2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
65 PACKET *cipher_suites,
67 **skp, int sslv2format,
71 * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
72 * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
73 * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
74 * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
76 * Valid return values are:
77 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
78 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
80 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
82 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
84 switch (st->hand_state) {
89 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
90 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
91 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
96 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
98 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
99 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
101 * 2) If we did request one then
102 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
104 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
105 * list if we requested a certificate)
107 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
108 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
109 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
110 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
111 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
113 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
114 * not going to accept it because we require a client
117 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
118 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
119 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
120 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
130 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
131 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
132 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
139 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
140 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
145 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
147 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
148 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
149 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
150 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
151 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
154 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
157 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
158 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
159 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
160 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
166 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
167 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
173 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
174 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
175 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
180 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
182 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
183 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
184 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
189 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
190 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
198 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
199 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
200 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
201 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
207 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
208 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
209 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
215 /* No valid transition found */
216 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
217 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
222 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
224 * Valid return values are:
228 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
230 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
233 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
234 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
235 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
236 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
237 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
240 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
242 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
246 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
247 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
248 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
249 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
250 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
253 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
254 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
264 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
266 * Valid return values are:
270 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
273 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
274 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
276 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
277 * during re-negotiation:
279 && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
280 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
282 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
283 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
286 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
288 * ... except when the application insists on
289 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
292 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
293 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
294 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
296 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
299 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
307 * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
308 * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
310 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
312 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
314 switch (st->hand_state) {
316 /* Shouldn't happen */
317 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
320 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
321 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
324 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
325 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
326 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
328 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
329 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
330 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
331 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
333 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
334 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
335 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
336 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
338 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
339 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
341 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
342 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
344 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
346 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
347 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
349 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
351 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
352 /* normal PSK or SRP */
353 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
354 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
356 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
357 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
358 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
359 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
361 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
364 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
367 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
368 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
369 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
373 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
374 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
375 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
376 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
380 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
381 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
382 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
383 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
387 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
388 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
389 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
391 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
392 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
394 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
396 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
397 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
398 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
399 } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
400 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
402 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
404 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
406 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
407 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
410 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
411 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
412 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
414 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
416 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
418 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
419 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
420 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
426 * the server to the client.
428 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
430 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
432 switch (st->hand_state) {
434 /* No pre work to be done */
437 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
440 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
443 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
445 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
446 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
447 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
452 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
453 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
455 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
456 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
462 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
463 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
464 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
465 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
467 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
469 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
470 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
472 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
473 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
479 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
480 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
481 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
482 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
485 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
487 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
488 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
489 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
490 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
494 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
497 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
500 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
504 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
505 * server to the client.
507 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
509 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
513 switch (st->hand_state) {
515 /* No post work to be done */
518 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
519 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
521 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
522 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
527 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
528 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
530 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
531 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
532 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
536 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
537 * treat like it was the first packet
542 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
543 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
544 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
545 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
546 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
549 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
552 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
553 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
555 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
556 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
557 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
559 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
563 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
564 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
569 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
571 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
573 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
576 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
580 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
581 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
583 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
588 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
591 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
592 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
596 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
597 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
599 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
600 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
602 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
605 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
612 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
616 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
619 * Valid return values are:
623 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
624 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
626 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
628 switch (st->hand_state) {
630 /* Shouldn't happen */
633 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
635 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
637 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
638 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
641 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
642 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
643 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
646 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
647 /* No construction function needed */
649 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
652 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
653 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
654 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
658 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
659 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
662 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
663 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
664 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
667 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
668 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
669 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
672 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
673 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
674 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
677 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
678 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
679 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
682 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
683 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
684 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
687 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
688 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
689 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
697 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
698 * calculated as follows:
700 * 2 + # client_version
701 * 32 + # only valid length for random
702 * 1 + # length of session_id
703 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
704 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
705 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
706 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
707 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
708 * 2 + # length of extensions
709 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
711 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
713 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
714 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
717 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
718 * reading. Excludes the message header.
