2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
65 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
66 PACKET *cipher_suites,
68 **skp, int sslv2format,
72 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
73 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
74 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
75 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
77 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
78 * (transition not allowed)
80 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
82 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
85 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
86 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
90 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
91 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
92 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
94 switch (st->hand_state) {
98 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
99 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
100 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
101 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
105 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
106 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
113 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
114 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
115 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
119 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
120 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
126 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
127 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
128 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
134 /* No valid transition found */
135 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
136 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_READ_TRANSITION,
137 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
142 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
143 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
144 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
145 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
147 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
148 * (transition not allowed)
150 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
152 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
154 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
155 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
160 switch (st->hand_state) {
165 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
166 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
167 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
172 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
174 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
175 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
177 * 2) If we did request one then
178 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
180 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
181 * list if we requested a certificate)
183 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
184 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
185 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
186 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
187 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
189 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
190 * not going to accept it because we require a client
193 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
194 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
195 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
196 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
199 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
203 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
206 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
207 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
208 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
215 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
216 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
221 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
223 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
224 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
225 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
226 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
227 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
230 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
231 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
233 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
234 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
235 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
236 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
238 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
242 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
243 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
249 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
250 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
251 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
256 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
257 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
258 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
259 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
260 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
265 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
266 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
275 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
276 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
277 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
283 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
284 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
285 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
292 /* No valid transition found */
293 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
294 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
299 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
301 * Valid return values are:
305 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
307 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
310 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
311 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
312 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
313 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
314 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
317 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
319 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
322 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
323 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
324 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
325 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
326 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
327 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
330 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
331 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
341 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
343 * Valid return values are:
347 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
350 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
351 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
353 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
354 * during re-negotiation:
356 && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
357 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
359 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
360 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
363 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
365 * ... except when the application insists on
366 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
369 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
370 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
371 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
373 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
376 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
384 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
385 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
388 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
390 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
393 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
394 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
398 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
399 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
402 switch (st->hand_state) {
404 /* Shouldn't happen */
405 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
407 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
408 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
409 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
411 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
412 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
413 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
415 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
417 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
418 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
419 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
421 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
426 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
427 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
430 st->hand_state = s->tlsext_status_expected ? TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS
431 : TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
432 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
434 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
435 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
436 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
438 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
439 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
441 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
442 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
443 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
444 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
449 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
450 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
452 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
454 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
457 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
458 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
462 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
464 switch (st->hand_state) {
466 /* Shouldn't happen */
467 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
470 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
471 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
474 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
475 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
476 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
478 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
479 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
480 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
481 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
483 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
484 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
485 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
486 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
488 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
489 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
491 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
492 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
494 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
496 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
497 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
499 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
501 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
502 /* normal PSK or SRP */
503 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
504 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
505 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
506 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
507 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
508 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
509 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
511 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
514 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
517 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
518 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
519 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
523 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
524 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
525 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
526 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
530 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
531 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
532 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
533 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
537 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
538 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
539 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
541 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
542 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
544 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
546 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
547 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
548 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
549 } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
550 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
552 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
554 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
556 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
557 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
558 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
560 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
561 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
562 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
564 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
566 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
568 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
569 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
570 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
575 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
576 * the server to the client.
578 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
580 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
582 switch (st->hand_state) {
584 /* No pre work to be done */
587 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
590 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
593 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
595 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
596 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
597 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
602 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
603 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
605 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
606 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
612 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
614 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
615 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
617 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
619 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
620 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
622 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
623 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
629 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
630 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
631 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
632 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
635 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
637 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
638 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
639 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
640 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
644 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
647 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
650 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
654 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
655 * server to the client.
657 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
659 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
663 switch (st->hand_state) {
665 /* No post work to be done */
668 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
669 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
671 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
672 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
677 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
678 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
680 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
681 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
682 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
686 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
687 * treat like it was the first packet
692 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
693 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
694 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
695 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
696 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
699 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
702 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
703 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
705 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
706 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
707 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
709 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
713 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
714 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
718 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
719 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
720 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
721 * something clever in the record layer for this.
