1 /* ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
153 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
154 #include "statem_locl.h"
155 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
156 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
157 #include <openssl/rand.h>
158 #include <openssl/objects.h>
159 #include <openssl/evp.h>
160 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
161 #include <openssl/x509.h>
162 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
163 # include <openssl/dh.h>
165 #include <openssl/bn.h>
166 #include <openssl/md5.h>
168 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
169 PACKET *cipher_suites,
170 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
171 int sslv2format, int *al);
174 * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake
175 * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The
176 * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state
177 * is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
179 * Valid return values are:
180 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
181 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
183 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
185 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
187 switch(st->hand_state) {
189 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
190 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
191 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
196 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
198 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
199 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
201 * 2) If we did request one then
202 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
204 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
205 * list if we requested a certificate)
207 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE
208 && (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request
209 || (!((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
210 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
211 && (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)))) {
212 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
214 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
215 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
216 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
223 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
224 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
229 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
231 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
232 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
233 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
234 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
235 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
238 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
239 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
241 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
242 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
243 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
244 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
246 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
250 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
251 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
257 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
258 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
259 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
264 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
265 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
266 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
267 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
268 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
273 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
274 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
283 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
284 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
285 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
291 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
292 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
293 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
302 /* No valid transition found */
307 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
309 * Valid return values are:
313 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
315 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
318 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
319 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
320 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
321 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
322 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
325 if ( (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
326 || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
328 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
331 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
332 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
333 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
334 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
335 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
336 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
339 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
340 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
350 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
352 * Valid return values are:
356 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
359 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
360 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
362 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
363 * during re-negotiation:
365 && ((s->session->peer == NULL) ||
366 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
368 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
369 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
372 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
374 * ... except when the application insists on
375 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
378 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
379 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
380 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
382 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
385 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
393 * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
394 * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
396 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
398 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
400 switch(st->hand_state) {
402 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */;
403 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
406 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
407 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
410 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
411 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
412 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
413 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
415 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
416 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
417 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
418 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
420 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
421 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
423 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
424 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
426 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
428 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
429 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
431 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
433 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
434 /* normal PSK or SRP */
435 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
436 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
437 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
438 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
439 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
440 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
441 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
446 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
449 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
451 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
455 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
456 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
457 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
458 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
462 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
463 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
464 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
465 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
469 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
470 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
471 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
473 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
474 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
476 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
478 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
479 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
480 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
481 } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
482 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
484 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
488 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
489 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
490 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
492 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
493 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
494 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
496 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
498 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
500 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
501 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
502 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
505 /* Shouldn't happen */
506 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
511 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
512 * the server to the client.
514 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
516 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
518 switch(st->hand_state) {
519 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
522 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
525 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
527 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
528 dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s);
529 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
534 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
535 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
537 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
538 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
544 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
545 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
546 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
547 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
549 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
551 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
552 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
554 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
555 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
561 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
562 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
563 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
564 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
567 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
569 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
570 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
571 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
572 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
576 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
579 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
582 /* No pre work to be done */
586 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
590 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
591 * server to the client.
593 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
595 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
599 switch(st->hand_state) {
600 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
601 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
603 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
606 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
607 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
609 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
610 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
611 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
613 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
614 * treat like it was the first packet
619 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
621 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
622 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
623 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
626 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
629 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
630 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
632 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
633 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
634 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
635 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
639 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
640 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
645 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
647 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
649 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
652 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
656 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
657 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
658 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
663 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
666 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
667 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
671 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
672 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
675 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
677 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
680 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
687 /* No post work to be done */
691 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
695 * Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client.
