2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
65 PACKET *cipher_suites,
67 **skp, int sslv2format,
71 * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
72 * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
73 * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
74 * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
76 * Valid return values are:
77 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
78 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
80 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
82 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
84 switch (st->hand_state) {
89 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
90 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
91 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
96 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
98 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
99 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
101 * 2) If we did request one then
102 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
104 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
105 * list if we requested a certificate)
107 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
108 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
109 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
110 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
111 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
113 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
114 * not going to accept it because we require a client
117 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
118 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
119 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
120 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
130 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
131 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
132 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
139 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
140 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
145 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
147 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
148 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
149 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
150 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
151 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
154 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
157 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
158 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
159 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
160 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
166 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
167 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
173 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
174 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
175 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
180 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
182 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
183 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
184 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
189 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
190 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
199 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
200 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
201 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
207 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
208 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
209 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
215 /* No valid transition found */
216 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
217 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
222 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
224 * Valid return values are:
228 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
230 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
233 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
234 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
235 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
236 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
237 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
240 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
242 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
246 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
247 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
248 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
249 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
250 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
253 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
254 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
264 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
266 * Valid return values are:
270 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
273 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
274 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
276 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
277 * during re-negotiation:
279 && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
280 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
282 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
283 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
286 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
288 * ... except when the application insists on
289 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
292 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
293 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
294 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
296 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
299 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
307 * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
308 * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
310 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
312 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
314 switch (st->hand_state) {
316 /* Shouldn't happen */
317 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
320 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
321 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
324 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
325 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
326 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
328 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
329 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
330 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
331 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
333 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
334 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
335 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
336 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
338 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
339 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
341 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
342 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
344 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
346 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
347 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
349 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
351 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
352 /* normal PSK or SRP */
353 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
354 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
356 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
357 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
358 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
359 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
361 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
364 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
367 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
368 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
369 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
373 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
374 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
375 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
376 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
380 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
381 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
382 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
383 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
387 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
388 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
389 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
391 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
392 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
394 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
396 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
397 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
398 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
399 } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
400 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
402 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
404 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
406 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
407 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
410 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
411 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
412 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
414 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
416 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
418 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
419 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
420 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
426 * the server to the client.
428 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
430 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
432 switch (st->hand_state) {
434 /* No pre work to be done */
437 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
440 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
443 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
445 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
446 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
447 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
452 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
453 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
455 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
456 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
462 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
464 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
465 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
467 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
469 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
470 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
472 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
473 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
479 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
480 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
481 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
482 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
485 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
487 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
488 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
489 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
490 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
494 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
497 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
500 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
504 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
505 * server to the client.
507 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
509 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
513 switch (st->hand_state) {
515 /* No post work to be done */
518 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
519 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
521 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
522 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
527 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
528 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
530 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
531 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
532 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
536 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
537 * treat like it was the first packet
542 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
544 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
545 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
546 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
549 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
552 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
553 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
555 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
556 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
557 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
559 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
563 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
564 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
569 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
571 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
573 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
576 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
580 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
581 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
583 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
588 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
591 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
592 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
596 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
597 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
600 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
602 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
605 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
612 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
616 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
619 * Valid return values are:
623 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
624 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
626 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
628 switch (st->hand_state) {
630 /* Shouldn't happen */
633 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
635 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
637 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
638 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
641 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
642 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
643 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
646 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
647 /* No construction function needed */
649 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
652 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
653 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
654 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
658 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
659 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
662 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
663 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
664 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
667 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
668 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
669 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
672 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
673 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
674 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
677 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
678 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
679 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
682 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
683 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
684 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
687 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
688 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
689 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
697 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
698 * calculated as follows:
700 * 2 + # client_version
701 * 32 + # only valid length for random
702 * 1 + # length of session_id
703 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
704 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
705 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
706 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
707 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
708 * 2 + # length of extensions
709 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
711 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
713 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
714 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
717 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
718 * reading. Excludes the message header.
