1 /* ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
153 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
154 #include "statem_locl.h"
155 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
156 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
157 #include <openssl/rand.h>
158 #include <openssl/objects.h>
159 #include <openssl/evp.h>
160 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
161 #include <openssl/x509.h>
162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
163 # include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #include <openssl/bn.h>
166 #include <openssl/md5.h>
168 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
169 PACKET *cipher_suites,
170 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
171 int sslv2format, int *al);
174 * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
175 * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
176 * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
177 * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
179 * Valid return values are:
180 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
181 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
183 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
185 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
187 switch(st->hand_state) {
189 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
190 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
191 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
196 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
198 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
199 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
201 * 2) If we did request one then
202 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
204 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
205 * list if we requested a certificate)
207 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
208 && (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request
209 || (!((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
210 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
211 && (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)))) {
212 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
214 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
215 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
216 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
223 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
224 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
229 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
231 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
232 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
233 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
234 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
235 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
238 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
239 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
241 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
242 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
243 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
244 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
246 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
250 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
251 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
257 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
258 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
259 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
264 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
265 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
266 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
267 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
268 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
273 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
274 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
283 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
284 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
285 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
291 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
292 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
293 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
302 /* No valid transition found */
307 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
309 * Valid return values are:
313 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
315 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
318 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
319 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
320 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
321 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
322 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
325 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)
327 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
331 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
332 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
333 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
334 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
335 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
337 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
338 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
339 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
349 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
351 * Valid return values are:
355 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
358 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
359 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
361 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
362 * during re-negotiation:
364 && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
365 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
367 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
368 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
371 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
373 * ... except when the application insists on
374 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
377 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
378 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
379 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
381 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
384 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
392 * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
393 * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
395 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
397 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
399 switch(st->hand_state) {
401 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */;
402 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
405 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
406 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
407 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
409 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
410 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
411 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
412 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
414 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
415 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
416 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
417 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
419 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
420 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
422 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
423 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
425 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
427 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
428 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
430 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
432 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
433 /* normal PSK or SRP */
434 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
435 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
436 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
437 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
438 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
439 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
440 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
442 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
445 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
448 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
449 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
450 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
454 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
455 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
456 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
457 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
461 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
462 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
463 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
464 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
468 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
469 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
470 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
472 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
473 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
475 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
478 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
479 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
480 } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
481 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
483 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
485 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
487 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
488 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
489 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
491 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
492 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
493 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
495 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
497 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
499 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
500 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
501 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
504 /* Shouldn't happen */
505 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
510 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
511 * the server to the client.
513 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
515 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
517 switch(st->hand_state) {
518 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
521 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
524 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
526 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
527 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
528 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
533 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
534 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
536 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
537 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
543 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
544 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
545 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
546 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
548 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
550 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
551 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
553 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
554 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
560 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
561 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
562 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
563 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
566 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
568 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
569 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
570 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
571 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
575 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
578 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
581 /* No pre work to be done */
585 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
589 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
590 * server to the client.
592 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
594 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
598 switch(st->hand_state) {
599 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
600 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
602 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
605 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
606 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
608 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
609 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
610 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
612 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
613 * treat like it was the first packet
618 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
619 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
620 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
621 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
622 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
625 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
628 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
629 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
631 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
632 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
633 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
634 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
638 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
639 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
644 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
646 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
648 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
651 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
655 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
656 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
657 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
662 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
665 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
666 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
670 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
671 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
674 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
676 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
679 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
686 /* No post work to be done */
690 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
694 * Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client.
696 * Valid return values are:
700 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s)
702 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
704 switch(st->hand_state) {
705 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
706 return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s);
708 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
709 return tls_construct_hello_request(s);
711 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
712 return tls_construct_server_hello(s);
715 return tls_construct_server_certificate(s);
717 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
718 return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s);
720 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
721 return tls_construct_certificate_request(s);
723 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
724 return tls_construct_server_done(s);
726 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
727 return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s);
729 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
730 return tls_construct_cert_status(s);
732 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
734 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
736 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
738 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
739 return tls_construct_finished(s,
741 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
743 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
746 /* Shouldn't happen */
753 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
754 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
757 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
758 * reading. Excludes the message header.
