2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 #include <openssl/objects.h>
13 #include <openssl/evp.h>
14 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
15 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
16 #include <openssl/conf.h>
17 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
18 #include <openssl/dh.h>
19 #include <openssl/bn.h>
20 #include "internal/nelem.h"
21 #include "ssl_local.h"
22 #include <openssl/ct.h>
24 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
25 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu);
27 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
31 tls1_generate_master_secret,
32 tls1_change_cipher_state,
33 tls1_final_finish_mac,
34 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
35 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
37 tls1_export_keying_material,
39 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
40 tls_close_construct_packet,
44 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
48 tls1_generate_master_secret,
49 tls1_change_cipher_state,
50 tls1_final_finish_mac,
51 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
52 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
54 tls1_export_keying_material,
55 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
56 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
57 tls_close_construct_packet,
61 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
65 tls1_generate_master_secret,
66 tls1_change_cipher_state,
67 tls1_final_finish_mac,
68 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
69 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
71 tls1_export_keying_material,
72 SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
73 | SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
74 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
75 tls_close_construct_packet,
79 SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
82 tls13_setup_key_block,
83 tls13_generate_master_secret,
84 tls13_change_cipher_state,
85 tls13_final_finish_mac,
86 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
87 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
89 tls13_export_keying_material,
90 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
91 ssl3_set_handshake_header,
92 tls_close_construct_packet,
96 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
99 * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for
100 * http, the cache would over fill
102 return (60 * 60 * 2);
109 if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s))
115 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
117 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
121 int tls1_clear(SSL *s)
126 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION)
127 s->version = TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL;
129 s->version = s->method->version;
135 * Table of group information.
137 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
138 static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list[] = {
139 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
140 {NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0001}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
141 {NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0002}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
142 {NID_sect163r2, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0003}, /* sect163r2 (3) */
143 {NID_sect193r1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0004}, /* sect193r1 (4) */
144 {NID_sect193r2, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0005}, /* sect193r2 (5) */
145 {NID_sect233k1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0006}, /* sect233k1 (6) */
146 {NID_sect233r1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0007}, /* sect233r1 (7) */
147 {NID_sect239k1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0008}, /* sect239k1 (8) */
148 {NID_sect283k1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x0009}, /* sect283k1 (9) */
149 {NID_sect283r1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000A}, /* sect283r1 (10) */
150 {NID_sect409k1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000B}, /* sect409k1 (11) */
151 {NID_sect409r1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000C}, /* sect409r1 (12) */
152 {NID_sect571k1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000D}, /* sect571k1 (13) */
153 {NID_sect571r1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2, 0x000E}, /* sect571r1 (14) */
154 {NID_secp160k1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x000F}, /* secp160k1 (15) */
155 {NID_secp160r1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0010}, /* secp160r1 (16) */
156 {NID_secp160r2, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0011}, /* secp160r2 (17) */
157 {NID_secp192k1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0012}, /* secp192k1 (18) */
158 {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 80, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0013}, /* secp192r1 (19) */
159 {NID_secp224k1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0014}, /* secp224k1 (20) */
160 {NID_secp224r1, 112, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0015}, /* secp224r1 (21) */
161 {NID_secp256k1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0016}, /* secp256k1 (22) */
162 {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0017}, /* secp256r1 (23) */
163 {NID_secp384r1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0018}, /* secp384r1 (24) */
164 {NID_secp521r1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x0019}, /* secp521r1 (25) */
165 {NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001A}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
166 {NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001B}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
167 {NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_PRIME, 0x001C}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
168 {EVP_PKEY_X25519, 128, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM, 0x001D}, /* X25519 (29) */
169 {EVP_PKEY_X448, 224, TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CUSTOM, 0x001E}, /* X448 (30) */
170 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
171 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
172 /* Security bit values for FFDHE groups are updated as per RFC 7919 */
173 {NID_ffdhe2048, 103, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0100}, /* ffdhe2048 (0x0100) */
174 {NID_ffdhe3072, 125, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0101}, /* ffdhe3072 (0x0101) */
175 {NID_ffdhe4096, 150, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0102}, /* ffdhe4096 (0x0102) */
176 {NID_ffdhe6144, 175, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0103}, /* ffdhe6144 (0x0103) */
177 {NID_ffdhe8192, 192, TLS_GROUP_FFDHE_FOR_TLS1_3, 0x0104}, /* ffdhe8192 (0x0104) */
178 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
183 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
184 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
185 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
186 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
188 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
190 /* The default curves */
191 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
192 static const uint16_t supported_groups_default[] = {
193 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
194 29, /* X25519 (29) */
195 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
197 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
198 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
200 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
201 0x100, /* ffdhe2048 (0x100) */
202 0x101, /* ffdhe3072 (0x101) */
203 0x102, /* ffdhe4096 (0x102) */
204 0x103, /* ffdhe6144 (0x103) */
205 0x104, /* ffdhe8192 (0x104) */
208 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
210 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
211 static const uint16_t suiteb_curves[] = {
217 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t group_id)
219 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
222 /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 FFDHE group from RFC 8446 */
223 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
224 if (nid_list[i].group_id == group_id)
227 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) */
231 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC)
232 int tls1_group_id2nid(uint16_t group_id)
234 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = tls1_group_id_lookup(group_id);
236 return ginf == NULL ? NID_undef : ginf->nid;
239 static uint16_t tls1_nid2group_id(int nid)
243 for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
244 if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
245 return nid_list[i].group_id;
249 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
252 * Set *pgroups to the supported groups list and *pgroupslen to
253 * the number of groups supported.
