1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 /* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
110 /* ====================================================================
111 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
114 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
117 * license provided above.
119 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
120 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
123 /* ====================================================================
124 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
127 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
130 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
131 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
132 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
135 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
136 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
139 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
140 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
141 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
144 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
145 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
146 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "statem_locl.h"
154 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
155 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
156 #include <openssl/rand.h>
157 #include <openssl/objects.h>
158 #include <openssl/evp.h>
159 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
160 #include <openssl/x509.h>
161 #include <openssl/dh.h>
162 #include <openssl/bn.h>
163 #include <openssl/md5.h>
165 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
166 PACKET *cipher_suites,
167 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
168 int sslv2format, int *al);
171 * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
172 * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
173 * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
174 * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
176 * Valid return values are:
177 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
178 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
180 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
182 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
184 switch(st->hand_state) {
186 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
187 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
188 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
193 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
195 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
196 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
198 * 2) If we did request one then
199 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
201 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
202 * list if we requested a certificate)
204 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
205 && (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request
206 || (!((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
207 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
208 && (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)))) {
209 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
211 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
212 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
213 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
220 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
221 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
226 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
228 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
229 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
230 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
231 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
232 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
235 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
236 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
238 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
239 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
240 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
241 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
243 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
247 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
248 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
254 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
255 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
256 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
261 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
262 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
263 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
264 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
265 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
270 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
271 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
279 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
280 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
281 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
282 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
288 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
289 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
290 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
299 /* No valid transition found */
304 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
306 * Valid return values are:
310 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
312 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
315 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
316 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
317 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
318 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
319 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
322 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)
324 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
328 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
329 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
330 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
331 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
332 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
335 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
336 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
346 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
348 * Valid return values are:
352 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
355 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
356 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
358 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
359 * during re-negotiation:
361 && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
362 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
364 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
365 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
368 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
370 * ... except when the application insists on
371 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
374 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
375 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
376 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
378 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
381 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
389 * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
390 * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
392 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
394 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
396 switch(st->hand_state) {
398 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */;
399 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
402 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
403 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
404 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
406 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
407 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
408 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
409 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
411 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
412 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
413 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
414 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
416 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
417 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
419 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
420 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
422 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
424 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
425 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
427 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
429 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
430 /* normal PSK or SRP */
431 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
432 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
433 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
434 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
435 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
436 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
437 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
439 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
442 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
445 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
446 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
447 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
451 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
452 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
453 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
454 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
458 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
459 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
460 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
465 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
466 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
467 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
469 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
470 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
472 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
474 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
475 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
476 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
477 } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
478 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
480 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
482 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
484 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
485 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
488 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
489 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
490 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
492 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
494 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
496 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
497 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
498 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
501 /* Shouldn't happen */
502 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
507 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
508 * the server to the client.
510 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
512 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
514 switch(st->hand_state) {
515 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
518 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
521 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
523 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
524 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
525 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
530 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
531 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
533 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
534 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
540 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
542 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
543 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
545 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
547 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
548 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
550 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
551 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
557 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
558 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
559 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
560 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
563 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
565 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
566 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
567 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
568 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
572 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
575 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
578 /* No pre work to be done */
582 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
586 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
587 * server to the client.
589 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
591 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
595 switch(st->hand_state) {
596 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
597 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
599 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
602 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
603 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
605 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
606 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
607 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
609 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
610 * treat like it was the first packet
615 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
617 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
618 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
619 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
622 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
625 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
626 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
628 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
629 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
630 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
631 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
635 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
636 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
641 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
642 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
643 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
645 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
648 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
652 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
653 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
654 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
659 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
662 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
663 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
667 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
668 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
671 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
673 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
676 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
683 /* No post work to be done */
687 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
691 * Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client.
693 * Valid return values are:
697 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s)
699 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
701 switch(st->hand_state) {
702 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
703 return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s);
705 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
706 return tls_construct_hello_request(s);
708 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
709 return tls_construct_server_hello(s);
712 return tls_construct_server_certificate(s);
714 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
715 return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s);
717 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
718 return tls_construct_certificate_request(s);
720 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
721 return tls_construct_server_done(s);
723 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
724 return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s);
726 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
727 return tls_construct_cert_status(s);
729 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
731 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
733 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
735 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
736 return tls_construct_finished(s,
738 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
740 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
743 /* Shouldn't happen */
750 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
751 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
754 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
755 * reading. Excludes the message header.
757 unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
759 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
761 switch(st->hand_state) {
762 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
763 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
766 return s->max_cert_list;
768 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
769 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
771 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
772 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
775 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
776 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
779 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
780 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
782 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
783 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
786 /* Shouldn't happen */
794 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
796 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
798 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
800 switch(st->hand_state) {
801 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
802 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
805 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
807 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
808 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
810 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
811 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
814 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
815 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
818 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
819 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
821 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
822 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
825 /* Shouldn't happen */
829 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
833 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
836 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
838 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
840 switch(st->hand_state) {
841 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
842 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
844 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
845 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
847 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
848 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
849 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
850 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
851 /* Are we renegotiating? */
853 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
854 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
855 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
856 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
857 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
858 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
861 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
864 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
870 /* Shouldn't happen */
874 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
875 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
877 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
879 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
881 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
882 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
883 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
885 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
889 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
891 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
898 int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s)
900 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
901 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
902 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
909 unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf,
910 unsigned char *cookie,
911 unsigned char cookie_len)
913 unsigned int msg_len;
917 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
918 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
919 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xFF;
921 *(p++) = (unsigned char)cookie_len;
922 memcpy(p, cookie, cookie_len);
929 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
934 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
936 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
937 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
938 &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 ||
939 s->d1->cookie_len > 255) {
940 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
941 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
942 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
946 len = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH],
947 s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
949 dtls1_set_message_header(s, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, len, 0,
951 len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
953 /* number of bytes to write */
960 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
962 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
963 unsigned int j, complen = 0;
966 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
967 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
969 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
971 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
972 PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
975 is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
977 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
978 /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
980 unsigned int version;
983 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
984 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
985 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
986 * the rest right through. Its format is:
988 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
989 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
991 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
992 * 7-8 session_id_length
993 * 9-10 challenge_length
997 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
998 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1000 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1001 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1002 * in the first place
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1008 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)) {
1009 /* No protocol version supplied! */
1010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1013 if (version == 0x0002) {
1014 /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
1015 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1017 } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1019 s->client_version = version;
1021 /* No idea what protocol this is */
1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1027 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
1028 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
1030 if(!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
1031 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1032 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1038 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1039 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1041 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1042 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
1043 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1044 DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->client_version, s->version)) {
1045 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1051 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1052 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
1054 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
1057 s->version = s->client_version;
1059 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1063 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1066 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1067 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1068 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
1070 unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1073 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len)
1074 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1075 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1077 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1078 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1082 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1083 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1088 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
1089 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
1090 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1091 /* No extensions. */
1092 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1094 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1095 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1099 /* Load the client random */
1100 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
1102 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1103 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1104 s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1105 challenge_len, challenge_len)) {
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1107 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1111 PACKET_null_init(&compression);
1112 PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
1114 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1115 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1116 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1117 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1118 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1122 if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1123 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1128 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1129 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1130 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1131 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1135 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1136 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1137 * So check cookie length...
1139 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1140 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)
1145 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites)
1146 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1147 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1151 /* Could be empty. */
1155 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1156 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1157 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1158 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1159 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
1160 PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) == 0) {
1161 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1163 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1165 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1167 /* default verification */
1168 } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1169 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1170 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1171 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1174 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1176 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1177 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
1178 if (protverr != 0) {
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1180 s->version = s->client_version;
1181 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1190 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1191 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1193 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1194 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1195 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1196 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1197 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1198 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1199 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1200 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1201 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1202 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1207 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1208 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1211 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);
1213 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1215 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1216 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1217 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1218 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1219 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1221 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1222 /* previous session */
1224 } else if (i == -1) {
1228 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1233 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),
1234 is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {
1238 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1241 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1244 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1245 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1247 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1248 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1250 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1251 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1260 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1263 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1265 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1270 complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
1271 for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
1272 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
1278 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1283 /* TLS extensions */
1284 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1285 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
1286 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1292 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1293 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1294 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1295 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1299 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1300 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1305 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1306 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1308 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1309 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1310 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1312 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1314 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1315 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1319 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1321 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1326 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1327 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1328 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1332 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1333 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1334 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1335 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1336 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1341 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1342 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1343 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1345 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1347 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1348 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1349 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1351 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1352 /* Can't disable compression */
1353 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1355 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1358 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1359 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1360 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1361 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1362 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1366 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1367 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1368 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1371 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1372 for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
1373 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)
1377 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1378 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1379 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1384 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1385 /* See if we have a match */
1386 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1389 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1390 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1391 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1393 for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
1394 if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {
1403 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1409 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1410 * using compression.
1412 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1419 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1423 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1424 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1426 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1428 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1429 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1430 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1431 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1436 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1437 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1442 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1443 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1445 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1447 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1449 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1450 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1454 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1456 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1457 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1459 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1461 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1462 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1463 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1465 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1466 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1470 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1473 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1475 cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1477 if (cipher == NULL) {
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1481 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1482 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1483 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1484 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1485 ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1486 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1487 /* do not send a session ticket */
1488 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1490 /* Session-id reuse */
1491 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1494 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1495 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1496 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1502 * we now have the following setup.
1504 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1505 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1506 * compression - basically ignored right now
1507 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1508 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1509 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1510 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1513 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1514 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1515 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1517 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1525 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1527 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1529 * callback indicates further work to be done
1531 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1534 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1536 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1537 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1539 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1540 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1541 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1548 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1550 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1551 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1555 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s)
1558 unsigned char *p, *d;
1563 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1565 /* Do the message type and length last */
1566 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1568 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1569 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1572 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1573 * tls_process_client_hello()
1575 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1576 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1579 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1580 * back in the server hello:
1581 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1582 * we send back the old session ID.
1583 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1584 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1585 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1586 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1588 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1589 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1590 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1591 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1594 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1595 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1597 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1599 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1600 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1601 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1602 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1606 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1609 /* put the cipher */
1610 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1613 /* put the compression method */
1614 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1617 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1620 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1623 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1624 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1625 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1629 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1631 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1632 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1633 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1639 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
1640 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1641 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1648 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s)
1650 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
1651 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1652 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1656 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
1657 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1658 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1665 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1667 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1668 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
1670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1671 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1676 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1677 unsigned char *p, *d;
1684 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1686 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1687 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1688 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1692 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1696 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1698 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1699 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1701 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1704 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
1705 n += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1707 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1708 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1710 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1711 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1712 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1713 CERT *cert = s->cert;
1715 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
1718 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1719 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1720 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
1721 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
1723 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1725 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1728 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
1731 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
1733 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1734 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
1735 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
1737 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1738 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1739 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1744 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
1745 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1746 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1747 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1750 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1751 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
1752 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1753 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1754 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1757 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1758 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1759 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1763 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp, NID_undef);
1765 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1770 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
1772 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1775 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
1776 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
1779 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1780 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1783 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1784 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1785 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1789 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1790 nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1791 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
1792 if (curve_id == 0) {
1793 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1794 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1797 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(NULL, nid);
1798 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
1799 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1800 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1801 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1805 /* Encode the public key. */
1806 encodedlen = EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->s3->tmp.pkey),
1807 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1808 &encodedPoint, NULL);
1810 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1816 * We only support named (not generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key
1817 * exchanges. In this situation, we need four additional bytes to
1818 * encode the entire ServerECDHParams structure.
1820 n += 4 + encodedlen;
1823 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1824 * can set these to NULLs
1831 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1832 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1833 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1834 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1835 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1836 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1838 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1841 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1842 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1843 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1844 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1848 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1849 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1850 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1853 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1854 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1855 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1856 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1863 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1864 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
1865 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1867 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1870 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1876 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1877 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1880 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1883 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1884 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1885 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) {
1886 s2n(strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint), p);
1887 strncpy((char *)p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
1888 strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint));
1889 p += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1896 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1897 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1898 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1908 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1909 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1911 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1912 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1913 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1914 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1916 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1924 memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1925 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1926 encodedPoint = NULL;
1934 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1935 * points to the space at the end.
1938 /* send signature algorithm */
1939 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1940 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1941 /* Should never happen */
1942 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1943 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1944 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1950 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1952 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1953 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1954 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1955 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1956 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1957 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
1958 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, &(p[2]),
1959 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {
1960 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
1961 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1966 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1969 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1970 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1972 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1977 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
1978 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1979 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1983 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1986 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1988 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1989 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1992 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1994 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1995 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1999 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2001 unsigned char *p, *d;
2002 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2003 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2009 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2011 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2013 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2018 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2019 const unsigned char *psigs;
2020 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2021 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2022 /* Skip over length for now */
2024 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2025 /* Now fill in length */
2035 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2038 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2039 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2040 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2041 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2042 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2043 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2047 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2049 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2054 /* else no CA names */
2055 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2058 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
2059 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2063 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2067 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2071 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2074 unsigned long alg_k;
2075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2078 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2079 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2081 PACKET enc_premaster;
2082 const unsigned char *data;
2083 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2085 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2087 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2088 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2089 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2090 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2092 PACKET psk_identity;
2094 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2095 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2096 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2099 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2100 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2101 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2102 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2105 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2106 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2107 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2108 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2112 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2113 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2114 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2118 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2121 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2122 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2123 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2125 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2127 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2129 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2130 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2131 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2135 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2136 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2137 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2139 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2140 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2141 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2145 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2147 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2148 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2149 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2150 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2151 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2154 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2155 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2156 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2157 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2163 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2164 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2166 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2169 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2170 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
2172 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2173 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2174 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2178 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2179 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2180 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2182 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2183 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2184 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2185 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2186 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2192 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2193 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2194 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2195 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2197 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2198 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2199 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2200 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2204 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2205 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2206 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2207 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2212 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2213 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2214 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2215 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2216 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2219 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2220 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
2224 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2225 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2226 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2230 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2231 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2234 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2237 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2238 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2239 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2240 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2241 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2242 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2245 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0],
2246 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2248 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
2249 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2252 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2253 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2254 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2255 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2256 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2257 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2260 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2261 unsigned char workaround_good;
2263 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2265 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
2266 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2267 version_good |= workaround_good;
2271 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2272 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2274 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2277 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2278 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2279 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2280 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2282 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2284 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, rsa_decrypt[j],
2285 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2288 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt,
2289 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2290 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2291 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2294 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2298 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2299 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2300 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2305 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)) {
2306 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2307 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2308 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2309 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2314 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2315 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2316 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2319 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2321 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2322 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2323 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2327 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2328 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2329 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2330 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2333 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2334 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2335 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2337 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2340 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2341 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2342 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2345 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2346 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2348 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2349 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2350 if (pub_key != NULL)
2355 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2356 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2357 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2361 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2363 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2364 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2370 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2371 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2373 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2374 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2375 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2376 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2377 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2383 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2384 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2387 /* Get encoded point length */
2388 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i)) {
2389 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2390 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2391 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2394 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2395 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2396 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2399 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2400 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2401 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2404 if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey), data, i,
2406 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2411 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2412 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2417 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2419 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2420 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2422 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2425 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2426 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2429 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2430 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2431 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2435 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2436 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2439 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2440 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2441 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2443 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2446 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2447 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2448 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2453 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2454 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2458 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2459 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2460 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2461 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2462 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2463 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2464 const unsigned char *start;
2465 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2466 unsigned long alg_a;
2471 /* Get our certificate private key */
2472 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2473 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2475 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2477 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2479 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2482 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2484 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2485 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2488 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2489 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2490 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2491 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2494 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2495 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2500 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2501 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2502 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2503 * client certificate for authorization only.
2505 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2506 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2507 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2510 /* Decrypt session key */
2511 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2512 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
2513 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2514 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2517 if (ASN1_get_object ((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2518 &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2519 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2520 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2521 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2523 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2528 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2529 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2530 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2532 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2535 /* Generate master secret */
2536 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2537 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2538 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2539 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2542 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2543 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2544 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2545 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2547 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2548 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2550 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2555 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2556 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2560 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2562 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2563 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2566 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2567 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2569 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2571 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2572 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2574 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2575 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2578 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2580 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2581 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2582 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2583 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2584 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2586 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2589 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2590 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2592 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2593 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2594 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
2595 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2599 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2600 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2605 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
2607 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2608 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2610 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2611 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
2612 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
2613 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
2614 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
2615 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2616 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2617 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
2620 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
2624 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify) {
2625 /* No certificate verify so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */
2626 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2627 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2628 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2630 if (!s->session->peer) {
2631 /* No peer certificate so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */
2632 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2633 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2635 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2637 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2638 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2642 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2643 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2645 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
2646 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2651 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2654 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2656 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2657 const unsigned char *sig, *data;
2658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2659 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
2661 int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2665 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2669 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2673 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2677 peer = s->session->peer;
2678 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
2679 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2681 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2682 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
2683 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2684 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2688 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2690 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2691 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
2693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2694 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
2695 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2700 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2703 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
2704 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2707 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
2709 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2711 } else if (rv == 0) {
2712 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2716 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2719 /* Use default digest for this key type */
2720 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
2722 md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
2724 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2729 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
2730 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2731 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2735 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2736 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
2737 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
2738 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2739 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2742 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
2743 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2744 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2748 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2749 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2751 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2755 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2757 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2758 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2760 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2764 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2766 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2767 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2768 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2769 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
2770 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
2771 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2772 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2775 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
2781 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2782 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2783 s->session->master_key_length,
2784 s->session->master_key)) {
2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2786 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2790 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
2791 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2792 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2796 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2799 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2800 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2802 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2803 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2804 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2806 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
2811 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2813 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2815 unsigned long l, llen;
2816 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
2817 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
2820 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2825 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
2826 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
2827 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2828 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2829 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2833 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
2834 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
2835 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
2836 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2838 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2842 certstart = certbytes;
2843 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2848 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
2849 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2850 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2851 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2854 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
2855 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2861 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
2862 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2863 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2864 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2865 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2866 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2869 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2870 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2871 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2873 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2874 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2877 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
2878 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2883 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
2885 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2887 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
2891 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
2892 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2895 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
2897 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2898 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2899 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
2904 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2905 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
2906 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2908 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
2909 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
2911 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
2912 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
2915 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2919 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2920 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2923 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
2927 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2931 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2933 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2934 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2938 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2940 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2947 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
2949 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
2950 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2951 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2952 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
2953 const unsigned char *const_p;
2954 int len, slen_full, slen;
2957 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2958 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2959 unsigned char key_name[16];
2961 /* get session encoding length */
2962 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2964 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
2967 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
2968 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2971 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
2973 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2977 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2978 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2981 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
2985 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
2988 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
2991 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
2993 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
2994 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
2995 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2999 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3000 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3003 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3006 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3007 * follows handshake_header_length +
3008 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3009 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3010 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3011 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3013 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3014 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3015 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3018 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3020 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3021 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3023 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3024 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, hctx, 1) < 0)
3027 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3029 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3030 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3032 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3033 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3035 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3039 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3040 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3041 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3043 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3045 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3047 /* Output key name */
3049 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3052 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx));
3053 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3054 /* Encrypt session data */
3055 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3058 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, p, &len))
3062 if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3064 if (!HMAC_Final(hctx, p, &hlen))
3067 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3068 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3073 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3075 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3076 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3077 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3079 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
3086 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3087 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3088 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3092 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s)
3096 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3097 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3098 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3101 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3102 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3106 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3109 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3110 /* message length */
3111 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3113 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3114 /* length of OCSP response */
3115 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3116 /* actual response */
3117 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3118 /* number of bytes to write */
3119 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3127 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3128 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3130 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3132 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3133 size_t next_proto_len;
3136 * The payload looks like:
3138 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3139 * uint8 padding_len;
3140 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3142 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3143 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3144 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3145 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3149 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated,
3151 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
3155 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3157 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3159 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3160 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3164 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3166 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3167 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3168 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3169 int sslv2format, int *al
3172 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3173 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3175 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3176 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3178 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3180 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3182 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3184 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3188 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3189 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3190 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3191 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3195 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
3196 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3199 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3204 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
3207 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3208 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3209 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3213 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3215 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3216 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3217 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3219 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3222 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3223 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3224 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3225 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3226 if (s->renegotiate) {
3227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3228 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3229 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3232 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3236 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3237 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3238 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3240 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3241 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3244 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
3245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3246 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3247 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3253 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3254 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3256 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3258 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3263 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3264 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3273 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
3274 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);