697 * Valid return values are:
701 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s)
703 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
705 switch(st->hand_state) {
706 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
707 return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s);
709 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
710 return tls_construct_hello_request(s);
712 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
713 return tls_construct_server_hello(s);
716 return tls_construct_server_certificate(s);
718 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
719 return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s);
721 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
722 return tls_construct_certificate_request(s);
724 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
725 return tls_construct_server_done(s);
727 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
728 return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s);
730 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
731 return tls_construct_cert_status(s);
733 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
735 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
737 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
739 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
740 return tls_construct_finished(s,
742 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
744 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
747 /* Shouldn't happen */
754 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
755 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
758 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
759 * reading. Excludes the message header.
761 unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
763 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
765 switch(st->hand_state) {
766 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
767 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
770 return s->max_cert_list;
772 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
773 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
775 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
776 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
778 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
779 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
780 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
783 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
784 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
786 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
787 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
790 /* Shouldn't happen */
798 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
800 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
802 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
804 switch(st->hand_state) {
805 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
806 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
809 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
811 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
812 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
814 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
815 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
818 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
819 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
822 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
823 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
825 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
826 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
829 /* Shouldn't happen */
833 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
837 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
840 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
842 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
844 switch(st->hand_state) {
845 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
846 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
848 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
849 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
851 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
853 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
854 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
855 /* Are we renegotiating? */
857 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
858 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
859 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
860 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
861 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
862 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
865 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
868 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
874 /* Shouldn't happen */
878 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
879 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
881 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
883 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
885 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
886 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
887 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
889 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
893 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
895 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
902 int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s)
904 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
905 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
906 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
913 unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf,
914 unsigned char *cookie,
915 unsigned char cookie_len)
917 unsigned int msg_len;
921 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
922 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8;
923 *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xFF;
925 *(p++) = (unsigned char)cookie_len;
926 memcpy(p, cookie, cookie_len);
933 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s)
938 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
940 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
941 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
942 &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 ||
943 s->d1->cookie_len > 255) {
944 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
945 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
946 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
950 len = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH],
951 s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
953 dtls1_set_message_header(s, buf, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, len, 0,
955 len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
957 /* number of bytes to write */
964 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
966 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
967 unsigned int j, complen = 0;
970 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
971 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
973 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
975 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
976 PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
979 is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
981 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
982 /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
984 unsigned int version;
987 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
988 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
989 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
990 * the rest right through. Its format is:
992 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
993 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
995 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
996 * 7-8 session_id_length
997 * 9-10 challenge_length
1001 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1002 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1004 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1005 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1006 * in the first place
1008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1012 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)) {
1013 /* No protocol version supplied! */
1014 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1017 if (version == 0x0002) {
1018 /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
1019 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1021 } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1023 s->client_version = version;
1025 /* No idea what protocol this is */
1026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1031 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
1032 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
1034 if(!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
1035 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1036 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1041 /* Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable */
1042 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1043 if (s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1044 if (s->client_version >= s->version) {
1047 } else if (s->client_version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1048 switch(s->client_version) {
1050 case TLS1_2_VERSION:
1051 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
1052 s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1053 s->method = TLSv1_2_server_method();
1057 /* Deliberately fall through */
1058 case TLS1_1_VERSION:
1059 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
1060 s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
1061 s->method = TLSv1_1_server_method();
1065 /* Deliberately fall through */
1067 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
1068 s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
1069 s->method = TLSv1_server_method();
1073 /* Deliberately fall through */
1075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1076 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
1077 s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
1078 s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
1087 } else if (s->client_version <= s->version
1088 || s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1090 * For DTLS we just check versions are potentially compatible. Version
1091 * negotiation comes later.
1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1098 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
1100 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
1103 s->version = s->client_version;
1105 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1109 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1112 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1113 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1114 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
1116 unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1119 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len)
1120 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1121 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1122 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1123 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1124 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1128 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
1129 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
1130 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1131 /* No extensions. */
1132 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1134 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1135 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1139 /* Load the client random */
1140 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
1142 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1143 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1144 s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1145 challenge_len, challenge_len)) {
1146 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1147 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1151 PACKET_null_init(&compression);
1152 PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
1154 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1155 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1156 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1157 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1158 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1162 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1163 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1164 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1169 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1170 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1171 * So check cookie length...
