1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 /* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
110 /* ====================================================================
111 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
114 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
117 * license provided above.
119 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
120 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
123 /* ====================================================================
124 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
127 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
130 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
131 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
132 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
135 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
136 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
139 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
140 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
141 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
144 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
145 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
146 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "statem_locl.h"
154 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
155 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
156 #include <openssl/rand.h>
157 #include <openssl/objects.h>
158 #include <openssl/evp.h>
159 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
160 #include <openssl/x509.h>
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
162 # include <openssl/dh.h>
164 #include <openssl/bn.h>
165 #include <openssl/md5.h>
167 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
168 PACKET *cipher_suites,
169 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
170 int sslv2format, int *al);
173 * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
174 * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
175 * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
176 * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
178 * Valid return values are:
179 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
180 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
182 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
184 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
186 switch(st->hand_state) {
188 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
189 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
190 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
195 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
197 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
198 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
200 * 2) If we did request one then
201 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
203 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
204 * list if we requested a certificate)
206 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
207 && (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request
208 || (!((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
209 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
210 && (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)))) {
211 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
213 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
214 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
215 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
222 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
223 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
228 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
230 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
231 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
232 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
233 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
234 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
237 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
238 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
240 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
241 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
242 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
243 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
245 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
249 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
256 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
257 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
258 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
263 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
264 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
265 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
266 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
267 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
272 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
273 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
276 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
282 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
283 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
284 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
290 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
291 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
292 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
301 /* No valid transition found */
306 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
308 * Valid return values are:
312 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
314 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
317 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
318 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
319 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
320 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
321 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
324 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)
326 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
330 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
331 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
332 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
333 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
334 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
336 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
337 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
338 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
348 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
350 * Valid return values are:
354 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
357 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
358 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
360 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
361 * during re-negotiation:
363 && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
364 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
366 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
367 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
370 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
372 * ... except when the application insists on
373 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
376 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
377 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
378 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
380 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
383 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
391 * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
392 * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
394 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
396 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
398 switch(st->hand_state) {
400 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */;
401 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
404 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
405 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
406 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
408 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
409 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
410 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
411 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
413 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
414 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
415 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
416 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
418 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
419 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
421 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
422 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
424 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
426 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
427 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
429 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
431 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
432 /* normal PSK or SRP */
433 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
434 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
435 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
436 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
437 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
438 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
439 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
441 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
444 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
447 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
448 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
449 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
453 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
454 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
455 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
460 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
461 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
462 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
463 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
467 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
468 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
469 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
471 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
472 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
474 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
476 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
477 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
478 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
479 } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
480 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
482 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
484 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
486 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
487 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
488 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
490 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
491 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
492 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
494 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
496 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
498 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
499 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
500 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
503 /* Shouldn't happen */
504 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
509 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
510 * the server to the client.
512 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
514 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
516 switch(st->hand_state) {
517 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
520 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
523 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
525 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
526 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
527 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
532 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
533 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
535 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
536 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
542 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
544 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
545 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
547 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
549 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
550 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
552 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
553 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
559 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
560 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
561 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
562 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
565 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
567 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
568 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
569 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
570 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
574 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
577 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
580 /* No pre work to be done */
584 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
588 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
589 * server to the client.
591 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
593 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
597 switch(st->hand_state) {
598 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
599 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
601 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
604 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
605 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
607 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
608 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
609 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
611 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
612 * treat like it was the first packet
617 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
619 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
620 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
621 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
624 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
627 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
628 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
630 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
631 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
632 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
633 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
637 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
638 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
643 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
644 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
645 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
647 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
650 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
654 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
655 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
656 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
661 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
664 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
665 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
669 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
670 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
673 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
675 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
678 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
685 /* No post work to be done */
689 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
693 * Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client.
695 * Valid return values are:
699 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s)
701 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
703 switch(st->hand_state) {
704 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
705 return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s);
707 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
708 return tls_construct_hello_request(s);
710 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
711 return tls_construct_server_hello(s);
714 return tls_construct_server_certificate(s);
716 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
717 return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s);
719 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
720 return tls_construct_certificate_request(s);
722 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
723 return tls_construct_server_done(s);
725 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
726 return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s);
728 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
729 return tls_construct_cert_status(s);
731 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
733 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
735 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
737 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
738 return tls_construct_finished(s,
740 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
742 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
745 /* Shouldn't happen */
752 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
753 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
756 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
757 * reading. Excludes the message header.
