1 /* ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
153 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
154 #include "statem_locl.h"
155 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
156 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
157 #include <openssl/rand.h>
158 #include <openssl/objects.h>
159 #include <openssl/evp.h>
160 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
161 #include <openssl/x509.h>
162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
163 # include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #include <openssl/bn.h>
166 #include <openssl/md5.h>
168 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
169 PACKET *cipher_suites,
170 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
171 int sslv2format, int *al);
174 * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
175 * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
176 * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
177 * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
179 * Valid return values are:
180 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
181 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
183 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
185 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
187 switch(st->hand_state) {
189 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
190 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
191 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
196 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
198 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
199 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
201 * 2) If we did request one then
202 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
204 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
205 * list if we requested a certificate)
207 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
208 && (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request
209 || (!((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
210 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
211 && (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)))) {
212 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
214 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
215 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
216 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
223 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
224 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
229 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
231 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
232 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
233 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
234 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
235 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
238 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
239 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
241 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
242 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
243 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
244 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
246 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
250 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
251 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
257 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
258 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
259 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
264 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
265 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
266 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
267 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
268 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
273 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
274 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
283 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
284 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
285 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
291 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
292 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
293 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
302 /* No valid transition found */
307 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
309 * Valid return values are:
313 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
315 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
318 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
319 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
320 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
321 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
322 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
325 if ( (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
326 || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
328 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
332 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
333 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
334 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
335 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
336 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
339 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
340 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
350 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
352 * Valid return values are:
356 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
359 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
360 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
362 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
363 * during re-negotiation:
365 && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
366 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
368 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
369 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
372 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
374 * ... except when the application insists on
375 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
378 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
379 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
380 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
382 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
385 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
393 * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
394 * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
396 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
398 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
400 switch(st->hand_state) {
402 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */;
403 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
406 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
407 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
410 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
411 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
412 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
413 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
415 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
416 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
417 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
418 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
420 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
421 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
423 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
424 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
426 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
428 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
429 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
431 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
433 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
434 /* normal PSK or SRP */
435 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
436 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
437 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
438 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
439 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
440 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
441 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
446 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
449 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
451 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
455 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
456 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
457 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
458 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
462 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
463 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
464 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
465 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
469 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
470 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
471 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
473 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
474 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
476 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
478 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
479 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
480 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
481 } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
482 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
484 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
488 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
489 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
490 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
492 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
493 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
494 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
496 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
498 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
500 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
501 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
502 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
505 /* Shouldn't happen */
506 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
511 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
512 * the server to the client.
514 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
516 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
518 switch(st->hand_state) {
519 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
522 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
525 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
527 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
528 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
529 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
534 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
535 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
537 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
538 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
544 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
546 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
547 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
549 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
551 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
552 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
554 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
555 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
561 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
562 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
563 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
564 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
567 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
569 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
570 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
571 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
572 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
576 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
579 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
582 /* No pre work to be done */
586 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
590 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
591 * server to the client.
593 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
595 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
599 switch(st->hand_state) {
600 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
601 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
603 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
606 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
607 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
609 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
610 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
611 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
613 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
614 * treat like it was the first packet
619 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
621 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
622 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
623 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
626 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
629 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
630 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
632 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
633 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
634 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
635 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
639 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
640 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
645 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
647 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
649 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
652 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
656 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
657 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
658 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
663 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
666 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
667 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
671 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
672 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
675 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
677 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
680 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
687 /* No post work to be done */
691 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
695 * Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client.
697 * Valid return values are:
701 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s)
703 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
705 switch(st->hand_state) {
706 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
707 return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s);
709 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
710 return tls_construct_hello_request(s);
712 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
713 return tls_construct_server_hello(s);
716 return tls_construct_server_certificate(s);
718 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
719 return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s);
721 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
722 return tls_construct_certificate_request(s);
724 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
725 return tls_construct_server_done(s);
727 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
728 return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s);
730 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
731 return tls_construct_cert_status(s);
733 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
735 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
737 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
739 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
740 return tls_construct_finished(s,
742 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
744 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
747 /* Shouldn't happen */
754 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
755 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
758 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
759 * reading. Excludes the message header.
