2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
65 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
68 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
69 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
70 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
71 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
73 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
74 * (transition not allowed)
76 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
78 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
81 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
82 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
83 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
85 switch (st->hand_state) {
89 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
90 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
91 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
96 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
97 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
98 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
99 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
106 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
107 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
108 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
109 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
110 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
114 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
115 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
122 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
123 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
124 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
128 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
129 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
135 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
136 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
137 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
144 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
145 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
147 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
149 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
150 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
156 /* No valid transition found */
161 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
162 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
163 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
164 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
166 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
167 * (transition not allowed)
169 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
171 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
173 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
174 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
179 switch (st->hand_state) {
185 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
186 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
187 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
192 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
194 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
195 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
197 * 2) If we did request one then
198 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
200 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
201 * list if we requested a certificate)
203 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
204 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
205 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
206 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
207 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
209 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
210 * not going to accept it because we require a client
213 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
214 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
215 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
216 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
219 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
223 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
226 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
227 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
228 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
235 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
236 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
241 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
243 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
244 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
245 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
246 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
247 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
250 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
251 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
253 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
254 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
255 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
256 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
258 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
262 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
263 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
269 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
270 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
271 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
276 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
278 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
279 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
280 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
285 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
286 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
289 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
294 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
295 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
296 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
297 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
303 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
304 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
305 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
312 /* No valid transition found */
313 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
314 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
319 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
321 * Valid return values are:
325 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
327 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
330 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
331 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
332 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
333 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
334 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
337 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
339 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
343 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
344 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
345 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
346 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
347 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
350 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
351 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
361 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
363 * Valid return values are:
367 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
370 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
371 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
373 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
374 * during re-negotiation:
376 && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
377 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
379 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
380 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
383 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
385 * ... except when the application insists on
386 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
389 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
390 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
391 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
393 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
396 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
404 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
405 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
408 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
410 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
413 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
414 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
417 switch (st->hand_state) {
419 /* Shouldn't happen */
420 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
423 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
424 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
425 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
427 /* Try to read from the client instead */
428 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
430 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
431 if (s->hello_retry_request)
432 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
435 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
437 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
438 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
440 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
441 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
442 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
444 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
446 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
447 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
448 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
452 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
454 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
455 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
459 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
462 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
463 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
464 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
466 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
467 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
468 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
470 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
471 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
473 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
475 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
476 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
478 * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
479 * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
482 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
483 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
485 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
486 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
487 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
488 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
492 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
493 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
494 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
495 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
500 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
501 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
503 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
505 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
508 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
509 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
513 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
515 switch (st->hand_state) {
517 /* Shouldn't happen */
518 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
521 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
522 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
523 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
524 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
525 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
527 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
528 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
529 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
530 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
535 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
536 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
538 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
539 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
540 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
542 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
543 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
544 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
545 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
547 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
548 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
550 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
551 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
553 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
555 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
556 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
558 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
560 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
561 /* normal PSK or SRP */
562 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
563 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
564 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
565 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
567 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
568 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
570 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
573 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
576 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
577 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
578 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
582 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
583 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
584 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
585 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
589 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
590 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
591 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
592 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
596 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
597 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
598 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
600 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
601 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
603 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
605 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
606 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
607 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
608 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
610 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
612 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
614 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
615 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
616 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
618 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
619 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
620 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
622 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
624 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
626 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
627 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
632 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
633 * the server to the client.
635 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
637 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
639 switch (st->hand_state) {
641 /* No pre work to be done */
644 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
647 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
650 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
652 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
653 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
654 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
659 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
660 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
662 * Messages we write from now on should be buffered and
663 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
669 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
671 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
672 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
674 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
676 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
677 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
679 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
680 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
681 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
683 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0);
684 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
686 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
687 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
693 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
694 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
695 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
696 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
699 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
701 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
702 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
703 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
704 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
708 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
710 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
711 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING)
712 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
716 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
719 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
723 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
724 * server to the client.