759 unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
761 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
763 switch(st->hand_state) {
764 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
765 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
768 return s->max_cert_list;
770 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
771 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
773 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
774 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
776 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
777 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
778 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
781 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
782 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
784 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
785 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
788 /* Shouldn't happen */
796 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
798 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
800 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
802 switch(st->hand_state) {
803 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
804 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
807 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
809 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
810 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
812 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
813 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
816 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
817 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
820 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
821 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
823 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
824 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
827 /* Shouldn't happen */
831 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
835 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
838 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
840 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
842 switch(st->hand_state) {
843 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
844 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
846 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
847 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
849 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
850 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
851 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
852 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
853 /* Are we renegotiating? */
855 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
856 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
857 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
858 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
859 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
860 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
863 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
866 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
872 /* Shouldn't happen */
876 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
877 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
879 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
881 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
883 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
884 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
885 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
887 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
891 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
893 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
900 int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s)
902 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
903 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
904 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
911 unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf,
912 unsigned char *cookie,
913 unsigned char cookie_len)
915 unsigned int msg_len;
919 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
920 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
921 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xFF;
923 *(p++) = (unsigned char)cookie_len;
924 memcpy(p, cookie, cookie_len);
931 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
936 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
938 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
939 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
940 &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 ||
941 s->d1->cookie_len > 255) {
942 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
943 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
944 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
948 len = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH],
949 s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
951 dtls1_set_message_header(s, buf, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, len, 0,
953 len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
955 /* number of bytes to write */
962 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
964 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
965 unsigned int j, complen = 0;
968 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
969 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
971 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
973 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
974 PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
977 is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
979 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
980 /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
982 unsigned int version;
985 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
986 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
987 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
988 * the rest right through. Its format is:
990 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
991 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
993 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
994 * 7-8 session_id_length
995 * 9-10 challenge_length
999 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1000 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1002 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1003 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1004 * in the first place
1006 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1010 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)) {
1011 /* No protocol version supplied! */
1012 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1015 if (version == 0x0002) {
1016 /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
1017 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1019 } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1021 s->client_version = version;
1023 /* No idea what protocol this is */
1024 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1029 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
1030 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
1032 if(!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
1033 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1040 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1041 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1043 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1044 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
1045 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1046 DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->client_version, s->version)) {
1047 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1054 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
1056 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
1059 s->version = s->client_version;
1061 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1065 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1068 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1069 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1070 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
1072 unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1075 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len)
1076 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1077 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1078 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1079 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1080 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1084 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1085 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1086 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1090 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
1091 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
1092 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1093 /* No extensions. */
1094 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1096 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1097 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1101 /* Load the client random */
1102 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
1104 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1105 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1106 s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1107 challenge_len, challenge_len)) {
1108 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1109 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1113 PACKET_null_init(&compression);
1114 PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
1116 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1117 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1118 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1119 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1120 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1124 if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1125 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1130 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1131 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1132 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1137 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1138 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1139 * So check cookie length...
1141 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1142 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)
1147 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites)
1148 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1149 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1150 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1153 /* Could be empty. */
1160 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1161 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1163 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1164 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1165 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1166 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1167 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1168 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1169 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1170 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1171 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1172 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1177 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1178 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1181 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);
1183 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1185 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1186 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1187 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1188 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1189 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1191 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1192 /* previous session */
1194 } else if (i == -1) {
1198 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1203 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1204 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1205 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1206 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1207 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
1208 PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) == 0) {
1209 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1210 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1211 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1213 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1215 /* default verification */
1216 } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1217 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1218 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1222 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1224 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1225 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
1226 if (protverr != 0) {
1227 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1228 s->version = s->client_version;
1229 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1232 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1236 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),
1237 is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {
1241 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1244 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1247 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1248 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1250 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1251 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1253 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1254 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1263 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1266 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1268 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1273 complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
1274 for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
1275 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
1281 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1282 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1286 /* TLS extensions */
1287 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1288 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
1289 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1295 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1296 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1297 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1298 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1302 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1303 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1308 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1309 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1311 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1312 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1313 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1315 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1317 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1318 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1322 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1324 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1329 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1330 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1331 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1335 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1336 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1337 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1338 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1339 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1344 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1345 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1346 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1348 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1350 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1351 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1352 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1354 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1355 /* Can't disable compression */
1356 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1358 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1361 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1362 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1363 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1364 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1365 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1369 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1370 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1371 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1374 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1375 for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
1376 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)
1380 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1381 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1382 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1387 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1388 /* See if we have a match */
1389 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1392 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1393 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1394 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1396 for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
1397 if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {
1406 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1412 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1413 * using compression.
