2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
65 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
66 PACKET *cipher_suites,
68 **skp, int sslv2format,
72 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
73 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
74 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
75 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
77 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
78 * (transition not allowed)
80 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
82 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
85 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
86 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
90 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
91 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
92 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
94 switch (st->hand_state) {
98 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
99 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
100 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
101 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
105 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
106 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
113 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
114 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
115 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
119 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
120 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
126 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
127 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
128 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
134 /* No valid transition found */
135 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
136 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_READ_TRANSITION,
137 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
142 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
143 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
144 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
145 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
147 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
148 * (transition not allowed)
150 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
152 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
154 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
155 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
160 switch (st->hand_state) {
166 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
167 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
168 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
173 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
175 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
176 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
178 * 2) If we did request one then
179 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
181 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
182 * list if we requested a certificate)
184 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
185 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
186 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
187 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
188 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
190 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
191 * not going to accept it because we require a client
194 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
195 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
196 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
197 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
200 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
204 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
207 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
208 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
209 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
216 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
217 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
222 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
224 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
225 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
226 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
227 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
228 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
231 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
232 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
234 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
235 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
236 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
237 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
239 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
243 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
244 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
250 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
251 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
252 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
257 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
259 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
260 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
261 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
266 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
267 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
276 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
277 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
278 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
284 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
285 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
286 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
293 /* No valid transition found */
294 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
295 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
300 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
302 * Valid return values are:
306 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
308 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
311 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
312 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
313 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
314 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
315 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
318 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
320 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
324 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
325 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
326 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
327 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
328 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
331 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
332 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
342 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
344 * Valid return values are:
348 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
351 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
352 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
354 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
355 * during re-negotiation:
357 && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
358 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
360 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
361 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
364 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
366 * ... except when the application insists on
367 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
370 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
371 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
372 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
374 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
377 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
385 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
386 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
389 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
391 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
394 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
395 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
399 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
400 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
403 switch (st->hand_state) {
405 /* Shouldn't happen */
406 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
408 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
409 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
410 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
412 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
413 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
414 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
416 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
418 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
419 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
420 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
422 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
424 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
426 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
427 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
428 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
431 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
432 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
434 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
435 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
436 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
438 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
439 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
441 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
443 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
444 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
446 * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
447 * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
451 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
453 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
455 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
461 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
462 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
464 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
466 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
469 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
470 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
474 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
476 switch (st->hand_state) {
478 /* Shouldn't happen */
479 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
482 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
483 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
484 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
485 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
488 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
489 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
490 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
491 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
496 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
497 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
499 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
500 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
501 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
502 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
504 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
505 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
506 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
507 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
509 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
510 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
512 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
513 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
515 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
517 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
518 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
520 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
522 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
523 /* normal PSK or SRP */
524 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
525 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
526 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
527 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
528 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
529 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
530 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
532 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
535 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
538 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
539 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
540 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
544 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
545 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
546 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
547 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
551 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
552 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
553 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
554 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
558 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
559 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
560 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
562 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
563 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
565 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
567 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
568 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
569 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
570 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
573 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
577 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
578 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
579 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
581 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
582 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
583 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
585 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
587 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
589 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
590 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
591 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
596 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
597 * the server to the client.
599 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
601 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
603 switch (st->hand_state) {
605 /* No pre work to be done */
608 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
611 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
614 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
616 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
617 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
618 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
623 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
624 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
626 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
627 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
633 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
634 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
635 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
636 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
638 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
640 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
641 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
643 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
644 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
645 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
647 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0);
648 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
650 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
651 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
657 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
658 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
659 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
660 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
663 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
665 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
666 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
667 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
668 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
672 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
675 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
678 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
682 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
683 * server to the client.
685 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
687 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
691 switch (st->hand_state) {
693 /* No post work to be done */
696 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
697 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
699 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
700 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
705 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
706 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
708 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
709 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
710 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
714 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
715 * treat like it was the first packet
720 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
721 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
722 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
723 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
724 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
727 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
730 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
731 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
733 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
734 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
735 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
737 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
741 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
742 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
746 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
747 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
748 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
749 * something clever in the record layer for this.
