nid == 0) {
2041 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2042 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT,
2043 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2047 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
2048 /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
2049 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
2051 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
2052 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2053 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2057 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2059 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2060 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2062 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2063 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
2065 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2066 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2067 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2068 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2071 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2074 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
2076 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2077 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2078 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2079 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2080 SSLerr(SSL_F_PROCESS_KEY_SHARE_EXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2091 * Loop through all remaining ClientHello extensions that we collected earlier
2092 * and haven't already processed. For each one parse it and update the SSL
2093 * object as required.
2095 * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
2096 * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
2099 * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
2100 * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
2102 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, int *al)
2105 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2107 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2108 s->servername_done = 0;
2109 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2110 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2111 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2114 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2115 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2116 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
2117 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
2118 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
2119 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
2121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2122 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
2123 ssl_check_for_safari(s, hello);
2124 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2126 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
2127 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
2128 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
2129 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2132 OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
2133 s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
2136 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
2139 * We process the supported_groups extension first so that is done before
2140 * we get to key_share which needs to use the information in it.
2142 if (!tls_process_supported_groups(s, hello)) {
2143 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2148 * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
2149 * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
2152 for (loop = 0; loop < hello->num_extensions; loop++) {
2153 RAW_EXTENSION *currext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[loop];
2155 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2156 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, currext->type,
2157 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2158 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
2159 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2161 if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2162 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s,
2163 &currext->data, al))
2165 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2166 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2169 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
2171 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
2172 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
2173 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
2174 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
2175 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
2176 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
2177 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
2178 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
2179 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
2180 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
2181 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
2182 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
2183 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
2184 * the value of the Host: field.
2185 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
2186 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
2187 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
2189 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
2193 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2194 unsigned int servname_type;
2195 PACKET sni, hostname;
2197 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data, &sni)
2198 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
2199 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
2204 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
2205 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
2206 * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
2208 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
2209 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
2210 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
2212 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
2213 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
2215 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
2216 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
2217 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
2222 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
2223 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2227 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
2228 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2232 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
2233 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2237 s->servername_done = 1;
2240 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
2241 * fall back to a full handshake.
2243 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
2244 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
2245 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
2248 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2249 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
2252 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data, &srp_I))
2255 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
2259 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
2260 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
2262 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
2263 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2270 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2271 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
2273 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&currext->data,
2274 &ec_point_format_list)
2275 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
2280 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
2281 &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2283 session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2284 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2289 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2290 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket
2291 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2292 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2293 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s,
2294 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2295 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data),
2296 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
2297 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2300 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
2301 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
2303 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&currext->data,
2304 &supported_sig_algs)
2305 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
2306 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
2311 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
2312 PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
2316 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2317 if (!PACKET_get_1(&currext->data,
2318 (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
2321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
2322 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2323 const unsigned char *ext_data;
2324 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
2325 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2
2326 (&currext->data, &responder_id_list))
2330 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
2331 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
2333 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids,
2335 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2336 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
2337 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL) {
2338 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2342 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL;
2345 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
2347 PACKET responder_id;
2348 const unsigned char *id_data;
2350 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
2352 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
2356 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
2357 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
2358 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
2359 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
2363 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
2364 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2368 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
2369 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2370 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2375 /* Read in request_extensions */
2376 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(
2377 &currext->data, &exts))
2380 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
2381 ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
2382 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2383 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2384 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2385 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
2386 (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
2387 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
2388 || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
2396 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
2398 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2401 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2402 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg
2403 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2405 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2408 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2409 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2410 * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
2411 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2412 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2413 * anything like that, but this might change).
2415 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2416 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2417 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2418 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2419 * Finished message could have been computed.)
2421 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2425 else if (currext->type
2426 == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
2427 && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2428 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s,
2429 &currext->data, al))
2433 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2435 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
2436 && currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2437 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s,
2438 &currext->data, al))
2442 else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
2443 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
2444 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2445 } else if (currext->type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
2446 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->hit
2447 && !process_key_share_ext(s, &currext->data, al)) {
2451 * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
2452 * tls_check_client_ems_support()
2456 * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
2457 * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
2458 * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
2459 * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
2460 * ServerHello may be later returned.
2463 if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, currext->type,
2464 PACKET_data(&currext->data),
2465 PACKET_remaining(&currext->data), al) <= 0)
2470 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2472 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2473 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2474 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2475 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2476 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2481 * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
2482 * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
2483 * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
2484 * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
2489 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
2492 custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
2493 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, hello, &al) <= 0) {
2494 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2497 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
2498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2506 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2507 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
2508 * fill the length of the block.