761 unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
763 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
765 switch(st->hand_state) {
766 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
767 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
770 return s->max_cert_list;
772 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
773 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
775 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
776 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
779 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
780 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
783 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
784 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
786 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
787 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
790 /* Shouldn't happen */
798 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
800 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
802 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
804 switch(st->hand_state) {
805 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
806 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
809 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
811 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
812 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
814 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
815 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
818 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
819 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
822 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
823 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
825 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
826 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
829 /* Shouldn't happen */
833 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
837 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
840 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
842 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
844 switch(st->hand_state) {
845 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
846 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
848 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
849 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
851 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
853 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
854 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
855 /* Are we renegotiating? */
857 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
858 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
859 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
860 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
861 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
862 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
865 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
868 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
874 /* Shouldn't happen */
878 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
879 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
881 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
883 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
885 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
886 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
887 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
889 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
893 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
895 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
902 int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s)
904 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
905 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
906 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
913 unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf,
914 unsigned char *cookie,
915 unsigned char cookie_len)
917 unsigned int msg_len;
921 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
922 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
923 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xFF;
925 *(p++) = (unsigned char)cookie_len;
926 memcpy(p, cookie, cookie_len);
933 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
938 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
940 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
941 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
942 &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 ||
943 s->d1->cookie_len > 255) {
944 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
945 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
946 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
950 len = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH],
951 s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
953 dtls1_set_message_header(s, buf, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, len, 0,
955 len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
957 /* number of bytes to write */
964 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
966 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
967 unsigned int j, complen = 0;
970 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
971 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
973 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
975 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
976 PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
979 is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
981 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
982 /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
984 unsigned int version;
987 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
988 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
989 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
990 * the rest right through. Its format is:
992 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
993 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
995 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
996 * 7-8 session_id_length
997 * 9-10 challenge_length
1001 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1002 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1004 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1005 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1006 * in the first place
1008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1012 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)) {
1013 /* No protocol version supplied! */
1014 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1017 if (version == 0x0002) {
1018 /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
1019 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1021 } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1023 s->client_version = version;
1025 /* No idea what protocol this is */
1026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1031 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
1032 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
1034 if(!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
1035 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1036 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1041 /* Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable */
1042 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1043 if (s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1044 if (s->client_version >= s->version) {
1047 } else if (s->client_version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1048 switch(s->client_version) {
1050 case TLS1_2_VERSION:
1051 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
1052 s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1053 s->method = TLSv1_2_server_method();
1057 /* Deliberately fall through */
1058 case TLS1_1_VERSION:
1059 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
1060 s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
1061 s->method = TLSv1_1_server_method();
1065 /* Deliberately fall through */
1067 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
1068 s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
1069 s->method = TLSv1_server_method();
1073 /* Deliberately fall through */
1075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1076 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
1077 s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
1078 s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
1087 } else if (s->client_version <= s->version
1088 || s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1090 * For DTLS we just check versions are potentially compatible. Version
1091 * negotiation comes later.
1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1098 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
1100 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
1103 s->version = s->client_version;
1105 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1109 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1112 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1113 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1114 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
1116 unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1119 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len)
1120 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1121 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1122 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1123 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1124 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1128 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
1129 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
1130 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1131 /* No extensions. */
1132 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1134 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1135 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1139 /* Load the client random */
1140 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
1142 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1143 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1144 s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1145 challenge_len, challenge_len)) {
1146 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1147 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1151 PACKET_null_init(&compression);
1152 PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
1154 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1155 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1156 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1157 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1158 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1162 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1163 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1164 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1169 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1170 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1171 * So check cookie length...
1173 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1174 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)
1179 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites)
1180 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1181 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1185 /* Could be empty. */
1192 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1193 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1195 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1196 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1197 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1198 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1199 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1200 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1201 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1202 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1203 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1204 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1209 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1210 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1213 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);
1215 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1217 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1218 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1219 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1220 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1221 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1223 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1224 /* previous session */
1226 } else if (i == -1) {
1230 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1235 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1236 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1237 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1238 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1239 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
1240 PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) == 0) {
1241 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1243 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1245 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1247 /* default verification */
1248 } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1249 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1250 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1254 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1256 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1257 /* Select version to use */
1258 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1259 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
1260 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1261 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1262 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1263 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1264 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1265 s->version = s->client_version;
1266 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1268 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1269 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
1270 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1271 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1274 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1275 s->version = s->client_version;
1276 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1279 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1283 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),
1284 is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {
1288 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1291 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1294 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1295 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1297 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1298 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1300 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1301 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1310 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1313 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1315 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1320 complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
1321 for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
1322 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
1328 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1329 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1333 /* TLS extensions */
1334 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1335 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1342 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1343 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1344 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1345 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1349 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1350 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1355 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1356 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1358 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1359 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1360 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1362 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1364 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1365 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1369 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1371 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1376 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1377 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1378 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1382 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1383 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1384 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1385 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1386 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1391 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1392 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1393 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1395 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1397 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1398 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1399 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1401 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1402 /* Can't disable compression */
1403 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1405 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1408 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1409 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1410 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1411 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1412 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1416 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1418 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1421 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1422 for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
1423 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)
1427 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1428 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1429 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1434 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1435 /* See if we have a match */
1436 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1439 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1440 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1441 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1443 for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
1444 if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {
1453 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1459 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1460 * using compression.