751 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
752 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
753 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
754 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)
755 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
756 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
761 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
762 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
763 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
765 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
768 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
772 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
773 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
775 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
780 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
783 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
784 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
788 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
789 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
791 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
792 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
794 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
797 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
801 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
802 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
803 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
804 &s->session->master_key_length)
805 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
806 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
811 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
812 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
817 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
821 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
824 * Valid return values are:
828 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
829 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
831 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
833 switch (st->hand_state) {
835 /* Shouldn't happen */
838 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
840 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
842 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
843 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
846 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
847 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
848 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
851 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
852 /* No construction function needed */
854 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
857 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
858 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
859 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
863 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
864 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
867 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
868 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
869 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
873 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
874 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
875 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
878 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
879 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
880 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
883 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
884 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
885 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
888 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
889 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
890 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
893 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
894 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
895 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
898 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
899 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
900 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
903 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
904 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
905 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
913 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
914 * calculated as follows:
916 * 2 + # client_version
917 * 32 + # only valid length for random
918 * 1 + # length of session_id
919 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
920 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
921 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
922 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
923 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
924 * 2 + # length of extensions
925 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
927 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
929 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
930 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
933 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
934 * reading. Excludes the message header.
936 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
938 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
940 switch (st->hand_state) {
942 /* Shouldn't happen */
945 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
946 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
949 return s->max_cert_list;
951 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
952 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
954 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
955 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
957 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
958 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
959 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
962 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
963 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
965 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
966 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
971 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
973 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
975 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
977 switch (st->hand_state) {
979 /* Shouldn't happen */
980 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
982 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
983 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
986 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
988 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
989 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
991 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
992 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
994 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
995 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
996 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
999 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1000 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1002 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1003 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1008 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1011 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1013 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1015 switch (st->hand_state) {
1017 /* Shouldn't happen */
1020 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1021 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1023 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1024 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1026 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1028 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
1029 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
1030 /* Are we renegotiating? */
1031 && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
1032 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1033 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1034 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1035 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1036 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
1039 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
1042 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1044 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1047 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1048 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
1050 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
1052 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1054 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1055 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1056 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1058 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1061 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
1062 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
1064 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
1071 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1074 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1075 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1076 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1082 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1084 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1085 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1086 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1087 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1088 cookie_leni > 255) {
1089 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1090 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1093 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1095 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1096 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1106 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1107 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1108 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1113 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1114 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1115 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1116 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1118 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1120 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1121 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1122 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1123 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1124 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1125 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1126 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1128 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1129 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1130 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1131 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1132 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1133 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1134 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1135 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1136 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1137 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1138 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1139 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1140 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1142 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1143 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1148 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1150 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1151 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1152 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1156 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1159 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1160 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1162 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1165 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1167 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1169 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1173 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1175 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1177 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1179 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1180 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1181 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1182 CLIENTHELLO_MSG clienthello;
1184 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1185 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1190 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
1191 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
1194 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1196 memset(&clienthello, 0, sizeof(clienthello));
1197 clienthello.isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1198 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1200 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1204 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1205 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1206 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1207 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1209 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1210 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1212 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1213 * 7-8 session_id_length
1214 * 9-10 challenge_length
1218 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1219 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1221 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1222 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1223 * in the first place
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1230 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello.legacy_version)) {
1231 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1236 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1237 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1239 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1240 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1241 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1243 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1246 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1247 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1248 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1250 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1251 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1255 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1256 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1261 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites,
1263 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.session_id, session_id_len)
1264 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1265 /* No extensions. */
1266 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1268 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1269 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1272 clienthello.session_id_len = session_id_len;
1274 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1275 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello.random) because that is the limit
1276 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1277 * sizeof(clienthello.random) does.
1279 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1280 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1281 memset(clienthello.random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1282 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1283 clienthello.random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1284 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1285 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1286 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1287 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1288 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1292 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
1294 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1295 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1296 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1297 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello.session_id,
1298 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1299 &clienthello.session_id_len)) {
1300 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1301 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1305 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1306 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1307 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1311 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
1312 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1313 &clienthello.dtls_cookie_len)) {
1314 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1315 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1319 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1320 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1321 * So check cookie length...
