2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
52 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
53 #include "statem_locl.h"
54 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
55 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
56 #include <openssl/rand.h>
57 #include <openssl/objects.h>
58 #include <openssl/evp.h>
59 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
60 #include <openssl/x509.h>
61 #include <openssl/dh.h>
62 #include <openssl/bn.h>
63 #include <openssl/md5.h>
65 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
66 PACKET *cipher_suites,
67 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
68 int sslv2format, int *al);
71 * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
72 * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
73 * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
74 * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
76 * Valid return values are:
77 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
78 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
80 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
82 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
84 switch(st->hand_state) {
86 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
87 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
88 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
93 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
95 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
96 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
98 * 2) If we did request one then
99 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
101 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
102 * list if we requested a certificate)
104 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
105 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
106 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
107 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
108 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
110 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
111 * not going to accept it because we require a client
114 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
115 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
116 SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE,
117 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
120 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
124 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
127 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
128 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
129 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
136 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
137 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
142 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
144 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
145 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
146 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
147 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
148 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
151 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
152 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
154 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
155 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
156 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
157 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
159 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
163 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
164 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
170 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
171 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
172 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
177 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
178 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
179 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
180 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
181 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
186 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
187 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
196 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
197 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
198 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
204 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
205 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
206 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
215 /* No valid transition found */
216 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
217 SSLerr(SSL_F_READ_STATE_MACHINE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
222 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
224 * Valid return values are:
228 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
230 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
233 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
234 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
235 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
236 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
237 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
240 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)
242 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
245 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
246 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
247 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
248 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
249 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
250 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
253 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
254 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
264 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
266 * Valid return values are:
270 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
273 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
274 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
276 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
277 * during re-negotiation:
279 && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
280 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
282 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
283 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
286 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
288 * ... except when the application insists on
289 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
292 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
293 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
294 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
296 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
299 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
307 * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
308 * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
310 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
312 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
314 switch(st->hand_state) {
316 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */;
317 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
320 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
321 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
322 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
324 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
325 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
326 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
327 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
329 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
330 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
331 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
332 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
334 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
335 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
337 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
338 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
340 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
342 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
343 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
345 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
347 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
348 /* normal PSK or SRP */
349 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
350 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
351 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
352 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
353 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
354 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
357 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
360 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
363 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
364 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
365 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
369 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
370 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
371 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
372 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
376 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
377 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
378 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
379 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
383 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
384 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
385 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
387 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
388 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
390 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
392 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
393 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
394 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
395 } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
396 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
398 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
400 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
402 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
403 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
404 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
406 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
407 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
410 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
412 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
414 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
415 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
416 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
419 /* Shouldn't happen */
420 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
425 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
426 * the server to the client.
428 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
430 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
432 switch(st->hand_state) {
433 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
436 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
439 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
441 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
442 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
443 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
448 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
449 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
451 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
452 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
458 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
459 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
460 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
461 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
463 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
465 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
466 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
468 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
469 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
475 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
476 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
477 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
478 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
481 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
483 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
484 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
485 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
486 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
490 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
493 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
496 /* No pre work to be done */
500 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
504 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
505 * server to the client.
507 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
509 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
513 switch(st->hand_state) {
514 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
515 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
517 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
518 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
523 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
524 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
526 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
527 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
528 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
532 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
533 * treat like it was the first packet
538 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
540 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
541 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
542 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
545 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
548 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
549 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
551 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
552 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
553 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
554 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
558 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
559 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
564 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
566 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
568 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
571 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
575 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
576 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
577 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
582 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
585 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
586 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
590 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
591 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
593 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
594 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
596 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
599 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
606 /* No post work to be done */
610 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
614 * Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client.
616 * Valid return values are:
620 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s)
622 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
624 switch(st->hand_state) {
625 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
626 return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s);
628 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
629 return tls_construct_hello_request(s);
631 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
632 return tls_construct_server_hello(s);
635 return tls_construct_server_certificate(s);
637 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
638 return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s);
640 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
641 return tls_construct_certificate_request(s);
643 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
644 return tls_construct_server_done(s);
646 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
647 return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s);
649 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
650 return tls_construct_cert_status(s);
652 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
654 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
656 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
658 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
659 return tls_construct_finished(s,
661 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
663 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
666 /* Shouldn't happen */
674 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
675 * calculated as follows:
677 * 2 + # client_version
678 * 32 + # only valid length for random
679 * 1 + # length of session_id
680 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
681 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
682 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
683 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
684 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
685 * 2 + # length of extensions
686 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
688 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
690 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
691 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
694 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
695 * reading. Excludes the message header.
