2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
113 #include <openssl/objects.h>
114 #include <openssl/evp.h>
115 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
116 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117 #include <openssl/rand.h>
118 #include "ssl_locl.h"
120 const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
127 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
130 SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
133 tls1_setup_key_block,
134 tls1_generate_master_secret,
135 tls1_change_cipher_state,
136 tls1_final_finish_mac,
137 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
138 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
139 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
140 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
142 tls1_export_keying_material,
145 long tls1_default_timeout(void)
147 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
148 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
154 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
155 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
159 void tls1_free(SSL *s)
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
162 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
164 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
166 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
170 void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
173 s->version = s->method->version;
176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
178 static int nid_list[] =
180 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
181 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
182 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
183 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
184 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
185 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
186 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
187 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
188 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
189 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
190 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
191 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
192 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
193 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
194 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
195 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
196 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
197 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
198 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
199 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
200 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
201 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
202 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
203 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
204 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
208 static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] =
210 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
211 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
212 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
215 static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] =
217 0,14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
218 0,13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
219 0,25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
220 0,11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
221 0,12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
222 0,24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
223 0,9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
224 0,10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
225 0,22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
226 0,23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
227 0,8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
228 0,6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
229 0,7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
230 0,20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
231 0,21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
232 0,4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
233 0,5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
234 0,18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
235 0,19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
236 0,1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
237 0,2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
238 0,3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
239 0,15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
240 0,16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
241 0,17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
244 static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] =
246 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
247 0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
250 int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
252 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
253 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
254 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
256 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
259 int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
261 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
264 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
266 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
268 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
270 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
272 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
274 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
276 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
278 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
280 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
282 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
284 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
286 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
288 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
290 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
292 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
294 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
296 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
298 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
300 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
302 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
304 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
306 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
308 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
310 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
312 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
318 /* Get curves list, if "sess" is set return client curves otherwise
321 static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
322 const unsigned char **pcurves,
327 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
328 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
331 /* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
332 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
334 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
335 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
336 *pcurveslen = sizeof(suiteb_curves);
339 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
340 *pcurves = suiteb_curves;
344 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
345 *pcurves = suiteb_curves + 2;
349 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
350 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
354 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
355 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default);
358 /* Check a curve is one of our preferences */
359 int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
361 const unsigned char *curves;
363 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
364 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
366 /* Check curve matches Suite B preferences */
369 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
372 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
374 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
377 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
379 if (p[2] != TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
382 else /* Should never happen */
385 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
386 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i += 2, curves += 2)
388 if (p[1] == curves[0] && p[2] == curves[1])
394 /* Return nth shared curve. If nmatch == -1 return number of
395 * matches. For nmatch == -2 return the NID of the curve to use for
399 int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
401 const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
402 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
404 /* Can't do anything on client side */
411 /* For Suite B ciphersuite determines curve: we
412 * already know these are acceptable due to previous
415 unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
416 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
417 return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
418 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
419 return NID_secp384r1; /* P-384 */
420 /* Should never happen */
423 /* If not Suite B just return first preference shared curve */
426 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
428 tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
433 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++, pref+=2)
435 const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
436 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++, tsupp+=2)
438 if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1])
442 int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
443 return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
454 int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
455 int *curves, size_t ncurves)
457 unsigned char *clist, *p;
459 /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
460 * while curve ids < 32
462 unsigned long dup_list = 0;
463 clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
466 for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++)
468 unsigned long idmask;
470 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
472 if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
483 *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
487 #define MAX_CURVELIST 25
492 int nid_arr[MAX_CURVELIST];
495 static int nid_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
497 nid_cb_st *narg = arg;
501 if (narg->nidcnt == MAX_CURVELIST)
503 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
505 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
507 nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(etmp);
508 if (nid == NID_undef)
509 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(etmp);
510 if (nid == NID_undef)
511 nid = OBJ_ln2nid(etmp);
512 if (nid == NID_undef)
514 for (i = 0; i < narg->nidcnt; i++)
515 if (narg->nid_arr[i] == nid)
517 narg->nid_arr[narg->nidcnt++] = nid;
520 /* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
521 int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
526 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, nid_cb, &ncb))
528 return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
530 /* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
531 static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
537 const EC_METHOD *meth;
540 /* Determine if it is a prime field */
541 grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
542 pt = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec);
545 meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
548 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
552 /* Determine curve ID */
553 id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
554 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
555 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
559 curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
571 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
574 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
576 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
579 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
583 /* Check an EC key is compatible with extensions */
584 static int tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s,
585 unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id)
587 const unsigned char *p;
590 /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
591 * is supported (see RFC4492).