2510 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
2512 PACKET tmp_protocol;
2514 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2515 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
2516 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
2524 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2526 unsigned int length, type, size;
2527 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2528 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2531 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2533 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2535 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2536 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
2538 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2540 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2542 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
2545 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
2546 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2550 if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(pkt)) {
2551 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2555 while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
2556 const unsigned char *data;
2559 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
2560 || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
2563 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2564 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2566 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
2567 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2569 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2570 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2571 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
2572 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
2573 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2576 tlsext_servername = 1;
2578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2579 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
2580 unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
2581 if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
2582 || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
2583 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2587 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2588 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2589 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
2590 OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
2591 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2594 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
2595 ecpointformatlist_length;
2596 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
2597 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
2598 ecpointformatlist_length)) {
2599 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2605 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2607 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2608 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2609 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
2610 s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2612 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2615 if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
2616 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2619 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2620 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
2622 * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
2625 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
2626 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2629 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2630 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2634 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
2635 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
2636 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
2638 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp &&
2639 s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2640 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
2641 if (s->tlsext_scts != NULL) {
2642 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_scts);
2643 s->tlsext_scts = NULL;
2645 s->tlsext_scts_len = size;
2647 s->tlsext_scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
2648 if (s->tlsext_scts == NULL) {
2649 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2652 memcpy(s->tlsext_scts, data, size);
2656 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2657 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2658 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
2659 unsigned char *selected;
2660 unsigned char selected_len;
2661 /* We must have requested it. */
2662 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
2663 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2666 /* The data must be valid */
2667 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
2668 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2671 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
2674 ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
2675 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
2676 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2680 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
2681 * a single Serverhello
2683 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
2684 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2685 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
2686 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2689 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2690 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2691 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2695 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
2697 /* We must have requested it. */
2698 if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) {
2699 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2703 * The extension data consists of:
2704 * uint16 list_length
2705 * uint8 proto_length;
2706 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
2708 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
2709 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
2710 || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
2711 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2714 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
2715 s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
2716 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
2717 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2720 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
2721 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2724 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
2726 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
2727 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
2728 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
2732 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
2733 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
2734 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&
2735 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
2736 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
2737 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
2738 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret &&
2739 (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
2740 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
2742 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
2743 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
2744 && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2745 unsigned int group_id;
2747 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
2751 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2756 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &group_id)) {
2757 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2759 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2763 if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
2765 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
2768 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2769 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2770 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
2774 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &encoded_pt)
2775 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
2776 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2778 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2782 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
2783 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2784 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2785 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2790 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
2791 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2793 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
2796 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
2798 * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
2799 * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
2801 } else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
2805 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2806 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2810 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
2811 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
2812 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
2813 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
2814 OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2815 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
2816 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2820 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2829 * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
2830 * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
2831 * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
2832 * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
2833 * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
2835 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2836 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
2837 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2838 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2839 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2845 * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
2848 if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
2849 !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
2850 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2851 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
2859 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2861 s->s3->alpn_sent = 0;
2865 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2870 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2872 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2873 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2875 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2877 * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
2878 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2881 * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
2882 * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2886 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2888 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2889 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2890 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
2891 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2893 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
2895 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2898 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2899 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2902 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2903 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2906 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2907 s->servername_done = 0;
2913 /* Initialise digests to default values */
2914 void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
2916 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
2917 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2918 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2920 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2921 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2922 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2924 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
2925 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
2927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2928 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
2930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2931 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
2932 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
2933 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
2937 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
2942 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
2943 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
2944 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
2945 s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
2946 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2947 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2948 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2949 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2952 /* If sigalgs received process it. */
2953 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
2954 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2955 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2956 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2959 /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
2960 if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
2961 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
2962 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2963 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2967 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2971 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2976 * Upon success, returns 1.
2977 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
2979 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s, int *al)
2981 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2984 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
2985 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
2986 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
2987 * influence which certificate is sent
2989 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2991 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2992 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2993 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2994 if (certpkey != NULL) {
2996 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
2997 * et al can pick it up.
2999 s->cert->key = certpkey;
3000 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
3002 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
3003 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3004 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
3006 /* status request response should be sent */
3007 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
3008 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
3009 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
3011 /* something bad happened */
3012 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3014 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3020 if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, al)) {
3027 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
3029 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
3030 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
3032 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3034 * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
3035 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
3036 * must contain uncompressed.
3038 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3039 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3040 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3041 && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3042 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
3043 && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
3044 && ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
3045 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
3047 unsigned char *list;
3048 int found_uncompressed = 0;
3049 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
3050 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
3051 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
3052 found_uncompressed = 1;
3056 if (!found_uncompressed) {
3057 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
3058 SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
3062 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
3063 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
3065 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3067 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3068 s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3069 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
3070 && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
3072 s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
3074 initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
3077 * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
3078 * that we don't receive a status message
3080 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
3081 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
3082 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
3085 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
3086 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3089 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
3090 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
3093 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
3094 s->servername_done = 0;
3100 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3103 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
3105 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
3106 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3110 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
3111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
3118 * Given a list of extensions that we collected earlier, find one of a given
3119 * type and return it.