726 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
728 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
732 switch (st->hand_state) {
734 /* No post work to be done */
737 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
738 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
742 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
743 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
745 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
746 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
751 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
752 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
754 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
755 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
756 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
760 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
761 * treat like it was the first packet
766 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
767 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
768 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
769 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
770 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
773 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
776 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
777 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
779 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
780 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
781 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
783 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
787 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
788 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
792 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
793 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
794 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
795 * something clever in the record layer for this.
797 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
798 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
799 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
800 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
803 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
804 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
805 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
810 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
811 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
812 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
814 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
817 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
821 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
822 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
824 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
829 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
832 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
833 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
837 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
838 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
841 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
843 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
846 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
850 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
851 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
852 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
853 &s->session->master_key_length)
854 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
855 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
860 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
861 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
863 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
867 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
868 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
873 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
877 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
880 * Valid return values are:
884 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
885 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
887 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
889 switch (st->hand_state) {
891 /* Shouldn't happen */
894 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
896 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
898 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
899 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
902 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
903 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
904 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
907 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
908 /* No construction function needed */
910 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
913 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
914 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
915 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
919 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
920 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
923 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
924 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
925 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
929 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
930 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
931 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
934 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
935 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
936 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
939 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
940 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
941 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
944 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
945 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
946 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
949 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
950 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
951 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
954 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
955 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
956 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
959 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
964 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
965 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
966 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
969 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
970 *confunc = tls_construct_hello_retry_request;
971 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
974 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
975 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
976 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
984 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
985 * calculated as follows:
987 * 2 + # client_version
988 * 32 + # only valid length for random
989 * 1 + # length of session_id
990 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
991 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
992 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
993 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
994 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
995 * 2 + # length of extensions
996 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
998 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1000 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1001 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1004 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1005 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1007 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1009 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1011 switch (st->hand_state) {
1013 /* Shouldn't happen */
1016 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1017 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1019 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1020 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1022 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1023 return s->max_cert_list;
1025 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1026 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1028 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1029 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1031 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1032 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1033 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1036 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1037 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1039 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1040 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1042 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1043 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1048 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1050 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1052 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1054 switch (st->hand_state) {
1056 /* Shouldn't happen */
1057 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1059 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1060 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1062 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1063 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1065 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1066 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1068 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1069 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1071 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1072 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1075 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1076 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1079 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1080 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1082 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1083 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1085 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1086 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1092 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1095 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1097 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1099 switch (st->hand_state) {
1101 /* Shouldn't happen */
1104 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1105 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1107 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1108 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1110 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1113 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1114 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
1116 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
1118 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1120 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1121 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1122 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1124 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1127 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
1128 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
1130 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
1137 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1140 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1141 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1142 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1148 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1150 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1151 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1152 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1153 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1154 cookie_leni > 255) {
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1156 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1159 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1161 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1162 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1163 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1170 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1172 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1173 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1174 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1178 * signature_algorithms (for TLSv1.2 only)
1180 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1181 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1182 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1183 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1185 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1187 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1188 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1189 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1190 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1191 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1192 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1193 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1195 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1196 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1197 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1198 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1199 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1200 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1201 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1202 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1203 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1204 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1205 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1206 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1207 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1209 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1210 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1215 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1217 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1218 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1219 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1223 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1226 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1227 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1229 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1232 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1234 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1236 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1237 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1238 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1239 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1240 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello;
1242 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1243 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1247 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1248 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1254 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1256 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1257 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1259 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1262 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) || s->hello_retry_request) {
1263 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1269 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1270 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1271 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1272 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1274 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1275 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1277 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1278 * 7-8 session_id_length
1279 * 9-10 challenge_length
1283 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1284 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1286 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1287 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1288 * in the first place
1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1295 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1296 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1301 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1302 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1304 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1305 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1306 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1308 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1311 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1312 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1313 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1315 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1316 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1320 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1321 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1322 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1326 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1328 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1329 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1330 /* No extensions. */
1331 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1332 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1333 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1334 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1337 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1339 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1340 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1341 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1342 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1344 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1345 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1346 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1347 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1348 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1349 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1350 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1351 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1352 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1353 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1357 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1359 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1360 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1361 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1362 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1363 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1364 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1365 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1370 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1371 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1372 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1376 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1377 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1378 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1379 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1380 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1384 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1385 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1386 * So check cookie length...