255 void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups,
258 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
259 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
260 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
261 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
262 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
263 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
264 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_curves);
267 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
268 *pgroups = suiteb_curves;
272 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
273 *pgroups = suiteb_curves + 1;
279 if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) {
280 *pgroups = supported_groups_default;
281 *pgroupslen = OSSL_NELEM(supported_groups_default);
283 *pgroups = s->ext.supportedgroups;
284 *pgroupslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
291 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
294 int tls_valid_group(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int version)
296 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(group_id);
298 if (version < TLS1_3_VERSION) {
299 if ((ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_ONLY_FOR_TLS1_3) != 0)
305 /* See if group is allowed by security callback */
306 int tls_group_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t group, int op)
308 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginfo = tls1_group_id_lookup(group);
309 unsigned char gtmp[2];
313 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
314 if (ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_CURVE_CHAR2)
318 if (ginfo->flags & TLS_GROUP_FFDHE)
321 gtmp[0] = group >> 8;
322 gtmp[1] = group & 0xff;
323 return ssl_security(s, op, ginfo->secbits, ginfo->nid, (void *)gtmp);
326 /* Return 1 if "id" is in "list" */
327 static int tls1_in_list(uint16_t id, const uint16_t *list, size_t listlen)
330 for (i = 0; i < listlen; i++)
337 * For nmatch >= 0, return the id of the |nmatch|th shared group or 0
338 * if there is no match.
339 * For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
340 * For nmatch == -2, return the id of the group to use for
341 * a tmp key, or 0 if there is no match.
343 uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
345 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
346 size_t num_pref, num_supp, i;
349 /* Can't do anything on client side */
353 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
355 * For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we already know
356 * these are acceptable due to previous checks.
358 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
360 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
361 return TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
362 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
363 return TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
364 /* Should never happen */
367 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
371 * If server preference set, our groups are the preference order
372 * otherwise peer decides.
374 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
375 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
376 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
378 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &pref, &num_pref);
379 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &supp, &num_supp);
382 for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++) {
383 uint16_t id = pref[i];
385 if (!tls1_in_list(id, supp, num_supp)
386 || !tls_group_allowed(s, id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
394 /* Out of range (nmatch > k). */
398 int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen,
399 int *groups, size_t ngroups)
401 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
405 * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: two variables are added
406 * to detect duplicates as some values are more than 32.
408 unsigned long *dup_list = NULL;
409 unsigned long dup_list_egrp = 0;
410 unsigned long dup_list_dhgrp = 0;
413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
416 if ((glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(*glist))) == NULL) {
417 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_GROUPS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
420 for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
421 unsigned long idmask;
423 id = tls1_nid2group_id(groups[i]);
424 if ((id & 0x00FF) >= (sizeof(unsigned long) * 8))
426 idmask = 1L << (id & 0x00FF);
427 dup_list = (id < 0x100) ? &dup_list_egrp : &dup_list_dhgrp;
428 if (!id || ((*dup_list) & idmask))
442 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
445 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
446 # define MAX_GROUPLIST OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)
450 int nid_arr[MAX_GROUPLIST];
453 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
455 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
461 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_GROUPLIST)
463 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
465 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
467 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
468 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
470 if (nid == NID_undef)
471 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
472 if (nid == NID_undef)
473 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
474 if (nid == NID_undef)
476 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
477 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
479 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
482 #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) */
484 /* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
485 int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
487 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
490 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
494 return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
500 /* Check a group id matches preferences */
501 int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_groups)
503 const uint16_t *groups;
509 /* Check for Suite B compliance */
510 if (tls1_suiteb(s) && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) {
511 unsigned long cid = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->id;
513 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) {
514 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
516 } else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) {
517 if (group_id != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
520 /* Should never happen */
525 if (check_own_groups) {
526 /* Check group is one of our preferences */
527 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
528 if (!tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len))
532 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))
535 /* For clients, nothing more to check */
539 /* Check group is one of peers preferences */
540 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &groups, &groups_len);
543 * RFC 4492 does not require the supported elliptic curves extension
544 * so if it is not sent we can just choose any curve.
545 * It is invalid to send an empty list in the supported groups
546 * extension, so groups_len == 0 always means no extension.
