2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
65 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
66 PACKET *cipher_suites,
68 **skp, int sslv2format,
72 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
73 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
74 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
75 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
77 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
78 * (transition not allowed)
80 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
82 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
85 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
86 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
90 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
91 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
92 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
94 switch (st->hand_state) {
98 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
99 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
100 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
101 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
105 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
106 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
113 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
114 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
115 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
119 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
120 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
126 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
127 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
128 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
134 /* No valid transition found */
135 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
136 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_READ_TRANSITION,
137 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
142 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
143 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
144 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
145 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
147 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
148 * (transition not allowed)
150 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
152 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
154 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
155 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
160 switch (st->hand_state) {
166 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
167 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
168 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
173 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
175 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
176 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
178 * 2) If we did request one then
179 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
181 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
182 * list if we requested a certificate)
184 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
185 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
186 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
187 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
188 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
190 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
191 * not going to accept it because we require a client
194 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
195 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
196 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
197 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
200 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
204 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
207 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
208 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
209 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
216 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
217 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
222 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
224 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
225 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
226 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
227 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
228 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
231 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
232 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
234 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
235 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
236 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
237 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
239 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
243 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
244 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
250 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
251 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
252 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
257 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
259 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
260 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
261 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
266 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
267 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
276 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
277 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
278 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
284 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
285 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
286 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
293 /* No valid transition found */
294 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
295 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
300 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
302 * Valid return values are:
306 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
308 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
311 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
312 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
313 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
314 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
315 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
318 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
320 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
324 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
325 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
326 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
327 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
328 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
331 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
332 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
342 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
344 * Valid return values are:
348 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
351 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
352 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
354 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
355 * during re-negotiation:
357 && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
358 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
360 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
361 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
364 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
366 * ... except when the application insists on
367 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
370 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
371 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
372 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
374 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
377 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
385 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
386 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
389 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
391 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
394 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
395 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
399 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
400 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
403 switch (st->hand_state) {
405 /* Shouldn't happen */
406 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
408 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
409 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
410 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
412 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
413 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
414 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
416 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
418 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
419 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
420 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
422 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
424 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
426 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
427 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
428 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
431 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
432 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
434 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
435 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
436 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
438 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
439 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
441 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
442 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
443 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
444 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
449 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
450 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
452 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
454 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
457 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
458 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
462 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
464 switch (st->hand_state) {
466 /* Shouldn't happen */
467 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
470 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
471 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
472 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
473 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
474 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
476 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
477 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
478 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
479 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
484 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
485 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
487 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
488 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
489 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
490 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
492 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
493 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
494 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
495 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
497 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
498 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
500 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
501 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
503 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
505 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
506 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
508 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
510 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
511 /* normal PSK or SRP */
512 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
513 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
514 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
515 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
516 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
517 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
518 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
520 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
523 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
526 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
527 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
528 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
532 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
533 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
534 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
535 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
539 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
540 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
541 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
542 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
546 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
547 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
548 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
550 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
551 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
553 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
555 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
556 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
558 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
559 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
561 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
563 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
565 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
567 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
569 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
570 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
571 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
573 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
575 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
577 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
578 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
579 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
584 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
585 * the server to the client.
587 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
589 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
591 switch (st->hand_state) {
593 /* No pre work to be done */
596 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
599 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
602 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
604 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
605 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
606 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
611 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
612 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
614 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
615 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
621 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
622 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
623 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
624 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
626 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
628 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
629 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
631 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
632 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
638 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
639 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
640 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
641 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
644 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
646 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
647 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
648 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
649 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
653 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
656 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
659 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
663 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
664 * server to the client.
666 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
668 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
672 switch (st->hand_state) {
674 /* No post work to be done */
677 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
678 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
680 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
681 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
686 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
687 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
689 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
690 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
691 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
695 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
696 * treat like it was the first packet
701 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
702 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
703 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
704 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
705 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
708 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
711 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
712 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
714 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
715 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
716 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
718 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
722 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
723 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
727 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
728 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
729 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
730 * something clever in the record layer for this.
