2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
65 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
66 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
67 PACKET *cipher_suites,
69 **skp, int sslv2format,
73 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
74 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
75 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
76 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
78 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
79 * (transition not allowed)
81 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
83 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
86 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
87 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
88 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
90 switch (st->hand_state) {
94 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
95 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
96 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
101 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
102 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
103 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
104 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
108 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
109 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
116 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
117 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
118 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
122 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
129 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
130 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
131 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
137 /* No valid transition found */
138 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
139 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER13_READ_TRANSITION,
140 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
145 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
146 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
147 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
148 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
150 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
151 * (transition not allowed)
153 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
155 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
157 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
158 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
163 switch (st->hand_state) {
169 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
170 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
171 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
176 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
178 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
179 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
181 * 2) If we did request one then
182 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
184 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
185 * list if we requested a certificate)
187 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
188 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
189 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
190 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
191 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
193 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
194 * not going to accept it because we require a client
197 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
198 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
199 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
200 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
203 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
207 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
210 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
211 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
212 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
219 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
220 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
225 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
227 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
228 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
229 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
230 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
231 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
234 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
235 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
237 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
238 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
239 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
240 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
242 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
246 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
247 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
253 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
260 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
261 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
262 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
263 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
264 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
269 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
270 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
273 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
278 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
279 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
280 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
281 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
287 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
288 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
289 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
296 /* No valid transition found */
297 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
298 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
303 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
305 * Valid return values are:
309 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
311 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
314 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
315 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
316 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
317 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
318 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
321 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
323 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
327 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
328 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
329 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
330 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
331 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
334 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
335 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
345 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
347 * Valid return values are:
351 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
354 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
355 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
357 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
358 * during re-negotiation:
360 && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
361 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
363 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
364 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
367 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
369 * ... except when the application insists on
370 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
373 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
374 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
375 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
377 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
380 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
388 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
389 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
392 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
394 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
397 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
398 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
402 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
403 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
406 switch (st->hand_state) {
408 /* Shouldn't happen */
409 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
411 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
412 if (s->hello_retry_request)
413 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
415 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
416 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
418 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
419 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
421 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
422 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
427 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
428 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
429 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
431 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
433 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
435 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
436 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
437 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
440 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
441 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
443 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
444 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
445 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
447 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
448 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
450 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
452 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
453 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
455 * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
456 * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
459 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
462 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
463 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
464 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
465 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
470 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
471 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
473 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
475 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
478 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
479 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
483 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
485 switch (st->hand_state) {
487 /* Shouldn't happen */
488 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
491 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
492 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
493 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
494 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
495 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
497 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
498 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
499 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
500 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
505 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
506 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
508 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
509 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
510 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
511 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
513 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
514 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
515 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
516 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
518 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
519 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
521 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
522 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
524 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
526 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
527 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
529 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
531 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
532 /* normal PSK or SRP */
533 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
534 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
535 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
536 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
537 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
538 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
539 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
541 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
544 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
547 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
548 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
549 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
553 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
554 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
555 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
556 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
560 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
561 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
562 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
563 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
567 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
568 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
569 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
571 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
572 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
574 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
576 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
577 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
578 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
579 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
580 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
582 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
584 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
586 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
587 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
588 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
590 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
591 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
592 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
594 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
596 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
598 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
599 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
600 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
605 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
606 * the server to the client.
608 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
610 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
612 switch (st->hand_state) {
614 /* No pre work to be done */
617 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
620 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
623 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
625 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
626 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
627 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
632 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
633 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
635 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
636 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
642 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
643 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
644 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
645 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
647 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
649 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
650 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
652 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
653 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
654 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
656 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0);
657 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
659 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
660 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
666 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
667 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
668 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
669 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
672 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
674 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
675 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
676 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
677 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
681 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
684 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
687 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
691 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
692 * server to the client.
694 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
696 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
700 switch (st->hand_state) {
702 /* No post work to be done */
705 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
706 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
710 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
711 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
713 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
714 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
719 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
720 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
722 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
723 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
724 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
728 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
729 * treat like it was the first packet
734 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
735 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
736 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
737 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
738 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
741 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
744 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
745 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
747 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
748 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
749 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
751 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
755 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
756 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
760 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
761 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
762 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
763 * something clever in the record layer for this.