550 return tls1_in_list(group_id, groups, groups_len);
553 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
554 void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
558 * If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
560 if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
561 *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
562 *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
564 *pformats = ecformats_default;
565 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
567 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
569 *num_formats = sizeof(ecformats_default);
573 /* Check a key is compatible with compression extension */
574 static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
578 unsigned char comp_id;
581 /* If not an EC key nothing to check */
582 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
584 ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
585 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
587 /* Get required compression id */
588 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
589 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
590 } else if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
592 * ec_point_formats extension is not used in TLSv1.3 so we ignore
597 int field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(grp));
599 if (field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
600 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
601 else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
602 comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
607 * If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
608 * supported (see RFC4492).
610 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL)
613 for (i = 0; i < s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; i++) {
614 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats[i] == comp_id)
620 /* Return group id of a key */
621 static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
623 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
628 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
629 return tls1_nid2group_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp));
633 * Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
634 * certificates have compatible curves and compression.
636 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
640 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
643 /* If not EC nothing to do */
644 if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
646 /* Check compression */
647 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
649 group_id = tls1_get_group_id(pkey);
651 * For a server we allow the certificate to not be in our list of supported
654 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, group_id, !s->server))
657 * Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
660 if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
664 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
665 if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
666 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
667 else if (group_id == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
668 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
670 return 0; /* Should never happen */
671 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
672 if (check_md == s->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
681 * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
683 * @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
685 * Checks that the kECDHE cipher suite we're considering using
686 * is compatible with the client extensions.
688 * Returns 0 when the cipher can't be used or 1 when it can.
690 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
692 /* If not Suite B just need a shared group */
694 return tls1_shared_group(s, 0) != 0;
696 * If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
699 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
700 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_256, 1);
701 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
702 return tls1_check_group_id(s, TLSEXT_curve_P_384, 1);
709 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
714 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
716 /* Default sigalg schemes */
717 static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
719 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
720 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
721 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
722 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
726 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
727 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
728 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
729 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
730 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
731 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
733 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
734 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
735 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
738 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
739 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
741 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
742 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
744 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
745 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
747 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
748 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
749 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
752 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
753 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
754 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
759 static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
760 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
761 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
765 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
767 {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
768 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
769 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
770 {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
771 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
772 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
773 {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
774 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
775 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
776 {"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
777 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
778 NID_undef, NID_undef},
779 {"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
780 NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
781 NID_undef, NID_undef},
782 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
783 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
784 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef},
785 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
786 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
787 NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
789 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
790 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
791 NID_undef, NID_undef},
792 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
793 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
794 NID_undef, NID_undef},
795 {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
796 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
797 NID_undef, NID_undef},
798 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
799 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
800 NID_undef, NID_undef},
801 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384,
802 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
803 NID_undef, NID_undef},
804 {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512,
805 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
806 NID_undef, NID_undef},
807 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
808 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
809 NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
810 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
811 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
812 NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
813 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
814 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
815 NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
816 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224,
817 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
818 NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
819 {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
820 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
821 NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
822 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
823 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
824 NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
825 NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
826 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
827 NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
828 NID_undef, NID_undef},
829 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
830 NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
831 NID_undef, NID_undef},
832 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224,
833 NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
834 NID_undef, NID_undef},
835 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
836 NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
837 NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
839 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
840 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
841 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
842 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
843 NID_undef, NID_undef},
844 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
845 NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
846 NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
847 NID_undef, NID_undef},
848 {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
849 NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
850 NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
851 NID_undef, NID_undef}
854 /* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
855 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
856 "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
857 NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
858 EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
863 * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
864 * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
866 static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
867 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
868 0, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN */
869 TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
870 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
871 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
872 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
873 TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
874 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
875 0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
878 /* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
879 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
882 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
884 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
886 if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
891 /* Lookup hash: return 0 if invalid or not enabled */
892 int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd)
897 /* lu->hash == NID_undef means no associated digest */
898 if (lu->hash == NID_undef) {
901 md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
911 * Check if key is large enough to generate RSA-PSS signature.
913 * The key must greater than or equal to 2 * hash length + 2.
914 * SHA512 has a hash length of 64 bytes, which is incompatible
915 * with a 128 byte (1024 bit) key.
917 #define RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md) (2 * EVP_MD_size(md) + 2)
918 static int rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(const RSA *rsa, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
924 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md) || md == NULL)
926 if (RSA_size(rsa) < RSA_PSS_MINIMUM_KEY_SIZE(md))
932 * Returns a signature algorithm when the peer did not send a list of supported
933 * signature algorithms. The signature algorithm is fixed for the certificate
934 * type. |idx| is a certificate type index (SSL_PKEY_*). When |idx| is -1 the
935 * certificate type from |s| will be used.
936 * Returns the signature algorithm to use, or NULL on error.
938 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
944 /* Work out index corresponding to ciphersuite */
945 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
946 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(i);
948 if (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) {
955 * Some GOST ciphersuites allow more than one signature algorithms
957 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST01 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aGOST01) {
960 for (real_idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512; real_idx >= SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
962 if (s->cert->pkeys[real_idx].privatekey != NULL) {
969 idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
972 if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
974 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
975 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
977 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
979 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
983 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, &legacy_rsa_sigalg))
985 return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
987 /* Set peer sigalg based key type */
988 int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
991 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
993 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
995 lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
998 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1002 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
1005 * If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
1008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1009 switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1010 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
1011 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1012 return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
1014 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
1015 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
1018 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
1019 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
1024 * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
1025 * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
1026 * determining which shared algorithm to use.