720 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
722 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
724 switch (st->hand_state) {
726 /* Shouldn't happen */
729 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
730 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
733 return s->max_cert_list;
735 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
736 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
738 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
739 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
742 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
743 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
746 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
747 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
749 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
750 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
755 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
757 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
759 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
761 switch (st->hand_state) {
763 /* Shouldn't happen */
764 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
766 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
767 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
770 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
772 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
773 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
775 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
776 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
779 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
780 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
783 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
784 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
786 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
787 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
792 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
795 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
797 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
799 switch (st->hand_state) {
801 /* Shouldn't happen */
804 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
805 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
807 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
808 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
810 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
811 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
812 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
813 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
814 /* Are we renegotiating? */
815 && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
816 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
817 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
818 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
819 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
820 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
823 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
826 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
831 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
832 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
834 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
836 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
838 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
839 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
840 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
842 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
846 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
848 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
855 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
858 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
859 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
860 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
866 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
868 unsigned int cookie_leni;
869 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
870 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
871 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
873 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
874 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
877 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
879 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
880 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
881 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
888 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
890 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
895 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
896 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
898 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
900 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
901 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
902 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
903 CLIENTHELLO_MSG clienthello;
906 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
908 memset(&clienthello, 0, sizeof(clienthello));
909 clienthello.isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
910 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
912 if (clienthello.isv2) {
916 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
917 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
918 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
919 * the rest right through. Its format is:
921 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
922 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
924 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
925 * 7-8 session_id_length
926 * 9-10 challenge_length
930 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
931 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
933 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
934 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
937 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
942 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello.legacy_version)) {
943 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
948 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
949 if (clienthello.isv2) {
951 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
952 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
953 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
955 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
958 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
959 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
960 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
961 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
962 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
963 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
967 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
968 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
973 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites,
975 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.session_id, session_id_len)
976 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
978 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
979 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
980 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
981 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
984 clienthello.session_id_len = session_id_len;
986 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
987 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello.random) because that is the limit
988 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
989 * sizeof(clienthello.random) does.
991 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
992 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
993 memset(clienthello.random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
994 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
995 clienthello.random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
996 challenge_len, challenge_len)
997 /* Advertise only null compression. */
998 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
999 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1000 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1004 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
1006 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1007 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1008 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1009 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello.session_id,
1010 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1011 &clienthello.session_id_len)) {
1012 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1013 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1017 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1018 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1019 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1020 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1023 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
1024 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1025 &clienthello.dtls_cookie_len)) {
1026 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1027 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1031 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1032 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1033 * So check cookie length...
1035 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1036 if (clienthello.dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1041 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites)) {
1042 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1043 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1047 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1048 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1053 /* Could be empty. */
1054 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1055 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
1057 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.extensions)) {
1058 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1059 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1065 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello.compressions,
1066 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1067 &clienthello.compressions_len)) {
1068 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1073 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1074 extensions = clienthello.extensions;
1075 if (!tls_collect_extensions(&extensions, &clienthello.pre_proc_exts,
1076 &clienthello.num_extensions, &al)) {
1077 /* SSLerr already been called */
1081 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1083 /* Set up the client_random */
1084 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1086 /* Choose the version */
1088 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1089 if (clienthello.legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1090 || (clienthello.legacy_version & 0xff00)
1091 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1093 * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
1096 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1100 s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
1103 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1104 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1106 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1107 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
1108 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1109 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello.legacy_version, s->version)) {
1110 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1116 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1117 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
1118 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1119 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
1121 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1125 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1126 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1127 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1128 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1129 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
1130 clienthello.dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1131 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1133 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1135 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1137 /* default verification */
1138 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello.dtls_cookie_len
1139 || memcmp(clienthello.dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1140 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1141 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1145 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1147 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1148 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
1149 if (protverr != 0) {
1150 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1151 s->version = s->client_version;
1152 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1160 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1161 if (!tls_check_client_ems_support(s, &clienthello)) {
1162 /* Only fails if the extension is malformed */
1163 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1169 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1170 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1172 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1173 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1174 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1175 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1176 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1177 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1178 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1179 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1180 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1181 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1184 if (clienthello.isv2 ||
1186 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1187 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1190 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &clienthello);
1192 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1194 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1195 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1196 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1197 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1198 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1200 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1201 /* previous session */
1203 } else if (i == -1) {
1207 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1212 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello.ciphersuites, &ciphers,
1213 clienthello.isv2, &al) == NULL) {
1217 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1220 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1223 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1225 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1226 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1228 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1229 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1238 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1241 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1243 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1248 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello.compressions_len; loop++) {
1249 if (clienthello.compressions[loop] == 0)
1253 if (loop >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
1255 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1260 /* TLS extensions */
1261 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &clienthello)) {
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1267 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1268 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1269 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1270 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1274 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1275 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1280 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1281 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1283 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1284 * backwards compat reasons
1286 int master_key_length;
1288 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1289 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1290 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1292 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)
1293 && master_key_length > 0) {
1294 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1296 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1297 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1301 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1303 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1308 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1309 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1310 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1314 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1315 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1316 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1317 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1318 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1323 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1324 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1325 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1327 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1329 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1330 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1331 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1333 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1334 /* Can't disable compression */
1335 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1337 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1340 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1341 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1342 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1343 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1344 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1348 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1349 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1350 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1353 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1354 for (k = 0; k < clienthello.compressions_len; k++) {
1355 if (clienthello.compressions[k] == comp_id)
1358 if (k >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
1359 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1361 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1366 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1367 /* See if we have a match */
1368 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1371 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1372 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1373 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1375 for (o = 0; o < clienthello.compressions_len; o++) {
1376 if (v == clienthello.compressions[o]) {
1385 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1391 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1392 * using compression.