593 if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
595 p = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
596 plen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
597 for (i = 0; i < plen; i++, p++)
607 /* Check curve is consistent with client and server preferences */
608 for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
610 tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &p, &plen);
611 for (i = 0; i < plen; i+=2, p+=2)
613 if (p[0] == curve_id[0] && p[1] == curve_id[1])
618 /* For clients can only check sent curve list */
625 static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
628 /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
630 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
632 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
633 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
637 *pformats = ecformats_default;
638 /* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
640 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default) - 1;
642 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
646 /* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks
647 * EC certificates have compatible curves and compression.
649 static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
651 unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
654 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
657 /* If not EC nothing to do */
658 if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
663 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
667 /* Can't check curve_id for client certs as we don't have a
668 * supported curves extension.
670 rv = tls1_check_ec_key(s, s->server ? curve_id : NULL, &comp_id);
673 /* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
674 * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
676 if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s))
683 /* Check to see we have necessary signing algorithm */
684 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
685 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256;
686 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
687 check_md = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384;
689 return 0; /* Should never happen */
690 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
691 if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
693 if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
697 if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
698 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha256();
700 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha384();
705 /* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions */
706 int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
708 unsigned char curve_id[2];
709 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
710 /* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384,
711 * no other curves permitted.
715 /* Curve to check determined by ciphersuite */
716 if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
717 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_256;
718 else if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
719 curve_id[1] = TLSEXT_curve_P_384;
723 /* Check this curve is acceptable */
724 if (!tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL))
726 /* If auto or setting curve from callback assume OK */
727 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto || s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
729 /* Otherwise check curve is acceptable */
732 unsigned char curve_tmp[2];
735 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_tmp, NULL, ec))
737 if (!curve_tmp[0] || curve_tmp[1] == curve_id[1])
743 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
745 /* Need a shared curve */
746 if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
752 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
757 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, NULL, ec))
759 /* Set this to allow use of invalid curves for testing */
763 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, NULL);
767 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
769 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
771 /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
772 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
775 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
776 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
778 #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
781 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
782 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
784 #define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
787 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
788 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
790 #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
793 #define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
794 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
795 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
796 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
798 static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
799 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
800 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
801 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
804 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
805 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
807 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
808 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
810 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
811 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
815 static unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
816 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
817 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
820 size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
822 /* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
825 switch (tls1_suiteb(s))
827 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
828 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
829 return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
831 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
832 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
835 case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
836 *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
840 /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
841 if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
843 *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
844 return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
846 else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
848 *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
849 return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
853 *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
855 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
857 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) - 2;
860 return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
863 /* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
864 * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
866 int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
867 const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
869 const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
870 size_t sent_sigslen, i;
871 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
872 /* Should never happen */
875 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
876 if (sigalg != (int)sig[1])
878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
881 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
883 unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
884 /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
885 if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
887 if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id))
889 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
892 /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
897 if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256)
899 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
901 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
902 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
906 else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384)
908 if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
910 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
911 SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
919 else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
922 /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
923 sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
924 for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
926 if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
929 /* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
930 if (i == sent_sigslen && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1 || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
932 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
935 *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
938 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
941 /* Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they
944 if (s->session && s->session->sess_cert)
945 s->session->sess_cert->peer_key->digest = *pmd;
948 /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
949 * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
950 * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
951 * session and not global settings.
954 void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
957 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
958 size_t i, sigalgslen;
959 int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
962 /* If less than TLS 1.2 don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers */
963 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
964 c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
967 /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
968 * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
971 sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
972 for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
976 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
977 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
981 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
982 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
986 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
987 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
993 /* Disable auth and static DH if we don't include any appropriate
994 * signature algorithms.