1415 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1416 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1422 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1426 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1427 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1429 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1431 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1432 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1433 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1434 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1435 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1439 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1440 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1445 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1446 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1448 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1450 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1452 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1453 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1457 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1459 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1460 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1462 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1464 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1465 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1466 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1468 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1473 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1476 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1478 cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1480 if (cipher == NULL) {
1481 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1484 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1485 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1486 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1487 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1488 ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1489 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1490 /* do not send a session ticket */
1491 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1493 /* Session-id reuse */
1494 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1497 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1498 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1499 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1505 * we now have the following setup.
1507 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1508 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1509 * compression - basically ignored right now
1510 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1511 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1512 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1513 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1516 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1517 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1518 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1519 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1520 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1528 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1530 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1532 * callback indicates further work to be done
1534 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1537 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1539 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1540 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1542 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1544 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1551 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1553 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1554 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1558 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s)
1561 unsigned char *p, *d;
1566 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1568 /* Do the message type and length last */
1569 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1571 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1572 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1575 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1576 * tls_process_client_hello()
1578 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1579 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1582 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1583 * back in the server hello:
1584 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1585 * we send back the old session ID.
1586 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1587 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1588 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1589 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1591 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1592 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1593 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1594 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1597 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1598 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1600 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1602 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1603 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1604 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1605 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1609 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1612 /* put the cipher */
1613 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1616 /* put the compression method */
1617 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1620 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1623 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1626 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1627 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1628 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1632 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1634 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1635 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1636 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1642 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1644 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1651 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s)
1653 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
1654 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1655 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1659 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
1660 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1661 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1668 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1671 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
1673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1674 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1679 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1680 unsigned char *p, *d;
1687 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1689 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1690 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1691 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1695 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1699 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1702 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1704 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1707 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
1708 n += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1710 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1711 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1713 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1714 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1715 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1716 CERT *cert = s->cert;
1718 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
1721 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1722 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1723 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
1724 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
1726 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1728 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1731 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
1734 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
1736 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1737 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
1738 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
1740 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1741 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1742 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1747 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
1748 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1749 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1750 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1753 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1754 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
1755 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1756 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1757 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1760 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1761 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1762 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1766 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp, NID_undef);
1768 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1769 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1773 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
1775 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1783 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1784 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1787 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1788 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1789 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1793 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1794 nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1795 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
1796 if (curve_id == 0) {
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1798 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1801 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(NULL, nid);
1802 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
1803 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1804 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1805 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1809 /* Encode the public key. */
1810 encodedlen = EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->s3->tmp.pkey),
1811 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1812 &encodedPoint, NULL);
1814 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1815 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1820 * We only support named (not generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key
1821 * exchanges. In this situation, we need four additional bytes to
1822 * encode the entire ServerECDHParams structure.
1824 n += 4 + encodedlen;
1827 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1828 * can set these to NULLs
1835 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1837 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1838 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1839 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1840 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1841 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1842 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1845 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1846 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1847 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1848 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1852 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1853 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1854 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1857 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1858 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1860 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1867 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1868 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
1869 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1871 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1874 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1880 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1881 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1884 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1886 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1887 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1888 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1889 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) {
1890 s2n(strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint), p);
1891 strncpy((char *)p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
1892 strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint));
1893 p += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1900 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1901 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1902 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1912 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1913 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1915 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1916 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1917 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1918 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1920 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1928 memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1929 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1930 encodedPoint = NULL;
1938 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1939 * points to the space at the end.