732 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
733 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
734 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
735 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)
736 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
737 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
742 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
743 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
744 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
746 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
749 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
753 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
754 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
756 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
761 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
764 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
765 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
769 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
770 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
772 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
773 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
775 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
778 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
782 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
783 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
784 s->session->master_key, s->handshake_secret, 0,
785 &s->session->master_key_length)
786 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
787 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
793 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
797 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
800 * Valid return values are:
804 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
805 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
807 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
809 switch (st->hand_state) {
811 /* Shouldn't happen */
814 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
816 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
818 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
819 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
822 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
823 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
824 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
827 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
828 /* No construction function needed */
830 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
833 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
834 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
835 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
839 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
840 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
843 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
844 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
845 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
849 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
850 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
851 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
854 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
855 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
856 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
859 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
860 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
861 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
864 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
865 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
866 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
869 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
870 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
871 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
874 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
875 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
876 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
879 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
880 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
881 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
889 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
890 * calculated as follows:
892 * 2 + # client_version
893 * 32 + # only valid length for random
894 * 1 + # length of session_id
895 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
896 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
897 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
898 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
899 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
900 * 2 + # length of extensions
901 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
903 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
905 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
906 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
909 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
910 * reading. Excludes the message header.
912 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
914 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
916 switch (st->hand_state) {
918 /* Shouldn't happen */
921 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
922 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
925 return s->max_cert_list;
927 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
928 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
930 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
931 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
933 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
934 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
935 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
938 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
939 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
941 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
942 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
947 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
949 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
951 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
953 switch (st->hand_state) {
955 /* Shouldn't happen */
956 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
958 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
959 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
962 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
964 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
965 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
967 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
968 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
970 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
971 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
972 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
975 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
976 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
978 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
979 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
984 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
987 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
989 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
991 switch (st->hand_state) {
993 /* Shouldn't happen */
996 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
997 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
999 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1000 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1002 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1004 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
1005 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
1006 /* Are we renegotiating? */
1007 && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
1008 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1009 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1010 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1011 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1012 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
1015 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
1018 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1020 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1023 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1024 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
1026 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
1028 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1030 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1031 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1032 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1034 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1037 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
1038 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
1040 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
1047 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1050 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1051 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1052 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1058 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1060 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1061 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1062 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1063 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1064 cookie_leni > 255) {
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1066 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1069 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1071 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1072 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1080 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1082 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1083 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1084 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1089 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1090 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1091 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1092 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1094 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1096 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1097 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1098 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1099 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1100 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1101 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1102 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1104 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1105 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1106 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1107 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1108 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1109 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1110 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1111 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1112 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1113 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1114 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1115 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1116 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1118 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1119 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1124 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1126 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1127 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1128 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1132 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1135 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1136 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1138 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1141 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1143 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1145 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1149 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1150 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1151 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1153 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1155 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1156 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1157 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1158 CLIENTHELLO_MSG clienthello;
1160 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1161 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1166 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
1167 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
1170 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1172 memset(&clienthello, 0, sizeof(clienthello));
1173 clienthello.isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1174 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1176 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1180 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1181 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1182 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1183 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1185 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1186 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1188 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1189 * 7-8 session_id_length
1190 * 9-10 challenge_length
1194 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1195 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1197 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1198 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1199 * in the first place
1201 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1206 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello.legacy_version)) {
1207 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1208 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1212 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1213 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1215 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1216 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1217 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1219 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1222 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1223 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1224 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1226 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1227 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1231 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1232 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1237 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites,
1239 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.session_id, session_id_len)
1240 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1241 /* No extensions. */
1242 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1243 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1244 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1245 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1248 clienthello.session_id_len = session_id_len;
1250 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1251 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello.random) because that is the limit
1252 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1253 * sizeof(clienthello.random) does.
1255 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1256 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1257 memset(clienthello.random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1258 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1259 clienthello.random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1260 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1261 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1262 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1263 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1264 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1268 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
1270 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1271 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1272 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1273 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello.session_id,
1274 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1275 &clienthello.session_id_len)) {
1276 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1281 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1282 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1283 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1284 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1287 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
1288 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1289 &clienthello.dtls_cookie_len)) {
1290 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1291 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1295 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1296 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1297 * So check cookie length...