1388 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1389 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1394 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1395 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1396 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1400 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1401 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1402 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1406 /* Could be empty. */
1407 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1408 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1410 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)
1411 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1412 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1419 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1420 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1421 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1422 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1423 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1427 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1428 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1429 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1430 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts, &al,
1431 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len, 1)) {
1432 /* SSLerr already been called */
1435 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1437 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1439 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1441 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1443 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1444 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1446 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1449 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, int *pal)
1452 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1457 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1459 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1460 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1461 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1462 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1463 DOWNGRADE dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1465 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1466 /* Give the early callback a crack at things */
1467 if (s->ctx->early_cb != NULL) {
1469 /* A failure in the early callback terminates the connection. */
1470 code = s->ctx->early_cb(s, &al, s->ctx->early_cb_arg);
1474 s->rwstate = SSL_EARLY_WORK;
1479 /* Set up the client_random */
1480 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1482 /* Choose the version */
1484 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1485 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1486 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1487 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1489 * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
1492 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1496 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1499 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1500 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1502 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1503 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1504 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1505 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1506 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1512 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1513 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1514 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1515 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1517 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1521 /* TLSv1.3 specifies that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1522 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1523 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1525 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1529 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1530 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1531 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1532 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1533 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1534 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1535 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1537 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1539 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1541 /* default verification */
1542 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1543 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1544 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1545 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1546 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1549 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1551 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1552 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello, &dgrd);
1553 if (protverr != 0) {
1554 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1555 s->version = s->client_version;
1556 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1564 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1565 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1566 SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1567 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1573 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1574 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1576 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1577 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1578 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1579 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1580 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1581 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1582 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1583 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1584 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1585 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1588 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1590 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1591 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1594 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello, &al);
1596 /* previous session */
1598 } else if (i == -1) {
1602 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1607 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1608 clienthello->isv2, &al) ||
1609 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1610 clienthello->isv2, &al)) {
1614 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
1615 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1616 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1617 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1618 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1619 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1620 if (s->renegotiate) {
1621 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1622 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1623 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1624 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1627 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1628 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1629 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1631 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1632 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1633 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1634 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1635 * an insecure downgrade.
1637 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1638 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1639 al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
1645 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1648 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1651 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1653 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1654 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1656 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1657 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1666 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1669 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1671 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1676 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1677 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1681 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1683 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1684 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1689 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1690 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1691 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1693 /* TLS extensions */
1694 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1695 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al, 1)) {
1696 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1701 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1702 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1703 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1704 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1708 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1709 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, dgrd) <= 0) {
1714 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1715 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1717 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1718 * backwards compat reasons
1720 int master_key_length;
1722 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1723 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1724 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1726 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1727 && master_key_length > 0) {
1728 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1730 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1731 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1735 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1736 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1737 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1738 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1739 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1740 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1741 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1745 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1746 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1747 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1748 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1749 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1754 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1755 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1756 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1758 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1759 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1761 * We already checked above that the NULL compression method appears in
1762 * the list. Now we check there aren't any others (which is illegal in
1763 * a TLSv1.3 ClientHello.
1765 if (clienthello->compressions_len != 1) {
1766 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1767 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1768 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1772 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1773 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1774 else if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1775 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1777 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1778 /* Can't disable compression */
1779 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1780 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1781 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1784 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1785 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1786 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1787 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1788 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1792 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1793 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1794 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1797 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1798 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1799 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
1802 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1803 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1804 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1805 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1808 } else if (s->hit) {
1810 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1811 /* See if we have a match */
1812 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1815 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1816 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1817 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1819 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
1820 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
1829 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1835 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1836 * using compression.