3121 * |exts| is the set of extensions previously collected.
3122 * |numexts| is the number of extensions that we have.
3123 * |type| the type of the extension that we are looking for.
3125 * Returns a pointer to the found RAW_EXTENSION data, or NULL if not found.
3127 RAW_EXTENSION *tls_get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION *exts, size_t numexts,
3132 for (loop = 0; loop < numexts; loop++) {
3133 if (exts[loop].type == type)
3141 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
3143 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
3144 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3145 * point to the resulting session.
3147 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
3148 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
3149 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
3152 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3153 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
3154 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
3155 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
3156 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
3157 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
3158 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
3161 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
3162 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
3163 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
3164 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
3165 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
3166 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
3168 int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
3172 const unsigned char *etick;
3174 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
3177 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
3180 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
3181 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
3184 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
3187 ticketext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
3188 hello->num_extensions,
3189 TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
3190 if (ticketext == NULL)
3193 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
3196 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
3199 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3202 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
3204 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
3205 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
3206 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
3207 * calculate the master secret later.
3211 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ticketext->data, &etick, size)) {
3212 /* Shouldn't ever happen */
3215 retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, hello->session_id,
3216 hello->session_id_len, ret);
3218 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3219 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3222 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3225 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3226 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3229 default: /* fatal error */
3235 * Sets the extended master secret flag if the extension is present in the
3236 * ClientHello and we can support it
3241 int tls_check_client_ems_support(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
3243 RAW_EXTENSION *emsext;
3245 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3247 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION
3248 || s->version > TLS1_2_VERSION))
3251 emsext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
3252 hello->num_extensions,
3253 TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret);
3256 * No extensions is a success - we have successfully discovered that the
3257 * client doesn't support EMS.
3262 /* The extensions must always be empty */
3263 if (PACKET_remaining(&emsext->data) != 0)
3266 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
3272 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3274 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3275 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
3276 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3277 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3278 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3279 * point to the resulting session.
3282 * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
3283 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3284 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3285 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3286 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3288 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
3289 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
3290 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
3293 unsigned char *sdec;
3294 const unsigned char *p;
3295 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
3297 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3298 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3299 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
3300 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3302 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3303 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3306 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3311 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3312 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3313 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3324 /* Check key name matches */
3325 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3326 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) != 0) {
3330 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3331 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3332 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
3333 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
3334 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
3335 etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
3341 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
3344 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
3348 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
3350 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
3355 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3356 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
3357 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
3360 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3361 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
3362 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3365 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3366 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3367 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3368 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3369 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3370 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
3371 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
3372 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3376 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
3377 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3382 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3386 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3390 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
3391 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
3392 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
3396 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3397 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3406 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
3410 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3411 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3415 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3422 static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3423 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3424 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3425 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3426 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3427 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3428 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3429 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3430 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3431 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3434 static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3435 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3436 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3437 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
3438 {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
3439 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
3440 {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
3443 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3446 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3447 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3453 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3456 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
3457 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3458 return table[i].nid;
3463 int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3469 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3472 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3475 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
3481 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3483 return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3490 unsigned char tlsext_hash;
3493 static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
3494 {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3495 {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3496 {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3497 {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3498 {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3499 {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
3500 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
3501 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
3502 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
3503 {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
3504 TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
3507 static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
3513 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
3514 if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
3515 return tls12_md_info + i;
3521 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3523 const tls12_hash_info *inf;
3524 if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
3526 inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
3529 return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
3532 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3536 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3537 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3540 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3541 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3544 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3545 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3547 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3548 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
3549 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
3551 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
3552 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
3554 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
3555 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
3561 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3562 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3563 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3565 int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
3566 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3568 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3569 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3571 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3573 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
3574 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3576 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3578 if (psignhash_nid) {
3579 if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
3580 || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
3581 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3585 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
3586 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
3588 /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
3589 const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
3590 if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
3592 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
3593 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3595 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
3596 return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
3600 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
3601 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
3605 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
3607 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
3608 size_t i, sigalgslen;
3609 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
3611 * Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for
3612 * RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
3613 * down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
3615 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
3616 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
3617 switch (sigalgs[1]) {
3618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3619 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3620 if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3624 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3625 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3626 if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3631 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3632 if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
3639 *pmask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
3641 *pmask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
3643 *pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
3646 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
3647 const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
3651 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
3652 if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
3653 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
3654 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
3661 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3662 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3663 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3664 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3666 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3667 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3668 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
3669 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3670 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
3672 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
3673 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
3676 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3677 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3678 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3680 &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
3690 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3691 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3693 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3694 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3696 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3698 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3700 OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
3701 c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
3702 c->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
3703 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3704 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3705 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3706 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3707 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
3708 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3709 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3711 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3712 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
3715 allow = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3716 allowlen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3720 pref = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3721 preflen = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
3723 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3725 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3728 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3732 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3733 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3737 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3739 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, size_t dsize)
3742 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
3743 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3745 /* Should never happen */
3749 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
3750 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3751 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
3753 s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3754 memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3758 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3763 const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
3764 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
3766 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3767 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
3770 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3771 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
3772 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3773 if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
3774 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3776 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3777 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
3778 pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3779 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
3785 * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
3786 * the certificate for signing.