1299 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1300 if (clienthello.dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1305 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites)) {
1306 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1311 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1312 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1313 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1317 /* Could be empty. */
1318 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1319 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
1321 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.extensions)) {
1322 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1323 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1329 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello.compressions,
1330 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1331 &clienthello.compressions_len)) {
1332 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1333 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1337 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1338 extensions = clienthello.extensions;
1339 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1340 &clienthello.pre_proc_exts, &al)) {
1341 /* SSLerr already been called */
1345 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1347 /* Set up the client_random */
1348 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1350 /* Choose the version */
1352 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1353 if (clienthello.legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1354 || (clienthello.legacy_version & 0xff00)
1355 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1357 * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1364 s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
1367 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1368 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1370 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1371 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
1372 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1373 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello.legacy_version, s->version)) {
1374 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1380 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1381 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
1382 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1383 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
1385 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1389 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1390 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1391 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1392 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1393 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
1394 clienthello.dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1395 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1397 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1399 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1401 /* default verification */
1402 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello.dtls_cookie_len
1403 || memcmp(clienthello.dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1404 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1405 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1406 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1409 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1411 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1412 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
1413 if (protverr != 0) {
1414 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1415 s->version = s->client_version;
1416 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1424 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1425 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1427 clienthello.pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1428 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1433 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1434 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1436 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1437 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1438 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1439 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1440 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1441 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1442 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1443 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1444 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1445 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1448 if (clienthello.isv2 ||
1450 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1451 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1454 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &clienthello);
1456 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1458 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1459 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1460 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1461 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1462 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1464 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1465 /* previous session */
1467 } else if (i == -1) {
1471 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1476 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello.ciphersuites, &ciphers,
1477 clienthello.isv2, &al) == NULL) {
1481 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1484 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1487 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1489 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1490 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1492 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1493 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1502 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1505 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1506 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1507 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1512 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello.compressions_len; loop++) {
1513 if (clienthello.compressions[loop] == 0)
1517 if (loop >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
1519 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1525 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1526 ssl_check_for_safari(s, &clienthello);
1527 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1529 /* TLS extensions */
1530 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1531 clienthello.pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1532 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1536 /* Check we've got a key_share for TLSv1.3 */
1537 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL && !s->hit) {
1538 /* No suitable share */
1539 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Send a HelloRetryRequest */
1540 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1541 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
1546 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1547 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1548 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1549 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1553 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1554 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1559 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1560 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1562 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1563 * backwards compat reasons
1565 int master_key_length;
1567 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1568 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1569 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1571 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1572 && master_key_length > 0) {
1573 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1575 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1576 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1580 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1582 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1587 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1588 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1589 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1593 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1594 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1595 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1596 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1597 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1602 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1603 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1604 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1606 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1607 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1608 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1609 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1610 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1612 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1613 /* Can't disable compression */
1614 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1615 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1616 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1619 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1620 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1621 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1622 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1623 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1627 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1628 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1629 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1632 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1633 for (k = 0; k < clienthello.compressions_len; k++) {
1634 if (clienthello.compressions[k] == comp_id)
1637 if (k >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
1638 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1639 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1640 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1645 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1646 /* See if we have a match */
1647 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1650 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1651 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1652 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1654 for (o = 0; o < clienthello.compressions_len; o++) {
1655 if (v == clienthello.compressions[o]) {
1664 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1670 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1671 * using compression.
1673 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1674 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1680 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1684 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1685 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1687 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1689 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1690 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1691 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1692 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1693 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1697 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1703 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1704 OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
1705 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1707 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1709 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1711 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1712 OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
1714 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1718 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1719 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
1721 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s, int *al)
1723 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1726 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1727 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
1728 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
1729 * influence which certificate is sent
1731 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
1732 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
1734 CERT_PKEY *certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
1736 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1737 if (certpkey != NULL) {
1739 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1740 * et al can pick it up.