1028 if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
1029 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
1030 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
1031 } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1032 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1033 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1035 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1036 return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1040 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1042 * Called by servers only. Checks that we have a sig alg that supports the
1043 * specified EC curve.
1045 int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve)
1047 const uint16_t *sigs;
1050 if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
1051 sigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
1052 siglen = s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
1054 sigs = tls12_sigalgs;
1055 siglen = OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
1058 for (i = 0; i < siglen; i++) {
1059 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigs[i]);
1063 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC
1064 && lu->curve != NID_undef
1065 && curve == lu->curve)
1074 * Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
1075 * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
1078 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
1080 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1081 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1083 size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
1084 int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
1085 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1087 /* Should never happen */
1090 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1091 /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
1092 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
1093 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1094 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1097 /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
1098 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1099 pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1101 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
1103 * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1/SHA224 with TLS 1.3. Check key type
1104 * is consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
1107 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->hash == NID_sha224))
1108 || (pkeyid != lu->sig
1109 && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
1110 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1111 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1114 /* Check the sigalg is consistent with the key OID */
1115 if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey), &cidx)
1116 || lu->sig_idx != (int)cidx) {
1117 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1118 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1123 if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
1125 /* Check point compression is permitted */
1126 if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey)) {
1127 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1128 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1129 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
1133 /* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
1134 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1135 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
1136 int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
1138 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
1139 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1140 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1144 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1145 /* Check curve matches extensions */
1146 if (!tls1_check_group_id(s, tls1_get_group_id(pkey), 1)) {
1147 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1148 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1151 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1152 /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
1153 if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
1154 && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
1155 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1156 SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1157 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1162 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1163 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1164 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1169 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
1170 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1171 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
1172 if (sig == *sent_sigs)
1175 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
1176 if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
1177 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
1178 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1179 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1182 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
1183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1184 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
1189 * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical
1190 * reasons we have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
1192 sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
1193 sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
1194 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
1195 EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
1196 (void *)sigalgstr)) {
1197 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
1198 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
1202 /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
1203 s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
1207 int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1209 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
1211 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
1215 int SSL_get_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
1217 if (s->s3.tmp.sigalg == NULL)
1219 *pnid = s->s3.tmp.sigalg->sig;
1224 * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
1225 * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
1226 * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
1228 * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
1231 * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
1233 int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
1235 s->s3.tmp.mask_a = 0;
1236 s->s3.tmp.mask_k = 0;
1237 ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3.tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
1238 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3.tmp.min_ver,
1239 &s->s3.tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
1241 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1242 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1243 if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
1244 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1245 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
1247 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1248 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1249 if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
1250 s->s3.tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
1251 s->s3.tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kSRP;
1258 * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
1259 * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
1260 * @c: cipher to check
1261 * @op: Security check that you want to do
1262 * @ecdhe: If set to 1 then TLSv1 ECDHE ciphers are also allowed in SSLv3
1264 * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
1266 int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int ecdhe)
1268 if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3.tmp.mask_k
1269 || c->algorithm_auth & s->s3.tmp.mask_a)
1271 if (s->s3.tmp.max_ver == 0)
1273 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1274 int min_tls = c->min_tls;
1277 * For historical reasons we will allow ECHDE to be selected by a server
1278 * in SSLv3 if we are a client
1280 if (min_tls == TLS1_VERSION && ecdhe
1281 && (c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) != 0)
1282 min_tls = SSL3_VERSION;
1284 if ((min_tls > s->s3.tmp.max_ver) || (c->max_tls < s->s3.tmp.min_ver))
1287 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3.tmp.max_ver)
1288 || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3.tmp.min_ver)))
1291 return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
1294 int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
1296 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1298 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
1301 int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1305 /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
1306 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1307 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1308 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1309 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
1310 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1311 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1313 * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
1314 * the default algorithm for each certificate type
1316 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs == NULL
1317 && s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
1318 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
1319 size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
1321 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1322 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
1327 /* Check default matches a type we sent */
1328 for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
1329 if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
1330 s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1338 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1339 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1340 SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1343 if (s->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
1346 /* Fatal error if no shared signature algorithms */
1347 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
1348 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
1353 * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
1355 * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
1356 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1357 * point to the resulting session.
1359 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
1363 RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
1366 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1369 * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
1370 * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
1373 if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
1374 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1376 ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
1377 if (!ticketext->present)
1378 return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1380 size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
1382 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
1383 hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
1387 * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
1389 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set and we're not doing TLSv1.3 then we are
1390 * expecting a pre-shared key ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for
1391 * session tickets and one will never be decrypted, nor will
1392 * s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
1395 * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
1396 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
1397 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
1398 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
1399 * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
1400 * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
1402 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
1403 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
1404 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
1405 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
1406 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
1407 * point to the resulting session.
