2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
65 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
66 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
67 PACKET *cipher_suites,
69 **skp, int sslv2format,
73 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
74 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
75 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
76 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
78 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
79 * (transition not allowed)
81 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
83 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
86 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
87 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
88 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
90 switch (st->hand_state) {
94 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
95 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
96 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
101 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
102 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
103 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
104 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
108 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
109 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
116 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
117 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
118 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
122 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
129 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
130 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
131 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
137 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
138 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
144 /* No valid transition found */
145 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
146 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_READ_TRANSITION,
147 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
152 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
153 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
154 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
155 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
157 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
158 * (transition not allowed)
160 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
162 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
164 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
165 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
170 switch (st->hand_state) {
176 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
177 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
178 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
183 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
185 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
186 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
188 * 2) If we did request one then
189 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
191 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
192 * list if we requested a certificate)
194 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
195 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
196 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
197 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
198 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
200 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
201 * not going to accept it because we require a client
204 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
205 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
206 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
207 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
210 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
214 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
217 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
218 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
219 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
226 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
227 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
232 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
234 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
235 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
236 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
237 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
238 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
241 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
242 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
244 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
245 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
246 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
247 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
249 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
253 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
254 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
260 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
261 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
262 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
267 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
268 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
269 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
270 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
271 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
276 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
277 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
280 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
285 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
286 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
287 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
288 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
294 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
295 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
296 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
303 /* No valid transition found */
304 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
305 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
310 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
312 * Valid return values are:
316 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
318 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
321 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
322 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
323 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
324 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
325 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
328 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
330 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
334 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
335 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
336 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
337 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
338 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
340 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
341 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
342 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
352 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
354 * Valid return values are:
358 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
361 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
362 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
364 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
365 * during re-negotiation:
367 && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
368 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
370 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
371 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
374 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
376 * ... except when the application insists on
377 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
380 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
381 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
382 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
384 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
387 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
395 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
396 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
399 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
401 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
404 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
405 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
408 switch (st->hand_state) {
410 /* Shouldn't happen */
411 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
414 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
415 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
416 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
418 /* Try to read from the client instead */
419 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
421 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
422 if (s->hello_retry_request)
423 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
425 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
426 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
428 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
429 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
431 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
432 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
433 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
435 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
437 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
438 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
439 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
441 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
443 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
445 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
446 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
447 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
451 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
453 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
455 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
457 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
458 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
460 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
462 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
463 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
465 * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
466 * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
469 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
470 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
472 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
473 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
474 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
475 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
476 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
477 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
482 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
483 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
485 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
487 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
490 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
491 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
495 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
497 switch (st->hand_state) {
499 /* Shouldn't happen */
500 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
503 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
504 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
505 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
506 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
507 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
509 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
510 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
511 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
512 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
517 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
518 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
520 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
521 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
522 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
523 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
525 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
526 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
527 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
528 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
530 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
531 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
533 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
534 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
536 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
538 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
539 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
541 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
543 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
544 /* normal PSK or SRP */
545 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
546 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
547 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
548 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
549 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
550 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
551 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
553 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
556 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
559 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
560 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
565 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
566 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
567 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
568 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
572 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
573 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
574 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
579 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
580 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
583 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
584 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
586 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
588 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
589 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
590 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
591 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
592 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
594 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
596 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
598 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
599 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
600 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
602 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
603 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
604 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
606 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
608 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
610 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
611 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
612 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
617 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
618 * the server to the client.
620 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
622 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
624 switch (st->hand_state) {
626 /* No pre work to be done */
629 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
632 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
635 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
637 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
638 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
639 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
644 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
645 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
647 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
648 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
654 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
656 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
657 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
659 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
661 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
662 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
664 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
665 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
666 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
668 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0);
669 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
671 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
672 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
678 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
679 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
680 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
681 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
684 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
686 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
687 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
688 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
689 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
693 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
696 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
699 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
703 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
704 * server to the client.
706 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
708 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
712 switch (st->hand_state) {
714 /* No post work to be done */
717 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
718 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
722 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
723 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
725 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
726 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
731 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
732 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
734 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
735 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
736 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
740 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
741 * treat like it was the first packet
746 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
748 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
749 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
750 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
753 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
756 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
757 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
759 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
760 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
761 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
763 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
767 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
768 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
772 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
773 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
774 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
775 * something clever in the record layer for this.