723 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
724 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
725 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
726 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)
727 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
728 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
733 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
734 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
735 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
737 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
740 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
744 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
745 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
747 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
752 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
755 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
756 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
760 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
761 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
764 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
766 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
769 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
773 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
774 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
775 s->session->master_key, s->handshake_secret, 0,
776 &s->session->master_key_length)
777 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
778 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
784 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
788 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
791 * Valid return values are:
795 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
796 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
798 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
800 switch (st->hand_state) {
802 /* Shouldn't happen */
805 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
807 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
809 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
810 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
813 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
814 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
815 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
818 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
819 /* No construction function needed */
821 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
824 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
825 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
826 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
830 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
831 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
834 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
835 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
836 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
839 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
840 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
841 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
844 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
845 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
846 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
849 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
850 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
851 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
854 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
855 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
856 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
859 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
860 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
861 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
864 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
865 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
866 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
874 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
875 * calculated as follows:
877 * 2 + # client_version
878 * 32 + # only valid length for random
879 * 1 + # length of session_id
880 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
881 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
882 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
883 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
884 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
885 * 2 + # length of extensions
886 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
888 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
890 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
891 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
894 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
895 * reading. Excludes the message header.
897 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
899 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
901 switch (st->hand_state) {
903 /* Shouldn't happen */
906 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
907 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
910 return s->max_cert_list;
912 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
913 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
915 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
916 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
919 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
920 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
923 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
924 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
926 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
927 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
932 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
934 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
936 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
938 switch (st->hand_state) {
940 /* Shouldn't happen */
941 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
943 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
944 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
947 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
949 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
950 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
952 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
953 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
955 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
956 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
957 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
960 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
961 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
963 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
964 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
969 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
972 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
974 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
976 switch (st->hand_state) {
978 /* Shouldn't happen */
981 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
982 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
984 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
985 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
987 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
988 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
989 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
990 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
991 /* Are we renegotiating? */
992 && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
993 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
994 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
995 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
996 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
997 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
1000 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
1003 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1005 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1009 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
1011 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
1013 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1015 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1016 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1017 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1019 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1022 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
1023 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
1025 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
1032 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1035 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1036 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1037 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1043 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1045 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1046 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1047 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1048 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1049 cookie_leni > 255) {
1050 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1051 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1054 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1056 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1057 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1058 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1065 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1067 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1068 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1069 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1074 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1075 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1076 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1077 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1079 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1081 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1082 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1083 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1084 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1085 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1086 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1087 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1089 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1090 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1091 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1092 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1093 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1094 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1095 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1096 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1097 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1098 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1099 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1100 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1101 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1103 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1104 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1109 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1111 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1112 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1113 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1117 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1120 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1121 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1123 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1126 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1128 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1130 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1134 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1135 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1136 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1138 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1140 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1141 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1142 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1143 CLIENTHELLO_MSG clienthello;
1146 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1148 memset(&clienthello, 0, sizeof(clienthello));
1149 clienthello.isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1150 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1152 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1156 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1157 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1158 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1159 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1161 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1162 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1164 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1165 * 7-8 session_id_length
1166 * 9-10 challenge_length
1170 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1171 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1173 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1174 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1175 * in the first place
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1182 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello.legacy_version)) {
1183 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1184 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1188 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1189 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1191 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1192 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1193 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1195 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1198 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1199 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1200 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1201 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1202 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1203 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1207 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1208 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1209 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1213 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites,
1215 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.session_id, session_id_len)
1216 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1217 /* No extensions. */
1218 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1220 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1221 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1224 clienthello.session_id_len = session_id_len;
1226 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1227 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello.random) because that is the limit
1228 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1229 * sizeof(clienthello.random) does.
1231 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1232 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1233 memset(clienthello.random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1234 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1235 clienthello.random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1236 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1237 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1238 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1240 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1244 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
1246 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1247 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1248 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1249 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello.session_id,
1250 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1251 &clienthello.session_id_len)) {
1252 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1253 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1257 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1258 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1259 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1263 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
1264 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1265 &clienthello.dtls_cookie_len)) {
1266 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1271 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1272 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1273 * So check cookie length...