998 c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
999 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHr|SSL_kECDHr;
1003 c->mask_a |= SSL_aDSS;
1004 c->mask_k |= SSL_kDHd;
1008 c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
1009 c->mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
1011 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1012 if (!kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx))
1014 c->mask_a |= SSL_aKRB5;
1015 c->mask_k |= SSL_kKRB5;
1018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1019 /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
1020 if (!s->psk_client_callback)
1022 c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
1023 c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
1025 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1029 /* byte_compare is a compare function for qsort(3) that compares bytes. */
1030 static int byte_compare(const void *in_a, const void *in_b)
1032 unsigned char a = *((const unsigned char*) in_a);
1033 unsigned char b = *((const unsigned char*) in_b);
1042 unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1045 unsigned char *ret = p;
1046 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1047 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
1049 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION)
1052 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1053 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1055 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1057 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1059 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1060 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1061 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)
1062 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1071 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
1072 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
1073 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1078 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1080 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1082 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
1083 unsigned long size_str;
1086 /* check for enough space.
1087 4 for the servername type and entension length
1088 2 for servernamelist length
1089 1 for the hostname type
1090 2 for hostname length
1094 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
1095 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
1098 /* extension type and length */
1099 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1100 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
1102 /* length of servername list */
1103 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
1105 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
1106 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
1108 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
1112 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
1117 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1123 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1125 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1128 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1138 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
1139 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1140 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
1142 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
1143 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1149 /* check for enough space.
1150 4 for the srp type type and entension length
1151 1 for the srp user identity
1152 + srp user identity length
1154 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
1156 /* fill in the extension */
1157 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
1158 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
1159 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
1160 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
1165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1168 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
1170 const unsigned char *plist;
1173 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1175 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1176 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1183 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1184 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1185 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen ;
1186 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1189 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
1190 plist = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1191 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &plist, &plistlen);
1193 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1194 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1195 if (plistlen > 65532)
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1201 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
1202 s2n(plistlen + 2, ret);
1204 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
1205 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
1206 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
1207 * resolves this to two bytes.
1210 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1213 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1215 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1218 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
1219 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
1220 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1221 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
1223 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
1224 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
1225 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
1227 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
1228 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
1230 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
1234 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
1235 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
1237 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
1240 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
1241 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1245 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
1251 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1254 const unsigned char *salg;
1255 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
1256 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
1258 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
1259 s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
1261 memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
1265 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1266 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1267 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1269 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
1271 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
1273 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1276 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1279 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
1284 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
1285 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1288 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
1292 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1294 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1295 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
1301 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1303 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
1310 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
1311 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1312 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
1314 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
1315 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
1317 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
1319 /* save position of id len */
1320 unsigned char *q = ret;
1321 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
1322 /* skip over id len */
1324 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
1330 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
1333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1334 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
1335 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1338 * 1: peer may send requests
1339 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1341 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1342 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1344 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1348 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
1350 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
1351 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
1352 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
1354 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1359 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
1363 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1365 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1367 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1370 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1378 /* Add TLS extension Server_Authz_DataFormats to the ClientHello */
1379 /* 2 bytes for extension type */
1380 /* 2 bytes for extension length */
1381 /* 1 byte for the list length */
1382 /* 1 byte for the list (we only support audit proofs) */
1383 if (s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb != NULL)
1386 const unsigned short ext_len = 2;
1387 const unsigned char list_len = 1;
1389 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
1391 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1392 /* Extension length: 2 bytes */
1394 *(ret++) = list_len;
1395 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof;
1398 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
1405 unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
1408 unsigned char *ret = p;
1409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1410 int next_proto_neg_seen;
1412 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1413 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1414 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1415 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1417 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
1418 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1422 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
1424 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
1426 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1428 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
1432 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1436 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
1438 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1442 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1444 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
1447 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1457 if (using_ecc && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1459 const unsigned char *plist;
1461 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
1464 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1466 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
1467 if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1474 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
1475 s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
1476 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
1477 memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
1481 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
1482 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1484 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
1485 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
1487 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1488 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
1492 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
1494 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
1495 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
1499 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1500 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1501 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1503 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1505 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
1507 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
1510 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
1513 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
1522 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1524 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
1526 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
1529 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1537 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
1538 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
1539 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1540 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1541 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1542 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1543 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1544 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1545 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
1546 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
1547 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
1552 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1553 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
1554 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
1556 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
1559 * 1: peer may send requests
1560 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
1562 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
1563 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1565 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1571 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1572 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1573 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
1575 const unsigned char *npa;
1576 unsigned int npalen;