697 unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
699 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
701 switch(st->hand_state) {
702 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
703 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
706 return s->max_cert_list;
708 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
709 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
711 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
712 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
714 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
715 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
716 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
719 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
720 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
722 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
723 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
726 /* Shouldn't happen */
734 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
736 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
738 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
740 switch(st->hand_state) {
741 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
742 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
745 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
747 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
748 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
750 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
751 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
753 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
754 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
755 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
758 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
759 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
761 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
762 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
765 /* Shouldn't happen */
769 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
773 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
776 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
778 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
780 switch(st->hand_state) {
781 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
782 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
784 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
785 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
787 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
788 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
789 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
790 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
791 /* Are we renegotiating? */
793 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
794 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
795 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
796 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
797 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
798 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
801 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
804 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
810 /* Shouldn't happen */
814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
815 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
817 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
819 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
821 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
822 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
823 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
825 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
829 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
831 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
838 int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s)
840 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
841 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
842 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
849 unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf,
850 unsigned char *cookie,
851 unsigned char cookie_len)
853 unsigned int msg_len;
857 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
858 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
859 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xFF;
861 *(p++) = (unsigned char)cookie_len;
862 memcpy(p, cookie, cookie_len);
869 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
874 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
876 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
877 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
878 &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 ||
879 s->d1->cookie_len > 255) {
880 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
881 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
882 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
886 len = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH],
887 s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
889 dtls1_set_message_header(s, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, len, 0,
891 len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
893 /* number of bytes to write */
900 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
902 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
903 unsigned int j, complen = 0;
906 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
907 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
909 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
911 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
912 PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
914 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
916 is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
918 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
919 /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
921 unsigned int version;
924 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
925 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
926 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
927 * the rest right through. Its format is:
929 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
930 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
932 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
933 * 7-8 session_id_length
934 * 9-10 challenge_length
938 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
939 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
941 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
942 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
945 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
949 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)) {
950 /* No protocol version supplied! */
951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
954 if (version == 0x0002) {
955 /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
958 } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
960 s->client_version = version;
962 /* No idea what protocol this is */
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
968 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
969 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
971 if(!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
972 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
979 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
980 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
982 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
983 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
984 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
985 DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->client_version, s->version)) {
986 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
993 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
995 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
998 s->version = s->client_version;
1000 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1004 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1007 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1008 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1009 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
1011 unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1014 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len)
1015 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1016 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1017 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1018 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1019 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1023 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1024 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1029 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
1030 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
1031 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1032 /* No extensions. */
1033 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1035 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1036 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1040 /* Load the client random and compression list. */
1041 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
1043 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1044 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1045 s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1046 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1047 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1048 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1050 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1054 PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
1056 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1057 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1058 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1059 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1060 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1064 if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1065 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1070 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1071 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1072 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1077 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1078 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1079 * So check cookie length...
1081 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1082 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)
1087 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites)
1088 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1089 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1090 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1093 /* Could be empty. */
1097 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1098 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1099 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1100 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1101 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
1102 PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) == 0) {
1103 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1105 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1107 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1109 /* default verification */
1110 } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1111 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1112 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1113 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1116 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1118 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1119 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s);
1120 if (protverr != 0) {
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1122 s->version = s->client_version;
1123 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1132 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1133 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1135 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1136 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1137 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1138 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1139 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1140 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1141 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1142 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1143 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1144 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1149 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1150 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1153 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);
1155 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1157 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1158 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1159 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1160 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1161 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1163 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1164 /* previous session */
1166 } else if (i == -1) {
1170 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1175 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),
1176 is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {
1180 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1183 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1186 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1187 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1189 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1190 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1192 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1193 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1202 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1205 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1207 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1212 complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
1213 for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
1214 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
1220 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1221 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1225 /* TLS extensions */
1226 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1227 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1234 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1235 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1236 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1237 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1241 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1242 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1247 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1248 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1250 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1251 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1252 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1254 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1256 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1257 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1261 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1263 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1268 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1269 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1270 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1274 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1275 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1276 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1277 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1278 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1283 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1284 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1285 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1287 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1288 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1289 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1290 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1291 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1293 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1294 /* Can't disable compression */
1295 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1296 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1297 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1300 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1301 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1302 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1303 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1304 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1308 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1310 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1313 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1314 for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
1315 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)
1319 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1321 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1326 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1327 /* See if we have a match */
1328 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1331 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1332 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1333 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1335 for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
1336 if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {
1345 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1351 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1352 * using compression.