765 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
766 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
767 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
768 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)
769 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
770 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
775 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
776 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
777 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
779 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
782 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
786 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
787 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
789 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
794 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
797 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
798 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
802 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
803 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
806 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
808 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
811 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
815 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
816 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
817 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
818 &s->session->master_key_length)
819 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
820 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
825 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
826 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
831 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
835 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
838 * Valid return values are:
842 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
843 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
845 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
847 switch (st->hand_state) {
849 /* Shouldn't happen */
852 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
854 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
856 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
857 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
860 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
861 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
862 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
865 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
866 /* No construction function needed */
868 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
871 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
872 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
873 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
877 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
878 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
881 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
882 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
883 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
887 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
888 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
889 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
892 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
893 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
894 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
897 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
898 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
899 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
902 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
903 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
904 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
907 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
908 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
909 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
912 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
913 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
914 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
917 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
918 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
919 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
922 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
923 *confunc = tls_construct_hello_retry_request;
924 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
932 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
933 * calculated as follows:
935 * 2 + # client_version
936 * 32 + # only valid length for random
937 * 1 + # length of session_id
938 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
939 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
940 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
941 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
942 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
943 * 2 + # length of extensions
944 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
946 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
948 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
949 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
952 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
953 * reading. Excludes the message header.
955 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
957 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
959 switch (st->hand_state) {
961 /* Shouldn't happen */
964 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
965 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
968 return s->max_cert_list;
970 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
971 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
973 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
974 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
976 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
977 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
978 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
981 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
982 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
984 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
985 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
990 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
992 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
994 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
996 switch (st->hand_state) {
998 /* Shouldn't happen */
999 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1001 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1002 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1004 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1005 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1007 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1008 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1010 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1011 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1013 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1014 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1015 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1018 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1019 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1021 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1022 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1027 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1030 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1032 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1034 switch (st->hand_state) {
1036 /* Shouldn't happen */
1039 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1040 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1042 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1043 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1045 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1046 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1047 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
1048 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
1049 /* Are we renegotiating? */
1050 && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
1051 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1052 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1053 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1054 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1055 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
1058 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
1061 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1063 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1066 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1067 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
1069 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
1071 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1073 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1074 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1075 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1077 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1080 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
1081 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
1083 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
1090 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1093 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1094 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1095 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1101 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1103 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1104 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1105 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1106 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1107 cookie_leni > 255) {
1108 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1109 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1112 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1114 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1115 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1116 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1125 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1126 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1127 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1132 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1133 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1134 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1135 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1137 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1139 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1140 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1141 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1142 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1143 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1144 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1145 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1147 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1148 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1149 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1150 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1151 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1152 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1153 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1154 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1155 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1156 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1157 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1158 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1159 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1161 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1162 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1167 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1169 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1170 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1171 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1175 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1178 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1179 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1181 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1184 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1186 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1188 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1192 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1194 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1196 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1198 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1199 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1200 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1201 CLIENTHELLO_MSG clienthello;
1203 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1204 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1209 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
1210 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
1213 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1215 memset(&clienthello, 0, sizeof(clienthello));
1216 clienthello.isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1217 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1219 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1222 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) || s->hello_retry_request) {
1223 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1224 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1229 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1230 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1231 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1232 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1234 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1235 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1237 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1238 * 7-8 session_id_length
1239 * 9-10 challenge_length
1243 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1244 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1246 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1247 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1248 * in the first place
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1255 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello.legacy_version)) {
1256 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1261 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1262 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1264 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1265 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1266 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1268 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1271 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1272 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1273 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1274 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1275 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1276 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1280 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1281 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1282 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1286 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites,
1288 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.session_id, session_id_len)
1289 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1290 /* No extensions. */
1291 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1292 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1293 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1294 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1297 clienthello.session_id_len = session_id_len;
1299 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1300 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello.random) because that is the limit
1301 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1302 * sizeof(clienthello.random) does.
1304 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1305 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1306 memset(clienthello.random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1307 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1308 clienthello.random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1309 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1310 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1311 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1312 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1313 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1317 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
1319 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1320 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1321 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1322 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello.session_id,
1323 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1324 &clienthello.session_id_len)) {
1325 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1326 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1330 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1331 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1332 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1333 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1336 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
1337 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1338 &clienthello.dtls_cookie_len)) {
1339 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1340 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1344 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1345 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1346 * So check cookie length...