1579 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1580 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1582 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
1583 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
1585 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1587 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1592 /* If the client supports authz then see whether we have any to offer
1594 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len)
1596 size_t authz_length;
1597 /* By now we already know the new cipher, so we can look ahead
1598 * to see whether the cert we are going to send
1599 * has any authz data attached to it. */
1600 const unsigned char* authz = ssl_get_authz_data(s, &authz_length);
1601 const unsigned char* const orig_authz = authz;
1603 unsigned authz_count = 0;
1605 /* The authz data contains a number of the following structures:
1606 * uint8_t authz_type
1608 * uint8_t data[length]
1610 * First we walk over it to find the number of authz elements. */
1611 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1613 unsigned short length;
1617 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1619 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1623 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1631 /* Add TLS extension server_authz to the ServerHello message
1632 * 2 bytes for extension type
1633 * 2 bytes for extension length
1634 * 1 byte for the list length
1635 * n bytes for the list */
1636 const unsigned short ext_len = 1 + authz_count;
1638 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ext_len) < 0) return NULL;
1639 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz, ret);
1641 *(ret++) = authz_count;
1642 s->s3->tlsext_authz_promised_to_client = 1;
1646 for (i = 0; i < authz_length; i++)
1648 unsigned short length;
1653 if (memchr(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
1655 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len) != NULL)
1658 /* n2s increments authz by 2 */
1665 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
1672 static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1674 unsigned short type;
1675 unsigned short size;
1677 unsigned char *data = *p;
1678 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1681 s->servername_done = 0;
1682 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1683 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1684 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1688 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1689 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1691 /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
1692 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
1694 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
1695 s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
1697 /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
1698 if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
1700 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
1701 s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
1703 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1704 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
1706 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
1707 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
1710 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1714 if (data > (d+n-len))
1717 while (data <= (d+n-4))
1722 if (data+size > (d+n))
1725 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
1727 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1728 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1729 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1730 /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1732 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1733 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1734 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1735 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1736 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1737 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1738 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1739 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1740 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1741 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1742 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1743 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1744 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1745 the value of the Host: field.
1746 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1747 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1748 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1749 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1753 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1755 unsigned char *sdata;
1761 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1768 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1775 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1781 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1784 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1785 switch (servname_type)
1787 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1790 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1792 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1795 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
1797 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1800 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1802 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1805 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1806 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
1807 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1808 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1809 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1810 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1813 s->servername_done = 1;
1817 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
1818 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
1819 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1831 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1837 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1839 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1841 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1844 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1846 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1849 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1851 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1852 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1854 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1856 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1862 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1863 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1864 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1866 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1867 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1869 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
1870 ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
1872 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1877 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1879 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1880 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1882 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1883 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1885 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1888 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1889 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1892 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1893 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1894 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1895 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1896 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1899 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1900 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1902 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1903 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1904 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1906 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
1907 ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
1909 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1914 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1916 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1919 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1920 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1922 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1925 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1926 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1929 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1930 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1931 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1932 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1933 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1936 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1937 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1938 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1939 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1941 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1945 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1948 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1949 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1951 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1955 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1956 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1957 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1958 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1960 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1961 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1963 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1968 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1970 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1971 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1973 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1977 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1979 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1981 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1983 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1986 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs || size < 2)
1988 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1993 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1 || !dsize)
1995 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1998 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
2000 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2003 /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
2006 if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
2008 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2009 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
2010 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2014 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2015 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2020 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2024 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
2026 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
2028 const unsigned char *sdata;
2030 /* Read in responder_id_list */
2035 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2044 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2048 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
2052 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2057 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
2061 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2066 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2067 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2070 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
2071 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
2072 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
2074 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2075 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2078 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
2079 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
2081 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
2082 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2087 /* Read in request_extensions */
2090 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2097 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2103 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
2105 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
2106 X509_EXTENSION_free);
2109 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
2110 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
2112 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
2113 || (data + dsize != sdata))
2115 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2120 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
2124 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
2126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2127 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2131 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
2132 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2134 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
2135 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2136 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2138 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2143 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2144 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2145 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2147 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
2150 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
2151 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
2152 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
2153 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
2154 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
2155 * anything like that, but this might change).