1275 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1276 if (clienthello.dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1281 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites)) {
1282 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1283 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1287 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1288 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1289 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1293 /* Could be empty. */
1294 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1295 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
1297 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.extensions)) {
1298 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1305 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello.compressions,
1306 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1307 &clienthello.compressions_len)) {
1308 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1313 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1314 extensions = clienthello.extensions;
1315 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1316 &clienthello.pre_proc_exts, &al)) {
1317 /* SSLerr already been called */
1321 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1323 /* Set up the client_random */
1324 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1326 /* Choose the version */
1328 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1329 if (clienthello.legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1330 || (clienthello.legacy_version & 0xff00)
1331 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1333 * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1340 s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
1343 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1344 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1346 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1347 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
1348 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1349 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello.legacy_version, s->version)) {
1350 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1356 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1357 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
1358 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1359 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
1361 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1365 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1366 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1367 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1368 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1369 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
1370 clienthello.dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1371 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1373 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1375 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1377 /* default verification */
1378 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello.dtls_cookie_len
1379 || memcmp(clienthello.dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1380 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1381 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1382 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1385 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1387 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1388 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
1389 if (protverr != 0) {
1390 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1391 s->version = s->client_version;
1392 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1400 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1401 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1403 clienthello.pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1409 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1410 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1412 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1413 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1414 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1415 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1416 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1417 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1418 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1419 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1420 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1421 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1424 if (clienthello.isv2 ||
1426 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1427 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1430 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &clienthello);
1432 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1434 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1435 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1436 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1437 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1438 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1440 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1441 /* previous session */
1443 } else if (i == -1) {
1447 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1452 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello.ciphersuites, &ciphers,
1453 clienthello.isv2, &al) == NULL) {
1457 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1460 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1463 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1465 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1466 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1468 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1469 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1478 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1481 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1483 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1488 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello.compressions_len; loop++) {
1489 if (clienthello.compressions[loop] == 0)
1493 if (loop >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
1495 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1496 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1500 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1501 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1502 ssl_check_for_safari(s, &clienthello);
1503 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1505 /* TLS extensions */
1506 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1507 clienthello.pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1508 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1512 /* Check we've got a key_share for TLSv1.3 */
1513 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL && !s->hit) {
1514 /* No suitable share */
1515 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Send a HelloRetryRequest */
1516 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1517 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
1522 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1523 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1524 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1525 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1529 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1530 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1535 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1536 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1538 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1539 * backwards compat reasons
1541 int master_key_length;
1543 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1544 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1545 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1547 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)
1548 && master_key_length > 0) {
1549 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1551 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1552 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1556 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1558 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1563 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1564 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1565 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1569 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1570 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1571 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1572 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1573 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1578 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1579 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1580 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1582 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1584 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1585 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1586 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1588 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1589 /* Can't disable compression */
1590 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1592 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1595 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1596 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1597 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1598 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1599 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1603 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1604 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1605 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1608 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1609 for (k = 0; k < clienthello.compressions_len; k++) {
1610 if (clienthello.compressions[k] == comp_id)
1613 if (k >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
1614 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1615 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1616 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1621 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1622 /* See if we have a match */
1623 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1626 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1627 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1628 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1630 for (o = 0; o < clienthello.compressions_len; o++) {
1631 if (v == clienthello.compressions[o]) {
1640 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1646 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1647 * using compression.
1649 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1656 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1660 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1661 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1663 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1665 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1666 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1667 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1668 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1669 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1673 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1674 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1679 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1680 OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
1681 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1683 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1685 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1687 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1688 OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
1690 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1694 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1695 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
1697 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s, int *al)
1699 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1702 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1703 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
1704 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
1705 * influence which certificate is sent
1707 if (s->tlsext_status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
1708 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) {
1710 CERT_PKEY *certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
1712 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1713 if (certpkey != NULL) {
1715 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1716 * et al can pick it up.