720 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
722 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
724 switch (st->hand_state) {
726 /* Shouldn't happen */
729 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
730 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
733 return s->max_cert_list;
735 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
736 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
738 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
739 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
742 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
743 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
746 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
747 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
749 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
750 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
755 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
757 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
759 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
761 switch (st->hand_state) {
763 /* Shouldn't happen */
764 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
766 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
767 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
770 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
772 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
773 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
775 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
776 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
779 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
780 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
783 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
784 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
786 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
787 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
792 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
795 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
797 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
799 switch (st->hand_state) {
801 /* Shouldn't happen */
804 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
805 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
807 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
808 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
810 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
811 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
812 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
813 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
814 /* Are we renegotiating? */
815 && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
816 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
817 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
818 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
819 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
820 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
823 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
826 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
831 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
832 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
834 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
836 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
838 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
839 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
840 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
842 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
846 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
848 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
855 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
856 unsigned char cookie_len)
858 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
859 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
860 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
866 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
868 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
869 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
870 &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 ||
871 s->d1->cookie_len > 255) {
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
873 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
877 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
878 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
879 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
886 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
888 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
889 unsigned int j, complen = 0;
892 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
893 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
895 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
897 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
898 PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
900 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
902 is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
904 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
905 /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
907 unsigned int version;
910 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
911 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
912 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
913 * the rest right through. Its format is:
915 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
916 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
918 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
919 * 7-8 session_id_length
920 * 9-10 challenge_length
924 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
925 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
927 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
928 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
931 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
935 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)) {
936 /* No protocol version supplied! */
937 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
940 if (version == 0x0002) {
941 /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
942 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
944 } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
946 s->client_version = version;
948 /* No idea what protocol this is */
949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
954 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
955 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
957 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
958 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
965 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
966 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
968 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
969 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
970 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
971 DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->client_version, s->version)) {
972 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
978 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
979 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
981 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
984 s->version = s->client_version;
986 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
990 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
993 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
994 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
995 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
997 unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1000 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len)
1001 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1002 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1003 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1004 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1005 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1009 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1010 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1015 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
1016 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
1017 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1018 /* No extensions. */
1019 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1020 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1021 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1022 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1026 /* Load the client random and compression list. */
1027 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
1029 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1030 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1031 s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1032 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1033 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1034 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1036 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1040 PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
1042 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1043 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1044 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1045 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1046 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1050 if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1051 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1052 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1056 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1057 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1058 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1059 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1063 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1064 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1065 * So check cookie length...
1067 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1068 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)
1073 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites)
1074 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1075 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1079 /* Could be empty. */
1083 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1084 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1085 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1086 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1087 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
1088 PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) ==
1090 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1092 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1094 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1096 /* default verification */
1097 } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1098 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1099 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1102 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1104 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1105 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
1106 if (protverr != 0) {
1107 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1108 s->version = s->client_version;
1109 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1118 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1119 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1121 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1122 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1123 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1124 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1125 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1126 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1127 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1128 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1129 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1130 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1135 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1136 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1139 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);
1141 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1143 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1144 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1145 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1146 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1147 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1149 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1150 /* previous session */
1152 } else if (i == -1) {
1156 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1161 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),
1162 is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {
1166 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1169 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1172 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1174 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1175 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1177 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1178 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1187 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1190 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1192 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1197 complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
1198 for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
1199 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
1205 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1210 /* TLS extensions */
1211 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1212 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1219 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1220 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1221 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1222 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1226 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1227 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1232 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1233 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1235 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1236 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1237 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1239 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1241 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1242 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1246 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1248 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1253 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1254 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1255 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1259 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1260 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1261 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1262 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1263 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1268 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1269 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1270 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1272 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1273 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1274 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1275 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1276 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1278 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1279 /* Can't disable compression */
1280 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1281 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1282 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1285 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1286 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1287 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1288 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1289 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1293 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1294 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1295 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1298 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1299 for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
1300 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)
1304 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1305 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1306 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1311 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1312 /* See if we have a match */
1313 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1316 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1317 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1318 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1320 for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
1321 if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {
1330 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1336 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1337 * using compression.