2157 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
2158 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
2159 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
2160 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
2161 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
2162 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2166 /* session ticket processed earlier */
2167 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2169 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2174 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2176 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2177 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2181 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2185 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2187 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2189 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2193 /* Successful session resumption uses the same authz
2194 * information as the original session so we ignore this
2195 * in the case of a session resumption. */
2198 if (s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types != NULL)
2199 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types);
2200 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types =
2201 OPENSSL_malloc(server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2202 if (!s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types)
2204 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2208 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types_len =
2209 server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2210 memcpy(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2212 server_authz_dataformatlist_length);
2214 /* Sort the types in order to check for duplicates. */
2215 qsort(s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types,
2216 server_authz_dataformatlist_length,
2217 1 /* element size */,
2220 for (i = 0; i < server_authz_dataformatlist_length; i++)
2223 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i] ==
2224 s->s3->tlsext_authz_client_types[i-1])
2226 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2240 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
2242 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
2243 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2245 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
2247 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2250 /* If no signature algorithms extension set default values */
2251 if (!s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
2252 ssl_cert_set_default_md(s->cert);
2257 int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2260 if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2262 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2266 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0)
2268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2275 /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
2276 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
2277 * the length of the block. */
2278 static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
2280 unsigned int off = 0;
2294 static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
2296 unsigned short length;
2297 unsigned short type;
2298 unsigned short size;
2299 unsigned char *data = *p;
2300 int tlsext_servername = 0;
2301 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
2303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2304 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
2307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2308 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
2309 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
2312 if (data >= (d+n-2))
2316 if (data+length != d+n)
2318 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2322 while(data <= (d+n-4))
2327 if (data+size > (d+n))
2330 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
2331 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
2332 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
2334 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
2336 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
2338 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2341 tlsext_servername = 1;
2344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2345 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
2346 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2348 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2349 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2351 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
2353 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2356 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
2357 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
2358 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
2360 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2363 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
2364 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
2366 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
2367 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2368 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2369 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
2370 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
2373 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2375 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2377 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
2378 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
2380 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2383 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2386 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2389 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2391 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2392 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
2393 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2395 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2399 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2402 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2403 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
2405 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2409 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2410 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2411 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2412 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2414 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
2416 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2418 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2423 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
2424 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
2426 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
2427 * a status request message.
2429 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
2431 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2434 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
2435 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2437 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2438 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
2439 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
2441 unsigned char *selected;
2442 unsigned char selected_len;
2444 /* We must have requested it. */
2445 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
2447 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2450 /* The data must be valid */
2451 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
2453 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2456 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
2458 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2461 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
2462 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
2464 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2467 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
2468 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
2469 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
2472 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
2474 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
2476 renegotiate_seen = 1;
2478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2479 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
2483 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
2484 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2486 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
2487 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
2488 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
2490 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2495 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
2497 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
2502 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz)
2504 /* We only support audit proofs. It's an error to send
2505 * an authz hello extension if the client
2506 * didn't request a proof. */
2507 unsigned char *sdata = data;
2508 unsigned char server_authz_dataformatlist_length;
2510 if (!s->ctx->tlsext_authz_server_audit_proof_cb)
2512 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2518 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2522 server_authz_dataformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
2523 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != size - 1)
2525 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2529 /* We only support audit proofs, so a legal ServerHello
2530 * authz list contains exactly one entry. */
2531 if (server_authz_dataformatlist_length != 1 ||
2532 sdata[0] != TLSEXT_AUTHZDATAFORMAT_audit_proof)
2534 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
2538 s->s3->tlsext_authz_server_promised = 1;
2546 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2550 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
2552 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
2554 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
2556 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
2557 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
2559 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2565 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2575 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
2576 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
2577 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
2578 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
2579 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
2580 * absence on initial connect only.
2582 if (!renegotiate_seen
2583 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
2584 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
2586 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
2588 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
2596 int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2599 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2603 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2605 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2610 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2612 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2613 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
2615 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2616 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2618 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2619 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2624 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2628 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
2629 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2636 int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2641 static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
2643 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2644 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2647 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2648 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2650 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
2651 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
2655 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2656 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2657 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2658 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2660 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2662 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
2663 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
2664 * so this has to happen here in
2665 * ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). */
2669 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
2671 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
2674 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2675 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2680 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
2681 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
2682 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
2684 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
2686 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
2687 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
2689 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
2690 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
2692 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
2693 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
2695 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
2696 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2698 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2699 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2702 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
2706 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2708 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
2709 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
2710 * abort the handshake.