760 unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
762 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
764 switch(st->hand_state) {
765 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
766 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
769 return s->max_cert_list;
771 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
772 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
774 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
775 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
777 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
778 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
779 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
782 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
783 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
785 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
786 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
789 /* Shouldn't happen */
797 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
799 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
801 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
803 switch(st->hand_state) {
804 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
805 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
808 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
810 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
811 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
813 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
814 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
816 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
817 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
818 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
821 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
822 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
824 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
825 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
828 /* Shouldn't happen */
832 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
836 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
839 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
841 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
843 switch(st->hand_state) {
844 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
845 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
847 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
848 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
850 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
851 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
852 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
853 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
854 /* Are we renegotiating? */
856 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
857 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
858 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
859 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
860 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
861 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
864 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
867 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
873 /* Shouldn't happen */
877 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
878 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
880 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
882 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
884 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
885 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
886 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
888 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
892 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
894 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
901 int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s)
903 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
904 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
905 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
912 unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf,
913 unsigned char *cookie,
914 unsigned char cookie_len)
916 unsigned int msg_len;
920 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
921 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
922 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xFF;
924 *(p++) = (unsigned char)cookie_len;
925 memcpy(p, cookie, cookie_len);
932 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
937 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
939 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
940 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
941 &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 ||
942 s->d1->cookie_len > 255) {
943 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
944 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
945 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
949 len = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH],
950 s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
952 dtls1_set_message_header(s, buf, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, len, 0,
954 len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
956 /* number of bytes to write */
963 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
965 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
966 unsigned int j, complen = 0;
969 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
970 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
972 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
974 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
975 PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
978 is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
980 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
981 /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
983 unsigned int version;
986 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
987 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
988 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
989 * the rest right through. Its format is:
991 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
992 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
994 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
995 * 7-8 session_id_length
996 * 9-10 challenge_length
1000 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1001 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1003 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1004 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1005 * in the first place
1007 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1011 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)) {
1012 /* No protocol version supplied! */
1013 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1016 if (version == 0x0002) {
1017 /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
1018 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1020 } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1022 s->client_version = version;
1024 /* No idea what protocol this is */
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1030 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
1031 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
1033 if(!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
1034 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1041 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1042 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1044 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1045 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
1046 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1047 DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->client_version, s->version)) {
1048 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1055 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
1057 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
1060 s->version = s->client_version;
1062 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1066 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1069 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1070 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1071 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
1073 unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1076 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len)
1077 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1078 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1079 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1080 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1081 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1085 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1086 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1087 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1091 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
1092 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
1093 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1094 /* No extensions. */
1095 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1096 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1097 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1098 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1102 /* Load the client random */
1103 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
1105 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1106 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1107 s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1108 challenge_len, challenge_len)) {
1109 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1110 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1114 PACKET_null_init(&compression);
1115 PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
1117 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1118 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1119 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1120 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1125 if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1126 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1127 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1131 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1132 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1133 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1134 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1138 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1139 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1140 * So check cookie length...
1142 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1143 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)
1148 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites)
1149 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1150 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1154 /* Could be empty. */
1161 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1162 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1164 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1165 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1166 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1167 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1168 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1169 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1170 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1171 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1172 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1173 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1178 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1179 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1182 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);
1184 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1186 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1187 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1188 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1189 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1190 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1192 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1193 /* previous session */
1195 } else if (i == -1) {
1199 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1204 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1205 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1206 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1207 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1208 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
1209 PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) == 0) {
1210 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1212 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1214 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1216 /* default verification */
1217 } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1218 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1219 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1223 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1225 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1226 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
1227 if (protverr != 0) {
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1229 s->version = s->client_version;
1230 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1233 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1237 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),
1238 is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {
1242 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1245 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1248 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1249 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1251 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1252 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1254 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1255 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1264 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1267 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1268 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1269 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1274 complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
1275 for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
1276 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
1282 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1287 /* TLS extensions */
1288 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1289 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1296 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1297 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1298 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1299 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1303 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1304 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1309 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1310 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1312 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1313 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1314 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1316 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1318 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1319 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1323 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1325 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1330 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1331 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1332 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1336 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1337 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1338 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1339 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1340 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1345 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1346 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1347 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1349 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1351 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1352 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1353 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1355 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1356 /* Can't disable compression */
1357 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1358 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1359 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1362 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1363 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1364 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1365 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1366 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1370 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1371 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1372 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1375 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1376 for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
1377 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)
1381 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1382 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1383 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1388 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1389 /* See if we have a match */
1390 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1393 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1394 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1395 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1397 for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
1398 if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {
1407 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1413 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1414 * using compression.