1718 s->cert->key = certpkey;
1719 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1721 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1722 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1723 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1725 /* status request response should be sent */
1726 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1727 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1728 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1730 /* something bad happened */
1731 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1733 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1742 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1744 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1745 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1747 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1749 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1750 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1751 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1753 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1755 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1759 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1762 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1765 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1767 if (cipher == NULL) {
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1769 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1772 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1773 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1774 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1775 s->session->not_resumable =
1776 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, ((cipher->algorithm_mkey
1777 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
1779 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1780 /* do not send a session ticket */
1781 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1783 /* Session-id reuse */
1784 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1787 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1788 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1789 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1795 * we now have the following setup.
1797 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1798 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1799 * compression - basically ignored right now
1800 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1801 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1802 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1803 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1807 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
1808 * certificate callbacks etc above.
1810 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s, &al)) {
1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1812 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1818 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1819 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1821 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1823 * callback indicates further work to be done
1825 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1828 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1830 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1831 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1833 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1834 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1835 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1838 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1845 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1847 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1848 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1852 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1854 int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1858 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
1859 version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version;
1860 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
1862 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1863 * tls_process_client_hello()
1865 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1866 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1871 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1872 * back in the server hello:
1873 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1874 * we send back the old session ID.
1875 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1876 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1877 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1878 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1880 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1881 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1882 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1883 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1886 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1887 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1889 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1891 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1892 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1893 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1897 /* set up the compression method */
1898 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1901 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1904 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1907 if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1908 && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl))
1909 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
1910 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1911 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm))
1912 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
1914 ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1915 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO,
1917 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1923 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1927 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1929 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
1930 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1931 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1938 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1940 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1941 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
1943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1944 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1945 size_t encodedlen = 0;
1949 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1950 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
1953 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1954 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
1956 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
1957 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1961 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1966 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1968 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1969 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1970 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1971 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1973 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1974 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1975 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1976 CERT *cert = s->cert;
1978 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
1981 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1982 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1983 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
1984 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
1986 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1987 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1990 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
1993 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
1995 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1996 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
1997 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
1999 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2000 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2005 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2006 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2007 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2008 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2011 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2012 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2013 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2014 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2015 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2018 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2019 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2020 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2024 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2026 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2027 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2031 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2033 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2036 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2037 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2040 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2041 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2044 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2045 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2046 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2050 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2051 nid = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2052 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
2053 if (curve_id == 0) {
2054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2055 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2058 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
2059 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2060 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2061 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2065 /* Encode the public key. */
2066 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2068 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2069 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2074 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2075 * can set these to NULLs
2082 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2084 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2085 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2086 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2087 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2088 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2089 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2092 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2093 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2094 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2095 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2099 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2100 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2101 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2105 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2106 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
2107 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
2109 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2117 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2118 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2119 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2122 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2123 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2125 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2126 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2128 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2129 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2135 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2136 unsigned char *binval;
2139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2140 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2141 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2144 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2147 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2148 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2152 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2154 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2155 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2158 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2159 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2162 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2163 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2164 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2167 memset(binval, 0, len);
2171 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2172 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2173 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2174 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2178 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2182 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2184 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2185 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2186 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2189 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2190 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2191 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2192 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2193 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2194 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2197 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2198 encodedPoint = NULL;
2205 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2206 * points to the space at the end.