1409 SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
1410 size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
1411 size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
1413 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1414 unsigned char *sdec;
1415 const unsigned char *p;
1416 int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
1417 SSL_TICKET_STATUS ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1419 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1420 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
1421 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
1422 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
1424 if (eticklen == 0) {
1426 * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
1427 * one (TLSv1.2 and below), or treated as a fatal error in TLSv1.3
1429 ret = SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
1432 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1434 * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
1435 * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
1436 * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
1437 * calculate the master secret later.
1439 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1443 /* Need at least keyname + iv */
1444 if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
1445 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1449 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1450 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
1452 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1455 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
1457 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
1460 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
1461 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1462 int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick,
1463 nctick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH,
1466 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1470 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1476 /* Check key name matches */
1477 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
1478 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
1479 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1482 if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
1483 sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
1484 EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
1485 || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
1486 tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
1487 etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
1488 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1491 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1495 * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
1498 mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
1500 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1504 /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
1506 TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
1507 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1511 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1512 if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
1513 || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
1514 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1518 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
1519 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1522 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1523 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1524 p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1525 eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
1526 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1527 if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
1528 (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
1530 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1533 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
1535 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1541 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1545 /* Some additional consistency checks */
1547 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1549 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1553 * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
1554 * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
1555 * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by
1559 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1560 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1563 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1565 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1570 * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
1572 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1575 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
1576 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
1579 * If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is called unless a fatal error was
1580 * detected above. The callback is responsible for checking |ret| before it
1581 * performs any action
1583 if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL
1584 && (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY
1585 || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT
1586 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1587 || ret == SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)) {
1588 size_t keyname_len = eticklen;
1591 if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
1592 keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
1593 retcb = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, sess, etick, keyname_len,
1595 s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
1597 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_ABORT:
1598 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1601 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE:
1602 ret = SSL_TICKET_NONE;
1603 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1607 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_IGNORE_RENEW:
1608 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_EMPTY && ret != SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1609 ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
1610 /* else the value of |ret| will already do the right thing */
1611 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1615 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE:
1616 case SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE_RENEW:
1617 if (ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS
1618 && ret != SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW)
1619 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1620 else if (retcb == SSL_TICKET_RETURN_USE)
1621 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
1623 ret = SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
1627 ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
1631 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb == NULL || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1633 case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
1634 case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
1635 case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
1636 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1645 /* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
1646 static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(const SSL *s, int op, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
1648 unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
1651 /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
1652 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
1654 /* DSA is not allowed in TLS 1.3 */
1655 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1657 /* TODO(OpenSSL1.2) fully axe DSA/etc. in ClientHello per TLS 1.3 spec */
1658 if (!s->server && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION
1659 && (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX
1660 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_MD5_IDX
1661 || lu->hash_idx == SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX))
1664 /* See if public key algorithm allowed */
1665 if (ssl_cert_is_disabled(lu->sig_idx))
1668 if (lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
1669 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512
1670 || lu->sig == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
1671 /* We never allow GOST sig algs on the server with TLSv1.3 */
1672 if (s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1675 && s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1676 && s->s3.tmp.max_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1678 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1681 * We're a client that could negotiate TLSv1.3. We only allow GOST
1682 * sig algs if we could negotiate TLSv1.2 or below and we have GOST
1683 * ciphersuites enabled.
1686 if (s->s3.tmp.min_ver >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
1689 sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1690 num = sk != NULL ? sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) : 0;
1691 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
1692 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1694 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
1695 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
1696 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
1699 if ((c->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kGOST) != 0)
1707 if (lu->hash == NID_undef)
1709 /* Security bits: half digest bits */
1710 secbits = EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu->hash_idx)) * 4;
1711 /* Finally see if security callback allows it */
1712 sigalgstr[0] = (lu->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff;
1713 sigalgstr[1] = lu->sigalg & 0xff;
1714 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
1718 * Get a mask of disabled public key algorithms based on supported signature
1719 * algorithms. For example if no signature algorithm supports RSA then RSA is
1723 void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
1725 const uint16_t *sigalgs;
1726 size_t i, sigalgslen;
1727 uint32_t disabled_mask = SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA;
1729 * Go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any
1732 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
1733 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++, sigalgs++) {
1734 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*sigalgs);
1735 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1740 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(lu->sig_idx);
1744 /* If algorithm is disabled see if we can enable it */
1745 if ((clu->amask & disabled_mask) != 0
1746 && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, lu))
1747 disabled_mask &= ~clu->amask;
1749 *pmask_a |= disabled_mask;
1752 int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1753 const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
1758 for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
1759 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1761 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, lu))
1763 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
1766 * If TLS 1.3 must have at least one valid TLS 1.3 message
1767 * signing algorithm: i.e. neither RSA nor SHA1/SHA224
1769 if (rv == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1770 || (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA
1771 && lu->hash != NID_sha1
1772 && lu->hash != NID_sha224)))
1776 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_COPY_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
1780 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
1781 static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
1782 const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
1783 const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
1785 const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
1786 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
1787 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
1788 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
1790 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
1791 if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, lu))
1793 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
1794 if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
1805 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
1806 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1808 const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
1809 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
1811 const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
1813 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
1815 OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs);
1816 s->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1817 s->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