1462 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1469 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1473 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1474 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1476 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1478 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1479 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1480 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1481 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1486 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1487 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1492 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1493 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1495 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1497 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1499 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1500 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1504 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1506 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1509 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1511 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1512 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1513 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1515 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1520 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1523 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1525 cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1527 if (cipher == NULL) {
1528 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1531 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1532 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1533 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1534 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1535 ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1536 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1537 /* do not send a session ticket */
1538 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1540 /* Session-id reuse */
1541 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1544 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1545 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1546 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1552 * we now have the following setup.
1554 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1555 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1556 * compression - basically ignored right now
1557 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1558 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1559 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1560 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1563 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1564 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1565 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1566 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1567 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1574 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1575 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1577 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1579 * callback indicates further work to be done
1581 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1584 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1586 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1587 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1589 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1590 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1591 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1598 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1600 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1601 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1605 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s)
1608 unsigned char *p, *d;
1613 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1615 /* Do the message type and length last */
1616 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1618 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1619 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1622 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1623 * tls_process_client_hello()
1625 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1626 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1629 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1630 * back in the server hello:
1631 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1632 * we send back the old session ID.
1633 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1634 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1635 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1636 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1638 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1639 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1640 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1641 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1644 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1645 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1647 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1649 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1650 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1651 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1652 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1656 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1659 /* put the cipher */
1660 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1663 /* put the compression method */
1664 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1667 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1670 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1673 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1674 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1675 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1679 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1681 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1683 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1689 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
1690 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1691 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1698 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s)
1700 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1702 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1706 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
1707 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1708 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1715 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1718 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1720 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1721 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1726 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1727 unsigned char *p, *d;
1734 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1736 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1737 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1738 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1742 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1746 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1749 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1751 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1754 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
1755 n += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1757 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1758 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1760 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1762 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1763 CERT *cert = s->cert;
1765 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1766 dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1768 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1769 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1770 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1775 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1776 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
1778 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1780 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1783 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1784 DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp)) {
1785 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1786 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1787 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1790 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1791 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1792 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1796 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1798 else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1799 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1804 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1805 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1806 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1807 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1808 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1812 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1813 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1814 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1815 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1825 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1828 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1829 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1830 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1834 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1835 nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1836 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
1837 if (curve_id == 0) {
1838 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1839 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1842 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(NULL, nid);
1843 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
1844 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1845 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1850 /* Encode the public key. */
1851 encodedlen = EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->s3->tmp.pkey),
1852 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1853 &encodedPoint, NULL);
1855 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1856 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1861 * We only support named (not generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key
1862 * exchanges. In this situation, we need four additional bytes to
1863 * encode the entire ServerECDHParams structure.
1865 n += 4 + encodedlen;
1868 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1869 * can set these to NULLs
1876 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1878 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1879 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1880 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1881 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1882 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1883 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1886 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1887 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1888 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1889 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1893 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1894 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1895 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1898 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1899 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1900 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1901 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1908 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1909 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
1910 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1912 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1915 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1921 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1922 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1925 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1928 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1929 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1930 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) {
1931 s2n(strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint), p);
1932 strncpy((char *)p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
1933 strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint));
1934 p += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1941 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1943 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1953 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1954 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1956 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1957 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1958 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1959 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1961 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1969 memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1970 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1971 encodedPoint = NULL;
1979 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1980 * points to the space at the end.