1339 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1340 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1346 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1350 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1351 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1353 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1355 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1356 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1357 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1358 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1359 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1363 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1369 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1370 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1372 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1374 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1376 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1377 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1381 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1383 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1384 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1386 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1388 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1389 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1390 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1392 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1393 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1394 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1398 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1401 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1404 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1406 if (cipher == NULL) {
1407 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1408 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1411 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1412 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1413 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1414 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1415 ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1416 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1417 /* do not send a session ticket */
1418 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1420 /* Session-id reuse */
1421 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1424 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1425 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1426 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1432 * we now have the following setup.
1434 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1435 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1436 * compression - basically ignored right now
1437 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1438 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1439 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1440 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1443 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1444 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1445 if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) {
1446 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1447 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1455 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1457 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1459 * callback indicates further work to be done
1461 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1464 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1466 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1467 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1469 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1471 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1478 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1480 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1481 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1485 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1487 int sl, compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1490 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->version)
1492 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1493 * tls_process_client_hello()
1495 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1496 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1501 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1502 * back in the server hello:
1503 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1504 * we send back the old session ID.
1505 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1506 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1507 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1508 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1510 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1511 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1512 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1513 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1516 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1517 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1519 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1521 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1522 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1523 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1527 /* set up the compression method */
1528 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1531 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1534 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1537 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl)
1538 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
1539 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)
1540 || !ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s)
1541 || !ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al)) {
1542 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1548 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1552 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1554 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
1555 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1556 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1563 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1566 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
1568 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1569 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1574 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1575 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
1578 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1579 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
1581 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
1582 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1586 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1587 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1591 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1593 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1595 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1596 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1598 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1600 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1601 CERT *cert = s->cert;
1603 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
1606 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1607 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1608 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
1609 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
1611 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1612 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1615 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
1618 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
1620 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1621 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
1622 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
1624 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1625 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1630 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
1631 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1632 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1633 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1636 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1637 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
1638 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1639 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1640 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1643 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1644 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1645 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1649 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
1651 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1652 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1656 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
1658 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1661 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
1662 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
1665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1666 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1669 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1671 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1675 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1676 nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1677 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
1678 if (curve_id == 0) {
1679 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1680 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1683 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
1684 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
1685 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1690 /* Encode the public key. */
1691 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
1693 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1694 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1699 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1700 * can set these to NULLs
1707 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1709 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1710 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1711 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1712 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1713 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1714 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1717 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1718 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1719 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1720 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1724 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1726 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1730 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1731 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
1732 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1734 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1742 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1743 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
1744 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1747 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
1748 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
1750 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
1751 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
1753 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1754 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1760 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1761 unsigned char *binval;
1764 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1765 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1766 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
1769 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1773 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1777 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1779 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
1780 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
1783 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
1784 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
1787 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
1788 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1789 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1792 memset(binval, 0, len);
1796 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
1797 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1798 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1799 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1803 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
1806 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1807 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1809 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
1810 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1811 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
1814 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
1815 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1816 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
1817 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
1818 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1819 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1822 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1823 encodedPoint = NULL;
1830 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1831 * points to the space at the end.