3788 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
3790 * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
3791 * supported it stays as NULL.
3793 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3794 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
3795 pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3797 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3798 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
3799 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
3800 pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
3803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3804 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
3805 pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
3807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3808 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
3809 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
3810 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
3811 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
3812 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
3813 if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
3814 pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
3815 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
3821 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3822 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3823 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3825 const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
3826 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3827 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
3831 if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
3838 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3840 return (int)numsigalgs;
3843 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3844 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3845 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3847 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3848 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
3849 || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
3853 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3855 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3857 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3859 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3861 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3862 return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3865 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3869 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3872 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
3874 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
3875 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3876 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
3877 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3878 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
3879 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3881 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
3882 if (*phash == NID_undef)
3883 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
3887 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3889 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3892 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
3895 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3897 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3899 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3901 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3909 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
3910 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
3912 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
3915 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i += 2) {
3916 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3919 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3920 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3925 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
3926 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
3928 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3932 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3936 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3939 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3941 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3946 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3947 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3949 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
3950 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
3951 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
3953 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3960 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3961 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3962 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3964 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3965 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3966 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3972 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3976 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3980 if (default_nid == -1)
3982 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3984 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3985 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3986 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3991 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3992 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3996 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3997 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
3998 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
4005 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
4006 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
4007 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
4008 * attempting to use them.
4011 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
4013 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
4014 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
4015 /* Strict mode flags */
4016 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
4017 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
4018 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
4020 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
4025 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
4026 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
4029 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
4030 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
4032 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
4035 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
4037 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
4038 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
4040 pk = cpk->privatekey;
4042 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
4043 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
4049 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
4052 pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
4054 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
4055 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
4057 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
4064 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4065 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
4066 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
4067 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
4068 else if (!check_flags)
4073 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
4074 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
4076 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
4078 unsigned char rsign = 0;
4079 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
4081 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
4084 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
4085 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
4086 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
4087 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
4090 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
4091 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
4092 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
4096 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
4097 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
4100 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
4101 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
4102 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
4105 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
4106 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
4107 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
4110 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
4111 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
4112 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
4121 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
4122 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
4124 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
4126 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
4127 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
4128 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
4131 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
4138 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
4139 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid)) {
4143 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
4144 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4145 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4146 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
4148 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4155 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
4156 else if (check_flags)
4157 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
4159 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
4160 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
4161 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
4162 else if (!check_flags)
4165 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4166 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
4167 else if (strict_mode) {
4168 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4169 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4170 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4171 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
4173 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
4180 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
4181 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
4183 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
4185 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
4188 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
4191 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4195 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4199 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4201 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4202 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4204 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
4205 if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
4206 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4210 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4213 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4215 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4217 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4218 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4220 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4221 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4222 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4224 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
4225 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
4226 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4227 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
4228 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4233 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4236 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4238 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4239 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4243 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
4244 if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4245 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4246 else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
4247 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4249 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4252 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
4256 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4259 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4260 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4267 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4268 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4270 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4271 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4272 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4273 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4274 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
4275 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
4276 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
4279 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4280 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4282 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
4285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
4286 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
4288 int dh_secbits = 80;
4289 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
4290 return DH_get_1024_160();
4291 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
4292 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
4297 CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
4298 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
4301 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
4309 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
4310 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
4312 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
4313 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
4321 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
4322 return DH_get_2048_224();
4323 return DH_get_1024_160();
4327 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4330 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
4333 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
4334 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
4335 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
4336 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
4338 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
4341 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
4343 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
4346 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
4348 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
4349 int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
4350 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
4351 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
4353 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
4354 if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
4356 if (md_nid && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)))
4357 secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
4360 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4362 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, md_nid, x);
4365 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
4368 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
4370 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
4371 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4373 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
4374 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
4376 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
4377 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
4382 * Check security of a chain, if sk includes the end entity certificate then
4383 * x is NULL. If vfy is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
4384 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
4387 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
4389 int rv, start_idx, i;
4391 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
4396 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
4400 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
4401 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
4402 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);