1818 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
1819 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1820 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
1821 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
1822 } else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb) {
1823 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
1824 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
1826 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
1827 if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
1830 allow = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1831 allowlen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1835 pref = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1836 preflen = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1838 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1840 if ((salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs))) == NULL) {
1841 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SHARED_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1844 nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
1848 s->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
1849 s->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
1853 int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen)
1859 size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1861 /* Invalid data length */
1862 if (size == 0 || (size & 1) != 0)
1867 if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(size * sizeof(*buf))) == NULL) {
1868 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SAVE_U16, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1871 for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
1879 OPENSSL_free(*pdest);
1886 int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert)
1888 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
1889 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1891 /* Should never happen */
1892 if (s->cert == NULL)
1896 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs,
1897 &s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen);
1899 return tls1_save_u16(pkt, &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs,
1900 &s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen);
1904 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
1906 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
1909 uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags;
1911 if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
1914 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1917 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
1918 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
1919 int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
1921 /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
1922 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1924 /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
1925 if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && !ssl_cert_is_disabled(idx))
1926 pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
1931 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1932 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1933 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1935 uint16_t *psig = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs;
1936 size_t numsigalgs = s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
1937 if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
1940 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
1942 if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
1946 *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
1948 *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
1949 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
1951 *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
1953 *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
1954 if (psignhash != NULL)
1955 *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
1957 return (int)numsigalgs;
1960 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
1961 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
1962 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
1964 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
1965 if (s->shared_sigalgs == NULL
1967 || idx >= (int)s->shared_sigalgslen
1968 || s->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
1970 shsigalgs = s->shared_sigalgs[idx];
1972 *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
1974 *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
1975 if (psignhash != NULL)
1976 *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
1978 *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
1980 *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
1981 return (int)s->shared_sigalgslen;
1984 /* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
1985 #define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
1989 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_XXX values */
1990 uint16_t sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
1993 static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
1995 if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
1996 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
1997 } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
1998 *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
1999 } else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
2000 *psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2001 } else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
2002 *psig = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2004 *phash = OBJ_sn2nid(str);
2005 if (*phash == NID_undef)
2006 *phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
2009 /* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
2010 #define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
2012 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
2014 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
2016 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
2017 char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
2018 int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
2021 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
2023 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
2025 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
2027 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
2029 * We only allow SignatureSchemes listed in the sigalg_lookup_tbl;
2030 * if there's no '+' in the provided name, look for the new-style combined
2031 * name. If not, match both sig+hash to find the needed SIGALG_LOOKUP.
2032 * Just sig+hash is not unique since TLS 1.3 adds rsa_pss_pss_* and
2033 * rsa_pss_rsae_* that differ only by public key OID; in such cases
2034 * we will pick the _rsae_ variant, by virtue of them appearing earlier
2038 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2040 if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
2041 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2045 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2052 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
2053 get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
2054 if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
2056 for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2058 if (s->hash == hash_alg && s->sig == sig_alg) {
2059 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = s->sigalg;
2063 if (i == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2067 /* Reject duplicates */
2068 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt - 1; i++) {
2069 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt - 1]) {
2078 * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
2079 * form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
2081 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
2085 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
2089 return tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
2092 int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen,
2097 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2098 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_RAW_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2101 memcpy(sigalgs, psigs, salglen * sizeof(*sigalgs));
2104 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2105 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2106 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
2108 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2109 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2110 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
2116 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
2118 uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
2123 if ((sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs))) == NULL) {
2124 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2127 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
2129 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
2130 int md_id = *psig_nids++;
2131 int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
2133 for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
2135 if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
2136 *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
2141 if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
2146 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
2147 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2148 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2150 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
2151 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
2152 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
2158 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
2162 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
2164 int sig_nid, use_pc_sigalgs = 0;
2166 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg;
2168 if (default_nid == -1)
2170 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
2172 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
2174 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2176 * If we're in TLSv1.3 then we only get here if we're checking the
2177 * chain. If the peer has specified peer_cert_sigalgs then we use them
2178 * otherwise we default to normal sigalgs.
2180 sigalgslen = s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen;
2183 sigalgslen = s->shared_sigalgslen;
2185 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i++) {
2186 sigalg = use_pc_sigalgs
2187 ? tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i])
2188 : s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2189 if (sig_nid == sigalg->sigandhash)
2195 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
2196 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
2200 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
2201 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
2202 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
2209 * Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is usable by
2210 * server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to check chains before
2211 * passing them to the server and it allows the server to check chains before
2212 * attempting to use them.
2215 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when strict mode not set */
2217 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
2218 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
2219 /* Strict mode flags */
2220 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
2221 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
2222 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
2224 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
2229 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
2230 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
2233 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
2234 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
2236 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
2239 idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
2241 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
2242 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2244 pk = cpk->privatekey;
2246 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
2247 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
2256 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pk, &certidx) == NULL)
2259 pvalid = s->s3.tmp.valid_flags + idx;
2261 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
2262 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
2264 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
2271 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2272 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
2273 if (ok == X509_V_OK)
2274 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
2275 else if (!check_flags)
2280 * Check all signature algorithms are consistent with signature
2281 * algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later and strict mode.