1834 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
1835 unsigned int siglen;
1837 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
1838 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
1839 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1840 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1843 /* send signature algorithm */
1844 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1845 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) {
1846 /* Should never happen */
1847 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1848 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1853 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1856 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
1857 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
1858 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
1861 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey),
1863 || EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1864 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1865 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1866 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1867 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1868 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
1870 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, pkey) <= 0
1871 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
1872 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
1873 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1874 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1878 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1879 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1880 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1881 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1886 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1889 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1891 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1892 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1895 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1897 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1901 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1904 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
1906 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1907 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1908 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt)
1909 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1910 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1914 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1915 const unsigned char *psigs;
1916 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
1917 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1918 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
1919 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1920 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1921 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1926 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
1927 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1928 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1932 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1934 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
1935 unsigned char *namebytes;
1936 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
1940 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
1941 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
1943 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
1944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1945 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1950 /* else no CA names */
1952 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1953 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1957 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
1961 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1965 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1967 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1968 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
1970 PACKET psk_identity;
1972 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
1973 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1974 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1977 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1978 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1979 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1982 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
1983 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1984 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
1988 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
1989 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1994 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
1997 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
1998 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1999 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2001 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2003 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2005 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2006 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2007 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2011 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2012 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2013 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2015 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2016 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2017 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2021 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2025 /* Should never happen */
2026 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2027 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2032 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2034 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2035 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2037 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2038 size_t j, padding_len;
2039 PACKET enc_premaster;
2041 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2044 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
2046 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2047 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2051 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2052 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2053 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2055 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2056 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2057 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2058 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2064 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2065 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2066 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2067 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2069 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2070 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2071 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2075 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2076 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2077 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2078 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2083 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2084 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2085 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2086 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2087 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2090 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2094 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2095 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2097 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2098 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2099 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2100 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2103 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2106 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2107 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2108 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2110 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2111 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2112 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2116 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2117 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2118 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2119 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2120 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2122 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2125 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2126 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2127 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2128 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2129 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2130 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2133 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2134 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2136 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2137 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2140 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2141 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2142 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2143 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2144 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2145 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2148 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2149 unsigned char workaround_good;
2150 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2151 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2153 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2154 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2155 version_good |= workaround_good;
2159 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2160 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2162 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2165 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2166 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2167 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2168 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2170 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2171 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2172 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2173 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2174 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2177 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2178 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2179 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2180 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2186 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2189 /* Should never happen */
2190 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2191 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2196 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2199 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2203 const unsigned char *data;
2204 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2207 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2208 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2209 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2210 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2213 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2215 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2216 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2220 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2221 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2222 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2225 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2226 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2227 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2231 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2232 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2233 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2236 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2237 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2239 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2240 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2241 if (pub_key != NULL)
2246 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2247 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2248 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2253 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2254 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2256 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2259 /* Should never happen */
2260 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2261 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2266 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2268 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2269 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2270 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2273 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2274 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2275 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2276 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2280 const unsigned char *data;
2283 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2284 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2287 /* Get encoded point length */
2288 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2289 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2290 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2291 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2294 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2295 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2296 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2299 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
2300 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2301 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2306 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2307 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2308 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2313 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2314 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2316 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2320 /* Should never happen */
2321 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2322 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2327 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2331 const unsigned char *data;
2333 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2334 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2335 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2339 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2340 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2343 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2344 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2345 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2348 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2349 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2350 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2355 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2356 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2362 /* Should never happen */
2363 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2364 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2369 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2372 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2373 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2374 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2375 const unsigned char *start;
2376 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2377 unsigned long alg_a;
2381 const unsigned char *data;
2384 /* Get our certificate private key */
2385 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2386 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2388 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2390 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2392 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2395 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2397 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2398 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2401 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2402 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2403 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2407 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2408 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2409 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2413 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2414 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2415 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2416 * client certificate for authorization only.