1173 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1174 if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)
1179 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites)
1180 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1181 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1185 /* Could be empty. */
1192 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1193 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1195 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1196 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1197 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1198 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1199 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1200 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1201 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1202 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1203 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1204 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1209 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1210 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1213 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);
1215 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1217 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1218 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1219 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1220 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1221 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1223 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1224 /* previous session */
1226 } else if (i == -1) {
1230 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1235 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1236 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1237 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1238 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1239 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
1240 PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) == 0) {
1241 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1243 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1245 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1247 /* default verification */
1248 } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1249 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1250 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1254 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1256 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1257 /* Select version to use */
1258 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1259 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
1260 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1261 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1262 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1263 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1264 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1265 s->version = s->client_version;
1266 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1268 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1269 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
1270 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1271 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1274 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1275 s->version = s->client_version;
1276 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1279 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1283 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),
1284 is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {
1288 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1291 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1294 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1295 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1297 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1298 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1300 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1301 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1310 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1313 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1315 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1320 complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
1321 for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
1322 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
1328 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1329 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1333 /* TLS extensions */
1334 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1335 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1342 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1343 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1344 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1345 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1349 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1350 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1355 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1356 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1358 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1359 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1360 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1362 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1364 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1365 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1369 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1371 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1376 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1377 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1378 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1382 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1383 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1384 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1385 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1386 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1391 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1392 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1393 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1395 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1396 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1397 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1398 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1399 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1401 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1402 /* Can't disable compression */
1403 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1405 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1408 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1409 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1410 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1411 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1412 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1416 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1417 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1418 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1421 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1422 for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
1423 if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)
1427 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1428 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1429 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1434 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1435 /* See if we have a match */
1436 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1439 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1440 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1441 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1443 for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
1444 if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {
1453 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1459 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1460 * using compression.
1462 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1469 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1473 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1474 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1476 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1478 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1479 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1480 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1481 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1486 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1487 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1492 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1493 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1495 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1497 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1499 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1500 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1504 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1506 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1509 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1511 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1512 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1513 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1515 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1520 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1523 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1525 cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1527 if (cipher == NULL) {
1528 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1531 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1532 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1533 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1534 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1535 ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
1536 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1537 /* do not send a session ticket */
1538 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1540 /* Session-id reuse */
1541 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1544 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1545 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1546 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1552 * we now have the following setup.
1554 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1555 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1556 * compression - basically ignored right now
1557 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1558 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1559 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1560 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1563 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1564 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1565 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1566 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1567 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1574 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1575 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1577 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1579 * callback indicates further work to be done
1581 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1584 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1586 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1587 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1589 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1590 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1591 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1598 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1600 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1601 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1605 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s)
1608 unsigned char *p, *d;
1613 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1615 /* Do the message type and length last */
1616 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1618 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1619 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1622 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1623 * tls_process_client_hello()
1625 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1626 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1629 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1630 * back in the server hello:
1631 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1632 * we send back the old session ID.
1633 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1634 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1635 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1636 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1638 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1639 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1640 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1641 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1644 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1645 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1647 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1649 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1650 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1651 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1652 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1656 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1659 /* put the cipher */
1660 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1663 /* put the compression method */
1664 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1667 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1670 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1673 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1674 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1675 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1679 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1681 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1683 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1689 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
1690 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1691 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1698 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s)
1700 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
1701 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1702 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1706 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
1707 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1708 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1715 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1718 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1720 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1721 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1724 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1727 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1728 unsigned char *p, *d;
1735 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1737 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1738 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1739 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1743 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1747 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1749 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1750 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1752 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1755 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
1756 n += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1758 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1759 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1761 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1762 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1763 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1764 CERT *cert = s->cert;
1766 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1767 dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1769 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1770 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1771 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1776 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1777 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
1779 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1780 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1781 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1784 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1785 DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp)) {
1786 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1787 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1788 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1791 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1792 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1793 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1797 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1799 else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1800 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1805 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1806 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1807 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1808 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1809 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1813 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1814 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1815 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1816 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1825 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1826 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1827 const EC_GROUP *group;
1828 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
1830 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1831 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1832 if (nid != NID_undef)
1833 ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1835 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1837 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1841 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1842 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1843 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1847 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1848 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1849 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1850 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1851 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1852 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1858 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1859 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1860 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1861 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1866 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1867 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1871 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1873 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1874 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1879 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1880 * allocate memory accordingly.