1394 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1395 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1401 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1405 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1406 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1408 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1410 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1411 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1412 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1413 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1414 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1418 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1419 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1424 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1425 OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
1426 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1428 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1430 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1432 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1433 OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
1435 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1438 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1440 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1441 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1443 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1445 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1446 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1447 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1449 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1450 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1451 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1455 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1458 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1461 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1463 if (cipher == NULL) {
1464 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1465 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1468 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1469 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1470 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1471 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1472 ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1473 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1474 /* do not send a session ticket */
1475 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1477 /* Session-id reuse */
1478 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1481 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1482 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1483 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1489 * we now have the following setup.
1491 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1492 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1493 * compression - basically ignored right now
1494 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1495 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1496 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1497 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1500 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1501 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1502 if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) {
1503 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1504 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1511 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1512 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1514 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1516 * callback indicates further work to be done
1518 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1521 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1523 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1524 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1526 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1528 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1530 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1531 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1538 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1540 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1541 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1545 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1547 int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1550 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
1551 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
1552 ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version)
1554 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1555 * tls_process_client_hello()
1557 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1558 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1563 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1564 * back in the server hello:
1565 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1566 * we send back the old session ID.
1567 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1568 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1569 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1570 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1572 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1573 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1574 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1575 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1578 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1579 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1581 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1583 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1584 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1585 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1589 /* set up the compression method */
1590 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1593 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1596 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1599 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl)
1600 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
1601 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm)
1602 || !ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s)
1603 || !ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al)) {
1604 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1610 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1614 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1616 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
1617 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1618 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1625 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1627 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1628 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
1630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1631 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1632 size_t encodedlen = 0;
1636 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1637 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
1640 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1641 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
1643 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
1644 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1648 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1649 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1653 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1655 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1656 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1657 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1658 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1660 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1661 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1662 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1663 CERT *cert = s->cert;
1665 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
1668 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1669 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1670 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
1671 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
1673 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1674 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1677 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
1680 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
1682 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1683 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
1684 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1687 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1692 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
1693 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1694 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1695 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1698 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1699 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
1700 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1702 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1705 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1706 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1707 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1711 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
1713 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1718 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
1720 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1723 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
1724 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
1727 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1728 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1731 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1732 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1733 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1737 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1738 nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1739 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
1740 if (curve_id == 0) {
1741 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1742 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1745 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
1746 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
1747 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1752 /* Encode the public key. */
1753 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
1755 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1756 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1761 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1762 * can set these to NULLs
1769 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1770 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1771 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1772 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1773 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1774 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1775 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1776 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1779 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1780 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1781 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1782 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1786 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1787 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1788 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1792 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1793 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
1794 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1796 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1804 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1805 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
1806 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1809 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
1810 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
1812 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
1813 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
1815 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1816 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1822 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1823 unsigned char *binval;
1826 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1827 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1828 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
1831 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
1834 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1835 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1839 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1841 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
1842 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
1845 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
1846 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
1849 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
1850 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1851 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1854 memset(binval, 0, len);
1858 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
1859 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1860 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1861 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1865 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
1868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1869 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1871 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
1872 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1873 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
1876 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
1877 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1878 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
1879 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
1880 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1881 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1884 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1885 encodedPoint = NULL;
1892 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1893 * points to the space at the end.