1838 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1839 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1845 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1848 if (!s->hit || s->hello_retry_request) {
1849 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1850 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1851 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1852 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1853 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1860 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1861 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1863 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1865 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1866 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1871 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1872 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
1873 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1874 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
1875 s->clienthello = NULL;
1878 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1881 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1882 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
1883 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1884 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
1885 s->clienthello = NULL;
1891 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1892 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
1894 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s, int *al)
1896 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1899 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1900 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
1901 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
1902 * influence which certificate is sent
1904 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
1905 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
1908 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1909 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
1911 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1912 * et al can pick it up.
1914 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
1915 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
1917 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1918 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1919 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1921 /* status request response should be sent */
1922 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1923 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
1924 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1926 /* something bad happened */
1927 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1929 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1938 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1940 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1941 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1943 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1944 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s, &al);
1946 /* SSLErr() was already called */
1953 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1954 if (!s->hit || s->hello_retry_request) {
1955 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1956 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1957 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1959 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1960 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1961 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1965 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1968 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1971 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1973 if (cipher == NULL) {
1974 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1975 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1978 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1979 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id) {
1981 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1982 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1984 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1985 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
1988 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1990 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, &al))
1992 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1993 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1994 s->session->not_resumable =
1995 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, ((cipher->algorithm_mkey
1996 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
1998 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1999 /* do not send a session ticket */
2000 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2003 /* Session-id reuse */
2004 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2008 * we now have the following setup.
2010 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2011 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2012 * compression - basically ignored right now
2013 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2014 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2015 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2016 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2020 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2021 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2023 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s, &al)) {
2024 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2025 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2031 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2032 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2034 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
2036 * callback indicates further work to be done
2038 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2041 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
2043 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
2044 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
2046 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
2047 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2048 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2050 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2051 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2057 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2059 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2060 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2064 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2066 int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2070 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
2071 version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version;
2072 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2074 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2075 * tls_process_client_hello()
2077 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2078 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2083 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2084 * back in the server hello:
2085 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2086 * we send back the old session ID.
2087 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2088 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2089 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2090 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2092 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2093 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2094 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2095 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2098 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2099 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2101 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2103 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2104 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2105 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2109 /* set up the compression method */
2110 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2113 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2116 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
2119 if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2120 && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl))
2121 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2122 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2123 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm))
2124 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2126 ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2127 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO,
2129 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2133 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2134 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2135 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2141 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2145 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2147 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2148 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2149 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2156 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2158 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2159 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2162 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2163 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2166 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
2167 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
2170 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2171 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2172 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2174 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2175 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2179 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2180 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2184 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2186 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2188 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2189 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2191 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2193 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2194 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2196 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2199 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2200 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2201 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2202 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2204 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2205 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2208 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2211 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2213 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2214 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2215 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2217 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2218 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2223 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2224 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2225 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2226 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2229 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2230 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2231 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2232 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2233 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2236 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2237 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2238 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2242 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2244 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2245 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2249 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2251 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2254 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2255 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2259 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2262 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2263 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2264 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2268 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2269 nid = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2270 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
2271 if (curve_id == 0) {
2272 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2273 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2276 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
2277 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2278 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2279 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2283 /* Encode the public key. */
2284 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2286 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2287 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2292 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2293 * can set these to NULLs
2300 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2302 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2303 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2304 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2305 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2307 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2310 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2311 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2312 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2313 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2317 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2318 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2319 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2323 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2324 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2326 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2327 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2332 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2333 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2334 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2337 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2338 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2340 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2341 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2343 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2344 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2350 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2351 unsigned char *binval;
2354 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2355 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2356 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2359 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2363 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2367 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2369 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2370 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2373 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2374 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2377 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2378 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2379 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2382 memset(binval, 0, len);
2386 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2387 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2388 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2389 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2393 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2397 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2399 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2400 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2401 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2404 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2405 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2406 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2407 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2408 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2409 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2412 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2413 encodedPoint = NULL;
2419 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
2420 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
2421 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
2424 if (pkey == NULL || md == NULL) {
2425 /* Should never happen */
2426 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2428 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2432 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2433 * points to the space at the end.