1882 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1883 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1884 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1887 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1888 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1889 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1890 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1891 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1892 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1896 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1897 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1898 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1899 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1901 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1902 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1906 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1910 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1911 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1912 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1915 n += 4 + encodedlen;
1918 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1919 * can set these to NULLs
1926 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1927 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1928 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1929 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1930 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1931 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1932 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1933 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1936 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1937 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1938 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1939 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1943 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1945 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1948 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1949 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1950 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1951 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1958 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1959 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
1960 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1962 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1965 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1971 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1975 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1977 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1978 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1979 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1980 if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) {
1981 s2n(strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint), p);
1982 strncpy((char *)p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
1983 strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint));
1984 p += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
1991 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1993 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2004 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2006 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
2007 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
2008 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
2009 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
2011 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
2019 memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
2020 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2021 encodedPoint = NULL;
2029 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2030 * points to the space at the end.
2033 /* send signature algorithm */
2034 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2035 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
2036 /* Should never happen */
2037 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2038 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2039 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2045 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2047 if (EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
2048 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2049 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2050 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2051 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2052 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, d, n) <= 0
2053 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, &(p[2]),
2054 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) {
2055 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
2056 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2061 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2064 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2065 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2067 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2072 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
2073 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2074 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2078 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2081 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2083 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2084 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2085 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2087 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2088 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2092 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2094 unsigned char *p, *d;
2095 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2096 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2102 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2104 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2106 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2111 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2112 const unsigned char *psigs;
2113 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2114 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2115 /* Skip over length for now */
2117 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2118 /* Now fill in length */
2128 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2131 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2132 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2133 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2134 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2135 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2136 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2140 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2142 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2147 /* else no CA names */
2148 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2151 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
2152 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2156 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2160 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2164 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2168 unsigned long alg_k;
2169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2171 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2175 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2177 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2178 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2179 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2180 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2181 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2183 PACKET enc_premaster;
2184 unsigned char *data, *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2186 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2189 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2190 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2191 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2193 PACKET psk_identity;
2195 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2196 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2197 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2200 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2201 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2202 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2203 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2206 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2207 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2208 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2209 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2213 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2214 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2215 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2219 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2222 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2223 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2224 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2226 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2228 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2230 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2231 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2232 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2236 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2237 s->s3->tmp.psk = BUF_memdup(psk, psklen);
2238 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2240 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2241 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2242 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2246 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2248 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2249 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2250 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2251 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2252 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2255 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2256 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2257 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2258 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2263 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2264 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2265 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2267 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2270 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2271 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2272 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2273 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2274 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2275 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2276 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2279 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2281 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2282 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2283 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2286 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2287 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2288 /* Try SSLv3 behaviour for TLS. */
2289 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG) {
2290 enc_premaster = orig;
2292 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2294 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2301 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2302 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2303 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2304 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2306 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2307 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2308 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2309 RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2313 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2314 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2315 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2316 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2321 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2322 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2323 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2324 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2325 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2328 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2329 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
2333 decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2334 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2335 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2339 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2340 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2343 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2346 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2347 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2348 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2349 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2350 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2351 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2354 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0],
2355 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2357 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
2358 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2361 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2362 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2363 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2364 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2365 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2366 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2369 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2370 unsigned char workaround_good;
2372 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2374 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
2375 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2376 version_good |= workaround_good;
2380 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2381 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2383 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2386 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2387 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2388 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2389 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2391 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2393 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, rsa_decrypt[j],
2394 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2397 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt,
2398 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2399 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2403 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2408 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2410 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2411 PACKET bookmark = *pkt;
2412 unsigned char shared[(OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS + 7) / 8];
2414 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)) {
2415 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2416 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2417 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2418 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2423 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2424 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2425 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2426 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2430 i = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2433 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2434 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2435 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2436 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2438 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2439 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2440 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