2209 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
2210 unsigned int siglen;
2212 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2213 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2214 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2215 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2218 /* send signature algorithm */
2219 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2220 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) {
2221 /* Should never happen */
2222 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2223 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2228 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2231 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2232 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2233 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2236 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey),
2238 || EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
2239 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2240 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2241 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2242 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2243 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2245 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen, pkey) <= 0
2246 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2247 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2248 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2249 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2253 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2254 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2255 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2256 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2261 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2264 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2266 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2267 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2270 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2272 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2276 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2279 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2281 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2282 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2283 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt)
2284 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2285 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2289 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2290 const unsigned char *psigs;
2291 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2292 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2293 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2294 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2295 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2296 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2301 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2302 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2303 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2307 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2309 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2310 unsigned char *namebytes;
2311 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2315 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2316 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2318 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2320 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2325 /* else no CA names */
2327 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2328 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2332 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2336 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2340 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2343 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2345 PACKET psk_identity;
2347 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2348 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2349 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2352 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2353 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2357 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2358 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2359 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2363 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2364 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2365 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2369 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2372 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2373 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2374 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2376 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2378 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2380 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2381 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2382 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2386 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2387 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2388 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2390 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2391 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2392 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2396 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2400 /* Should never happen */
2401 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2402 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2407 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2410 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2412 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2413 size_t j, padding_len;
2414 PACKET enc_premaster;
2416 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2419 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey);
2421 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2422 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2426 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2427 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2428 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2430 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2431 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2432 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2439 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2440 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2441 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2442 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2444 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2445 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2446 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2450 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2451 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2452 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2453 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2458 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2459 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2460 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2461 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2462 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2465 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2469 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2470 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2472 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2473 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2474 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2475 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2476 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2479 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2482 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2483 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2484 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2486 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2487 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2488 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2492 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2493 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2494 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2495 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2496 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2498 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2501 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2502 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2503 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2504 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2505 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2506 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2509 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2510 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2512 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2513 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2516 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2517 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2518 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2519 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2520 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2521 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2524 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2525 unsigned char workaround_good;
2526 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2527 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2529 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2530 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2531 version_good |= workaround_good;
2535 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2536 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2538 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2541 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2542 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2543 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2544 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2546 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2547 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2548 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2549 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2550 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2553 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2554 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2555 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2556 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2562 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2565 /* Should never happen */
2566 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2567 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2572 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2574 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2575 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2579 const unsigned char *data;
2580 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2583 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2584 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2585 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2586 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2589 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2591 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2592 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2596 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2597 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2598 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2601 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2602 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2603 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2604 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2607 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2608 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2609 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2612 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2613 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2615 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2616 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2617 if (pub_key != NULL)
2622 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2623 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2624 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2629 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2630 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2632 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2635 /* Should never happen */
2636 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2637 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2642 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2644 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2645 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2646 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2649 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2650 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2651 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2652 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2656 const unsigned char *data;
2659 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2660 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2663 /* Get encoded point length */
2664 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2665 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2666 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2667 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2670 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2671 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2675 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
2676 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2677 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2682 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2683 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2684 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2689 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2690 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2692 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2696 /* Should never happen */
2697 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2703 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2707 const unsigned char *data;
2709 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2710 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2711 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2715 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2719 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2720 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2724 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2725 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2726 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2731 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2732 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2738 /* Should never happen */
2739 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2740 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2745 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2748 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2749 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2750 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2751 const unsigned char *start;
2752 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2753 unsigned long alg_a;
2756 size_t sess_key_len;
2757 const unsigned char *data;
2760 /* Get our certificate private key */
2761 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2762 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2764 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2766 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2768 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2771 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2773 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2774 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2777 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2778 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2779 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2780 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2783 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2784 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2789 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2790 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2791 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2792 * client certificate for authorization only.
2794 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2795 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2796 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2799 /* Decrypt session key */
2800 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2801 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
2802 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2803 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2806 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2807 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2808 &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2809 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2810 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2811 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2816 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2817 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2818 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2819 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2822 /* Generate master secret */
2823 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2824 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2825 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2826 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2829 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2830 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2831 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2832 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2836 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2839 /* Should never happen */
2840 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2841 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2846 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2849 unsigned long alg_k;
2851 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2853 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2854 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2857 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2858 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2859 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2860 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2861 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2862 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2865 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2866 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2867 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2868 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2871 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2872 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2874 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2875 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2877 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2878 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2880 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2881 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2883 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2884 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2887 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2888 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2889 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2893 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2896 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2897 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2898 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2899 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2901 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2902 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2905 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2907 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2908 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2909 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2910 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2911 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2913 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2916 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2917 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2919 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2920 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2921 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