777 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
778 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
779 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
780 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)
781 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
782 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
787 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
788 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
789 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
791 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
794 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
798 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
799 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
801 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
806 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
809 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
810 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
814 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
815 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
818 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
820 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
823 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
827 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
828 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
829 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
830 &s->session->master_key_length)
831 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
832 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
837 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
838 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
839 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
844 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
848 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
851 * Valid return values are:
855 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
856 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
858 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
860 switch (st->hand_state) {
862 /* Shouldn't happen */
865 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
867 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
869 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
870 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
873 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
874 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
875 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
878 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
879 /* No construction function needed */
881 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
884 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
885 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
886 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
890 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
891 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
894 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
895 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
896 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
900 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
901 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
902 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
905 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
906 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
907 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
910 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
911 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
912 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
915 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
916 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
917 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
920 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
921 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
922 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
925 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
926 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
927 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
930 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
931 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
932 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
935 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
936 *confunc = tls_construct_hello_retry_request;
937 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
940 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
941 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
942 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
950 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
951 * calculated as follows:
953 * 2 + # client_version
954 * 32 + # only valid length for random
955 * 1 + # length of session_id
956 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
957 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
958 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
959 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
960 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
961 * 2 + # length of extensions
962 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
964 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
966 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
967 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
970 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
971 * reading. Excludes the message header.
973 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
975 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
977 switch (st->hand_state) {
979 /* Shouldn't happen */
982 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
983 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
986 return s->max_cert_list;
988 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
989 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
991 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
992 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
994 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
995 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
996 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
999 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1000 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1002 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1003 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1005 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1006 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1011 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1013 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1015 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1017 switch (st->hand_state) {
1019 /* Shouldn't happen */
1020 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1022 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1023 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1025 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1026 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1028 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1029 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1031 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1032 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1034 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1035 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1036 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1039 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1040 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1042 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1043 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1045 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1046 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1052 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1055 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1057 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1059 switch (st->hand_state) {
1061 /* Shouldn't happen */
1064 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1065 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1067 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1068 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1070 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1071 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1072 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
1073 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
1074 /* Are we renegotiating? */
1075 && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
1076 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1077 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1078 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1079 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1080 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
1083 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
1086 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1088 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1092 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
1094 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
1096 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1098 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1099 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1100 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1102 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1105 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
1106 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
1108 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
1115 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1118 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1119 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1120 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1126 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1128 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1129 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1130 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1131 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1132 cookie_leni > 255) {
1133 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1134 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1137 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1139 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1140 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1150 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1151 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1152 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1157 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1158 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1159 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1160 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1162 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1164 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1165 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1166 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1167 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1168 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1169 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1170 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1172 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1173 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1174 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1175 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1176 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1177 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1178 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1179 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1180 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1181 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1182 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1183 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1184 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1186 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1187 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1192 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1194 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1195 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1196 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1200 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1203 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1204 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1206 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1209 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1211 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1213 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1217 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1218 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1219 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1221 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1223 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1224 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1225 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1226 CLIENTHELLO_MSG clienthello;
1228 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1229 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1234 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
1235 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
1238 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1240 memset(&clienthello, 0, sizeof(clienthello));
1241 clienthello.isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1242 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1244 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1247 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) || s->hello_retry_request) {
1248 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1249 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1254 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1255 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1256 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1257 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1259 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1260 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1262 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1263 * 7-8 session_id_length
1264 * 9-10 challenge_length
1268 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1269 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1271 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1272 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1273 * in the first place
1275 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1280 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello.legacy_version)) {
1281 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1282 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1286 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1287 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1289 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1290 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1291 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1293 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1296 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1297 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1298 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1300 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1301 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1305 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1306 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1311 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites,
1313 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.session_id, session_id_len)
1314 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1315 /* No extensions. */
1316 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1317 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1318 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1319 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1322 clienthello.session_id_len = session_id_len;
1324 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1325 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello.random) because that is the limit
1326 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1327 * sizeof(clienthello.random) does.