2418 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2419 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2420 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2423 /* Decrypt session key */
2424 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2425 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
2426 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2430 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2431 &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2432 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2433 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2434 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2439 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2440 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2441 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2445 /* Generate master secret */
2446 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2447 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2448 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2452 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2453 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2454 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2455 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2459 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2462 /* Should never happen */
2463 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2464 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2469 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2472 unsigned long alg_k;
2474 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2476 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2477 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2480 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2481 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2482 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2483 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2484 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2485 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2488 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2489 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2490 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2491 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2494 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2495 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2497 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2498 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2500 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2501 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2503 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2504 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2506 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2507 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2510 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2511 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2512 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2516 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2519 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2520 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2521 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2522 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2524 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2525 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2528 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2531 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2532 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2533 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2534 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2536 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2539 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2540 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2542 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2543 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2544 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
2546 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2550 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2551 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2556 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
2558 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2559 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2561 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2562 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
2563 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
2564 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
2565 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
2566 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2567 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2568 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
2571 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
2575 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
2577 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
2578 * the handshake_buffer
2580 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2581 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2584 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2586 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2587 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2588 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2589 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2593 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2594 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2596 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
2597 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2602 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2605 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2607 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2608 const unsigned char *sig, *data;
2609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2610 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
2612 int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2616 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2620 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2623 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2624 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2628 peer = s->session->peer;
2629 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
2630 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2632 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2633 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
2634 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2635 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2639 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2641 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2642 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
2644 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2645 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
2646 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2651 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2654 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
2655 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2658 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
2660 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2662 } else if (rv == 0) {
2663 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2667 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2670 /* Use default digest for this key type */
2671 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
2673 md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
2675 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2680 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
2681 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2682 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2686 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2687 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
2688 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
2689 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2690 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2693 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
2694 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2695 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2699 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2700 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2701 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2702 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2706 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2708 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2709 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2710 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2711 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2714 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2716 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2717 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2718 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2719 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
2720 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2722 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2725 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
2731 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2732 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2733 s->session->master_key_length,
2734 s->session->master_key)) {
2735 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2736 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2740 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
2741 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2742 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2746 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2749 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2750 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2752 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2753 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2754 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2756 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
2761 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2763 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2765 unsigned long l, llen;
2766 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
2767 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
2770 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2771 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2775 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
2776 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
2777 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2778 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2783 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
2784 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
2785 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
2786 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2787 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2788 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2792 certstart = certbytes;
2793 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
2795 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2798 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
2799 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2800 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2801 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2804 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
2805 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2811 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
2812 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2813 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2814 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2815 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2816 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2819 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2820 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2821 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2822 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2823 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2824 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2827 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
2828 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2833 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
2835 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2837 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
2841 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
2842 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2845 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
2847 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2848 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2849 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
2854 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2855 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
2856 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2858 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
2859 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
2861 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
2862 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
2865 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2869 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2870 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2873 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
2877 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2881 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2883 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2887 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
2888 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2895 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2897 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
2898 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
2899 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2900 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
2901 const unsigned char *const_p;
2902 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
2905 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2906 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2907 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
2909 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
2911 /* get session encoding length */
2912 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2914 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
2917 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
2918 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2921 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
2923 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2927 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2928 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2929 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
2930 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2935 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
2939 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
2942 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
2945 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
2947 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
2948 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
2949 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2953 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
2954 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2957 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2960 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
2961 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
2963 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2964 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
2965 int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
2970 /* Put timeout and length */
2971 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
2972 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
2973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2974 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2978 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
2979 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
2984 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
2986 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
2988 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
2989 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
2991 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
2992 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
2994 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
2995 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
2996 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
2998 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
2999 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));
3003 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3004 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3005 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3007 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3008 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3009 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3010 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3011 /* Output key name */
3012 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3014 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3015 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3017 /* Encrypt session data */
3018 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3019 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3020 || encdata1 != encdata2
3021 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3022 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3023 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3024 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3025 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3026 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3027 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3028 macendoffset - macoffset)
3029 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3030 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3031 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3032 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3033 || macdata1 != macdata2
3034 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3038 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3039 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3045 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3046 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3047 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3051 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3053 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->tlsext_status_type)
3054 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp,
3055 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3057 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3064 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3066 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3067 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3069 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3071 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3072 size_t next_proto_len;
3075 * The payload looks like:
3077 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3078 * uint8 padding_len;
3079 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3081 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3082 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3083 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3084 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3088 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) {
3089 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
3093 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3095 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3097 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3098 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3102 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3104 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3105 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3106 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3107 int sslv2format, int *al)
3109 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3110 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3112 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3113 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3115 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3117 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3119 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3120 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3121 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3125 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3126 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3127 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3128 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3132 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
3133 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3135 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3136 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3141 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
3144 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3145 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3146 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3150 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3152 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3153 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3154 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3156 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3159 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3160 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3161 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3162 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3163 if (s->renegotiate) {
3164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3165 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3166 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3169 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3173 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3174 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3175 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3177 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3178 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3181 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
3182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3183 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3184 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3190 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3191 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3193 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3195 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3200 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3201 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3210 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
3211 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);