1983 /* send signature algorithm */
1984 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1985 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1986 /* Should never happen */
1987 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1989 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1995 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1997 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1998 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1999 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2000 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2001 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2002 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
2003 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, &(p[2]),
2004 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {
2005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
2006 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2011 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2014 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2015 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2017 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2022 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
2023 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2024 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2028 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2031 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2033 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2034 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2036 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2037 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2041 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2043 unsigned char *p, *d;
2044 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2045 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2051 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2053 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2055 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2060 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2061 const unsigned char *psigs;
2062 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2063 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2064 /* Skip over length for now */
2066 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2067 /* Now fill in length */
2077 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2080 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2081 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2082 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2083 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2084 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2085 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2089 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2091 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2096 /* else no CA names */
2097 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2100 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
2101 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2105 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2109 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2113 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2117 unsigned long alg_k;
2118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2120 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2124 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2127 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2129 PACKET enc_premaster;
2130 unsigned char *data, *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2132 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2134 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2135 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2136 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2137 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2139 PACKET psk_identity;
2141 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2142 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2143 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2146 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2147 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2148 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2149 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2152 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2153 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2154 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2155 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2159 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2160 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2161 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2165 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2168 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2169 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2170 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2172 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2174 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2176 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2177 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2178 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2182 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2183 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2184 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2186 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2187 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2188 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2192 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2194 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2195 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2196 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2197 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2201 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2202 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2203 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2204 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2210 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2211 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2213 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2216 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2217 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2218 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2219 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2220 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2221 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2222 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2225 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2227 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2228 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2229 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2232 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2233 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2234 /* Try SSLv3 behaviour for TLS. */
2235 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG) {
2236 enc_premaster = orig;
2238 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2240 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2247 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2248 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2249 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2250 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2252 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2253 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2254 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2255 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2259 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2260 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2261 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2262 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2267 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2268 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2269 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2270 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2271 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2274 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2275 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
2279 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2280 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2281 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2285 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2286 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2289 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2292 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2293 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2294 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2295 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2296 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2297 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2300 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0],
2301 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2303 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
2304 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2307 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2308 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2309 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2310 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2311 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2312 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2315 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2316 unsigned char workaround_good;
2318 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2320 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
2321 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2322 version_good |= workaround_good;
2326 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2327 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2329 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2332 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2333 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2334 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2335 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2337 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2339 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, rsa_decrypt[j],
2340 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2343 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt,
2344 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2345 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2346 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2349 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2354 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2356 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2357 unsigned char shared[(OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS + 7) / 8];
2359 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)) {
2360 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2361 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2363 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2368 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2369 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2370 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2373 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2374 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2375 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2376 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2378 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2379 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2380 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
2381 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2382 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2383 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2386 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2387 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2388 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2389 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2390 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2393 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2395 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2396 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2397 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2399 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2400 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2402 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2403 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2405 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2408 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2409 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2411 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2412 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2413 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2414 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2415 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2418 pub = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2421 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2425 i = DH_compute_key(shared, pub, dh_srvr);
2428 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2433 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2434 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2440 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, shared, i, 0)) {
2441 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2446 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2447 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2453 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2454 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2456 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2457 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2458 /* use the certificate */
2459 skey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey;
2462 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2463 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2465 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2468 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2469 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2470 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2471 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2472 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2476 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2477 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2480 /* Get encoded point length */
2481 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i)) {
2482 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2483 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2484 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2487 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2488 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2489 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2492 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2493 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2494 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2497 if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey), data, i,
2499 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2504 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2505 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2506 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2510 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2513 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2517 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2518 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2519 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2520 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2521 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2524 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2525 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2528 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2529 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2530 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2532 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2535 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2536 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2537 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2538 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2542 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2543 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2547 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2548 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2549 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2550 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2551 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2552 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2553 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2554 unsigned long alg_a;
2559 /* Get our certificate private key */
2560 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2561 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2563 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2565 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2567 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2570 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2572 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2573 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2576 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2577 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2578 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2579 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2582 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2583 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2584 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2588 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2589 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2590 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2591 * client certificate for authorization only.