1348 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1349 if (clienthello.dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1354 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.ciphersuites)) {
1355 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1356 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1360 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1361 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1362 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1366 /* Could be empty. */
1367 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1368 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello.extensions);
1370 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello.extensions)) {
1371 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1372 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1378 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello.compressions,
1379 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1380 &clienthello.compressions_len)) {
1381 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1382 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1386 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1387 extensions = clienthello.extensions;
1388 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1389 &clienthello.pre_proc_exts, &al)) {
1390 /* SSLerr already been called */
1394 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1396 /* Set up the client_random */
1397 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello.random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1399 /* Choose the version */
1401 if (clienthello.isv2) {
1402 if (clienthello.legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1403 || (clienthello.legacy_version & 0xff00)
1404 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1406 * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
1409 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1413 s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
1416 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1417 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1419 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1420 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
1421 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1422 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello.legacy_version, s->version)) {
1423 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1430 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1431 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1432 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello.legacy_version;
1434 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1438 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1439 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1440 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1441 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1442 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello.dtls_cookie,
1443 clienthello.dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1444 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1445 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1446 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1448 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1450 /* default verification */
1451 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello.dtls_cookie_len
1452 || memcmp(clienthello.dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1453 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1454 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1455 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1458 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1460 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1461 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, &clienthello);
1462 if (protverr != 0) {
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1464 s->version = s->client_version;
1465 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1473 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1474 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1476 clienthello.pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1482 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1483 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1485 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1486 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1487 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1488 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1489 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1490 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1491 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1492 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1493 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1494 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1497 if (clienthello.isv2 ||
1499 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1500 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1503 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &clienthello, &al);
1505 /* previous session */
1507 } else if (i == -1) {
1511 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1516 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello.ciphersuites, &ciphers,
1517 clienthello.isv2, &al) == NULL) {
1521 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1524 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1527 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1529 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1530 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1532 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1533 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1542 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1545 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1546 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1547 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1552 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello.compressions_len; loop++) {
1553 if (clienthello.compressions[loop] == 0)
1557 if (loop >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
1559 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1565 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1566 ssl_check_for_safari(s, &clienthello);
1567 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1569 /* TLS extensions */
1570 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1571 clienthello.pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1572 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1577 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1578 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1579 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1580 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1584 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1585 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1590 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1591 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1593 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1594 * backwards compat reasons
1596 int master_key_length;
1598 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1599 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1600 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1602 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1603 && master_key_length > 0) {
1604 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1606 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1607 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1611 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1612 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1613 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1614 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1615 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1616 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1617 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1621 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1622 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1623 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1624 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1625 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1630 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1631 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1632 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1634 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1635 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1636 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1637 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1638 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1640 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1641 /* Can't disable compression */
1642 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1644 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1647 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1648 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1649 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1650 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1651 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1655 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1656 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1657 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1660 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1661 for (k = 0; k < clienthello.compressions_len; k++) {
1662 if (clienthello.compressions[k] == comp_id)
1665 if (k >= clienthello.compressions_len) {
1666 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1667 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1668 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1673 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1674 /* See if we have a match */
1675 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1678 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1679 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1680 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1682 for (o = 0; o < clienthello.compressions_len; o++) {
1683 if (v == clienthello.compressions[o]) {
1692 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1698 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1699 * using compression.
1701 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1708 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1712 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1713 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1715 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1717 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1718 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1719 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1720 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1725 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1726 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1731 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1732 OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
1733 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1735 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1737 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1739 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1740 OPENSSL_free(clienthello.pre_proc_exts);
1742 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1746 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1747 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
1749 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s, int *al)
1751 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1754 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1755 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
1756 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
1757 * influence which certificate is sent
1759 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
1760 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
1763 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1764 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
1766 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1767 * et al can pick it up.
1769 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
1770 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
1772 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1773 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1774 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1776 /* status request response should be sent */
1777 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1778 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
1779 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1781 /* something bad happened */
1782 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1784 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1793 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1795 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1796 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1798 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1800 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1801 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1802 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1804 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1805 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1806 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1810 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1813 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1816 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1818 if (cipher == NULL) {
1819 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1820 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1823 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1824 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, &al))
1826 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1827 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1828 s->session->not_resumable =
1829 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, ((cipher->algorithm_mkey
1830 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
1832 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1833 /* do not send a session ticket */
1834 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1836 /* Session-id reuse */
1837 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1841 * we now have the following setup.
1843 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
1844 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
1845 * compression - basically ignored right now
1846 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1847 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1848 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1849 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1853 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
1854 * certificate callbacks etc above.