1742 s->cert->key = certpkey;
1743 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
1745 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1746 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1747 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1749 /* status request response should be sent */
1750 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1751 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
1752 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1754 /* something bad happened */
1755 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1757 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1766 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1768 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1769 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1771 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1773 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1774 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1775 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1777 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1778 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1779 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1783 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1786 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1789 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1791 if (cipher == NULL) {
1792 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1793 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1796 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1797 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1798 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1799 s->session->not_resumable =
1800 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, ((cipher->algorithm_mkey
1801 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
1803 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1804 /* do not send a session ticket */
1805 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1807 /* Session-id reuse */
1808 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1811 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1812 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1813 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1819 * we now have the following setup.
1821 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1822 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1823 * compression - basically ignored right now
1824 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1825 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1826 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1827 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1831 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
1832 * certificate callbacks etc above.
1834 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s, &al)) {
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1836 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1842 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1843 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1845 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1847 * callback indicates further work to be done
1849 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1852 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1854 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1855 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1857 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1858 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1859 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1861 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1862 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1868 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1870 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1871 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1875 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1877 int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1881 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
1882 version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version;
1883 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
1885 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1886 * tls_process_client_hello()
1888 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1889 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1894 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1895 * back in the server hello:
1896 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1897 * we send back the old session ID.
1898 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1899 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1900 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1901 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1903 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1904 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1905 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1906 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1909 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1910 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1912 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1914 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1915 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1916 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1920 /* set up the compression method */
1921 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1924 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1927 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1930 if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1931 && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl))
1932 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
1933 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1934 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm))
1935 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
1937 ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1938 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO,
1940 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1946 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1950 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1952 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
1953 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1954 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1961 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1963 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1964 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
1966 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1967 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1968 size_t encodedlen = 0;
1972 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1973 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
1976 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1977 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1978 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
1980 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
1981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1985 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1986 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1990 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1992 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1993 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1994 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1995 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1997 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1998 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1999 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2000 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2002 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2005 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2006 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2007 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2008 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2011 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2014 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2017 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2019 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2020 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2021 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2023 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2024 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2029 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2030 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2032 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2035 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2036 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2037 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2038 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2039 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2042 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2043 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2044 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2048 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2050 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2051 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2055 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2057 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2060 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2061 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2064 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2065 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2068 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2069 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2070 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2074 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2075 nid = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2076 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
2077 if (curve_id == 0) {
2078 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2079 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2082 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
2083 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2084 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2085 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2089 /* Encode the public key. */
2090 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2092 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2098 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2099 * can set these to NULLs
2106 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2107 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2108 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2109 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2110 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2111 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2112 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2113 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2116 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2117 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2118 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2119 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2123 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2124 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2125 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2129 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2130 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
2131 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
2133 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2141 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2142 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2143 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2146 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2147 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2149 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2150 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2152 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2153 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2159 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2160 unsigned char *binval;
2163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2164 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2165 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2168 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2171 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2172 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2176 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2178 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2179 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2182 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2183 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2186 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2187 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2188 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2191 memset(binval, 0, len);
2195 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2196 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2197 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2198 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2202 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2206 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2208 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2209 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2210 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2213 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2214 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2215 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2216 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2217 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2218 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2221 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2222 encodedPoint = NULL;
2229 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2230 * points to the space at the end.