1942 /* send signature algorithm */
1943 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1944 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1945 /* Should never happen */
1946 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1948 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1954 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1956 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1957 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1958 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1959 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1960 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1961 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
1962 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, &(p[2]),
1963 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {
1964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
1965 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1970 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1973 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1974 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1975 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1976 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1981 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
1982 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1983 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1987 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1990 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1993 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1995 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1996 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1998 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1999 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2003 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2005 unsigned char *p, *d;
2006 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2007 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2013 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2015 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2017 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2022 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2023 const unsigned char *psigs;
2024 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2025 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2026 /* Skip over length for now */
2028 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2029 /* Now fill in length */
2039 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2042 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2043 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2044 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2045 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2046 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2047 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2051 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2053 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2058 /* else no CA names */
2059 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2062 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
2063 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2067 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2071 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2075 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2079 unsigned long alg_k;
2080 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2083 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2084 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2086 PACKET enc_premaster;
2087 const unsigned char *data;
2088 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2090 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2092 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2093 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2094 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2095 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2097 PACKET psk_identity;
2099 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2100 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2101 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2104 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2105 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2106 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2107 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2110 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2111 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2112 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2113 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2117 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2118 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2119 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2123 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2126 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2127 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2128 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2130 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2132 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2134 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2135 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2136 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2140 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2141 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2142 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2144 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2145 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2146 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2150 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2152 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2153 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2154 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2155 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2156 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2159 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2160 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2161 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2162 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2168 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2169 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2171 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2174 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2175 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
2177 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2178 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2179 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2183 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2184 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2185 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2187 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2188 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2189 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2191 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2197 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2198 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2199 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2200 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2202 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2203 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2204 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2205 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2209 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2210 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2211 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2212 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2217 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2218 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2219 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2220 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2221 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2224 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2225 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
2229 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2230 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2231 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2235 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2236 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2239 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2242 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2243 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2244 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2245 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2246 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2247 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2250 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0],
2251 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2253 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
2254 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2257 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2258 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2259 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2260 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2261 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2262 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2265 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2266 unsigned char workaround_good;
2268 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2270 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
2271 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2272 version_good |= workaround_good;
2276 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2277 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2279 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2282 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2283 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2284 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2285 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2287 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2289 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, rsa_decrypt[j],
2290 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2293 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt,
2294 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2295 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2296 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2299 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2304 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2305 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2308 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)) {
2309 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2310 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2311 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2312 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2317 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2318 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2319 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2322 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2324 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2325 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2326 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2330 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2331 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2332 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2333 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2336 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2337 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2338 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2339 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2340 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2343 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2344 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2345 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2348 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2349 cdh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2350 if (cdh->pub_key == NULL) {
2351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2355 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2356 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2357 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2361 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2363 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2364 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2370 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2371 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2373 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2374 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2375 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2376 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2377 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2381 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2382 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2385 /* Get encoded point length */
2386 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i)) {
2387 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2388 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2389 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2392 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2393 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2394 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2397 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2398 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2399 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2402 if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey), data, i,
2404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2409 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2410 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2411 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2415 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2417 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2418 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2420 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2423 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2424 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2425 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2426 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2427 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2428 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2431 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2435 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2436 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2437 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2438 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2439 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2442 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2443 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2444 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2445 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2449 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2450 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2454 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2456 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2457 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2458 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2459 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2460 const unsigned char *start;
2461 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2462 unsigned long alg_a;
2467 /* Get our certificate private key */
2468 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2469 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2471 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2473 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2475 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2478 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2480 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2481 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2484 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2485 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2486 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2490 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2491 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2492 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2496 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2497 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2498 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2499 * client certificate for authorization only.