2593 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2594 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2595 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2598 /* Decrypt session key */
2599 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2600 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
2601 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2605 if (ASN1_get_object ((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2606 &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2607 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2608 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2609 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2610 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2611 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2616 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2617 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2618 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2619 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2620 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2623 /* Generate master secret */
2624 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2625 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2626 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2630 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2631 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2632 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2633 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2635 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2636 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2637 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2639 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2640 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2645 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2646 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2650 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2652 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2653 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2656 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2657 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2658 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2661 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2662 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2664 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2665 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2668 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2671 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2672 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2673 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2674 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2676 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2679 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2680 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2682 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2683 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2684 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
2685 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2689 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2690 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2695 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
2697 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2698 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2700 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2701 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
2702 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
2703 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
2704 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
2705 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2706 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2707 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
2710 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
2714 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify) {
2715 /* No certificate verify so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */
2716 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2717 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2718 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2720 if (!s->session->peer) {
2721 /* No peer certificate so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */
2722 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2723 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2725 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2726 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2727 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2728 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2732 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2733 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2735 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
2736 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2741 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2744 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2746 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2747 unsigned char *sig, *data;
2748 int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2752 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2756 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2760 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2764 peer = s->session->peer;
2765 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2766 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2768 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2769 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
2770 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2771 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2775 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2777 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2778 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
2780 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2781 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 && pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2786 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2789 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
2790 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2793 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
2795 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2797 } else if (rv == 0) {
2798 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2802 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2805 /* Use default digest for this key type */
2806 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
2808 md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
2810 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2815 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
2816 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2817 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2821 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2822 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
2823 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
2824 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2825 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2828 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
2829 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2830 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2834 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2835 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2837 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2841 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2843 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2844 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2846 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2850 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2851 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2852 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2853 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
2854 BUF_reverse(data, NULL, len);
2858 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2859 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2860 s->session->master_key_length,
2861 s->session->master_key)) {
2862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2863 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2867 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
2868 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2869 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2873 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2876 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2877 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2879 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2880 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2881 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2882 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2886 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2888 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2890 unsigned long l, llen;
2891 const unsigned char *certstart;
2892 unsigned char *certbytes;
2893 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
2896 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2897 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2901 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
2902 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
2903 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2904 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2905 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2909 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
2910 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
2911 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
2912 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2913 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2914 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2918 certstart = certbytes;
2919 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2924 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
2925 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2927 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2930 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
2931 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2937 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
2938 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2939 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2940 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2942 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2945 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2946 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2947 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2949 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2950 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2953 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
2954 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2959 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
2961 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2963 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
2967 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
2968 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2971 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
2973 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2974 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2975 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
2978 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2981 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2982 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
2983 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2985 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
2986 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
2988 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
2989 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
2992 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2996 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2997 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3000 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3004 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3008 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3011 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3015 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
3016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3017 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3024 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
3026 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3028 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3029 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3030 const unsigned char *const_p;
3031 int len, slen_full, slen;
3034 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3035 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3036 unsigned char key_name[16];
3038 /* get session encoding length */
3039 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3041 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3044 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3045 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3048 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3050 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3054 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3055 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3058 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3062 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3065 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3068 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3070 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3071 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3072 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3076 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3077 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3080 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3083 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3084 * follows handshake_header_length +
3085 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3086 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3087 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3088 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3090 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3091 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3092 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3095 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3097 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3098 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3100 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3101 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, hctx, 1) < 0)
3104 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3106 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3107 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3109 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3110 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3112 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3116 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3117 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3118 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3120 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3122 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3124 /* Output key name */
3126 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3129 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3130 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3131 /* Encrypt session data */
3132 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3135 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3139 if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3141 if (!HMAC_Final(hctx, p, &hlen))
3144 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3145 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3148 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3150 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3151 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3152 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3154 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
3161 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3162 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3163 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3167 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s)
3171 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3172 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3173 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3176 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3177 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3181 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3184 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3185 /* message length */
3186 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3188 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3189 /* length of OCSP response */
3190 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3191 /* actual response */
3192 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3193 /* number of bytes to write */
3194 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3202 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3203 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3205 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3207 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3208 size_t next_proto_len;
3211 * The payload looks like:
3213 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3214 * uint8 padding_len;
3215 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3217 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3218 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3219 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3224 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated,
3226 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
3230 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3232 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3234 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3235 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3239 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3241 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3242 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3243 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3244 int sslv2format, int *al
3247 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3248 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3250 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3251 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3253 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3255 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3257 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3259 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3263 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3264 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3265 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3266 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3270 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
3271 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3274 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3279 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
3282 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3283 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3284 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3288 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3290 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3291 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3292 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3294 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3297 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3298 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3299 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3300 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3301 if (s->renegotiate) {
3302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3303 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3304 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3307 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3308 #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
3309 fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
3314 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3315 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3316 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3318 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3319 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3322 if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) {
3323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3324 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3325 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3331 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3332 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3334 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3336 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3341 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3342 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3351 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
3352 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);