2233 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
2237 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2238 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2240 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2243 /* send signature algorithm */
2244 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2245 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(s, pkt, pkey, md, &ispss)) {
2246 /* Should never happen */
2247 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2248 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2253 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2256 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2257 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2258 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2261 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2262 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2263 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2264 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2265 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2269 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx,
2270 RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2271 /* -1 here means set saltlen to the digest len */
2272 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1) <= 0) {
2273 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2278 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2279 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2280 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2281 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2282 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx,
2283 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2285 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen) <= 0
2286 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2287 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2288 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2289 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2293 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2294 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2295 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2296 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2301 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2304 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2306 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2307 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2309 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2310 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2312 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2316 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2319 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2321 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2322 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2323 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt)
2324 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2325 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2329 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2330 const unsigned int *psigs;
2331 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2333 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2334 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2335 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2337 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2342 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2343 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2344 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2348 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2350 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2351 unsigned char *namebytes;
2352 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2356 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2357 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2359 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2360 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2361 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2366 /* else no CA names */
2368 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2369 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2373 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2377 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2381 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2384 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2386 PACKET psk_identity;
2388 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2389 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2390 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2393 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2394 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2395 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2398 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2399 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2404 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2405 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2406 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2410 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2413 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2414 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2415 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2417 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2419 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2421 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2422 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2423 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2427 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2428 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2429 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2431 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2432 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2437 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2441 /* Should never happen */
2442 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2443 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2448 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2450 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2451 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2453 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2454 size_t j, padding_len;
2455 PACKET enc_premaster;
2457 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2460 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
2462 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2463 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2467 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2468 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2469 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2471 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2472 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2473 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2480 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2481 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2482 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2483 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2485 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2486 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2491 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2492 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2493 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2494 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2499 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2500 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2501 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2502 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2503 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2506 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2510 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2511 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2513 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2514 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2515 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2516 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2517 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2520 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2523 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2524 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2525 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2527 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2528 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2529 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2533 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2534 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2535 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2536 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2537 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2539 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2542 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2543 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2544 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2545 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2546 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2547 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2550 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2551 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2553 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2554 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2557 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2558 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2559 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2560 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2561 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2562 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2565 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2566 unsigned char workaround_good;
2567 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2568 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2570 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2571 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2572 version_good |= workaround_good;
2576 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2577 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2579 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2582 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2583 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2584 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2585 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2587 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2588 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2589 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2590 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2591 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2594 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2595 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2596 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2597 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2603 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2606 /* Should never happen */
2607 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2608 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2613 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2615 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2616 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2620 const unsigned char *data;
2621 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2624 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2625 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2626 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2627 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2630 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2632 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2633 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2637 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2638 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2642 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2643 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2644 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2648 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2649 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2650 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2653 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2654 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2656 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2658 if (pub_key != NULL)
2663 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2664 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2665 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2670 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2671 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2673 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2676 /* Should never happen */
2677 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2678 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2683 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2685 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2686 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2687 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2690 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2691 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2692 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2693 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2697 const unsigned char *data;
2700 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2701 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2704 /* Get encoded point length */
2705 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2706 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2707 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2708 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2711 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2712 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2713 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2716 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
2717 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2718 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2723 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2724 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2725 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2730 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2731 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2733 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2737 /* Should never happen */
2738 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2739 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2744 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2748 const unsigned char *data;
2750 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2751 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2752 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2753 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2756 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2757 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2760 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2761 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2765 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2766 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2767 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2768 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2772 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2773 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2779 /* Should never happen */
2780 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2781 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2786 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2788 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2789 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2790 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2791 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2792 const unsigned char *start;
2793 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2794 unsigned long alg_a;
2797 size_t sess_key_len;
2798 const unsigned char *data;
2801 /* Get our certificate private key */
2802 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2803 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2805 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2807 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2809 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2812 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2814 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2815 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2818 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2819 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2820 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2824 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2825 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2826 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2830 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2831 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2832 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2833 * client certificate for authorization only.