2441 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2442 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2443 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2446 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2447 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2448 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2450 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2453 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2455 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2456 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2457 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2459 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2460 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2462 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2463 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2464 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2465 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2468 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2469 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2471 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2472 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2473 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2475 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2478 pub = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2481 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2485 i = DH_compute_key(shared, pub, dh_srvr);
2488 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2493 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2494 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2500 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, shared, i, 0)) {
2501 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2502 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2506 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2507 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2512 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2513 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2516 const EC_GROUP *group;
2517 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2518 unsigned char *shared;
2520 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2521 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2526 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2527 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2528 /* use the certificate */
2529 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2532 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2533 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2535 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2538 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2539 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2541 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2542 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2543 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2547 /* Let's get client's public key */
2548 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2549 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2553 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2554 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2556 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2557 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2558 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2559 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2562 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2563 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2565 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2566 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2567 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2568 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2569 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2570 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2572 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2573 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2574 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2578 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2579 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2581 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2584 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2587 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2588 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2590 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2591 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2592 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2596 /* Get encoded point length */
2597 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i)) {
2598 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2599 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2600 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2603 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2604 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2605 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2608 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, data, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2609 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2614 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2615 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2616 if (field_size <= 0) {
2617 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2620 shared = OPENSSL_malloc((field_size + 7) / 8);
2621 if (shared == NULL) {
2622 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2625 i = ECDH_compute_key(shared, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint,
2628 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2629 OPENSSL_free(shared);
2633 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2634 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2635 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2636 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2637 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2638 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2640 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, shared, i, 1)) {
2641 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2642 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2645 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2648 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2649 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2650 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2651 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2652 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2653 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2656 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2660 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2661 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2662 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2663 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2664 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2667 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2668 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2669 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2670 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2674 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2675 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2679 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2680 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2681 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2682 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2683 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2684 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2685 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2686 unsigned long alg_a;
2691 /* Get our certificate private key */
2692 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2693 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2695 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2697 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2699 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2702 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2704 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2705 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2708 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2709 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2710 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2711 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2714 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2715 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2720 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2721 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2722 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2723 * client certificate for authorization only.
2725 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2726 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2727 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2730 /* Decrypt session key */
2731 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2732 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
2733 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2734 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2737 if (ASN1_get_object ((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2738 &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2739 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2740 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2741 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2742 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2743 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2748 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2749 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2750 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2751 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2752 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2755 /* Generate master secret */
2756 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2757 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2758 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2762 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2763 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2764 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2765 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2767 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2768 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2769 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2771 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2772 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2777 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2782 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2784 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2785 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2788 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2789 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2790 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2791 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2792 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2793 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2795 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2796 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2797 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2799 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2800 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2803 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2806 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2807 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2808 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2809 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2811 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2814 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2815 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2817 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2818 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2819 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
2820 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2824 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2825 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2830 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
2832 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2833 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2835 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2836 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
2837 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
2838 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
2839 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
2840 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2841 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2842 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
2845 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
2849 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify) {
2850 /* No certificate verify so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */
2851 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2852 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2853 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2855 if (!s->session->peer) {
2856 /* No peer certificate so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */
2857 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2858 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2860 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2861 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2862 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2863 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2867 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
2868 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
2870 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
2871 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2876 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2879 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2881 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2882 unsigned char *sig, *data;
2883 int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2887 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2891 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2894 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2895 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2899 peer = s->session->peer;
2900 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2901 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2903 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2904 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
2905 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2906 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2910 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2912 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2913 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
2915 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2916 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 && pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2921 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2924 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