2283 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
2286 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL
2287 || s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2289 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
2293 rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
2294 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
2297 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
2298 rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
2299 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
2303 rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
2304 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
2307 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
2308 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
2309 default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
2312 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
2313 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
2314 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
2317 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
2318 rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
2319 default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
2328 * If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we have set
2329 * preferred signature algorithms check we support sha1.
2331 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
2333 const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
2334 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
2335 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
2337 if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
2340 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
2347 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
2348 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2350 * We only get here if the application has called SSL_check_chain(),
2351 * so check_flags is always set.
2353 if (find_sig_alg(s, x, pk) != NULL)
2354 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2355 } else if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, x, default_nid)) {
2359 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
2360 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2361 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2362 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(s, sk_X509_value(chain, i), default_nid)) {
2364 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2371 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
2372 else if (check_flags)
2373 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
2375 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
2376 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
2377 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
2378 else if (!check_flags)
2381 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2382 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
2383 else if (strict_mode) {
2384 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2385 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2386 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2387 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0)) {
2389 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
2396 if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
2397 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
2399 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
2401 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
2404 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
2407 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
2411 const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
2414 for (j = 0; j < s->s3.tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
2415 if (*ctypes == check_type) {
2416 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2420 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
2423 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2426 ca_dn = s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
2428 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
2429 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2431 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2432 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
2433 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2435 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME)) {
2436 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
2437 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
2438 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp)) {
2439 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
2444 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
2447 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME | CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
2449 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
2450 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
2454 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2455 rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
2457 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
2460 * When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant if the
2464 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
2467 /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
2468 *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
2475 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
2476 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
2478 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
2479 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN);
2480 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
2481 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
2482 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
2483 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
2484 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
2485 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
2486 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
2489 /* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */
2490 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2492 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
2495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2496 DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
2498 int dh_secbits = 80;
2499 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto == 2)
2500 return DH_get_1024_160();
2501 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aPSK)) {
2502 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->strength_bits == 256)
2507 if (s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL)
2509 dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey);
2512 if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
2518 if (g == NULL || !BN_set_word(g, 2)) {
2523 if (dh_secbits >= 192)
2524 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
2526 p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
2527 if (p == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
2535 if (dh_secbits >= 112)
2536 return DH_get_2048_224();
2537 return DH_get_1024_160();
2541 static int ssl_security_cert_key(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2544 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
2547 * If no parameters this will return -1 and fail using the default
2548 * security callback for any non-zero security level. This will
2549 * reject keys which omit parameters but this only affects DSA and
2550 * omission of parameters is never (?) done in practice.
2552 secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey);
2555 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, 0, x);
2557 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, 0, x);
2560 static int ssl_security_cert_sig(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int op)
2562 /* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
2563 int secbits, nid, pknid;
2564 /* Don't check signature if self signed */
2565 if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
2567 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &nid, &pknid, &secbits, NULL))
2569 /* If digest NID not defined use signature NID */
2570 if (nid == NID_undef)
2573 return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, nid, x);
2575 return ssl_ctx_security(ctx, op, secbits, nid, x);
2578 int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee)
2581 vfy = SSL_SECOP_PEER;
2583 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY | vfy))
2584 return SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2586 if (!ssl_security_cert_key(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY | vfy))
2587 return SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL;
2589 if (!ssl_security_cert_sig(s, ctx, x, SSL_SECOP_CA_MD | vfy))
2590 return SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK;
2595 * Check security of a chain, if |sk| includes the end entity certificate then
2596 * |x| is NULL. If |vfy| is 1 then we are verifying a peer chain and not sending
2597 * one to the peer. Return values: 1 if ok otherwise error code to use
2600 int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x, int vfy)
2602 int rv, start_idx, i;
2604 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
2609 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 1);
2613 for (i = start_idx; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
2614 x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
2615 rv = ssl_security_cert(s, NULL, x, vfy, 0);
2623 * For TLS 1.2 servers check if we have a certificate which can be used
2624 * with the signature algorithm "lu" and return index of certificate.
2627 static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
2629 int sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2630 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(sig_idx);
2632 /* If not recognised or not supported by cipher mask it is not suitable */
2634 || (clu->amask & s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0
2635 || (clu->nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS
2636 && (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kRSA) != 0))
2639 return s->s3.tmp.valid_flags[sig_idx] & CERT_PKEY_VALID ? sig_idx : -1;
2643 * Checks the given cert against signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by
2644 * the peer (if any) as well as whether the hash from the sigalg is usable with
2646 * Returns true if the cert is usable and false otherwise.
2648 static int check_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
2651 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
2652 int mdnid, pknid, supported;
2656 * If the given EVP_PKEY cannot supporting signing with this sigalg,
2657 * the answer is simply 'no'.