2835 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2836 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2837 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2840 /* Decrypt session key */
2841 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2842 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
2843 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2844 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2847 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2848 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2849 &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2850 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2851 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2852 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2857 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2858 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2859 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2860 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2863 /* Generate master secret */
2864 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2865 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2866 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2870 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2871 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2872 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2873 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2877 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2880 /* Should never happen */
2881 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2882 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2887 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2890 unsigned long alg_k;
2892 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2894 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2895 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2898 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2899 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2900 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2901 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2902 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2903 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2906 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2907 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2908 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2909 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2912 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2913 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2915 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2916 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2918 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2919 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2921 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2922 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2924 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2925 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2928 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2929 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2930 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2934 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2937 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2939 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2940 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2942 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2943 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2946 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2948 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2949 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2950 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2951 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2952 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2954 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2957 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2958 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2960 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2961 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2962 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
2964 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2968 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2969 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2974 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
2976 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2977 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2979 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2980 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
2981 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
2982 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
2983 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
2984 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2985 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2986 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
2989 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
2993 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
2995 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
2996 * the handshake_buffer
2998 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2999 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3002 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3004 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3006 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3007 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3011 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3012 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3014 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3015 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3020 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3023 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3025 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3027 unsigned long l, llen;
3028 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3029 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3030 PACKET spkt, context;
3033 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3038 /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
3039 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context))
3040 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
3041 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
3042 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3043 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3048 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3049 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3050 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3051 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3052 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3053 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3057 certstart = certbytes;
3058 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3060 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3063 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3064 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3066 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3070 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3071 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3074 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3075 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
3079 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3081 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3082 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
3083 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3086 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3089 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3090 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3096 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3097 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3098 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3099 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3100 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3101 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3104 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3105 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3106 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3107 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3108 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3109 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3112 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3113 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3118 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3120 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3121 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3122 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3126 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3127 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3130 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3132 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3133 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3134 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3139 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3140 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3141 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3143 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3144 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3147 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3150 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3151 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3152 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3157 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3158 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3162 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3164 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3165 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3166 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3167 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3172 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3176 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3177 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3180 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3184 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3187 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3189 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3191 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3196 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3197 * for the server Certificate message
3199 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3200 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &al)) {
3201 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3202 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3209 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3211 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3212 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3213 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3214 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3215 const unsigned char *const_p;
3216 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3219 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3220 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3221 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3223 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3225 /* get session encoding length */
3226 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3228 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3231 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3232 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3235 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3237 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3241 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3242 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3243 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3244 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3249 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3253 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3256 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3259 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3261 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3262 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3263 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3267 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3268 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3271 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3274 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3275 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3277 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3278 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3279 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3284 /* Put timeout and length */
3285 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3286 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3287 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3288 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3292 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3293 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3298 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3300 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3302 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3303 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
3305 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3306 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv))
3308 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
3309 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
3310 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3312 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3313 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3317 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3318 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3319 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3321 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3322 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3323 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3324 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3325 /* Output key name */
3326 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3328 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3329 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3331 /* Encrypt session data */
3332 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3333 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3334 || encdata1 != encdata2
3335 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3336 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3337 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3338 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3339 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3340 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3341 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3342 macendoffset - macoffset)
3343 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3344 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3345 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3346 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3347 || macdata1 != macdata2
3348 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3349 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3352 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3353 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3359 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3360 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3361 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3366 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3367 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3369 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3371 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
3372 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
3373 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
3374 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3381 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3383 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
3384 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3393 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3394 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3396 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3398 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3399 size_t next_proto_len;
3402 * The payload looks like:
3404 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3405 * uint8 padding_len;
3406 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3408 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3409 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3410 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3411 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3415 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
3420 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3422 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3424 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3425 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3429 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3433 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3435 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3436 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3437 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3444 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3446 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3447 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3448 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3449 int sslv2format, int *al)
3451 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3452 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3454 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3455 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3457 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3459 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3461 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3463 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3467 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3468 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3469 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3470 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3474 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
3476 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3477 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3482 size_t numciphers = PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) / n;
3483 PACKET sslv2ciphers = *cipher_suites;
3484 unsigned int leadbyte;
3488 * We store the raw ciphers list in SSLv3+ format so we need to do some
3489 * preprocessing to convert the list first. If there are any SSLv2 only
3490 * ciphersuites with a non-zero leading byte then we are going to
3491 * slightly over allocate because we won't store those. But that isn't a
3494 raw = OPENSSL_malloc(numciphers * TLS_CIPHER_LEN);
3495 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = raw;
3497 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3500 for (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
3501 PACKET_remaining(&sslv2ciphers) > 0;
3502 raw += TLS_CIPHER_LEN) {
3503 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sslv2ciphers, &leadbyte)
3505 && !PACKET_copy_bytes(&sslv2ciphers, raw,
3508 && !PACKET_forward(&sslv2ciphers, TLS_CIPHER_LEN))) {
3509 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3510 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw);
3511 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL;
3512 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
3516 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen += TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3518 } else if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3519 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3520 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3524 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3526 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3527 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3528 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3530 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3533 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3534 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3535 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3536 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3537 if (s->renegotiate) {
3538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3539 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3540 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3543 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3547 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3548 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3549 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3551 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3552 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3555 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
3556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3557 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3558 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3564 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3565 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3567 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3569 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3574 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3575 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3583 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);