2501 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2502 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2503 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2506 /* Decrypt session key */
2507 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2508 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
2509 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2510 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2513 if (ASN1_get_object ((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2514 &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2515 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2516 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2517 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2518 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2519 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2524 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2525 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2526 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2528 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2531 /* Generate master secret */
2532 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2533 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2534 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2538 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2539 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2540 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2541 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2543 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2544 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2546 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2551 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2552 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2556 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2558 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2559 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2562 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2563 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2565 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2567 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2568 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2570 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2571 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2574 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2577 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2578 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2579 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2580 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2582 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2585 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2586 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2588 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2589 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2590 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
2591 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2595 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2596 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2601 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
2603 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2604 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2606 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2607 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
2608 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
2609 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
2610 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
2611 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2612 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2613 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
2616 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
2620 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify) {
2621 /* No certificate verify so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */
2622 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2623 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2624 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2626 if (!s->session->peer) {
2627 /* No peer certificate so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */
2628 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2629 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2631 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2632 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2633 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2634 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2638 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2639 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2641 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
2642 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2647 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2650 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2652 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2653 const unsigned char *sig, *data;
2654 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
2655 int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2659 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2663 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2666 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2667 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2671 peer = s->session->peer;
2672 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
2673 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2675 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2676 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
2677 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2678 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2682 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2684 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2685 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
2687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2688 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
2689 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2694 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2697 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
2698 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2701 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
2703 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2705 } else if (rv == 0) {
2706 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2710 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2713 /* Use default digest for this key type */
2714 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
2716 md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
2718 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2723 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
2724 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2725 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2729 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2730 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
2731 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
2732 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2733 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2736 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
2737 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2738 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2742 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2743 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2744 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2745 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2749 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2751 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2752 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2753 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2754 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2760 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2761 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2762 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2763 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
2764 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
2765 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2766 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2769 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
2775 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2776 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2777 s->session->master_key_length,
2778 s->session->master_key)) {
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2780 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2784 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
2785 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2786 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2790 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2793 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2794 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2796 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2797 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2798 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2799 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
2803 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2805 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2807 unsigned long l, llen;
2808 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
2809 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
2812 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2813 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2817 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
2818 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
2819 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2820 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2825 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
2826 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
2827 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
2828 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2829 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2830 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2834 certstart = certbytes;
2835 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2840 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
2841 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2842 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2843 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2846 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
2847 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2853 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
2854 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2855 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2856 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2857 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2858 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2861 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2862 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2863 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2864 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2865 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2866 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2869 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
2870 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2875 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
2877 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2879 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
2883 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
2884 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2887 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
2889 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2890 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2891 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
2896 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2897 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
2898 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2900 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
2901 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
2903 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
2904 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
2907 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2911 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2912 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2915 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
2919 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2923 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2925 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2926 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2930 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
2931 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2932 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2939 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
2941 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
2942 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2943 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2944 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
2945 const unsigned char *const_p;
2946 int len, slen_full, slen;
2949 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2950 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2951 unsigned char key_name[16];
2953 /* get session encoding length */
2954 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2956 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
2959 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
2960 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2963 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
2965 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2969 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2970 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2973 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
2977 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
2980 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
2983 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
2985 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
2986 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
2987 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2991 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
2992 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2995 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2998 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2999 * follows handshake_header_length +
3000 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3001 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3002 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3003 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3005 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3006 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3007 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3010 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3012 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3013 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3015 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3016 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, hctx, 1) < 0)
3019 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3021 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3022 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3024 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3025 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3027 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3031 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3032 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3033 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3035 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3037 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3039 /* Output key name */
3041 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3044 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
3045 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3046 /* Encrypt session data */
3047 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3050 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, p, &len))
3054 if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3056 if (!HMAC_Final(hctx, p, &hlen))
3059 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3060 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3065 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3067 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3068 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3069 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3071 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
3078 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3079 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3080 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3084 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s)
3088 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3089 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3090 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3093 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3094 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3098 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3101 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3102 /* message length */
3103 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3105 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3106 /* length of OCSP response */
3107 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3108 /* actual response */
3109 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3110 /* number of bytes to write */
3111 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3119 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3120 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3122 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3124 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3125 size_t next_proto_len;
3128 * The payload looks like:
3130 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3131 * uint8 padding_len;
3132 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3134 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3135 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3136 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3137 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3141 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated,
3143 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
3147 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3149 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3151 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3152 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3156 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3158 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3159 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3160 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3161 int sslv2format, int *al
3164 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3165 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3167 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3168 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3170 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3172 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3174 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3176 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3180 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3182 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3183 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3187 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
3188 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3191 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3196 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
3199 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3200 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3201 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3205 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3207 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3208 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3209 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3211 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3214 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3215 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3216 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3217 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3218 if (s->renegotiate) {
3219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3220 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3221 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3224 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3228 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3229 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3230 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3232 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3233 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3236 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
3237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3238 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3239 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3245 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3246 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3248 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3250 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3255 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3256 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3265 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
3266 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);