1896 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
1897 unsigned int siglen;
1899 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
1900 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
1901 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1902 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1905 /* send signature algorithm */
1906 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1907 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) {
1908 /* Should never happen */
1909 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1910 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1915 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1918 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
1919 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
1920 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
1923 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey),
1925 || EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1926 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1927 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1928 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1929 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1930 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
1932 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, pkey) <= 0
1933 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
1934 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
1935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1936 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1940 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1941 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1942 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1943 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1948 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1951 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1953 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1954 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1956 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1957 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1959 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1963 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1966 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
1968 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1969 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1970 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt)
1971 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1976 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1977 const unsigned char *psigs;
1978 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
1979 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1980 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
1981 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1983 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1988 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
1989 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1994 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1996 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
1997 unsigned char *namebytes;
1998 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2002 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2003 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2005 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2006 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2007 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2012 /* else no CA names */
2014 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2015 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2019 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2023 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2027 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2029 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2030 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2032 PACKET psk_identity;
2034 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2035 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2036 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2039 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2040 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2041 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2044 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2045 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2046 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2050 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2051 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2052 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2056 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2059 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2060 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2061 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2063 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2065 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2067 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2068 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2069 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2073 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2074 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2075 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2077 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2078 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2079 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2083 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2087 /* Should never happen */
2088 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2089 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2094 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2097 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2099 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2100 size_t j, padding_len;
2101 PACKET enc_premaster;
2103 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2106 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
2108 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2109 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2113 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2114 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2115 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2117 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2118 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2119 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2120 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2126 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2127 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2128 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2129 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2131 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2132 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2133 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2137 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2138 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2139 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2140 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2145 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2146 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2147 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2148 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2149 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2152 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2156 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2157 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2159 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2160 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2161 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2162 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2163 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2166 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2169 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2170 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2171 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2173 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2174 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2175 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2179 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2180 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2181 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2182 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2183 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2185 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2188 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2189 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2190 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2191 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2192 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2193 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2196 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2197 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2199 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2200 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2203 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2204 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2205 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2206 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2207 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2208 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2211 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2212 unsigned char workaround_good;
2213 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2214 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2216 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2217 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2218 version_good |= workaround_good;
2222 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2223 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2225 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2228 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2229 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2230 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2231 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2233 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2234 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2235 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2236 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2237 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2240 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2241 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2242 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2243 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2249 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2252 /* Should never happen */
2253 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2254 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2259 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2262 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2266 const unsigned char *data;
2267 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2270 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2271 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2272 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2273 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2276 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2278 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2279 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2283 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2284 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2285 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2288 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2289 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2290 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2291 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2294 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2295 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2296 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2299 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2300 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2302 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2303 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2304 if (pub_key != NULL)
2309 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2310 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2311 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2316 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2317 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2319 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2322 /* Should never happen */
2323 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2324 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2329 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2332 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2333 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2336 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2337 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2338 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2339 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2343 const unsigned char *data;
2346 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2347 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2350 /* Get encoded point length */
2351 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2352 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2353 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2357 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2358 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2359 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2362 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
2363 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2364 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2369 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2370 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2371 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2376 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2377 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2379 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2383 /* Should never happen */
2384 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2385 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2390 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2394 const unsigned char *data;
2396 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2397 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2398 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2399 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2402 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2403 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2406 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2407 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2408 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2411 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2412 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2413 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2414 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2418 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2419 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2425 /* Should never happen */
2426 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2432 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2434 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2435 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2436 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2437 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2438 const unsigned char *start;
2439 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2440 unsigned long alg_a;
2443 size_t sess_key_len;
2444 const unsigned char *data;
2447 /* Get our certificate private key */
2448 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2449 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2451 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2453 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2455 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2458 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2460 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2461 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2464 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2465 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2466 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2467 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2470 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2471 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2472 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2476 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2477 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2478 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2479 * client certificate for authorization only.