2712 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2713 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2721 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2722 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2725 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2726 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2729 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2730 s->servername_done=0;
2736 int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
2738 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2741 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
2742 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
2743 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
2744 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
2746 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2749 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
2750 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2751 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
2752 if (certpkey == NULL)
2754 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2757 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
2758 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
2760 s->cert->key = certpkey;
2761 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2764 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
2765 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2766 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2768 /* status request response should be sent */
2769 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
2770 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2771 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
2773 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2775 /* something bad happened */
2776 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2777 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2778 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2783 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2788 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2789 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2792 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2793 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2801 int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2803 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2804 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2806 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2807 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2808 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2809 * it must contain uncompressed.
2811 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2812 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2813 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2814 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2815 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
2817 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2819 unsigned char *list;
2820 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2821 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2822 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
2824 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
2826 found_uncompressed = 1;
2830 if (!found_uncompressed)
2832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2836 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2837 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2839 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2840 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2841 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2842 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2844 #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
2845 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
2847 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
2848 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
2850 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
2852 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2853 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2856 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
2857 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
2858 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
2859 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
2861 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2862 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2867 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2870 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
2871 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
2874 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2875 * there is no response.
2877 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2879 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2880 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2882 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2883 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2886 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2887 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2891 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2892 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2898 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2899 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2902 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2903 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
2906 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2907 s->servername_done=0;
2913 int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n)
2916 if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
2918 if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, d, n, &al) <= 0)
2920 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2924 if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
2926 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
2932 /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2933 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2934 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2936 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2937 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2938 * extension, if any.
2939 * len: the length of the session ID.
2940 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2941 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2942 * point to the resulting session.
2944 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2945 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2946 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2949 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2950 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2951 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2952 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2953 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2954 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2955 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2958 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2959 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2960 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2961 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2962 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2963 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2965 int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2966 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2968 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2969 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2973 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2975 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2976 * to permit stateful resumption.
2978 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2980 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2984 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2985 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2992 /* Skip past cipher list */
2997 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
3002 /* Now at start of extensions */
3003 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
3006 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
3008 unsigned short type, size;
3011 if (p + size > limit)
3013 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
3018 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
3019 * currently have one. */
3020 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3023 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
3025 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
3026 * decrypted rather than generating the session
3027 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
3028 * handshake based on external mechanism to
3029 * calculate the master secret later. */
3032 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
3035 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
3036 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3038 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
3040 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
3041 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
3043 default: /* fatal error */
3052 /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
3054 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
3055 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
3056 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
3057 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
3058 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
3059 * point to the resulting session.
3062 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
3063 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
3064 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
3065 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
3067 static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
3068 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
3069 SSL_SESSION **psess)
3072 unsigned char *sdec;
3073 const unsigned char *p;
3074 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
3075 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
3078 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3079 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
3082 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
3083 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3084 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3085 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3087 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
3088 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
3099 /* Check key name matches */
3100 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
3102 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3103 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3104 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3105 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
3107 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
3108 * integrity checks on ticket.
3110 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
3113 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3117 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
3118 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
3119 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
3120 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3121 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
3123 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
3124 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
3125 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3126 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3127 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
3130 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3133 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
3134 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
3137 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3140 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
3144 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
3145 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
3146 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
3147 * as required by standard.