2436 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2437 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2438 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2439 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2442 /* send signature algorithm */
2443 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg))
2446 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2447 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2448 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2451 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2452 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2453 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2454 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2455 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2458 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2459 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2460 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2461 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2466 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2467 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2468 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2469 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2470 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx,
2471 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2473 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen) <= 0
2474 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2475 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2476 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2477 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2482 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2485 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2488 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2491 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2493 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2497 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2499 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2501 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2502 /* TODO(TLS1.3) for now send empty request context */
2503 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2505 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2509 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2510 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, NULL,
2512 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2513 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2519 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2520 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2521 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2526 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2527 const uint16_t *psigs;
2528 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2530 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2531 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2532 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2533 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2535 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2540 if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2546 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2549 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2553 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2556 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2558 PACKET psk_identity;
2560 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2561 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2562 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2565 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2566 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2567 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2570 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2571 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2572 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2576 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2577 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2578 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2582 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2585 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2586 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2587 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2589 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2591 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2593 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2594 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2595 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2599 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2600 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2601 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2603 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2604 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2605 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2609 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2613 /* Should never happen */
2614 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2615 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2620 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2622 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2623 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2625 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2626 size_t j, padding_len;
2627 PACKET enc_premaster;
2629 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2632 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2634 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2635 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2639 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2640 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2641 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2643 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2644 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2645 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2646 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2652 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2653 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2654 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2655 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2657 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2658 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2659 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2663 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2664 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2665 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2666 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2671 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2672 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2673 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2674 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2675 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2678 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2682 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2683 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2685 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2686 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2687 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2688 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2689 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2692 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2695 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2696 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2697 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2699 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2700 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2701 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2705 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2706 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2707 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2708 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2709 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2711 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2714 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2715 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2716 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2717 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2718 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2719 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2722 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2723 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2725 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2726 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2729 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2730 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2731 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2732 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2733 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2734 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2737 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2738 unsigned char workaround_good;
2739 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2740 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2742 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2743 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2744 version_good |= workaround_good;
2748 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2749 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2751 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2754 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2755 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2756 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2757 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2759 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2760 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2761 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2762 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2763 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2766 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2767 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2768 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2769 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2775 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2778 /* Should never happen */
2779 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2780 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2785 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2787 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2788 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2792 const unsigned char *data;
2793 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2796 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2797 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2799 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2802 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2804 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2805 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2809 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2810 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2811 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2814 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2815 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2816 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2817 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2820 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2821 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2822 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2825 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2826 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2828 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2829 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2830 if (pub_key != NULL)
2835 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2836 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2842 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2843 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2845 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2848 /* Should never happen */
2849 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2850 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2855 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2857 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2858 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2859 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2862 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2863 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2864 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2865 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2869 const unsigned char *data;
2872 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2873 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2876 /* Get encoded point length */
2877 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2878 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2879 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2880 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2883 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2884 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2885 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2888 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
2889 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2890 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2895 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2896 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2897 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2902 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2903 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2905 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2909 /* Should never happen */
2910 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2911 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2916 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2920 const unsigned char *data;
2922 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2923 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2924 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2925 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2928 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2929 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2932 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2933 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2934 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2937 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2938 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2939 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2940 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2944 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2945 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2951 /* Should never happen */
2952 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2953 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2958 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2960 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2961 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2962 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2963 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2964 const unsigned char *start;
2965 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2966 unsigned long alg_a;
2969 size_t sess_key_len;
2970 const unsigned char *data;
2973 /* Get our certificate private key */
2974 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2975 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2977 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2979 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2981 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2984 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2986 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2987 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2990 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2991 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2992 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2996 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2997 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3002 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3003 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3004 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3005 * client certificate for authorization only.