1416 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1423 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1427 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1428 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1430 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1432 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1433 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1434 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1435 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1440 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1441 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1446 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1447 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1449 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1451 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1453 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1454 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1458 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1460 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1461 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1463 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1465 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1466 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1467 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1469 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1474 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1477 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1479 cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1481 if (cipher == NULL) {
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1485 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1486 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1487 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1488 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1489 ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1490 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1491 /* do not send a session ticket */
1492 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1494 /* Session-id reuse */
1495 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1498 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1499 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1500 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1506 * we now have the following setup.
1508 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1509 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1510 * compression - basically ignored right now
1511 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1512 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1513 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1514 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1517 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1518 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1519 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1521 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1528 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1529 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1531 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1533 * callback indicates further work to be done
1535 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1538 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1540 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1541 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1543 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1545 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1552 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1554 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1555 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1559 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s)
1562 unsigned char *p, *d;
1567 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1569 /* Do the message type and length last */
1570 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1572 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1573 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1576 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1577 * tls_process_client_hello()
1579 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1580 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1583 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1584 * back in the server hello:
1585 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1586 * we send back the old session ID.
1587 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1588 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1589 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1590 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1592 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1593 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1594 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1595 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1598 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1599 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1601 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1603 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1604 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1606 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1610 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1613 /* put the cipher */
1614 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1617 /* put the compression method */
1618 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1621 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1624 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1627 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1628 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1629 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1633 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1635 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1636 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1637 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1643 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
1644 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1645 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1652 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s)
1654 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1656 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1660 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
1661 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1662 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1669 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1671 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1672 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
1674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1675 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1680 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1681 unsigned char *p, *d;
1688 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1690 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1691 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1692 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1696 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1700 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1702 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1703 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1705 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1708 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
1709 n += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1711 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1712 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1714 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1715 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1716 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1717 CERT *cert = s->cert;
1719 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
1722 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1723 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1724 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
1725 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
1727 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1728 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1729 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1732 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
1735 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
1737 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1738 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
1739 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
1741 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1743 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1748 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
1749 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1750 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1751 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1754 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1755 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
1756 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1757 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1758 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1761 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1763 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1767 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp, NID_undef);
1769 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1770 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1774 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
1776 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1784 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1785 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1788 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1789 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1790 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1794 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1795 nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1796 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
1797 if (curve_id == 0) {
1798 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1799 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1802 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(NULL, nid);
1803 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
1804 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1805 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1806 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1810 /* Encode the public key. */
1811 encodedlen = EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->s3->tmp.pkey),
1812 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1813 &encodedPoint, NULL);
1815 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1816 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1821 * We only support named (not generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key
1822 * exchanges. In this situation, we need four additional bytes to
1823 * encode the entire ServerECDHParams structure.
1825 n += 4 + encodedlen;
1828 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1829 * can set these to NULLs
1836 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1837 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1838 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1839 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1840 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1841 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1842 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1843 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1846 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1847 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1848 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1849 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1853 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1854 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1855 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1858 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1859 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1861 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1868 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1869 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
1870 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1872 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1875 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1881 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1882 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1885 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1887 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1888 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1889 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1890 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) {
1891 s2n(strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint), p);
1892 strncpy((char *)p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
1893 strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint));
1894 p += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1901 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1902 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1903 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1913 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1914 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1916 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1917 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1918 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1919 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1921 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1929 memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1930 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1931 encodedPoint = NULL;
1939 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1940 * points to the space at the end.