3150 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
3151 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
3159 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
3164 /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
3172 static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
3173 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
3174 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
3175 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
3176 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
3177 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
3178 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
3181 static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
3182 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
3183 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
3184 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
3187 static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3190 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3192 if (table[i].nid == nid)
3198 static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
3201 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
3203 if ((table[i].id) == id)
3204 return table[i].nid;
3209 int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
3214 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
3215 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3218 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
3221 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
3222 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
3226 int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
3228 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
3229 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3232 const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
3236 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
3237 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
3244 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
3245 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
3248 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
3249 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
3250 return EVP_sha224();
3252 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
3253 return EVP_sha256();
3255 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
3256 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
3257 return EVP_sha384();
3259 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
3260 return EVP_sha512();
3268 static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
3272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3273 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
3274 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
3276 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3277 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
3278 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
3280 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3281 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
3282 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
3288 /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
3289 static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
3290 int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
3292 int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
3293 if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
3295 if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
3297 hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
3298 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3300 *phash_nid = hash_nid;
3302 if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
3304 sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
3305 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3307 *psign_nid = sign_nid;
3311 if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
3312 OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
3313 hash_nid, sign_nid);
3315 *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
3318 /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
3319 static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
3320 const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
3321 const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
3323 const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
3324 size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
3325 for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
3327 /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
3328 if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
3330 if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
3332 for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
3334 if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
3339 shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
3340 shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
3341 tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
3343 &shsig->signandhash_nid,
3354 /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
3355 static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
3357 const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
3358 size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
3360 TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
3362 unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
3363 /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
3364 if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3366 conf = c->client_sigalgs;
3367 conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
3369 else if (c->conf_sigalgs && !is_suiteb)
3371 conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
3372 conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
3375 conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
3376 if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb)
3380 allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
3381 allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3387 pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
3388 preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
3390 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3393 salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
3396 nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
3397 c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
3398 c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
3403 /* Set preferred digest for each key type */
3405 int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
3411 TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
3412 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
3413 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
3415 /* Should never happen */
3419 c->peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
3420 if (!c->peer_sigalgs)
3422 c->peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
3423 memcpy(c->peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
3425 tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
3427 for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
3428 i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++)
3430 idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
3431 if (idx > 0 && c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
3433 md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
3434 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
3435 c->pkeys[idx].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3436 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
3438 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].valid_flags = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
3439 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
3444 /* In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't
3445 * use the certificate for signing.
3447 if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT))
3449 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is
3450 * not supported it stays as NULL.
3452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3453 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
3454 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3457 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
3459 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
3460 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3464 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
3465 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
3472 int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3473 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3474 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3476 const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
3482 if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
3489 tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
3491 return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
3494 int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
3495 int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
3496 unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
3498 TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
3499 if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
3503 *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
3505 *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
3507 *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
3509 *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
3511 *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
3512 return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
3516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
3518 tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3520 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
3521 unsigned short hbtype;
3522 unsigned int payload;
3523 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3525 /* Read type and payload length first */
3530 if (s->msg_callback)
3531 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3532 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
3533 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3535 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
3537 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
3540 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
3541 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
3542 * payload, plus padding
3544 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3547 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
3548 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
3550 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
3552 /* Random padding */
3553 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
3555 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
3557 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
3558 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3559 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
3560 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3562 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
3567 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
3571 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
3572 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
3573 * sequence number */
3576 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
3579 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
3587 tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
3589 unsigned char *buf, *p;
3591 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
3592 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
3594 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
3595 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
3596 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
3598 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
3602 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
3603 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
3605 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
3609 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
3610 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
3612 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
3616 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
3617 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
3619 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
3621 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
3622 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
3623 * some random stuff.
3624 * - Message Type, 1 byte
3625 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
3626 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
3627 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
3630 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
3633 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
3634 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
3636 /* Sequence number */
3637 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
3638 /* 16 random bytes */
3639 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
3641 /* Random padding */
3642 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
3644 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
3647 if (s->msg_callback)
3648 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
3649 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
3650 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
3652 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
3661 #define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
3666 int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
3669 static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
3671 sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
3674 int sig_alg, hash_alg;
3675 if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
3677 if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
3679 memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
3681 p = strchr(etmp, '+');
3689 if (!strcmp(etmp, "RSA"))
3690 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
3691 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "DSA"))
3692 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
3693 else if (!strcmp(etmp, "ECDSA"))
3694 sig_alg = EVP_PKEY_EC;
3697 hash_alg = OBJ_sn2nid(p);
3698 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3699 hash_alg = OBJ_ln2nid(p);
3700 if (hash_alg == NID_undef)
3703 for (i = 0; i < sarg->sigalgcnt; i+=2)
3705 if (sarg->sigalgs[i] == sig_alg
3706 && sarg->sigalgs[i + 1] == hash_alg)
3709 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = hash_alg;
3710 sarg->sigalgs[sarg->sigalgcnt++] = sig_alg;
3714 /* Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list
3715 * of the form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512 */
3716 int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
3720 if (!CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, sig_cb, &sig))
3722 return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
3725 int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
3727 unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
3732 sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
3733 if (sigalgs == NULL)
3735 for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
3737 rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
3738 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3739 rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
3740 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
3742 if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
3750 if (c->client_sigalgs)
3751 OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
3752 c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3753 c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
3757 if (c->conf_sigalgs)
3758 OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
3759 c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
3760 c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
3766 OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
3770 static int tls1_check_sig_alg(CERT *c, X509 *x, int default_nid)
3774 if (default_nid == -1)
3776 sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
3778 return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
3779 for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
3780 if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
3784 /* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
3785 static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
3789 nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
3790 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++)
3792 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, sk_X509_NAME_value(names, i)))
3798 /* Check certificate chain is consistent with TLS extensions and is
3799 * usable by server. This servers two purposes: it allows users to
3800 * check chains before passing them to the server and it allows the
3801 * server to check chains before attempting to use them.