1329 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1330 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1331 memset(clienthello.random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1332 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1333 clienthello.random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1334 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1335 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1336 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1338 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1342 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
1344 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1345 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1346 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1347 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello.session_id,
1348 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1349 &clienthello.session_id_len)) {
1350 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1355 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1356 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1357 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1358 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1361 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
1362 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1363 &clienthello.dtls_cookie_len)) {
1364 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1365 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1369 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1370 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1371 * So check cookie length...
1373 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1374 if (clienthello.dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1379 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites)) {
1380 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1381 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1385 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1386 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1391 /* Could be empty. */
1392 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1393 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
1395 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.extensions)) {
1396 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1403 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello.compressions,
1404 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1405 &clienthello.compressions_len)) {
1406 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1407 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1411 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1412 extensions = clienthello.extensions;
1413 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1414 &clienthello.pre_proc_exts, &al)) {
1415 /* SSLerr already been called */
1419 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1421 /* Set up the client_random */
1422 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1424 /* Choose the version */
1426 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1427 if (clienthello.legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1428 || (clienthello.legacy_version & 0xff00)
1429 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1431 * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1438 s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
1441 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1442 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1444 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1445 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
1446 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1447 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello.legacy_version, s->version)) {
1448 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1454 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1455 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1456 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1457 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
1459 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1463 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1464 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1465 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1466 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1467 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
1468 clienthello.dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1469 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1471 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1473 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1475 /* default verification */
1476 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello.dtls_cookie_len
1477 || memcmp(clienthello.dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1478 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1479 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1480 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1483 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1485 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1486 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
1487 if (protverr != 0) {
1488 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1489 s->version = s->client_version;
1490 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1498 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1499 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1501 clienthello.pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1502 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1507 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1508 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1510 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1511 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1512 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1513 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1514 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1515 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1516 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1517 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1518 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1519 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1522 if (clienthello.isv2 ||
1524 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1525 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1528 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &clienthello, &al);
1530 /* previous session */
1532 } else if (i == -1) {
1536 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1541 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello.ciphersuites, &ciphers,
1542 clienthello.isv2, &al) == NULL) {
1546 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1549 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1552 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1554 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1555 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1557 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1558 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1567 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1570 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1571 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1572 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1577 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello.compressions_len; loop++) {
1578 if (clienthello.compressions[loop] == 0)
1582 if (loop >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
1584 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1585 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1589 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1590 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1591 ssl_check_for_safari(s, &clienthello);
1592 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1594 /* TLS extensions */
1595 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1596 clienthello.pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1597 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1602 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1603 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1604 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1605 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1609 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1610 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1615 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1616 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1618 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1619 * backwards compat reasons
1621 int master_key_length;
1623 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1624 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1625 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1627 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1628 && master_key_length > 0) {
1629 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1631 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1632 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1636 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1637 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1638 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1639 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1640 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1641 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1642 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1646 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1647 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1648 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1649 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1650 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1655 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1656 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1657 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1659 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1661 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1662 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1663 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1665 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1666 /* Can't disable compression */
1667 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1668 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1669 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1672 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1673 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1674 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1675 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1676 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1680 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1681 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1682 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1685 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1686 for (k = 0; k < clienthello.compressions_len; k++) {
1687 if (clienthello.compressions[k] == comp_id)
1690 if (k >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
1691 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1692 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1693 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1698 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1699 /* See if we have a match */
1700 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1703 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1704 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1705 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1707 for (o = 0; o < clienthello.compressions_len; o++) {
1708 if (v == clienthello.compressions[o]) {
1717 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1723 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1724 * using compression.
1726 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1733 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1737 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1738 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1740 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1742 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1743 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1744 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1745 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1746 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1750 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1751 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1756 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1757 OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
1758 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1760 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1762 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1764 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1765 OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
1767 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1771 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1772 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
1774 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s, int *al)
1776 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1779 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1780 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
1781 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
1782 * influence which certificate is sent
1784 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
1785 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
1788 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1789 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
1791 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1792 * et al can pick it up.
