2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
20 #include "internal/nelem.h"
22 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
28 tls1_generate_master_secret,
29 tls1_change_cipher_state,
30 tls1_final_finish_mac,
31 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
32 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
34 tls1_export_keying_material,
36 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
37 tls_close_construct_packet,
41 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
45 tls1_generate_master_secret,
46 tls1_change_cipher_state,
47 tls1_final_finish_mac,
48 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
49 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
51 tls1_export_keying_material,
52 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
53 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
54 tls_close_construct_packet,
58 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
62 tls1_generate_master_secret,
63 tls1_change_cipher_state,
64 tls1_final_finish_mac,
65 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
66 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
68 tls1_export_keying_material,
69 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
70 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
71 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
72 tls_close_construct_packet,
76 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
79 tls13_setup_key_block,
80 tls13_generate_master_secret,
81 tls13_change_cipher_state,
82 tls13_final_finish_mac,
83 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
84 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
86 tls13_export_keying_material,
87 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
88 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
89 tls_close_construct_packet,
93 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
96 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
97 * http, the cache would over fill
106 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
112 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
114 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
118 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
123 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
124 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
126 s->version = s->method->version;
132 * Table of group information.
134 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
135 static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list[] = {
136 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
137 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0001}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
138 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0002}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
139 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0003}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
140 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0004}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
141 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0005}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
142 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0006}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
143 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0007}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
144 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0008}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
145 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0009}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
146 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000A}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
147 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000B}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
148 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000C}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
149 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000D}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
150 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000E}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
151 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x000F}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
152 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0010}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
153 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0011}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
154 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0012}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
155 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0013}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
156 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0014}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
157 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0015}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
158 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0016}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
159 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0017}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
160 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0018}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
161 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0019}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
162 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001A}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
163 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001B}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
164 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001C}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
165 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM, 0x001D}, /* X25519 (29) */
166 {EVP_PKEY_X448, 224, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM, 0x001E}, /* X448 (30) */
167 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
168 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
169 /* Security bit values for FFDHE groups are updated as per RFC 7919 */
170 {NID_ffdhe2048, 103, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0100}, /* ffdhe2048 (0x0100) */
171 {NID_ffdhe3072, 125, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0101}, /* ffdhe3072 (0x0101) */
172 {NID_ffdhe4096, 150, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0102}, /* ffdhe4096 (0x0102) */
173 {NID_ffdhe6144, 175, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0103}, /* ffdhe6144 (0x0103) */
174 {NID_ffdhe8192, 192, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0104}, /* ffdhe8192 (0x0104) */
175 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
179 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
180 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
181 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
182 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
183 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
185 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
187 /* The default curves */
188 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
189 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
190 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
191 29, /* X25519 (29) */
192 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
194 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
195 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
197 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
198 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
199 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
200 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
201 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
202 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
205 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
208 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
214 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t group_id)
216 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
219 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 FFDHE group from RFC 8446 */
220 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
221 if (nid_list[i].group_id == group_id)
224 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) */
228 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
229 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
233 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
234 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
235 return nid_list[i].group_id;
239 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
242 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
243 * the number of groups supported.
245 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
248 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
249 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
250 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
251 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
252 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
253 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
254 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
257 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
258 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
262 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
263 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
269 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
270 *pgroups = supported_groups_default;
271 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default);
273 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
274 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
281 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
284 int tls_valid_group(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int version)
286 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(group_id);
288 if (version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
289 if ((ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_ONLY_FOR_TLS1_3) != 0)
295 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
296 int tls_group_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t group, int op)
298 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(group);
299 unsigned char gtmp[2];
303 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
304 if (ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2)
308 if (ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_FFDHE)
311 gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
312 gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
313 return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits, ginfo->nid, (void *)gtmp);
316 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
317 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
320 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
327 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
328 * if there is no match.
329 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
330 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
331 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
333 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
335 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
336 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
339 /* Can't do anything on client side */
343 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
345 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
346 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
348 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
350 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
351 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
352 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
353 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
354 /* Should never happen */
357 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
361 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
362 * otherwise peer decides.