1943 /* send signature algorithm */
1944 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1945 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1946 /* Should never happen */
1947 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1949 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1955 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1957 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1958 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1959 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1960 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1961 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1962 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
1963 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, &(p[2]),
1964 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {
1965 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
1966 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1971 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1974 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1975 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1976 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1977 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1982 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
1983 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1984 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1988 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1991 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1993 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1994 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1996 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1997 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1999 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2000 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2004 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2006 unsigned char *p, *d;
2007 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2008 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2014 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2016 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2018 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2023 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2024 const unsigned char *psigs;
2025 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2026 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2027 /* Skip over length for now */
2029 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2030 /* Now fill in length */
2040 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2043 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2044 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2045 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2046 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2047 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2048 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2052 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2054 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2059 /* else no CA names */
2060 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2063 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
2064 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2068 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2072 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2076 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2080 unsigned long alg_k;
2081 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2083 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2085 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2086 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2088 PACKET enc_premaster;
2089 unsigned char *data, *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2091 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2093 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2094 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2095 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2096 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2098 PACKET psk_identity;
2100 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2101 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2102 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2105 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2106 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2107 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2108 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2111 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2112 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2113 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2114 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2118 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2119 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2120 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2124 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2127 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2128 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2129 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2131 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2133 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2136 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2137 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2141 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2142 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2143 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2145 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2146 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2147 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2151 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2153 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2154 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2155 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2156 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2157 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2160 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2161 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2162 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2163 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2168 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2169 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2170 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2172 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2175 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2176 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2177 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2178 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2179 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2180 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2181 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2184 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2186 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2187 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2188 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2190 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2191 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2192 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2193 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2194 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2200 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2201 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2202 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2203 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2205 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2206 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2207 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2208 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2212 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2213 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2214 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2215 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2220 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2221 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2222 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2223 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2224 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2227 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2228 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
2232 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2233 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2234 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2238 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2239 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2242 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2245 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2246 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2247 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2248 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2249 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2250 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2253 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0],
2254 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2256 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
2257 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2260 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2261 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2262 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2263 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2264 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2265 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2268 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2269 unsigned char workaround_good;
2271 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2273 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
2274 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2275 version_good |= workaround_good;
2279 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2280 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2282 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2285 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2286 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2287 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2288 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2290 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2292 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, rsa_decrypt[j],
2293 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2296 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt,
2297 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2298 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2302 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2306 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2307 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2308 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2311 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)) {
2312 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2313 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2315 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2320 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2321 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2322 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2325 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2327 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2328 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2329 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2333 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2334 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2335 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2336 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2339 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2340 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2341 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2342 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2343 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2346 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2347 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2348 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2351 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2352 cdh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2353 if (cdh->pub_key == NULL) {
2354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2358 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2359 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2360 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2364 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2370 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2371 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2372 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2374 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2375 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2376 /* use the certificate */
2377 skey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey;
2380 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2381 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2383 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2386 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2387 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2388 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2389 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2390 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2394 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2395 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2398 /* Get encoded point length */
2399 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i)) {
2400 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2401 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2402 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2405 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2406 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2407 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2410 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2411 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2412 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2415 if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey), data, i,
2417 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2422 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2423 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2428 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2431 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2435 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2436 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2437 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2438 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2439 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2442 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2443 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2446 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2447 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2448 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2450 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2453 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2454 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2455 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2456 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2460 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2461 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2465 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2467 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2468 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2469 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2470 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2471 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2472 unsigned long alg_a;
2477 /* Get our certificate private key */
2478 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2479 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2481 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2483 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2485 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2488 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2490 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2491 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2494 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2495 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2496 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2497 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2500 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2501 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2502 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2506 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2507 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2508 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2509 * client certificate for authorization only.