1354 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1355 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1361 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1365 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1366 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1368 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1370 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1371 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1372 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1373 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1374 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1378 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1379 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1384 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1385 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1387 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1389 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1391 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1392 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1396 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1398 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1399 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1401 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1403 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1404 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1405 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1407 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1408 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1412 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1415 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1417 cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1419 if (cipher == NULL) {
1420 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1423 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1424 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1425 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1426 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1427 ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1428 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1429 /* do not send a session ticket */
1430 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1432 /* Session-id reuse */
1433 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1436 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1437 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1438 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1444 * we now have the following setup.
1446 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1447 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1448 * compression - basically ignored right now
1449 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1450 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1451 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1452 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1455 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1456 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1457 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1458 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1459 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1466 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1467 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1469 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1471 * callback indicates further work to be done
1473 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1476 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1478 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1479 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1481 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1483 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1490 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1492 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1493 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1497 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s)
1500 unsigned char *p, *d;
1505 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1507 /* Do the message type and length last */
1508 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1510 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1511 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1514 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1515 * tls_process_client_hello()
1517 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1518 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1521 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1522 * back in the server hello:
1523 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1524 * we send back the old session ID.
1525 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1526 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1527 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1528 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1530 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1531 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1532 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1533 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1536 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1537 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1539 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1541 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1542 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1543 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1544 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1548 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1551 /* put the cipher */
1552 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1555 /* put the compression method */
1556 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1559 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1562 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1565 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1566 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1567 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1571 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1573 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1574 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1575 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1581 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
1582 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1583 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1590 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s)
1592 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
1593 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1594 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1598 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
1599 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1600 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1607 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1610 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
1612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1613 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1618 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1619 unsigned char *p, *d;
1626 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1628 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1629 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1630 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1634 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1638 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1640 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1641 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1643 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1646 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
1647 n += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1649 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1650 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1652 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1653 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1654 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1655 CERT *cert = s->cert;
1657 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
1660 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1661 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1662 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
1663 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
1665 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1667 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1670 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
1673 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
1675 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1676 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
1677 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
1679 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1680 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1681 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1686 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
1687 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1689 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1692 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1693 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
1694 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1696 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1699 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1701 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1705 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp, NID_undef);
1707 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1708 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1712 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
1714 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1717 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
1718 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
1721 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1722 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1725 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
1726 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1727 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1731 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1732 nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1733 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
1734 if (curve_id == 0) {
1735 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1736 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1739 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(NULL, nid);
1740 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
1741 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
1742 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1743 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1747 /* Encode the public key. */
1748 encodedlen = EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->s3->tmp.pkey),
1749 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1750 &encodedPoint, NULL);
1752 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1753 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1758 * We only support named (not generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key
1759 * exchanges. In this situation, we need four additional bytes to
1760 * encode the entire ServerECDHParams structure.
1762 n += 4 + encodedlen;
1765 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1766 * can set these to NULLs
1773 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1775 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1776 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1777 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1778 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1780 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1783 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1784 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1785 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1786 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1790 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1791 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1792 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1795 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1796 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1797 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1798 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1805 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1806 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
1807 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1809 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1812 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1813 /* Allow space for signature algorithm */
1814 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1816 /* Allow space for signature length */
1823 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1824 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1827 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1830 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1831 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1832 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) {
1833 s2n(strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint), p);
1834 strncpy((char *)p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
1835 strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint));
1836 p += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1843 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1844 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1845 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
1855 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1856 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1858 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
1859 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
1860 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
1861 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
1863 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1871 memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1872 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1873 encodedPoint = NULL;
1881 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
1882 * points to the space at the end.