2660 supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(pkey, sig->hash);
2666 * The TLS 1.3 signature_algorithms_cert extension places restrictions
2667 * on the sigalg with which the certificate was signed (by its issuer).
2669 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
2670 if (!X509_get_signature_info(x, &mdnid, &pknid, NULL, NULL))
2672 for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
2673 lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3.tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
2678 * TODO this does not differentiate between the
2679 * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
2680 * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
2681 * signing certificate.
2683 if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
2690 * Without signat_algorithms_cert, any certificate for which we have
2691 * a viable public key is permitted.
2697 * Returns true if |s| has a usable certificate configured for use
2698 * with signature scheme |sig|.
2699 * "Usable" includes a check for presence as well as applying
2700 * the signature_algorithm_cert restrictions sent by the peer (if any).
2701 * Returns false if no usable certificate is found.
2703 static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
2705 /* TLS 1.2 callers can override sig->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
2708 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
2711 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509,
2712 s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
2716 * Returns true if the supplied cert |x| and key |pkey| is usable with the
2717 * specified signature scheme |sig|, or false otherwise.
2719 static int is_cert_usable(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, X509 *x,
2724 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &idx) == NULL)
2727 /* Check the key is consistent with the sig alg */
2728 if ((int)idx != sig->sig_idx)
2731 return check_cert_usable(s, sig, x, pkey);
2735 * Find a signature scheme that works with the supplied certificate |x| and key
2736 * |pkey|. |x| and |pkey| may be NULL in which case we additionally look at our
2737 * available certs/keys to find one that works.
2739 static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
2741 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2748 /* Look for a shared sigalgs matching possible certificates */
2749 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2750 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2752 /* Skip SHA1, SHA224, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
2753 if (lu->hash == NID_sha1
2754 || lu->hash == NID_sha224
2755 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
2756 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2758 /* Check that we have a cert, and signature_algorithms_cert */
2759 if (!tls1_lookup_md(lu, NULL))
2761 if ((pkey == NULL && !has_usable_cert(s, lu, -1))
2762 || (pkey != NULL && !is_cert_usable(s, lu, x, pkey)))
2765 tmppkey = (pkey != NULL) ? pkey
2766 : s->cert->pkeys[lu->sig_idx].privatekey;
2768 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2769 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2771 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(tmppkey);
2772 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2774 if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
2779 } else if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2780 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2781 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(tmppkey), lu))
2787 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen)
2794 * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
2795 * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
2797 * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error,
2798 * an appropriate error code is set and a TLS alert is sent.
2800 * For clients fatalerrs is set to 0. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
2801 * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
2802 * to the server. In this case no error is set.
2804 int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
2806 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
2809 s->s3.tmp.cert = NULL;
2810 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = NULL;
2812 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2813 lu = find_sig_alg(s, NULL, NULL);
2817 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2818 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2822 /* If ciphersuite doesn't require a cert nothing to do */
2823 if (!(s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aCERT))
2825 if (!s->server && !ssl_has_cert(s, s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys))
2828 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2830 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
2831 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2834 /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
2835 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
2836 EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
2837 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
2844 * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
2847 for (i = 0; i < s->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
2848 lu = s->shared_sigalgs[i];
2851 if ((sig_idx = tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(s, lu)) == -1)
2854 int cc_idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
2856 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2857 if (cc_idx != sig_idx)
2860 /* Check that we have a cert, and sig_algs_cert */
2861 if (!has_usable_cert(s, lu, sig_idx))
2863 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2864 /* validate that key is large enough for the signature algorithm */
2865 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx].privatekey;
2867 if (!rsa_pss_check_min_key_size(EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey), lu))
2870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2871 if (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve)
2875 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2877 * Some Windows-based implementations do not send GOST algorithms indication
2878 * in supported_algorithms extension, so when we have GOST-based ciphersuite,
2879 * we have to assume GOST support.
2881 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) {
2882 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2885 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2886 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2887 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2891 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2895 if (i == s->shared_sigalgslen) {
2898 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2899 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2900 SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
2905 * If we have no sigalg use defaults
2907 const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
2908 size_t sent_sigslen;
2910 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2913 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2914 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2918 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
2919 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
2920 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
2921 if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs
2922 && has_usable_cert(s, lu, lu->sig_idx))
2925 if (i == sent_sigslen) {
2928 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
2929 SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2930 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2935 if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, -1)) == NULL) {
2938 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
2939 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2945 sig_idx = lu->sig_idx;
2946 s->s3.tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[sig_idx];
2947 s->cert->key = s->s3.tmp.cert;
2948 s->s3.tmp.sigalg = lu;
2952 int SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint8_t mode)
2954 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2955 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
2956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
2957 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
2961 ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
2965 int SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(SSL *ssl, uint8_t mode)
2967 if (mode != TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED
2968 && !IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(mode)) {
2969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_TLSEXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH,
2970 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
2974 ssl->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = mode;
2978 uint8_t SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length(const SSL_SESSION *session)
2980 return session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode;