2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
65 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
68 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
69 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
70 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
71 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
73 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
74 * (transition not allowed)
76 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
78 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
81 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
82 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
83 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
85 switch (st->hand_state) {
89 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
90 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
91 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
96 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
97 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
98 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
99 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
106 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
107 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
108 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
109 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
110 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
114 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
115 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
122 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
123 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
124 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
128 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
129 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
135 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
136 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
137 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
144 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
145 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
147 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
149 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
150 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
156 /* No valid transition found */
161 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
162 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
163 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
164 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
166 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
167 * (transition not allowed)
169 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
171 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
173 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
174 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
179 switch (st->hand_state) {
185 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
186 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
187 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
192 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
194 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
195 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
197 * 2) If we did request one then
198 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
200 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
201 * list if we requested a certificate)
203 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
204 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
205 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
206 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
207 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
209 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
210 * not going to accept it because we require a client
213 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
214 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
215 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
216 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
219 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
223 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
226 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
227 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
228 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
235 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
236 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
241 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
243 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
244 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
245 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
246 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
247 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
250 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
251 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
253 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
254 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
255 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
256 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
258 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
262 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
263 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
269 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
270 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
271 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
276 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
278 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
279 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
280 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
285 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
286 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
289 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
294 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
295 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
296 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
297 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
303 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
304 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
305 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
312 /* No valid transition found */
313 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
314 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
319 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
321 * Valid return values are:
325 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
327 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
330 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
331 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
332 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
333 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
334 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
337 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
339 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
343 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
344 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
345 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
346 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
347 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
350 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
351 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
361 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
363 * Valid return values are:
367 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
370 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
371 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
373 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
374 * during re-negotiation:
376 && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
377 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
379 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
380 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
383 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
385 * ... except when the application insists on
386 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
389 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
390 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
391 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
393 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
396 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
404 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
405 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
408 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
410 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
413 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
414 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
417 switch (st->hand_state) {
419 /* Shouldn't happen */
420 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
423 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
424 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
425 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
427 /* Try to read from the client instead */
428 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
430 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
431 if (s->hello_retry_request)
432 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
435 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
437 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
438 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
440 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
441 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
442 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
444 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
446 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
447 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
448 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
452 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
454 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
455 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
459 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
462 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
463 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
464 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
466 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
467 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
468 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
470 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
471 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
473 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
475 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
476 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
478 * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
479 * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
482 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
483 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
485 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
486 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
487 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
488 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
492 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
493 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
494 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
495 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
500 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
501 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
503 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
505 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
508 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
509 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
513 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
515 switch (st->hand_state) {
517 /* Shouldn't happen */
518 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
521 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
522 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
523 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
524 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
525 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
527 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
528 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
529 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
530 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
535 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
536 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
538 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
539 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
540 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
542 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
543 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
544 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
545 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
547 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
548 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
550 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
551 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
553 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
555 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
556 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
558 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
560 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
561 /* normal PSK or SRP */
562 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
563 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
564 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
565 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
567 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
568 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
570 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
573 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
576 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
577 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
578 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
582 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
583 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
584 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
585 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
589 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
590 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
591 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
592 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
596 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
597 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
598 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
600 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
601 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
603 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
605 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
606 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
607 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
608 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
610 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
612 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
614 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
615 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
616 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
618 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
619 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
620 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
622 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
624 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
626 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
627 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
632 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
633 * the server to the client.
635 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
637 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
639 switch (st->hand_state) {
641 /* No pre work to be done */
644 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
647 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
650 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
652 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
653 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
654 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
659 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
660 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
662 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
663 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
669 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
671 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
672 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
674 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
676 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
677 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
679 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
680 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
681 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
683 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0);
684 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
686 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
687 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
693 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
694 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
695 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
696 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
699 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
701 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
702 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
703 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
704 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
708 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
710 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
711 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING)
712 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
716 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
719 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
723 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
724 * server to the client.
726 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
728 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
732 switch (st->hand_state) {
734 /* No post work to be done */
737 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
738 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
742 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
743 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
745 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
746 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
751 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
752 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
754 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
755 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
756 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
760 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
761 * treat like it was the first packet
766 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
767 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
768 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
769 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
770 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
773 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
776 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
777 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
779 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
780 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
781 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
783 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
787 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
788 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
792 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
793 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
794 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
795 * something clever in the record layer for this.
797 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
798 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
799 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
800 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
803 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
804 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
805 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
810 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
811 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
812 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
814 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
817 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
821 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
822 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
824 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
829 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
832 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
833 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
837 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
838 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
841 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
843 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
846 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
850 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
851 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
852 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
853 &s->session->master_key_length)
854 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
855 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
860 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
861 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
863 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
867 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
868 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
873 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
877 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
880 * Valid return values are:
884 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
885 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
887 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
889 switch (st->hand_state) {
891 /* Shouldn't happen */
894 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
896 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
898 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
899 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
902 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
903 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
904 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
907 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
908 /* No construction function needed */
910 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
913 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
914 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
915 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
919 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
920 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
923 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
924 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
925 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
929 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
930 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
931 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
934 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
935 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
936 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
939 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
940 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
941 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
944 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
945 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
946 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
949 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
950 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
951 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
954 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
955 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
956 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
959 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
964 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
965 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
966 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
969 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
970 *confunc = tls_construct_hello_retry_request;
971 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
974 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
975 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
976 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
984 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
985 * calculated as follows:
987 * 2 + # client_version
988 * 32 + # only valid length for random
989 * 1 + # length of session_id
990 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
991 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
992 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
993 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
994 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
995 * 2 + # length of extensions
996 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
998 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1000 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1001 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1004 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1005 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1007 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1009 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1011 switch (st->hand_state) {
1013 /* Shouldn't happen */
1016 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1017 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1019 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1020 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1022 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1023 return s->max_cert_list;
1025 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1026 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1028 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1029 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1031 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1032 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1033 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1036 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1037 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1039 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1040 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1042 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1043 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1048 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1050 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1052 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1054 switch (st->hand_state) {
1056 /* Shouldn't happen */
1057 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1059 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1060 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1062 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1063 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1065 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1066 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1068 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1069 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1071 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1072 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1075 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1076 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1079 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1080 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1082 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1083 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1085 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1086 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1092 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1095 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1097 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1099 switch (st->hand_state) {
1101 /* Shouldn't happen */
1104 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1105 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1107 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1108 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1110 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1113 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1114 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
1116 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
1118 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1120 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1121 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1122 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1124 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1127 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
1128 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
1130 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
1137 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1140 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1141 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1142 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1148 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1150 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1151 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1152 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1153 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1154 cookie_leni > 255) {
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1156 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1159 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1161 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1162 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1163 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1170 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1172 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1173 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1174 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1179 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1180 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1181 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1182 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1184 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1186 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1187 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1188 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1189 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1190 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1191 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1192 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1194 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1195 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1196 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1197 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1198 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1199 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1200 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1201 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1202 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1203 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1204 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1205 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1206 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1208 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1209 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1214 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1216 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1217 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1218 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1222 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1225 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1226 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1228 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1231 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1233 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1235 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1236 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1237 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1238 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1239 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello;
1241 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1242 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1243 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1246 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1247 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1253 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1255 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1256 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1258 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1261 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) || s->hello_retry_request) {
1262 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1263 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1268 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1269 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1270 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1271 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1273 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1274 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1276 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1277 * 7-8 session_id_length
1278 * 9-10 challenge_length
1282 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1283 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1285 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1286 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1287 * in the first place
1289 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1294 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1295 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1296 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1300 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1301 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1303 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1304 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1305 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1307 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1310 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1311 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1312 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1313 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1314 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1315 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1319 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1320 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1321 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1325 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1327 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1328 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1329 /* No extensions. */
1330 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1331 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1332 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1333 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1336 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1338 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1339 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1340 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1341 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1343 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1344 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1345 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1346 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1347 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1348 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1349 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1350 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1352 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1356 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1358 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1359 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1360 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1361 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1362 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1363 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1364 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1369 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1370 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1371 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1375 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1376 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1377 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1378 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1383 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1384 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1385 * So check cookie length...
1387 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1388 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1393 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1394 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1395 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1399 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1400 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1401 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1405 /* Could be empty. */
1406 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1407 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1409 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)) {
1410 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1411 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1417 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1418 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1419 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1420 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1421 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1425 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1426 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1427 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1428 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts, &al,
1429 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len)) {
1430 /* SSLerr already been called */
1433 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1435 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1437 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1439 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1441 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1442 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1444 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1447 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, int *pal)
1450 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1455 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1457 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1458 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1459 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1460 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1461 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1463 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1464 /* Give the early callback a crack at things */
1465 if (s->ctx->early_cb != NULL) {
1467 /* A failure in the early callback terminates the connection. */
1468 code = s->ctx->early_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->early_cb_arg);
1472 s->rwstate = SSL_EARLY_WORK;
1477 /* Set up the client_random */
1478 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1480 /* Choose the version */
1482 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1483 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1484 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1485 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1487 * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
1490 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1494 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1497 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1498 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1500 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1501 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1502 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1503 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1504 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1510 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1511 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1512 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1513 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1515 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1519 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1520 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1521 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1522 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1523 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1527 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1528 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1529 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1530 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1531 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1532 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1533 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1534 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1535 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1537 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1539 /* default verification */
1540 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1541 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1542 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1543 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1547 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1549 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1550 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1551 if (protverr != 0) {
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1553 s->version = s->client_version;
1554 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1562 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1563 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1564 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1565 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1566 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1571 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1572 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1574 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1575 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1576 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1577 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1578 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1579 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1580 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1581 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1582 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1583 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1586 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1588 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1589 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1592 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello, &al);
1594 /* previous session */
1596 } else if (i == -1) {
1600 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1605 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1606 clienthello->isv2, &al) ||
1607 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1608 clienthello->isv2, &al)) {
1612 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
1613 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1614 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1615 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1616 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1617 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1618 if (s->renegotiate) {
1619 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1620 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1621 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1622 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1625 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1626 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1627 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1629 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1630 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1631 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1632 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1633 * an insecure downgrade.
1635 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1636 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1637 al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
1643 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1646 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1649 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1651 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1652 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1654 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1655 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1664 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1667 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1668 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1669 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1674 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1675 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1679 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1681 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1686 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1687 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1688 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1689 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1691 /* TLS extensions */
1692 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1693 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1694 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1699 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1700 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1701 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1702 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1706 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1707 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1712 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1713 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1715 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1716 * backwards compat reasons
1718 int master_key_length;
1720 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1721 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1722 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1724 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1725 && master_key_length > 0) {
1726 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1728 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1729 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1733 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1734 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1735 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1736 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1737 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1738 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1739 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1743 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1744 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1745 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1746 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1747 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1752 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1753 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1754 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1756 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1757 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1758 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1759 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1760 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1762 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1763 /* Can't disable compression */
1764 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1765 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1766 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1769 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1770 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1771 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1772 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1773 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1777 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1778 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1779 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1782 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1783 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1784 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
1787 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1788 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1789 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1790 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1793 } else if (s->hit) {
1795 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods
1796 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1797 /* See if we have a match */
1798 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1801 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1802 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1803 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1805 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
1806 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
1815 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1821 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1822 * using compression.
1824 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1825 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1831 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1834 if (!s->hit || s->hello_retry_request) {
1835 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1836 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1837 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1838 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1839 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1846 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1847 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1849 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1851 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1852 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1857 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1858 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
1859 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1860 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
1861 s->clienthello = NULL;
1864 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1867 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1868 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
1869 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1870 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
1871 s->clienthello = NULL;
1877 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1878 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
1880 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s, int *al)
1882 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1885 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1886 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
1887 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
1888 * influence which certificate is sent
1890 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
1891 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
1894 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1895 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
1897 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1898 * et al can pick it up.
1900 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
1901 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
1903 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1904 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1905 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1907 /* status request response should be sent */
1908 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1909 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
1910 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1912 /* something bad happened */
1913 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1915 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1924 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1926 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1927 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1929 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1930 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s, &al);
1932 /* SSLErr() was already called */
1939 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1940 if (!s->hit || s->hello_retry_request) {
1941 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1942 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1943 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1945 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1946 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1947 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1951 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1954 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1957 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1959 if (cipher == NULL) {
1960 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1961 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1964 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1965 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id) {
1967 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1968 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1970 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
1974 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1976 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, &al))
1978 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1979 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1980 s->session->not_resumable =
1981 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, ((cipher->algorithm_mkey
1982 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
1984 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1985 /* do not send a session ticket */
1986 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1989 /* Session-id reuse */
1990 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1994 * we now have the following setup.
1996 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1997 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1998 * compression - basically ignored right now
1999 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2000 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2001 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2002 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2006 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2007 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2009 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s, &al)) {
2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2011 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2017 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2018 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2020 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
2022 * callback indicates further work to be done
2024 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2027 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
2029 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
2030 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
2032 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
2033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2034 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2036 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2037 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2043 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2045 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2046 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2050 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2052 int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2056 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
2057 version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version;
2058 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2060 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2061 * tls_process_client_hello()
2063 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2064 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2069 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2070 * back in the server hello:
2071 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2072 * we send back the old session ID.
2073 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2074 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2075 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2076 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2078 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2079 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2080 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2081 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2084 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2085 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2087 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2089 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2090 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2091 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2095 /* set up the compression method */
2096 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2099 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2102 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
2105 if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2106 && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl))
2107 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2108 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2109 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm))
2110 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2112 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2113 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO,
2115 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2119 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2120 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2121 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2127 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2131 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2133 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2134 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2135 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2142 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2145 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2147 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2148 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2149 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2152 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
2153 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
2156 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2157 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2158 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2160 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2161 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2165 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2166 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2170 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2172 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2174 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2175 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2177 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2178 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2179 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2180 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2182 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2185 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2186 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2187 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2188 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2191 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2194 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2197 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2199 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2200 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2201 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2203 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2204 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2209 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2210 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2211 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2212 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2215 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2216 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2217 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2218 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2219 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2222 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2223 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2224 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2228 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2230 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2231 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2235 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2237 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2240 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2241 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2244 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2245 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2248 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2249 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2250 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2254 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2255 nid = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2256 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
2257 if (curve_id == 0) {
2258 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2259 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2262 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
2263 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2264 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2269 /* Encode the public key. */
2270 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2272 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2273 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2278 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2279 * can set these to NULLs
2286 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2287 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2288 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2289 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2290 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2291 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2292 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2293 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2296 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2297 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2298 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2299 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2303 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2304 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2305 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2309 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2310 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2312 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2313 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2317 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2318 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2319 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2320 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2323 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2324 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2326 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2327 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2329 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2330 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2336 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2337 unsigned char *binval;
2340 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2341 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2342 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2345 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2348 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2349 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2353 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2355 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2356 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2359 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2360 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2363 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2364 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2365 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2368 memset(binval, 0, len);
2372 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2373 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2374 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2375 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2379 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2382 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2383 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2385 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2386 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2387 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2390 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2391 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2392 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2393 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2394 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2395 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2398 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2399 encodedPoint = NULL;
2405 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
2406 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
2407 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
2410 if (pkey == NULL || md == NULL) {
2411 /* Should never happen */
2412 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2414 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2418 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2419 * points to the space at the end.
2422 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2423 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2425 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2428 /* send signature algorithm */
2429 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg))
2432 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2433 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2434 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2437 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2438 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2439 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2440 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2441 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2444 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2445 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2446 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2447 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2452 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2453 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2454 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2455 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2456 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx,
2457 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2459 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen) <= 0
2460 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2461 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2462 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2463 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2468 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2471 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2473 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2474 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2477 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2479 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2483 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2485 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2487 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2488 /* TODO(TLS1.3) for now send empty request context */
2489 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2490 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2491 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2495 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2496 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2498 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2499 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2505 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2506 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2507 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2512 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2513 const uint16_t *psigs;
2514 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2516 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2517 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2518 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2519 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2521 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2526 if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2532 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2535 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2539 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2542 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2544 PACKET psk_identity;
2546 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2547 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2548 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2551 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2552 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2556 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2557 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2558 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2562 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2563 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2564 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2568 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2571 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2572 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2573 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2575 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2577 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2579 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2580 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2581 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2585 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2586 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2587 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2589 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2590 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2591 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2595 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2599 /* Should never happen */
2600 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2601 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2606 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2609 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2611 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2612 size_t j, padding_len;
2613 PACKET enc_premaster;
2615 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2618 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2620 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2625 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2626 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2627 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2629 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2630 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2631 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2632 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2638 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2639 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2640 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2641 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2643 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2644 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2649 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2650 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2651 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2652 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2657 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2658 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2659 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2660 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2661 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2664 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2668 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2669 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2671 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2672 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2673 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2674 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2675 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2678 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2681 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2682 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2683 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2685 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2686 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2687 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2691 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2692 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2693 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2694 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2695 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2697 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2700 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2701 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2702 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2703 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2704 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2705 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2708 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2709 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2711 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2712 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2715 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2716 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2717 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2718 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2719 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2720 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2723 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2724 unsigned char workaround_good;
2725 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2726 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2728 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2729 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2730 version_good |= workaround_good;
2734 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2735 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2737 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2740 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2741 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2742 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2743 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2745 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2746 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2747 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2748 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2749 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2752 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2753 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2754 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2755 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2761 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2764 /* Should never happen */
2765 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2766 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2771 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2774 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2778 const unsigned char *data;
2779 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2782 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2783 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2784 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2785 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2788 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2790 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2795 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2796 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2797 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2800 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2801 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2802 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2803 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2806 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2807 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2808 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2811 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2812 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2814 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2815 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2816 if (pub_key != NULL)
2821 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2822 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2823 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2828 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2829 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2831 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2834 /* Should never happen */
2835 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2841 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2843 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2844 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2845 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2848 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2849 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2850 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2851 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2855 const unsigned char *data;
2858 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2859 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2862 /* Get encoded point length */
2863 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2864 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2865 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2866 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2869 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2870 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2871 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2874 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
2875 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2876 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2881 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2882 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2883 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2888 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2889 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2891 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2895 /* Should never happen */
2896 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2897 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2902 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2904 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2906 const unsigned char *data;
2908 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2909 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2910 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2911 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2914 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2915 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2918 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2919 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2920 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2923 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2924 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2925 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2930 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2931 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2937 /* Should never happen */
2938 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2944 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2947 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2948 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2949 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2950 const unsigned char *start;
2951 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2952 unsigned long alg_a;
2955 size_t sess_key_len;
2956 const unsigned char *data;
2959 /* Get our certificate private key */
2960 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2961 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2963 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2965 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2967 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2970 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2972 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2973 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2976 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2977 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2978 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2979 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2982 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2983 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2984 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2988 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2989 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2990 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2991 * client certificate for authorization only.
2993 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2994 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2995 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2998 /* Decrypt session key */
2999 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
3000 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
3001 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3005 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3006 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
3007 &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
3008 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
3009 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3015 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
3016 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
3017 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3018 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3021 /* Generate master secret */
3022 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3023 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3024 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3028 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3029 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
3030 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
3031 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3035 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3038 /* Should never happen */
3039 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3040 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3045 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3048 unsigned long alg_k;
3050 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3052 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3053 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
3056 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3057 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3058 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3059 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3060 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3061 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3064 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3065 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3066 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3067 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3070 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3071 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3073 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3074 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3076 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3077 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3079 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3080 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3082 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3083 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3086 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3087 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3088 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3092 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3095 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3097 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3098 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3100 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3101 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3104 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3106 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3107 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3108 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3109 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3110 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3112 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3115 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3116 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3118 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3119 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3120 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
3122 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3126 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3127 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3132 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3134 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3135 * the handshake_buffer
3137 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3138 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3141 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3143 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3144 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3145 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3146 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3150 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3151 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3153 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3154 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3159 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3162 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3164 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3166 unsigned long l, llen;
3167 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3168 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3169 PACKET spkt, context;
3172 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3173 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3177 /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
3178 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context))
3179 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
3180 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
3181 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3182 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3183 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3187 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3188 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3189 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3190 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3191 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3192 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3196 certstart = certbytes;
3197 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3199 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3202 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3203 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3204 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3205 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3209 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3210 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3213 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3214 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3215 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
3218 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3219 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3221 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3222 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
3223 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3226 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3229 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3230 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3236 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3237 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3238 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3239 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3240 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3241 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3244 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3245 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3246 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3247 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3248 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3249 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED;
3252 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3253 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3258 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3260 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3261 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3262 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3266 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3267 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3270 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3272 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3273 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3274 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3279 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3280 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3281 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3283 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3284 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3287 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3290 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3291 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3292 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3297 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3298 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3302 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3304 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3305 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3306 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3307 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3308 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3312 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3316 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3317 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3320 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3324 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3326 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
3327 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3330 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3335 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3336 * for the server Certificate message
3338 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3339 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &al)) {
3340 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3341 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3348 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3350 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3351 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3352 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3353 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3354 const unsigned char *const_p;
3355 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3358 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3359 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3360 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3361 int iv_len, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3362 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3364 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3368 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3369 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0)
3371 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
3372 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
3373 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
3374 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
3375 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
3376 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
3377 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
3378 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3379 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3382 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
3384 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
3387 /* get session encoding length */
3388 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3390 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3393 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3394 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3397 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3399 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3403 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3404 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3405 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3406 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3411 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3415 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3418 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3421 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3423 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3424 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3425 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3429 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3430 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3433 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3436 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3437 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3439 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3440 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3441 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3446 /* Put timeout and length */
3447 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3448 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3449 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3450 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3454 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3455 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3460 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3462 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3464 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3465 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
3467 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3468 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv))
3470 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
3471 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
3472 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3474 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3475 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3479 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3480 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3481 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3484 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3485 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3486 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3488 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add))
3489 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3490 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3491 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3492 /* Output key name */
3493 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3495 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3496 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3498 /* Encrypt session data */
3499 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3500 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3501 || encdata1 != encdata2
3502 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3503 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3504 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3505 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3506 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3507 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3508 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3509 macendoffset - macoffset)
3510 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3511 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3512 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3513 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3514 || macdata1 != macdata2
3515 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
3517 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
3518 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3523 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3524 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3529 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3531 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3532 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3533 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3538 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3539 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3541 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3543 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
3544 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
3545 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
3546 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3553 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3555 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
3556 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3563 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3565 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3566 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3568 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3570 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3571 size_t next_proto_len;
3574 * The payload looks like:
3576 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3577 * uint8 padding_len;
3578 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3580 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3581 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3582 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3583 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3587 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
3592 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3594 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3596 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3597 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3601 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3605 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3607 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3608 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3609 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3616 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3618 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3622 * TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT version before release
3623 * (should be s->version)
3625 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
3626 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
3627 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
3628 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
3630 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3634 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
3635 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3640 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
3641 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
3643 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s))
3648 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3652 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3654 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3656 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3657 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3658 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3659 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3660 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3663 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
3664 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
3665 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3670 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
3671 * a record boundary.
3673 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
3674 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3675 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3676 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
3680 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
3681 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3682 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
3683 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3687 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3689 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3690 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3691 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;