2511 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2512 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2513 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2516 /* Decrypt session key */
2517 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2518 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
2519 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2523 if (ASN1_get_object ((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2524 &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2525 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2526 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2527 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2529 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2534 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2535 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2536 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2537 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2538 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2541 /* Generate master secret */
2542 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2543 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2544 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2545 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2548 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2549 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2550 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2551 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2553 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2554 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2556 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2561 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2562 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2566 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2568 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2569 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2572 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2573 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2575 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2576 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2577 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2578 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2580 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2581 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2584 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2587 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2588 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2589 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2590 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2592 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2595 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2596 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2598 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2599 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2600 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
2601 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2605 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2606 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2611 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
2613 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2614 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2616 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2617 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
2618 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
2619 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
2620 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
2621 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2622 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2623 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
2626 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
2630 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify) {
2631 /* No certificate verify so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */
2632 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2633 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2634 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2636 if (!s->session->peer) {
2637 /* No peer certificate so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */
2638 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2639 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2641 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2642 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2643 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2644 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2648 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2649 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2651 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
2652 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2657 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2660 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2662 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2663 unsigned char *sig, *data;
2664 int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2668 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2672 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2675 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2676 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2680 peer = s->session->peer;
2681 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
2682 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2684 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2685 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
2686 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2687 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2691 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2693 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2694 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
2696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2697 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 && pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2702 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2705 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
2706 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2709 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
2711 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2713 } else if (rv == 0) {
2714 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2718 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2721 /* Use default digest for this key type */
2722 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
2724 md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
2726 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2731 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
2732 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2733 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2737 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2738 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
2739 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
2740 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2741 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2744 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2746 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2750 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2751 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2752 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2753 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2757 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2759 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2760 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2761 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2762 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2766 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2767 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2768 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2769 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
2770 BUF_reverse(data, NULL, len);
2774 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2775 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2776 s->session->master_key_length,
2777 s->session->master_key)) {
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2779 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2783 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
2784 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2789 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2792 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2793 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2795 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2796 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2797 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2801 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2803 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2805 unsigned long l, llen;
2806 const unsigned char *certstart;
2807 unsigned char *certbytes;
2808 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
2811 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2812 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2816 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
2817 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
2818 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2819 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2820 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2824 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
2825 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
2826 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
2827 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2829 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2833 certstart = certbytes;
2834 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2839 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
2840 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2841 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2842 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2845 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
2846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2852 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
2853 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2854 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2855 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2856 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2857 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2860 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2861 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2862 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2863 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2864 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2865 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2868 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
2869 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2874 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
2876 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2877 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2878 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
2882 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
2883 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2886 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
2888 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2889 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2890 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
2895 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2896 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
2897 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2899 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
2900 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
2902 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
2903 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
2906 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2910 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2911 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2914 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
2918 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2922 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2924 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2925 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2929 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
2930 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2931 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2938 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
2940 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
2941 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2942 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2943 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
2944 const unsigned char *const_p;
2945 int len, slen_full, slen;
2948 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2949 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2950 unsigned char key_name[16];
2952 /* get session encoding length */
2953 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2955 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
2958 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
2959 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2962 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
2964 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2968 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2969 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2972 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
2976 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
2979 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
2982 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
2984 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
2985 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
2986 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2990 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
2991 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2994 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2997 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2998 * follows handshake_header_length +
2999 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3000 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3001 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3002 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3004 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3005 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3006 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3009 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3011 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3012 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3014 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3015 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, hctx, 1) < 0)
3018 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3020 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3021 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3023 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3024 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3026 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3030 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3031 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3032 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3034 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3036 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3038 /* Output key name */
3040 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3043 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
3044 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3045 /* Encrypt session data */
3046 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3049 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, p, &len))
3053 if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3055 if (!HMAC_Final(hctx, p, &hlen))
3058 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3059 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3064 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3066 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3067 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3068 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3070 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
3077 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3078 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3079 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3083 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s)
3087 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3088 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3089 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3092 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3093 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3097 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3100 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3101 /* message length */
3102 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3104 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3105 /* length of OCSP response */
3106 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3107 /* actual response */
3108 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3109 /* number of bytes to write */
3110 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3118 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3119 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3121 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3123 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3124 size_t next_proto_len;
3127 * The payload looks like:
3129 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3130 * uint8 padding_len;
3131 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3133 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3134 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3135 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3136 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3140 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated,
3142 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
3146 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3148 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3150 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3151 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3155 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3157 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3158 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3159 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3160 int sslv2format, int *al
3163 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3164 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3166 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3167 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3169 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3171 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3173 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3174 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3175 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3179 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3181 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3182 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3186 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
3187 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3190 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3195 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
3198 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3199 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3200 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3204 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3206 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3207 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3208 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3210 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3213 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3214 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3215 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3216 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3217 if (s->renegotiate) {
3218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3219 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3220 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3223 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3224 #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
3225 fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
3230 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3231 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3232 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3234 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3235 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3238 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
3239 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3240 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3241 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3247 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3248 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3250 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3252 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3257 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3258 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3267 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
3268 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);