2481 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2482 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2483 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2486 /* Decrypt session key */
2487 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2488 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
2489 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2490 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2493 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2494 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2495 &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2496 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2497 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2498 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2503 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2504 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2505 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2506 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2509 /* Generate master secret */
2510 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2511 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2512 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2516 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2517 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2518 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2519 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2523 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2526 /* Should never happen */
2527 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2533 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2536 unsigned long alg_k;
2538 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2540 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2541 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2544 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2545 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2546 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2547 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2548 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2549 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2552 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2553 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2554 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2555 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2558 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2559 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2561 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2562 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2564 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2565 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2567 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2568 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2570 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2571 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2574 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2575 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2576 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2580 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2583 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2584 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2585 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2586 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2588 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2589 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2592 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2594 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2595 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2596 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2597 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2598 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2600 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2603 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2604 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2606 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2607 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2608 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
2610 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2614 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2615 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2620 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
2622 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2623 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2625 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2626 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
2627 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
2628 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
2629 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
2630 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2631 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2632 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
2635 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
2639 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
2641 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
2642 * the handshake_buffer
2644 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2645 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2648 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2650 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2651 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2652 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2653 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2657 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2658 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2660 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
2661 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2666 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2669 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2671 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2672 const unsigned char *sig, *data;
2673 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2674 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
2676 int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2680 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2684 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2687 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2688 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2692 peer = s->session->peer;
2693 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
2694 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2696 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2697 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
2698 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2699 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2703 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2705 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2706 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
2708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2709 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
2710 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2715 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2718 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
2719 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2722 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
2724 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2726 } else if (rv == 0) {
2727 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2731 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2734 /* Use default digest for this key type */
2735 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
2737 md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
2739 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2744 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2746 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2750 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2751 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
2752 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
2753 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2754 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2757 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2759 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2763 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2764 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2765 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2766 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2770 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2772 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2773 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2774 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2775 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2780 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2781 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2782 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2783 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
2784 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2786 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2789 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
2795 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2796 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2797 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
2798 s->session->master_key)) {
2799 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2800 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2804 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
2805 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2806 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2810 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2813 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2814 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2816 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2817 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2818 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2820 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
2825 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2827 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2829 unsigned long l, llen;
2830 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
2831 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
2834 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2839 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
2840 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
2841 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2842 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2843 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2847 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
2848 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
2849 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
2850 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2851 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2852 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2856 certstart = certbytes;
2857 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
2859 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2862 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
2863 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2864 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2865 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2868 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
2869 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2875 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
2876 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2877 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2878 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2879 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2880 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2883 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2884 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2885 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2887 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2888 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2891 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
2892 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2897 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
2899 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2900 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2901 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
2905 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
2906 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2909 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
2911 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2912 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2913 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
2918 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2919 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
2920 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2922 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
2923 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
2925 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
2926 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
2929 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2933 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2934 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2937 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
2941 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2945 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2951 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
2952 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2959 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2961 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
2962 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
2963 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2964 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
2965 const unsigned char *const_p;
2966 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
2969 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2970 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2971 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
2973 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
2975 /* get session encoding length */
2976 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2978 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
2981 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
2982 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2985 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
2987 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2991 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2992 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2993 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
2994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2999 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3003 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3006 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3009 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3011 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3012 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3013 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3017 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3018 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3021 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3024 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3025 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3027 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3028 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3029 int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3034 /* Put timeout and length */
3035 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3036 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3037 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3038 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3042 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3043 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3048 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3050 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3052 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3053 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
3055 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3056 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3058 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3059 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3060 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3062 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3063 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));
3067 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3068 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3069 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3071 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3072 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3073 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3074 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3075 /* Output key name */
3076 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3078 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3079 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3081 /* Encrypt session data */
3082 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3083 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3084 || encdata1 != encdata2
3085 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3086 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3087 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3088 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3089 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3090 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3091 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3092 macendoffset - macoffset)
3093 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3094 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3095 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3096 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3097 || macdata1 != macdata2
3098 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3099 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3102 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3103 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3109 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3110 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3111 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3115 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3117 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->tlsext_status_type)
3118 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp,
3119 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3120 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3121 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3128 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3130 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3131 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3133 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3135 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3136 size_t next_proto_len;
3139 * The payload looks like:
3141 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3142 * uint8 padding_len;
3143 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3145 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3146 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3147 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3148 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3152 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) {
3153 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
3157 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3159 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3161 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3162 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3166 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3168 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3169 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3170 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3171 int sslv2format, int *al)
3173 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3174 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3176 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3177 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3179 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3181 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3183 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3185 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3189 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3191 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3192 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3196 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
3197 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3200 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3205 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
3208 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3209 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3210 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3214 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3216 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3217 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3218 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3220 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3223 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3224 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3225 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3226 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3227 if (s->renegotiate) {
3228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3229 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3230 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3233 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3237 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3238 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3239 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3241 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3242 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3245 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
3246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3247 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3248 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3254 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3255 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3257 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3259 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3264 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3265 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3274 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
3275 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);