2925 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2928 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
2930 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2932 } else if (rv == 0) {
2933 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2937 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2940 /* Use default digest for this key type */
2941 int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
2943 md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx];
2945 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2950 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
2951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2952 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2956 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2957 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
2958 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
2959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2960 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2963 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
2964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2965 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2969 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2970 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2972 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2976 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2978 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2979 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2980 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2981 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2985 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2986 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2987 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2988 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
2989 BUF_reverse(data, NULL, len);
2993 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2994 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2995 s->session->master_key_length,
2996 s->session->master_key)) {
2997 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2998 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3002 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
3003 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3004 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3008 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3011 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3012 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3014 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3015 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3016 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
3017 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3021 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3023 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3025 unsigned long l, llen;
3026 const unsigned char *certstart;
3027 unsigned char *certbytes;
3028 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3031 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3032 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3036 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
3037 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
3038 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3039 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3040 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3044 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
3045 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3046 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3047 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3048 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3049 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3053 certstart = certbytes;
3054 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3059 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3060 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3061 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3062 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3065 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3072 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3073 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3074 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3075 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3077 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3080 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3081 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3082 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3083 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3084 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3085 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3088 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3089 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3094 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3096 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3097 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3098 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3102 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3103 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3106 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3108 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3109 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3110 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3113 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3116 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3117 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3118 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3120 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3121 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3123 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3124 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3127 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3131 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3132 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3135 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3139 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3143 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3145 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3146 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3150 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
3151 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3152 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3159 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
3161 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3163 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3164 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3165 const unsigned char *const_p;
3166 int len, slen_full, slen;
3169 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3170 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3171 unsigned char key_name[16];
3173 /* get session encoding length */
3174 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3176 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3179 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3180 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3183 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3185 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3189 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3190 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3193 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3197 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3200 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3203 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3205 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3206 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3207 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3211 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3212 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3215 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3218 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3219 * follows handshake_header_length +
3220 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3221 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3222 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3223 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3225 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3226 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3227 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3230 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3232 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3233 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3235 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3236 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, hctx, 1) < 0)
3239 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3241 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3242 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3244 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3245 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3247 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3251 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3252 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3253 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3255 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3257 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3259 /* Output key name */
3261 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3264 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3265 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3266 /* Encrypt session data */
3267 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3270 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3274 if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3276 if (!HMAC_Final(hctx, p, &hlen))
3279 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3280 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3283 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3285 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3286 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3287 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3289 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
3296 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3297 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3298 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3302 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s)
3306 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3307 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3308 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3311 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3312 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3316 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3319 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3320 /* message length */
3321 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3323 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3324 /* length of OCSP response */
3325 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3326 /* actual response */
3327 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3328 /* number of bytes to write */
3329 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3335 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3337 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3338 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3340 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3342 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3343 size_t next_proto_len;
3346 * The payload looks like:
3348 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3349 * uint8 padding_len;
3350 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3352 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3353 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3354 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3355 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3359 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated,
3361 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
3365 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3367 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3369 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3370 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3374 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3376 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3377 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3378 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3379 int sslv2format, int *al
3382 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3383 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3385 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3386 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3388 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3390 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3392 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3393 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3394 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3398 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3400 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3401 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3405 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
3406 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3408 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3409 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3414 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
3417 if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3418 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3419 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3423 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3425 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3426 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3427 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3429 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3432 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3433 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3434 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3435 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3436 if (s->renegotiate) {
3437 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3438 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3439 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3442 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3443 #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
3444 fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
3449 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3450 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3451 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3453 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3454 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3457 if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) {
3458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3459 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3460 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3466 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3467 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3469 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3471 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3476 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3477 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3486 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
3487 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);