1794 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
1795 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
1797 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1798 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1799 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1801 /* status request response should be sent */
1802 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1803 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
1804 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1806 /* something bad happened */
1807 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1809 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1818 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1820 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1821 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1823 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1825 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1826 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1827 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1829 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1831 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1835 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1838 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1841 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1843 if (cipher == NULL) {
1844 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1845 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1848 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1849 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, &al))
1851 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1852 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1853 s->session->not_resumable =
1854 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, ((cipher->algorithm_mkey
1855 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
1857 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1858 /* do not send a session ticket */
1859 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1861 /* Session-id reuse */
1862 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1866 * we now have the following setup.
1868 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1869 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1870 * compression - basically ignored right now
1871 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1872 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1873 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1874 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1878 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
1879 * certificate callbacks etc above.
1881 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s, &al)) {
1882 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1883 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1889 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1890 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1892 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1894 * callback indicates further work to be done
1896 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1899 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1901 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1902 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1904 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1905 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1906 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1908 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1909 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1915 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1917 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1918 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1922 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1924 int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1928 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
1929 version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version;
1930 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
1932 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1933 * tls_process_client_hello()
1935 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1936 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1941 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1942 * back in the server hello:
1943 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1944 * we send back the old session ID.
1945 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1946 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1947 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1948 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1950 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1951 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1952 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1953 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1956 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1957 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1959 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1961 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1962 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1967 /* set up the compression method */
1968 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1971 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1974 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1977 if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1978 && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl))
1979 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
1980 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1981 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm))
1982 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
1984 ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1985 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO,
1987 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1991 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
1992 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1993 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1999 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2003 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2005 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2006 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2007 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2014 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2016 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2017 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2020 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2021 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2024 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
2025 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
2028 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2029 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2030 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2032 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2037 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2038 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2042 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2044 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2045 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2046 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2047 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2049 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2050 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2051 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2052 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2054 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2057 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2058 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2059 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2060 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2062 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2063 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2066 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2069 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2071 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2072 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2073 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2075 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2076 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2081 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2082 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2083 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2084 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2087 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2088 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2089 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2090 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2091 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2094 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2096 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2100 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2102 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2103 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2107 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2109 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2112 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2113 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2116 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2117 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2120 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2121 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2122 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2126 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2127 nid = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2128 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
2129 if (curve_id == 0) {
2130 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2131 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2134 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
2135 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2136 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2137 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2141 /* Encode the public key. */
2142 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2144 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2145 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2150 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2151 * can set these to NULLs
2158 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2160 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2161 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2162 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2163 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2164 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2165 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2168 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2169 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2170 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2171 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2175 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2176 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2177 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2181 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2182 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2184 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2185 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2189 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2190 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2191 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2192 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2195 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2196 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2198 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2199 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2201 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2202 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2208 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2209 unsigned char *binval;
2212 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2213 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2214 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2217 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2221 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2225 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2227 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2228 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2231 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2232 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2235 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2236 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2237 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2240 memset(binval, 0, len);
2244 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2245 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2246 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2247 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2251 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2254 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2255 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2257 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2258 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2259 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2262 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2263 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2264 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2265 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2266 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2267 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2270 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2271 encodedPoint = NULL;
2277 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
2278 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
2279 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
2282 if (pkey == NULL || md == NULL) {
2283 /* Should never happen */
2284 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2285 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2286 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2290 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2291 * points to the space at the end.