1885 /* send signature algorithm */
1886 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1887 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1888 /* Should never happen */
1889 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1890 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1891 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1897 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1899 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1900 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1901 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1902 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1903 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1904 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
1905 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, &(p[2]),
1906 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {
1907 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
1908 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1913 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1916 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1917 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1918 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1919 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1924 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
1925 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1930 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1933 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1935 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1936 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
1938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1939 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1941 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1942 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1946 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1948 unsigned char *p, *d;
1949 int i, j, nl, off, n;
1950 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
1956 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1958 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1960 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
1965 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1966 const unsigned char *psigs;
1967 unsigned char *etmp = p;
1968 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
1969 /* Skip over length for now */
1971 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
1972 /* Now fill in length */
1982 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1985 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
1986 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
1987 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
1988 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
1989 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
1990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1994 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
1996 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2001 /* else no CA names */
2002 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2005 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
2006 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2010 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2014 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2018 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2020 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2021 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2023 PACKET psk_identity;
2025 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2026 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2027 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2030 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2031 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2032 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2035 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2036 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2037 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2038 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2042 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2043 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2048 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2051 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2052 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2053 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2055 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2057 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2059 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2060 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2061 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2065 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2066 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2067 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2069 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2070 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2071 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2075 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2079 /* Should never happen */
2080 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2081 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2087 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2089 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2090 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2092 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2093 size_t j, padding_len;
2094 PACKET enc_premaster;
2096 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2099 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
2101 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2102 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2106 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2107 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2108 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2110 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2111 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2112 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2113 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2119 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2120 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2121 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2122 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2124 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2125 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2126 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2130 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2131 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2132 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2133 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2138 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2139 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2140 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2141 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2142 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2145 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2146 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2150 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2151 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2153 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2154 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2155 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2156 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2159 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2162 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2163 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2164 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2166 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2167 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2172 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2173 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2174 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2175 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2176 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2178 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2181 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2182 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2183 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2184 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2185 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2186 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2189 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2190 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2192 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2193 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2196 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2197 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2198 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2199 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2200 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2201 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2204 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2205 unsigned char workaround_good;
2206 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2207 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2209 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2210 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2211 version_good |= workaround_good;
2215 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2216 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2218 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2221 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2222 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2223 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2224 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2226 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2227 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2228 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2229 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2230 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2233 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2234 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2235 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2236 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2242 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2245 /* Should never happen */
2246 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2247 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2252 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2255 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2259 const unsigned char *data;
2260 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2263 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)) {
2264 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2266 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2269 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2270 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2271 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2274 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2276 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2281 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2282 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2283 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2286 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2287 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2288 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2289 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2292 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2293 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2294 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2297 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2298 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2300 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2301 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2302 if (pub_key != NULL)
2307 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2308 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2309 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2314 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2315 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2317 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2320 /* Should never happen */
2321 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2322 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2327 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2330 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2331 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2334 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2335 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2336 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2337 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2341 const unsigned char *data;
2344 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2345 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2348 /* Get encoded point length */
2349 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i)) {
2350 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2354 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2355 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2356 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2359 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2360 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2361 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2364 if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey), data, i,
2366 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2371 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) {
2372 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2373 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2378 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2379 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2381 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2385 /* Should never happen */
2386 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2392 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2394 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2396 const unsigned char *data;
2398 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2399 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2400 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2401 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2404 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2405 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2408 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2409 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2410 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2411 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2414 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2415 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2416 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2417 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2421 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2422 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2428 /* Should never happen */
2429 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2430 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2435 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2437 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2438 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2439 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2440 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2441 const unsigned char *start;
2442 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2443 unsigned long alg_a;
2447 const unsigned char *data;
2450 /* Get our certificate private key */
2451 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2452 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2454 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2456 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2458 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2461 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2463 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2464 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2467 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2468 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2469 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2470 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2473 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2474 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2475 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2479 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2480 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2481 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2482 * client certificate for authorization only.