1323 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1324 if (clienthello.dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1329 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites)) {
1330 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1331 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1335 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1336 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1341 /* Could be empty. */
1342 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1343 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
1345 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.extensions)) {
1346 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1347 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1353 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello.compressions,
1354 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1355 &clienthello.compressions_len)) {
1356 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1361 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1362 extensions = clienthello.extensions;
1363 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1364 &clienthello.pre_proc_exts, &al)) {
1365 /* SSLerr already been called */
1369 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1371 /* Set up the client_random */
1372 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1374 /* Choose the version */
1376 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1377 if (clienthello.legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1378 || (clienthello.legacy_version & 0xff00)
1379 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1381 * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
1384 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1388 s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
1391 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1392 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1394 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1395 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
1396 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1397 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello.legacy_version, s->version)) {
1398 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1405 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
1406 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1407 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
1409 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1413 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1414 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1415 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1416 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1417 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
1418 clienthello.dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1419 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1420 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1421 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1423 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1425 /* default verification */
1426 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello.dtls_cookie_len
1427 || memcmp(clienthello.dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1428 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1429 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1430 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1433 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1435 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1436 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
1437 if (protverr != 0) {
1438 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1439 s->version = s->client_version;
1440 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1448 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1449 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1451 clienthello.pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1452 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1457 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1458 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1460 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1461 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1462 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1463 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1464 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1465 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1466 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1467 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1468 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1469 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1472 if (clienthello.isv2 ||
1474 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1475 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1478 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &clienthello);
1480 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1482 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1483 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1484 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1485 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1486 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1488 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1489 /* previous session */
1491 } else if (i == -1) {
1495 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1500 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello.ciphersuites, &ciphers,
1501 clienthello.isv2, &al) == NULL) {
1505 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1508 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1511 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1513 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1514 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1516 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1517 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1526 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1529 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1530 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1531 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1536 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello.compressions_len; loop++) {
1537 if (clienthello.compressions[loop] == 0)
1541 if (loop >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
1543 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1548 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1549 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1550 ssl_check_for_safari(s, &clienthello);
1551 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1553 /* TLS extensions */
1554 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1555 clienthello.pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1560 /* Check we've got a key_share for TLSv1.3 */
1561 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL && !s->hit) {
1562 /* No suitable share */
1563 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Send a HelloRetryRequest */
1564 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1565 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
1570 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1571 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1572 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1573 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1577 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1578 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1583 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1584 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1586 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1587 * backwards compat reasons
1589 int master_key_length;
1591 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1592 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1593 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1595 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1596 && master_key_length > 0) {
1597 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1599 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1600 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1604 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1606 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1611 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1612 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1613 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1617 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1618 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1619 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1620 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1621 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1626 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1627 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1628 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1630 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1631 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1632 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1633 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1634 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1636 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1637 /* Can't disable compression */
1638 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1639 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1640 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1643 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1644 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1645 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1646 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1647 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1651 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1652 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1653 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1656 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1657 for (k = 0; k < clienthello.compressions_len; k++) {
1658 if (clienthello.compressions[k] == comp_id)
1661 if (k >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
1662 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1663 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1664 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1669 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1670 /* See if we have a match */
1671 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1674 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1675 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1676 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1678 for (o = 0; o < clienthello.compressions_len; o++) {
1679 if (v == clienthello.compressions[o]) {
1688 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1694 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1695 * using compression.
1697 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1704 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1708 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1709 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1711 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1713 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1714 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1715 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1716 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1717 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1721 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1727 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1728 OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
1729 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1731 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1733 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1735 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1736 OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
1738 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1742 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1743 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
1745 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s, int *al)
1747 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1750 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1751 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
1752 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
1753 * influence which certificate is sent
1755 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
1756 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
1758 CERT_PKEY *certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
1760 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1761 if (certpkey != NULL) {
1763 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1764 * et al can pick it up.