3804 /* Flags which need to be set for a certificate when stict mode not set */
3806 #define CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS \
3807 (CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM)
3808 /* Strict mode flags */
3809 #define CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS \
3810 (CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM \
3811 | CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE)
3813 int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
3818 int check_flags = 0, strict_mode;
3819 CERT_PKEY *cpk = NULL;
3821 unsigned int suiteb_flags = tls1_suiteb(s);
3822 /* idx == -1 means checking server chains */
3825 /* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
3829 idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
3832 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3834 pk = cpk->privatekey;
3836 strict_mode = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT;
3837 /* If no cert or key, forget it */
3845 idx = ssl_cert_type(x, pk);
3848 cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
3849 if (c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)
3850 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS;
3852 check_flags = CERT_PKEY_VALID_FLAGS;
3860 check_flags |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3861 ok = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, x, chain, suiteb_flags);
3862 if (ok != X509_V_OK)
3865 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SUITEB;
3871 /* Check all signature algorithms are consistent with
3872 * signature algorithms extension if TLS 1.2 or later
3875 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode)
3878 unsigned char rsign = 0;
3879 if (c->peer_sigalgs)
3881 /* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
3886 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
3887 case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
3888 case SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA:
3889 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
3890 default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
3893 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
3894 case SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA:
3895 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
3896 default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
3900 rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
3901 default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
3909 /* If peer sent no signature algorithms extension and we
3910 * have set preferred signature algorithms check we support
3913 if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs)
3916 const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
3917 for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2)
3919 if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
3922 if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen)
3930 /* Check signature algorithm of each cert in chain */
3931 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, x, default_nid))
3933 if (!check_flags) goto end;
3936 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE;
3937 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3938 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
3940 if (!tls1_check_sig_alg(c, sk_X509_value(chain, i),
3945 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3953 /* Else not TLS 1.2, so mark EE and CA signing algorithms OK */
3954 else if(check_flags)
3955 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE|CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
3957 /* Check cert parameters are consistent */
3958 if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
3959 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
3960 else if (!check_flags)
3963 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3964 /* In strict mode check rest of chain too */
3965 else if (strict_mode)
3967 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3968 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
3970 X509 *ca = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
3971 if (!tls1_check_cert_param(s, ca, 0))
3975 rv &= ~CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM;
3983 if (!s->server && strict_mode)
3985 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
3990 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
3993 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
3996 check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
4001 int cert_type = X509_certificate_type(x, pk);
4002 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_RSA)
4003 check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH;
4004 if (cert_type & EVP_PKS_DSA)
4005 check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH;
4010 const unsigned char *ctypes;
4015 ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
4019 ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
4020 ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
4022 for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++)
4024 if (ctypes[i] == check_type)
4026 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4030 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
4034 rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4037 ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
4039 if (!sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_dn))
4040 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4042 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4044 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, x))
4045 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4047 if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4049 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
4051 X509 *xtmp = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
4052 if (ssl_check_ca_name(ca_dn, xtmp))
4054 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME;
4059 if (!check_flags && !(rv & CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME))
4063 rv |= CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME|CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
4065 if (!check_flags || (rv & check_flags) == check_flags)
4066 rv |= CERT_PKEY_VALID;
4070 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
4072 if (cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
4073 rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4074 else if (cpk->digest)
4075 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
4078 rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN|CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4080 /* When checking a CERT_PKEY structure all flags are irrelevant
4081 * if the chain is invalid.
4085 if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
4086 cpk->valid_flags = rv;
4089 /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
4090 cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
4097 /* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
4098 void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
4100 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
4101 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
4102 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
4103 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA);
4104 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA);
4105 tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
4107 /* User level utiity function to check a chain is suitable */
4108 int SSL_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
4110 return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);