364 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
365 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
366 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
368 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
369 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
372 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
373 uint16_t id = pref[i];
375 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
376 || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
384 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
388 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
389 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
391 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
395 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
396 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
398 unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
399 unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
400 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
403 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
406 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
407 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
410 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
411 unsigned long idmask;
413 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
414 if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
416 idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
417 dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
418 if (!id || ((*dup_list) & idmask))
432 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
435 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
436 # define MAX_GROUPLIST OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)
440 int nid_arr[MAX_GROUPLIST];
443 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
445 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
451 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_GROUPLIST)
453 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
455 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
457 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
458 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
460 if (nid == NID_undef)
461 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
462 if (nid == NID_undef)
463 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
464 if (nid == NID_undef)
466 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
467 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
469 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
472 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
474 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
475 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
477 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
480 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
484 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
490 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
491 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
493 const uint16_t *groups;
499 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
500 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
501 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
503 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
504 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
506 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
507 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
510 /* Should never happen */
515 if (check_own_groups) {
516 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
517 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
518 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
522 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
525 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
529 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
530 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
533 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
534 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
535 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
536 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
540 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
544 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
548 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
550 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
551 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
552 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
554 *pformats = ecformats_default;
555 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
557 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
559 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
563 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
564 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
568 unsigned char comp_id;
571 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
572 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
574 ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
575 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
577 /* Get required compression id */
578 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
579 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
580 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
582 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
587 int field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp));
589 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
590 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
591 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
592 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
597 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
598 * supported (see RFC4492).
600 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
603 for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
604 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
610 /* Return group id of a key */
611 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
613 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
618 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
619 return tls1_nid2group_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp));
623 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
624 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
626 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
630 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
633 /* If not EC nothing to do */
634 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
636 /* Check compression */
637 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
639 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
641 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
644 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
647 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
650 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
654 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
655 if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
656 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
657 else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
658 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
660 return 0; /* Should never happen */
661 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
662 if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
671 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
673 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
675 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
676 * is compatible with the client extensions.
678 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
680 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
682 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
684 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
686 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
689 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
690 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 1);
691 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
692 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384, 1);
699 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
704 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
706 /* Default sigalg schemes */
707 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
709 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
710 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
711 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
712 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
716 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
717 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
718 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
719 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
720 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
721 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
723 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
724 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
725 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
728 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
729 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
731 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
732 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
733 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
734 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
735 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
737 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
738 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
739 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
742 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
743 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
744 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
749 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
750 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
751 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
755 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
757 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
758 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
759 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
760 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
761 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
762 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
763 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
764 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
765 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
766 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
767 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
768 NID_undef, NID_undef},
769 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
770 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
771 NID_undef, NID_undef},
772 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
773 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
774 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef},
775 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
776 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
777 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
779 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
780 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
781 NID_undef, NID_undef},
782 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
783 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
784 NID_undef, NID_undef},
785 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
786 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
787 NID_undef, NID_undef},
788 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
789 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
790 NID_undef, NID_undef},
791 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
792 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
793 NID_undef, NID_undef},
794 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
795 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
796 NID_undef, NID_undef},
797 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
798 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
799 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
800 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
801 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
802 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
803 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
804 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
805 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
806 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
807 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
808 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
809 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
810 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
811 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
812 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
813 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
814 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
815 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
816 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
817 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
818 NID_undef, NID_undef},
819 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
820 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
821 NID_undef, NID_undef},
822 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
823 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
824 NID_undef, NID_undef},
825 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
826 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
827 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
830 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
831 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
832 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
833 NID_undef, NID_undef},
834 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
835 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
836 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
837 NID_undef, NID_undef},
838 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
839 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
840 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
841 NID_undef, NID_undef}
844 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
845 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
846 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
847 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
848 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
853 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
854 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
856 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
857 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
858 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
859 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
860 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
861 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
862 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
863 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
864 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
865 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
868 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
869 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
872 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
874 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
876 if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
881 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
882 int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
887 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
888 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
891 md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
901 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
903 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
904 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
905 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
907 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
908 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(const RSA *rsa, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
914 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md) || md == NULL)
916 if (RSA_size(rsa) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
922 * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
923 * is fixed by the certificate type.
925 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
931 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
932 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
933 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
935 if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
942 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
944 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
947 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
949 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
956 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
959 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
961 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
962 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
964 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
968 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
970 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
971 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
974 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
976 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
978 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
981 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
985 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
988 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
992 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
993 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
994 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
995 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
997 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
998 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1001 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1002 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
1007 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1008 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1009 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1011 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
1012 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1013 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1014 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1015 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1016 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1018 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1019 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1023 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1025 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1026 * specified EC curve.
1028 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
1030 const uint16_t *sigs;
1033 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1034 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1035 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1037 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1038 siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1041 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
1042 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigs[i]);
1046 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
1047 && lu->curve != NID_undef
1048 && curve == lu->curve)
1057 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1058 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1061 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1063 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1064 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1066 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1067 int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
1068 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1070 /* Should never happen */
1073 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1074 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1075 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1076 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1077 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1080 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1081 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1082 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1084 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
1086 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1087 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1090 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1091 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1092 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1093 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1094 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1097 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1098 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey), &cidx)
1099 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1100 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1101 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1105 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1106 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1108 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1109 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1110 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1111 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1112 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1116 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1117 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1118 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
1119 int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
1121 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1122 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1123 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1127 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1128 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1129 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1130 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1131 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1134 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1135 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1136 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1137 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1138 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1139 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1140 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1145 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1146 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1147 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1152 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1153 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1154 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1155 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1158 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1159 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1160 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1161 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1162 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1165 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
1166 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1167 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1172 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1173 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1175 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1176 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1177 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1178 EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
1179 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1180 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1181 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1185 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1186 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1190 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1192 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1194 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1198 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1200 if (s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1202 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
1207 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1208 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1209 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1211 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1214 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1216 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1218 s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
1219 s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
1220 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1221 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
1222 &s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1224 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1225 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1226 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1227 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1228 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1230 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1231 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1232 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1233 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1234 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1241 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1242 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1243 * @c: cipher to check
1244 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1245 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1247 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1249 int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1251 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
1252 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
1254 if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
1256 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1257 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1260 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1261 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1263 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1264 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1265 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1267 if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
1270 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
1271 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
1274 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1277 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1279 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1281 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1284 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1288 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1289 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1290 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1291 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1292 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1293 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1294 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1296 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1297 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1299 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1300 && s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1301 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1302 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1304 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1305 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1310 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1311 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1312 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1313 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1321 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1322 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1323 SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1326 if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1329 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1330 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1331 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1336 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1338 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1339 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1340 * point to the resulting session.
1342 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1346 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1349 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1352 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1353 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1356 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1357 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1359 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1360 if (!ticketext->present)
1361 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1363 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1365 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1366 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1370 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1372 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1373 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1374 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1375 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1378 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1379 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1380 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1381 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1382 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1383 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1385 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1386 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1387 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1388 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1389 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1390 * point to the resulting session.
1392 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1393 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1394 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1396 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1397 unsigned char *sdec;
1398 const unsigned char *p;
1399 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1400 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1402 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1403 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1404 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1405 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1407 if (eticklen == 0) {
1409 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1410 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1412 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1415 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1417 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1418 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1419 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1420 * calculate the master secret later.
1422 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1426 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1427 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1428 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1432 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1433 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1435 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1438 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1440 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1443 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
1444 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1445 int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
1446 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1449 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1453 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1459 /* Check key name matches */
1460 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1461 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1462 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1465 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1466 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1467 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1468 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1469 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1470 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1471 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1474 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1478 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1481 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1483 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1487 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1489 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1490 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1494 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1495 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1496 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1497 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1501 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1502 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1505 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1506 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1507 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1508 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1509 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1510 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1511 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1513 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1516 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1518 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1524 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1528 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1530 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1532 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1536 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1537 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1538 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1542 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1543 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1546 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1548 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1553 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1555 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1558 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1559 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1562 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1563 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1564 * performs any action
1566 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
1567 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1568 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1569 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1570 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
1571 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
1574 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
1575 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
1576 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
1578 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
1580 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
1581 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1584 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
1585 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1586 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1590 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
1591 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1592 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1593 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
1594 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1598 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
1599 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
1600 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1601 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
1602 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1603 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
1604 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1606 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1610 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1614 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1616 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1617 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1618 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
1619 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1628 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1629 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1631 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1634 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1635 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
1637 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1638 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1640 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1641 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
1642 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1643 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1644 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
1647 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1648 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx))
1651 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
1652 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
1653 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
1654 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
1655 if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1658 && s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1659 && s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1661 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1664 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
1665 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
1666 * ciphersuites enabled.
1669 if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
1672 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1673 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
1674 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
1675 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1677 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1678 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
1679 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
1682 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kGOST) != 0)
1690 if (lu->hash == NID_undef)
1692 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1693 secbits = EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu->hash_idx)) * 4;
1694 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1695 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
1696 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
1697 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
1701 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1702 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1706 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1708 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1709 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1710 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
1712 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1715 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1716 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
1717 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
1718 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1723 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
1727 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1728 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
1729 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1730 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
1732 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
1735 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1736 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1741 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1742 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1744 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1746 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1749 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1750 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1752 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1753 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
1754 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
1755 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
1759 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
1763 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1764 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
1765 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1766 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1768 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
1769 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1770 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1771 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
1773 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1774 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
1776 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1777 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1788 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1789 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1791 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
1792 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1794 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1796 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1798 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1799 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1800 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1801 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1802 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1803 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1804 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1805 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1806 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1807 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1809 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1810 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1813 allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1814 allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1818 pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1819 preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1821 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1823 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
1824 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1827 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1831 s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1832 s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1836 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
1842 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1844 /* Invalid data length */
1845 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
1850 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
1851 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1854 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1862 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
1869 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
1871 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1872 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1874 /* Should never happen */
1875 if (s->cert == NULL)
1879 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
1880 &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
1882 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
1883 &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
1887 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1889 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1892 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
1894 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1897 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1900 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1901 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
1902 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
1904 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1905 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1907 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1908 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx))
1909 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1914 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1915 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1916 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1918 uint16_t *psig = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1919 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1920 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1923 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1925 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
1929 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
1931 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
1932 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1934 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
1936 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
1937 if (psignhash != NULL)
1938 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
1940 return (int)numsigalgs;
1943 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1944 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1945 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1947 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
1948 if (s->shared_sigalgs == NULL
1950 || idx >= (int)s->shared_sigalgslen
1951 || s->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1953 shsigalgs = s->shared_sigalgs[idx];
1955 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
1957 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
1958 if (psignhash != NULL)
1959 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
1961 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
1963 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
1964 return (int)s->shared_sigalgslen;
1967 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1968 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1972 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
1973 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
1976 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
1978 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1979 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1980 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
1981 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1982 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
1983 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
1984 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
1985 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
1987 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
1988 if (*phash == NID_undef)
1989 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
1992 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
1993 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
1995 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
1997 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
1999 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
2000 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
2001 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2004 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
2006 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
2008 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
2010 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
2012 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2013 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2014 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2015 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2016 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2017 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2021 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2023 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
2024 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2028 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2035 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
2036 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
2037 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
2039 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2041 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
2042 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2046 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2050 /* Reject duplicates */
2051 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
2052 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
2061 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2062 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2064 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
2068 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2072 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2075 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2080 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2081 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2084 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2087 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2088 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2089 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2091 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2092 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2093 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2099 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2101 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2106 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2107 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2110 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2112 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2113 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2114 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2116 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2118 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2119 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2124 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2129 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2130 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2131 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2133 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2134 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2135 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2141 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2145 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2149 if (default_nid == -1)
2151 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2153 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2154 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
2155 if (sig_nid == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
2160 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2161 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2165 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2166 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2167 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2174 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2175 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2176 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2177 * attempting to use them.
2180 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2182 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2183 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2184 /* Strict mode flags */
2185 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2186 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2187 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2189 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
2194 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2195 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2198 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2199 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2201 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2204 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2206 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2207 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2209 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2211 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2212 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2221 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2224 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2226 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2227 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2229 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2236 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2237 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2238 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2239 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2240 else if (!check_flags)
2245 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2246 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2248 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
2251 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2252 || s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2254 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2258 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2259 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2262 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2263 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2264 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2268 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2269 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2272 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2273 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2274 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2277 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2278 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2279 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2282 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2283 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2284 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2293 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2294 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2296 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2298 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2299 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2300 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
2302 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2305 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2312 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2313 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
2317 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2318 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2319 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2320 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2322 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2329 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2330 else if (check_flags)
2331 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2333 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2334 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2335 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2336 else if (!check_flags)
2339 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2340 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2341 else if (strict_mode) {
2342 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2343 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2344 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2345 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2347 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2354 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2355 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2357 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2359 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2362 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2365 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2369 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
2372 for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2373 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2374 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2378 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2381 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2384 ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
2386 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2387 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2389 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2390 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2391 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2393 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2394 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2395 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2396 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2397 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2402 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2405 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2407 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2408 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2412 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2413 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2415 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2418 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2422 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2425 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2426 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2433 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2434 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2436 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2437 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2438 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2439 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2440 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2441 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2442 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2443 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2444 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2447 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2448 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2450 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2454 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2456 int dh_secbits = 80;
2457 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2458 return DH_get_1024_160();
2459 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2460 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2465 if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
2467 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
2470 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2476 if (g == NULL || !BN_set_word(g, 2)) {
2481 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2482 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2484 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2485 if (p == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2493 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2494 return DH_get_2048_224();
2495 return DH_get_1024_160();
2499 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2502 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2505 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2506 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2507 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2508 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2510 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2513 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2515 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2518 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2520 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2521 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2522 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2523 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2525 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2527 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2528 if (nid == NID_undef)
2531 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2533 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2536 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2539 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2541 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2542 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2544 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2545 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2547 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2548 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2553 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2554 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2555 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2558 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2560 int rv, start_idx, i;
2562 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2567 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2571 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2572 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2573 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
2581 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2582 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2585 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2587 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2588 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
2590 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2592 || (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
2593 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
2594 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
2597 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
2601 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
2602 * with signature scheme |sig|.
2603 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
2604 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
2605 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
2607 static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
2609 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2610 int mdnid, pknid, supported;
2613 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override lu->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
2616 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
2618 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2619 for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
2620 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
2622 || !X509_get_signature_info(s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509, &mdnid,
2625 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
2626 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
2627 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
2628 * signing certificate.
2630 || mdnid != lu->hash
2631 || pknid != lu->sig)
2635 supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey,
2639 else if (supported < 0)
2641 /* If it didn't report a mandatory NID, for whatever reasons,
2642 * just clear the error and allow all hashes to be used. */
2649 supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey,
2653 else if (supported < 0)
2660 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2661 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2663 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
2664 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
2666 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2667 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2668 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2670 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
2672 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2675 s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
2676 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
2678 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2684 /* Look for a certificate matching shared sigalgs */
2685 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2686 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2689 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2690 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
2691 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
2692 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
2693 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2695 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
2696 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL) || !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
2698 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2701 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2703 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2705 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
2710 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2711 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2714 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
2715 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey), lu))
2720 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
2723 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2724 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2728 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2729 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
2731 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
2734 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2736 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2740 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2741 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
2742 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2743 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2750 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2753 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2754 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2757 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
2760 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
2762 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2763 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
2766 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
2767 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
2769 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2770 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2771 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
2773 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey), lu))
2776 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2777 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
2781 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
2784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2785 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2786 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2791 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2793 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2794 size_t sent_sigslen;
2796 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2799 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2800 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2804 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2805 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
2806 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
2807 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
2808 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
2811 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
2814 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2815 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2816 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2821 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2824 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2825 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2831 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2832 s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
2833 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
2834 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
2838 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
2840 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2841 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
2842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
2843 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
2847 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
2851 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
2853 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2854 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
2855 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
2856 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
2860 ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
2864 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
2866 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;