1766 s->cert->key = certpkey;
1767 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
1769 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1770 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1771 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1773 /* status request response should be sent */
1774 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1775 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
1776 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1778 /* something bad happened */
1779 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1781 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1790 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1792 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1793 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1795 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1797 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1798 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1799 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1801 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1802 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1803 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1807 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1810 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1813 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1815 if (cipher == NULL) {
1816 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1817 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1820 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1821 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1822 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1823 s->session->not_resumable =
1824 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, ((cipher->algorithm_mkey
1825 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
1827 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1828 /* do not send a session ticket */
1829 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1831 /* Session-id reuse */
1832 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1835 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1836 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1837 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1843 * we now have the following setup.
1845 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1846 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1847 * compression - basically ignored right now
1848 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1849 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1850 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1851 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1855 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
1856 * certificate callbacks etc above.
1858 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s, &al)) {
1859 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1860 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1866 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1867 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1869 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1871 * callback indicates further work to be done
1873 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1876 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1878 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1879 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1881 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1882 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1883 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1885 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1886 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1892 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1894 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1895 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1899 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1901 int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1905 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
1906 version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version;
1907 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
1909 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1910 * tls_process_client_hello()
1912 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1913 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1918 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1919 * back in the server hello:
1920 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1921 * we send back the old session ID.
1922 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1923 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1924 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1925 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1927 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1928 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1929 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1930 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1933 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1934 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1936 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1938 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1939 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1940 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1944 /* set up the compression method */
1945 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1948 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1951 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1954 if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1955 && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl))
1956 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
1957 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1958 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm))
1959 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
1961 ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1962 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO,
1964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1970 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1974 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1976 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
1977 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1978 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1985 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1987 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1988 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
1990 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1991 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1992 size_t encodedlen = 0;
1996 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1997 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
2000 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2001 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2002 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2004 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2009 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2014 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2016 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2017 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2018 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2019 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2021 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2022 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2023 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2024 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2026 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2029 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2030 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2031 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2032 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2035 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2038 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2041 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2043 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2044 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2045 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2047 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2048 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2053 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2054 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2055 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2056 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2059 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2060 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2061 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2062 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2063 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2066 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2067 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2068 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2072 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2074 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2075 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2079 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2081 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2084 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2085 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2088 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2089 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2092 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2094 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2098 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2099 nid = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2100 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
2101 if (curve_id == 0) {
2102 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2103 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2106 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
2107 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2108 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2109 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2113 /* Encode the public key. */
2114 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2116 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2117 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2122 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2123 * can set these to NULLs
2130 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2132 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2133 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2134 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2135 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2136 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2137 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2140 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2141 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2142 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2143 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2147 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2148 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2149 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2153 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2154 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
2155 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
2157 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2165 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2166 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2167 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2170 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2171 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2173 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2174 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2176 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2177 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2183 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2184 unsigned char *binval;
2187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2188 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2189 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2192 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2195 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2196 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2202 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2203 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2206 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2207 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2210 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2211 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2212 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2215 memset(binval, 0, len);
2219 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2220 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2221 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2222 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2226 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2229 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2230 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2232 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2233 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2234 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2237 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2238 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2239 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2240 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2241 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2242 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2245 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2246 encodedPoint = NULL;
2253 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2254 * points to the space at the end.