2923 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2927 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2928 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2933 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
2935 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2936 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2938 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2939 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
2940 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
2941 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
2942 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
2943 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2944 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2945 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
2948 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
2952 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
2954 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
2955 * the handshake_buffer
2957 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2958 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2961 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2963 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2965 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2966 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2970 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2971 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2973 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
2974 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2979 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2982 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2984 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2985 const unsigned char *sig, *data;
2986 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2987 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
2989 int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2993 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2997 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3000 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3001 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3005 peer = s->session->peer;
3006 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
3007 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
3009 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
3011 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
3012 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3016 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
3018 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
3019 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
3021 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3022 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
3023 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3028 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3031 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
3032 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3035 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
3037 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3039 } else if (rv == 0) {
3040 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3044 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3047 /* Use default digest for this key type */
3048 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
3050 md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
3052 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3057 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
3058 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3059 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3063 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3064 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
3065 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
3066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3067 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3070 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
3071 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3072 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3076 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3077 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
3078 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3079 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3084 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3086 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
3087 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
3088 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3089 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3092 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3094 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
3095 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
3096 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
3097 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
3098 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
3099 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3100 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3103 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
3109 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
3110 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
3111 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
3112 s->session->master_key)) {
3113 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3114 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3118 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
3119 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3120 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3124 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3127 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3128 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3130 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3131 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3132 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
3133 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3134 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
3139 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3141 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3143 unsigned long l, llen;
3144 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3145 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3148 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3149 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3153 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
3154 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
3155 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3156 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3157 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3161 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
3162 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3163 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3164 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3165 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3166 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3170 certstart = certbytes;
3171 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3173 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3176 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3177 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3178 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3179 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3182 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3183 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3189 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3190 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3191 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3192 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3193 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3194 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3197 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3198 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3199 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3200 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3201 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3202 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3205 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3206 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3211 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3213 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3214 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3215 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3219 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3220 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3223 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3225 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3226 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3227 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3232 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3233 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3234 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3236 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3237 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3240 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3243 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3244 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3245 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3250 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3251 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3254 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3258 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3259 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3262 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3266 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3270 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3272 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3276 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) {
3277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3284 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3286 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3287 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3288 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3289 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3290 const unsigned char *const_p;
3291 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3294 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3295 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3296 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3298 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3300 /* get session encoding length */
3301 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3303 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3306 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3307 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3310 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3312 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3316 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3317 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3318 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3324 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3328 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3331 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3334 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3336 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3337 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3338 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3342 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3343 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3346 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3349 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3350 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3352 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3353 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3354 int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3359 /* Put timeout and length */
3360 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3361 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3362 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3363 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3367 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3368 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3373 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3375 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3377 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3378 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
3380 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3381 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3383 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
3384 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
3385 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3387 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name,
3388 sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name));
3392 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3393 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3394 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3396 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3397 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3398 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3399 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3400 /* Output key name */
3401 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3403 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3404 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3406 /* Encrypt session data */
3407 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3408 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3409 || encdata1 != encdata2
3410 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3411 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3412 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3413 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3414 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3415 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3416 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3417 macendoffset - macoffset)
3418 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3419 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3420 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3421 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3422 || macdata1 != macdata2
3423 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3424 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3427 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3428 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3434 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3435 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3436 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3440 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3442 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->tlsext_status_type)
3443 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp,
3444 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3445 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3446 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3455 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3456 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3458 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3460 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3461 size_t next_proto_len;
3464 * The payload looks like:
3466 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3467 * uint8 padding_len;
3468 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3470 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3471 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3472 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3473 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3477 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) {
3478 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
3482 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3484 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3486 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3487 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3491 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3496 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we send certificate extensions in with the
3497 * encrypted extensions. Later we need to move these to the certificate
3500 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
3501 | EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3503 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3504 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3505 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3512 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3514 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3515 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3516 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3517 int sslv2format, int *al)
3519 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3520 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3522 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3523 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3525 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3527 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3529 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3531 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3535 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3537 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3538 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3542 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
3543 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3545 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3546 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3551 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
3554 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3555 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3556 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3560 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3562 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3563 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3564 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3566 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3569 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3570 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3571 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3572 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3573 if (s->renegotiate) {
3574 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3575 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3576 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3579 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3583 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3584 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3585 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3587 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3588 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3591 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
3592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3593 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3594 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3600 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3601 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3603 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3604 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3605 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3610 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3611 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3620 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
3621 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);