2484 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2485 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2486 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2489 /* Decrypt session key */
2490 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2491 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
2492 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2493 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2496 if (ASN1_get_object ((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2497 &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2498 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2499 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2500 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2501 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2506 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2507 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2508 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2509 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2512 /* Generate master secret */
2513 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2514 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2515 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2516 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2519 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2520 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2521 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2522 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2526 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2529 /* Should never happen */
2530 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2536 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2539 unsigned long alg_k;
2541 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2543 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2544 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2547 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2548 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2549 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2550 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2551 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2554 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2555 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2556 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2557 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2560 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2561 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2563 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2564 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2566 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2567 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2569 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2570 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2572 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2573 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2576 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2577 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2581 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2584 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2586 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2587 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2589 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2590 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2593 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2595 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2596 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2597 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2598 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2599 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2601 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2604 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2605 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2607 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2608 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2609 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
2610 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2614 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2615 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2620 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
2622 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2623 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2625 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2626 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
2627 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
2628 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
2629 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
2630 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2631 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2632 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
2635 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
2639 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
2640 /* No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need the
2643 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2644 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2647 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2649 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2650 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2651 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2652 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2656 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2657 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2659 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
2660 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2665 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2668 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2670 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2671 const unsigned char *sig, *data;
2672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2673 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
2675 int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2679 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2683 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2686 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2687 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2691 peer = s->session->peer;
2692 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
2693 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2695 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2696 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
2697 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2698 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2702 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2704 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2705 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
2707 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2708 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
2709 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2714 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2717 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
2718 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2721 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
2723 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2725 } else if (rv == 0) {
2726 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2730 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2733 /* Use default digest for this key type */
2734 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
2736 md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
2738 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2743 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
2744 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2745 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2749 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2750 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
2751 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
2752 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2753 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2756 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
2757 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2758 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2762 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2763 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2765 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2769 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2771 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2772 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2773 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2774 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2780 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2781 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2782 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2783 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
2784 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2786 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2789 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
2795 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2796 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2797 s->session->master_key_length,
2798 s->session->master_key)) {
2799 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2800 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2804 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
2805 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2806 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2810 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2813 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2814 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2816 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2817 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2818 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2820 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
2825 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2827 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2829 unsigned long l, llen;
2830 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
2831 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
2834 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2839 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
2840 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
2841 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2842 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2843 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2847 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
2848 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
2849 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
2850 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2851 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2852 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2856 certstart = certbytes;
2857 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
2859 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2862 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
2863 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2864 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2865 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2868 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
2869 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2875 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
2876 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2877 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2878 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2879 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2880 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2883 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2884 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2885 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2887 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2888 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2891 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
2892 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2897 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
2899 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2900 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2901 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
2905 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
2906 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2909 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
2911 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2912 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2913 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
2918 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2919 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
2920 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2922 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
2923 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
2925 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
2926 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
2929 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2933 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2934 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2937 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
2941 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2945 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
2947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2948 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2952 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
2953 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2954 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2961 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
2963 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
2964 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
2965 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
2966 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
2967 const unsigned char *const_p;
2968 int len, slen_full, slen;
2971 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2972 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2973 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
2976 /* get session encoding length */
2977 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2979 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
2982 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
2983 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2986 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
2988 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2992 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
2993 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
2996 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3000 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3003 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3006 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3008 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3009 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3010 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3014 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3015 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3018 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3021 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3022 * follows handshake_header_length +
3023 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3024 * sizeof(keyname) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3025 * max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) +
3026 * max_md_size (HMAC) + session_length.
3028 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3029 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 6 + sizeof(key_name) +
3030 EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3031 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3034 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3036 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3037 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3039 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3040 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3041 int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3045 l2n(0, p); /* timeout */
3046 s2n(0, p); /* length */
3047 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, p - ssl_handshake_start(s)))
3050 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3051 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3056 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3058 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3060 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3061 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
3063 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3064 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3066 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3067 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3068 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3070 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3071 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));
3075 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3076 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3077 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3079 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3081 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3083 /* Output key name */
3085 memcpy(p, key_name, sizeof(key_name));
3086 p += sizeof(key_name);
3088 memcpy(p, iv, iv_len);
3090 /* Encrypt session data */
3091 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3094 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, p, &len))
3098 if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3100 if (!HMAC_Final(hctx, p, &hlen))
3103 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3104 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3109 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3111 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3112 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3113 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3115 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
3122 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3123 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3124 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3128 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s)
3132 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3133 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3134 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3137 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3138 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3142 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3145 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3146 /* message length */
3147 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3149 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3150 /* length of OCSP response */
3151 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3152 /* actual response */
3153 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3154 /* number of bytes to write */
3155 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3163 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3164 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3166 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3168 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3169 size_t next_proto_len;
3172 * The payload looks like:
3174 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3175 * uint8 padding_len;
3176 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3178 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3179 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3180 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3181 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3185 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated,
3187 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
3191 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3193 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3195 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3196 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3200 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3202 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3203 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3204 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3205 int sslv2format, int *al
3208 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3209 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3211 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3212 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3214 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3216 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3218 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3220 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3224 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3226 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3227 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3231 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
3232 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3235 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3240 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
3243 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3244 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3245 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3249 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3251 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3252 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3253 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3255 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3258 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3259 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3260 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3261 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3262 if (s->renegotiate) {
3263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3264 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3265 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3268 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3272 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3273 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3274 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3276 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3277 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3280 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
3281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3282 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3283 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3289 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3290 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3292 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3293 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3294 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3299 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3300 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3309 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
3310 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);