2257 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
2261 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2262 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2263 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2264 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2267 /* send signature algorithm */
2268 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2269 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(s, pkt, pkey, md, &ispss)) {
2270 /* Should never happen */
2271 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2272 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2277 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2280 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2281 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2282 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2285 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2286 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2287 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2288 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2289 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2293 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx,
2294 RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2295 /* -1 here means set saltlen to the digest len */
2296 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1) <= 0) {
2297 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2302 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2303 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2304 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2305 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2306 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx,
2307 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2309 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen) <= 0
2310 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2311 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2312 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2313 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2317 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2318 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2320 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2325 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2328 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2331 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2334 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2336 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2340 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2343 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2345 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2346 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2347 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt)
2348 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2349 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2353 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2354 const unsigned int *psigs;
2355 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2357 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2358 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2359 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2360 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2361 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2366 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2367 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2368 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2372 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2374 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2375 unsigned char *namebytes;
2376 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2380 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2381 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2383 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2384 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2385 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2390 /* else no CA names */
2392 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2393 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2397 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2401 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2405 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2408 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2410 PACKET psk_identity;
2412 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2413 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2414 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2417 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2418 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2419 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2422 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2423 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2428 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2429 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2430 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2434 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2437 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2438 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2439 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2441 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2443 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2445 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2446 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2447 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2451 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2452 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2453 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2455 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2456 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2457 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2461 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2465 /* Should never happen */
2466 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2467 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2472 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2474 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2475 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2477 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2478 size_t j, padding_len;
2479 PACKET enc_premaster;
2481 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2484 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
2486 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2491 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2492 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2493 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2495 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2496 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2497 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2498 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2504 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2505 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2506 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2507 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2509 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2510 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2511 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2515 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2516 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2517 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2518 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2523 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2524 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2525 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2526 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2527 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2530 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2534 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2535 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2537 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2538 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2539 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2540 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2541 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2544 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2547 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2548 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2549 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2551 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2552 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2557 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2558 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2559 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2560 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2561 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2563 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2566 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2567 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2568 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2569 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2570 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2571 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2574 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2575 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2577 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2578 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2581 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2582 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2583 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2584 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2585 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2586 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2589 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2590 unsigned char workaround_good;
2591 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2592 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2594 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2595 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2596 version_good |= workaround_good;
2600 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2601 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2603 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2606 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2607 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2608 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2609 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2611 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2612 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2613 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2614 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2615 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2618 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2619 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2620 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2627 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2630 /* Should never happen */
2631 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2632 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2637 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2640 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2644 const unsigned char *data;
2645 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2648 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2649 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2650 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2651 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2654 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2656 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2661 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2662 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2663 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2666 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2667 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2668 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2669 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2672 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2673 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2674 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2677 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2678 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2680 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2681 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2682 if (pub_key != NULL)
2687 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2688 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2689 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2694 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2695 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2697 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2700 /* Should never happen */
2701 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2702 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2707 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2710 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2711 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2714 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2715 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2716 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2717 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2721 const unsigned char *data;
2724 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2725 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2728 /* Get encoded point length */
2729 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2730 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2731 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2732 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2735 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2736 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2737 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2740 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
2741 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2742 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2747 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2748 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2749 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2754 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2755 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2757 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2761 /* Should never happen */
2762 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2763 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2768 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2770 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2772 const unsigned char *data;
2774 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2775 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2776 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2780 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2781 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2784 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2785 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2786 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2789 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2790 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2791 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2792 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2796 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2797 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2803 /* Should never happen */
2804 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2805 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2810 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2812 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2813 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2814 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2815 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2816 const unsigned char *start;
2817 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2818 unsigned long alg_a;
2821 size_t sess_key_len;
2822 const unsigned char *data;
2825 /* Get our certificate private key */
2826 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2827 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2829 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2831 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2833 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2836 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2838 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2839 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2842 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2843 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2844 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2848 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2849 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2850 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2854 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2855 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2856 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2857 * client certificate for authorization only.
2859 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2860 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2861 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2864 /* Decrypt session key */
2865 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2866 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
2867 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2868 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2871 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2872 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2873 &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2874 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2875 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2876 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2881 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2882 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2883 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2884 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2887 /* Generate master secret */
2888 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2889 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2890 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2891 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2894 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2895 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2896 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2897 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2901 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2904 /* Should never happen */
2905 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2906 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2911 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2914 unsigned long alg_k;