2294 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2295 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2296 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2297 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2300 /* send signature algorithm */
2301 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg))
2304 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2305 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2306 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2309 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2310 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2311 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2312 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2313 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2316 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2317 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2318 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2324 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2325 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2326 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2327 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2328 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx,
2329 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2331 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen) <= 0
2332 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2333 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2334 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2335 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2340 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2343 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2345 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2346 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2349 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2351 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2355 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2358 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2360 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2361 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2362 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt)
2363 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2364 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2368 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2369 const uint16_t *psigs;
2370 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2372 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2373 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2374 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2375 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2376 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2381 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2382 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2383 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2387 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2389 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2390 unsigned char *namebytes;
2391 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2395 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2396 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2398 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2399 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2400 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2405 /* else no CA names */
2407 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2408 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2412 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2416 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2420 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2423 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2425 PACKET psk_identity;
2427 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2428 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2429 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2432 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2433 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2434 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2437 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2438 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2439 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2443 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2444 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2445 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2449 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2452 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2453 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2454 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2456 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2458 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2460 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2461 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2462 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2466 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2467 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2468 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2470 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2471 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2472 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2476 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2480 /* Should never happen */
2481 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2482 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2487 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2490 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2492 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2493 size_t j, padding_len;
2494 PACKET enc_premaster;
2496 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2499 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2501 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2502 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2506 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2507 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2508 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2510 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2511 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2512 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2519 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2520 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2521 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2522 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2524 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2525 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2530 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2531 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2532 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2533 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2538 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2539 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2540 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2541 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2542 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2545 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2549 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2550 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2552 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2553 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2554 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2555 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2556 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2559 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2562 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2563 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2564 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2566 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2567 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2568 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2572 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2573 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2574 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2575 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2576 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2578 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2581 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2582 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2583 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2584 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2585 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2586 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2589 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2590 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2592 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2593 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2596 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2597 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2598 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2599 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2600 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2601 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2604 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2605 unsigned char workaround_good;
2606 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2607 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2609 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2610 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2611 version_good |= workaround_good;
2615 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2616 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2618 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2621 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2622 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2623 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2624 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2626 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2627 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2628 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2629 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2630 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2633 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2634 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2635 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2642 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2645 /* Should never happen */
2646 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2647 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2652 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2654 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2655 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2659 const unsigned char *data;
2660 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2663 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2664 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2665 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2666 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2669 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2671 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2676 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2677 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2678 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2681 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2682 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2683 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2684 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2687 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2688 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2689 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2692 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2693 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2695 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2696 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2697 if (pub_key != NULL)
2702 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2703 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2704 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2709 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2710 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2712 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2715 /* Should never happen */
2716 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2717 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2722 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2724 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2725 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2726 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2729 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2730 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2731 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2732 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2736 const unsigned char *data;
2739 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2740 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2743 /* Get encoded point length */
2744 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2745 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2746 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2747 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2750 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2751 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2752 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2755 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
2756 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2757 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2762 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2763 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2769 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2770 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2772 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2776 /* Should never happen */
2777 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2783 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2787 const unsigned char *data;
2789 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2790 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2791 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2792 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2795 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2796 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2799 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2800 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2801 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2804 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2805 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2806 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2807 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2811 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2812 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2818 /* Should never happen */
2819 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2820 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2825 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2827 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2828 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2829 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2830 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2831 const unsigned char *start;
2832 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2833 unsigned long alg_a;
2836 size_t sess_key_len;
2837 const unsigned char *data;
2840 /* Get our certificate private key */
2841 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2842 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2844 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2846 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2848 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2851 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2853 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2854 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2857 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2858 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2859 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2860 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2863 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2864 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2865 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2869 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2870 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2871 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2872 * client certificate for authorization only.
2874 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2875 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2876 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2879 /* Decrypt session key */
2880 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2881 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
2882 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2883 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2886 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2887 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2888 &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2889 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2890 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2891 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2896 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2897 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2898 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2899 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2902 /* Generate master secret */
2903 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2904 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2905 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2906 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2909 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2910 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2911 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2912 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2916 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2919 /* Should never happen */
2920 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2926 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2929 unsigned long alg_k;
2931 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2933 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2934 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2937 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2938 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2939 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2940 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2942 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2945 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2946 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2947 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2951 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2952 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2954 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2955 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2957 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2958 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2960 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2961 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2963 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2964 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2967 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2968 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2969 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2973 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2976 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2977 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2978 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2979 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2981 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2982 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2985 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2987 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2988 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2989 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2990 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2991 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2993 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2996 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2997 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2999 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3000 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3001 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