3007 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3008 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3009 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3012 /* Decrypt session key */
3013 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
3014 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
3015 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3019 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3020 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
3021 &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
3022 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
3023 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3024 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3029 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
3030 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
3031 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3032 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3035 /* Generate master secret */
3036 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3037 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3038 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3042 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3043 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
3044 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
3045 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3049 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3052 /* Should never happen */
3053 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3059 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3062 unsigned long alg_k;
3064 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3066 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3067 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
3070 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3071 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3072 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3073 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3074 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3075 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3078 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3079 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3080 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3081 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3084 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3085 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3087 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3088 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3090 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3091 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3093 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3094 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3096 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3097 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3100 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3101 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3102 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3106 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3109 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3110 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3111 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3112 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3114 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3115 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3118 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3120 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3121 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3122 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3123 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3124 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3126 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3129 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3130 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3132 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3133 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3134 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
3136 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3140 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3141 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3146 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3148 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3149 * the handshake_buffer
3151 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3152 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3155 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3157 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3158 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3159 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3160 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3164 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3165 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3167 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3168 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3173 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3176 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3178 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3180 unsigned long l, llen;
3181 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3182 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3183 PACKET spkt, context;
3186 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3187 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3191 /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
3192 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context))
3193 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
3194 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
3195 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3196 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3197 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3201 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3202 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3203 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3204 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3205 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3206 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3210 certstart = certbytes;
3211 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3213 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3216 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3217 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3218 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3219 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3223 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3224 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3227 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3228 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3229 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
3232 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3233 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
3234 &al, NULL, chainidx == 0)
3235 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3236 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al,
3237 PACKET_remaining(&spkt) == 0)) {
3238 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3241 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3244 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3245 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3251 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3252 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3253 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3254 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3255 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3256 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3259 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3260 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3261 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3262 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3263 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3264 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED;
3267 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3268 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3273 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3275 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3276 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3277 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3281 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3282 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3285 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3287 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3288 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3289 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3294 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3295 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3296 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3298 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3299 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3302 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3305 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3306 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3307 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3312 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3313 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3317 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3319 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3320 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3321 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3322 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3323 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3327 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3331 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3332 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3335 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3339 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3341 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
3342 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3345 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3350 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3351 * for the server Certificate message
3353 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3354 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &al)) {
3355 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3356 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3363 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3365 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3366 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3367 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3368 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3369 const unsigned char *const_p;
3370 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3373 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3374 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3375 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3376 int iv_len, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3377 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3379 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3383 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3384 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0)
3386 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
3387 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
3388 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
3389 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
3390 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
3391 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
3392 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
3393 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3394 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3397 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
3399 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
3402 /* get session encoding length */
3403 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3405 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3408 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3409 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3412 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3414 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3418 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3419 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3420 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3421 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3426 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3430 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3433 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3436 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3438 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3439 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3440 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3444 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3445 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3448 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3451 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3452 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3454 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3455 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3456 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3461 /* Put timeout and length */
3462 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3463 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3464 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3465 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3469 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3470 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3475 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3477 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3479 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3480 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
3482 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3483 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv))
3485 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
3486 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
3487 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3489 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3490 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3494 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3495 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3496 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3499 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3500 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3501 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3503 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add))
3504 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3505 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3506 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3507 /* Output key name */
3508 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3510 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3511 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3513 /* Encrypt session data */
3514 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3515 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3516 || encdata1 != encdata2
3517 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3518 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3519 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3520 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3521 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3522 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3523 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3524 macendoffset - macoffset)
3525 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3526 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3527 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3528 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3529 || macdata1 != macdata2
3530 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
3532 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
3533 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3535 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3538 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3539 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3544 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3546 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3547 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3548 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3553 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3554 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3556 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3558 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
3559 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
3560 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
3561 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3568 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3570 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
3571 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3580 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3581 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3583 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3585 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3586 size_t next_proto_len;
3589 * The payload looks like:
3591 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3592 * uint8 padding_len;
3593 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3595 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3596 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3597 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3598 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3602 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
3607 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3609 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3611 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3612 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3616 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3620 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3622 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3623 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3624 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3631 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3633 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3637 * TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT version before release
3638 * (should be s->version)
3640 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
3641 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
3642 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
3643 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
3645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3649 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
3650 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3655 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
3656 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
3658 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s))
3663 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3667 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3669 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3671 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3672 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3673 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3674 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3675 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3678 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
3679 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
3680 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3685 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
3686 * a record boundary.
3688 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
3689 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3690 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3691 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
3695 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
3696 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3697 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
3698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3702 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3704 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3705 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3706 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;