2916 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2918 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2919 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2922 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2923 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2924 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2925 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2927 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2930 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2931 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2932 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2933 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2936 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2937 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2939 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2940 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2942 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2943 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2945 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2946 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2948 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2949 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2952 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2953 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2954 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2958 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2961 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2963 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2964 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2966 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2967 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2970 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2972 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2973 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2974 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2975 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2976 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2978 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2981 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2982 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2984 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2985 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2986 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
2988 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2992 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2993 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2998 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
3000 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
3001 /* Are we renegotiating? */
3003 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
3004 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
3005 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
3006 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
3007 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
3008 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
3009 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
3010 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
3013 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
3017 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3019 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3020 * the handshake_buffer
3022 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3023 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3026 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3028 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3029 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3030 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3031 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3035 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3036 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3038 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3039 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3044 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3047 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3049 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3051 unsigned long l, llen;
3052 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3053 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3054 PACKET spkt, context;
3057 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3058 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3062 /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
3063 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context))
3064 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
3065 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
3066 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3067 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3068 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3072 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3073 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3074 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3075 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3077 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3081 certstart = certbytes;
3082 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3084 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3087 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3088 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3089 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3090 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3094 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3095 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3098 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3099 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3100 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
3103 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3105 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3106 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
3107 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3110 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3113 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3114 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3120 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3121 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3122 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3123 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3124 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3125 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3128 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3129 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3130 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3131 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3132 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3133 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3136 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3137 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3142 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3144 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3145 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3146 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3150 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3151 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3154 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3156 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3157 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3158 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3163 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3164 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3165 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3167 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3168 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3171 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3174 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3175 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3176 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3181 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3182 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3186 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3188 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3189 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3190 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3191 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3192 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3196 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3200 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3201 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3204 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3208 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3211 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3213 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3215 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3220 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3221 * for the server Certificate message
3223 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3224 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &al)) {
3225 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3226 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3233 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3235 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3236 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3237 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3238 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3239 const unsigned char *const_p;
3240 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3243 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3244 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3245 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3246 int iv_len, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3247 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3249 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3253 /* get session encoding length */
3254 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3256 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3259 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3260 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3263 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3265 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3269 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3270 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3271 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3272 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3277 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3281 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3284 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3287 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3289 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3290 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3291 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3295 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3296 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3299 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3302 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3303 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3305 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3306 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3307 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3312 /* Put timeout and length */
3313 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3314 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3315 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3316 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3320 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3321 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3326 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3328 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3330 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3331 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
3333 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3334 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv))
3336 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
3337 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
3338 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3340 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3341 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3344 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c,
3345 sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0)
3349 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3350 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3351 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3353 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3355 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add))
3356 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3357 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3358 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3359 /* Output key name */
3360 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3362 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3363 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3365 /* Encrypt session data */
3366 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3367 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3368 || encdata1 != encdata2
3369 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3370 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3371 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3372 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3373 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3374 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3375 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3376 macendoffset - macoffset)
3377 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3378 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3379 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3380 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3381 || macdata1 != macdata2
3382 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
3384 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
3385 EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3390 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3391 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3397 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3398 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3399 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3404 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3405 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3407 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3409 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
3410 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
3411 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
3412 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3419 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3421 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
3422 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3431 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3432 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3434 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3436 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3437 size_t next_proto_len;
3440 * The payload looks like:
3442 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3443 * uint8 padding_len;
3444 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3446 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3447 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3448 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3449 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3453 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
3458 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3460 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3462 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3463 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3467 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3471 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3473 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3474 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3475 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3482 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3484 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3485 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3486 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3487 int sslv2format, int *al)
3489 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3490 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3492 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3493 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3495 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3497 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3499 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3501 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3505 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3507 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3508 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3512 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
3514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3515 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3520 size_t numciphers = PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) / n;
3521 PACKET sslv2ciphers = *cipher_suites;
3522 unsigned int leadbyte;
3526 * We store the raw ciphers list in SSLv3+ format so we need to do some
3527 * preprocessing to convert the list first. If there are any SSLv2 only
3528 * ciphersuites with a non-zero leading byte then we are going to
3529 * slightly over allocate because we won't store those. But that isn't a
3532 raw = OPENSSL_malloc(numciphers * TLS_CIPHER_LEN);
3533 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = raw;
3535 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3538 for (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
3539 PACKET_remaining(&sslv2ciphers) > 0;
3540 raw += TLS_CIPHER_LEN) {
3541 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sslv2ciphers, &leadbyte)
3543 && !PACKET_copy_bytes(&sslv2ciphers, raw,
3546 && !PACKET_forward(&sslv2ciphers, TLS_CIPHER_LEN))) {
3547 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3548 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw);
3549 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL;
3550 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
3554 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen += TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3556 } else if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3557 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3558 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3562 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3564 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3565 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3566 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3568 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3571 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3572 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3573 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3574 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3575 if (s->renegotiate) {
3576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3577 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3578 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3581 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3585 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3586 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3587 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3589 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3590 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3593 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
3594 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3595 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3596 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3602 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3603 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3605 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3607 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3612 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3613 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3621 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);