3003 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3007 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3008 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3013 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
3015 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
3016 /* Are we renegotiating? */
3018 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
3019 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
3020 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
3021 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
3022 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
3023 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
3024 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
3025 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
3028 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
3032 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3034 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3035 * the handshake_buffer
3037 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3038 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3041 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3043 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3045 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3046 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3050 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3051 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3053 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3054 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3059 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3062 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3064 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3066 unsigned long l, llen;
3067 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3068 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3069 PACKET spkt, context;
3072 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3073 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3077 /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
3078 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context))
3079 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
3080 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
3081 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3082 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3083 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3087 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3088 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3089 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3090 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3091 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3092 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3096 certstart = certbytes;
3097 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3099 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3102 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3103 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3105 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3109 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3110 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3113 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3114 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3115 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
3118 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3120 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3121 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
3122 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3125 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3128 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3129 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3135 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3136 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3137 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3138 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3139 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3140 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3143 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3144 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3145 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3146 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3147 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3148 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3151 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3152 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3157 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3159 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3160 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3161 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3165 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3166 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3169 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3171 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3172 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3173 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3178 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3179 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3180 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3182 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3183 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3186 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3189 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3190 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3191 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3196 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3197 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3201 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3203 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3204 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3205 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3206 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3207 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3211 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3215 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3216 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3219 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3223 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3225 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
3226 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3229 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3234 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3235 * for the server Certificate message
3237 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3238 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &al)) {
3239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3240 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3247 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3249 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3250 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3251 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3252 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3253 const unsigned char *const_p;
3254 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3257 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3258 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3259 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3260 int iv_len, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3261 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3263 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3267 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3268 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0)
3270 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
3273 /* get session encoding length */
3274 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3276 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3279 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3280 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3283 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3285 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3289 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3290 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3291 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3292 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3297 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3301 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3304 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3307 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3309 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3310 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3311 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3315 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3316 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3319 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3322 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3323 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3325 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3326 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3327 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3332 /* Put timeout and length */
3333 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3334 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3335 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3336 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3340 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3341 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3346 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3348 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3350 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3351 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
3353 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3354 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv))
3356 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
3357 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
3358 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3360 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3361 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3365 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3366 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3367 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3369 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3371 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add))
3372 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3373 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3374 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3375 /* Output key name */
3376 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3378 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3379 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3381 /* Encrypt session data */
3382 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3383 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3384 || encdata1 != encdata2
3385 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3386 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3387 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3388 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3389 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3390 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3391 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3392 macendoffset - macoffset)
3393 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3394 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3395 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3396 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3397 || macdata1 != macdata2
3398 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
3400 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
3401 EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3403 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3406 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3407 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3413 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3414 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3415 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3420 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3421 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3423 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3425 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
3426 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
3427 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
3428 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3435 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3437 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
3438 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3447 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3448 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3450 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3452 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3453 size_t next_proto_len;
3456 * The payload looks like:
3458 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3459 * uint8 padding_len;
3460 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3462 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3463 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3464 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3465 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3469 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
3474 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3476 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3478 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3479 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3483 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3487 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3489 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3490 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3491 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3498 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3500 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3501 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3502 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3503 int sslv2format, int *al)
3505 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3506 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3508 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3509 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3511 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3513 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3515 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3517 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3521 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3523 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3524 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3528 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
3530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3531 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3535 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw);
3536 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL;
3537 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
3540 size_t numciphers = PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) / n;
3541 PACKET sslv2ciphers = *cipher_suites;
3542 unsigned int leadbyte;
3546 * We store the raw ciphers list in SSLv3+ format so we need to do some
3547 * preprocessing to convert the list first. If there are any SSLv2 only
3548 * ciphersuites with a non-zero leading byte then we are going to
3549 * slightly over allocate because we won't store those. But that isn't a
3552 raw = OPENSSL_malloc(numciphers * TLS_CIPHER_LEN);
3553 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = raw;
3555 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3558 for (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
3559 PACKET_remaining(&sslv2ciphers) > 0;
3560 raw += TLS_CIPHER_LEN) {
3561 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sslv2ciphers, &leadbyte)
3563 && !PACKET_copy_bytes(&sslv2ciphers, raw,
3566 && !PACKET_forward(&sslv2ciphers, TLS_CIPHER_LEN))) {
3567 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3568 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw);
3569 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL;
3570 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
3574 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen += TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3576 } else if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3577 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3578 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3582 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3584 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3585 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3586 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3588 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3591 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3592 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3593 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3594 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3595 if (s->renegotiate) {
3596 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3597 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3598 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3601 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3605 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3606 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3607 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3609 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3610 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3613 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
3614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3615 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3616 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3622 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3623 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3625 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3627 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3632 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3633 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3641 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
3645 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3647 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3650 * TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT version before release
3651 * (should be s->version)
3653 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
3654 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
3656 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3657 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3661 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
3662 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);