1856 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s, &al)) {
1857 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1858 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1865 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1867 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
1869 * callback indicates further work to be done
1871 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1874 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
1876 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
1877 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
1879 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
1880 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1881 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1883 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1884 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
1890 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1892 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1893 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1897 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1899 int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1903 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
1904 version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version;
1905 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
1907 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1908 * tls_process_client_hello()
1910 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1911 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1916 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1917 * back in the server hello:
1918 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1919 * we send back the old session ID.
1920 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1921 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1922 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1923 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1925 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1926 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1927 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1928 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1931 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1932 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1934 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1936 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1937 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1938 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1942 /* set up the compression method */
1943 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1946 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1949 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1952 if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1953 && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl))
1954 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
1955 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1956 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm))
1957 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
1959 ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1960 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO,
1962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1966 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
1967 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1968 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1974 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1978 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1980 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
1981 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
1982 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1989 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1992 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
1994 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1995 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1996 size_t encodedlen = 0;
1999 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
2000 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
2003 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2004 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2005 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2007 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2012 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2013 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2017 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2019 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2020 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2021 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2022 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2024 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2025 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2026 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2027 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2029 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2032 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2033 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2034 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2035 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2037 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2038 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2041 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2044 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2046 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2047 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2048 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2050 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2051 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2056 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2057 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2058 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2059 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2062 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2063 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2064 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2066 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2069 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2070 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2071 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2075 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2077 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2078 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2082 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2084 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2087 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2088 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2092 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2095 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2096 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2097 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2101 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2102 nid = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2103 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
2104 if (curve_id == 0) {
2105 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2106 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2109 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
2110 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2111 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2112 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2116 /* Encode the public key. */
2117 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2119 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2120 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2125 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2126 * can set these to NULLs
2133 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2134 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2135 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2136 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2137 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2138 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2139 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2140 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2143 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2144 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2145 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2146 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2150 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2151 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2152 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2156 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2157 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2159 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2160 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2165 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2166 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2167 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2170 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2171 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2173 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2174 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2176 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2177 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2183 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2184 unsigned char *binval;
2187 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2188 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2189 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2192 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2195 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2196 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2200 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2202 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2203 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2206 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2207 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2210 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2211 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2212 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2215 memset(binval, 0, len);
2219 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2220 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2221 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2222 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2226 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2229 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2230 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2232 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2233 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2234 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2237 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2238 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2239 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2240 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2241 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2242 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2245 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2246 encodedPoint = NULL;
2252 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
2253 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
2254 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
2257 if (pkey == NULL || md == NULL) {
2258 /* Should never happen */
2259 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2260 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2261 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2265 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2266 * points to the space at the end.
2269 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2270 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2271 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2272 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2275 /* send signature algorithm */
2276 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg))
2279 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2280 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2281 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2284 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2285 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2286 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2287 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2288 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2291 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2292 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2293 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2294 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2299 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2300 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2301 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2302 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2303 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx,
2304 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2306 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen) <= 0
2307 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2308 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2309 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2310 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2315 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2318 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2320 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2321 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2324 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2326 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2330 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2333 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2335 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2336 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2337 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt)
2338 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2339 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2343 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2344 const uint16_t *psigs;
2345 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2347 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2348 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2349 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2350 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2351 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2356 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2357 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2358 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2362 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2364 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2365 unsigned char *namebytes;
2366 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2370 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2371 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2373 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2374 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2375 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2380 /* else no CA names */
2382 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2383 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2387 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2391 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2395 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2397 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2398 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2400 PACKET psk_identity;
2402 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2403 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2407 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2408 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2409 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2412 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2413 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2414 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2418 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2419 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2420 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2424 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2427 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2428 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2429 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2431 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2433 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2435 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2436 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2437 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2441 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2442 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2443 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2445 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2446 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2447 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2451 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2455 /* Should never happen */
2456 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2457 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2462 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2464 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2465 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2467 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2468 size_t j, padding_len;
2469 PACKET enc_premaster;
2471 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2474 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2476 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2477 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2481 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2482 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2483 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2485 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2486 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2487 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2488 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2494 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2495 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2496 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2497 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2499 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2500 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2501 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2505 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2506 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2507 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2513 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2514 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2515 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2516 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2517 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2520 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2524 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2525 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2527 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2528 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2529 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2530 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2531 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2534 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2537 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2538 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2539 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2541 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2542 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2543 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2547 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2548 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2549 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2550 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2551 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2553 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2556 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2557 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2558 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2559 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2560 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2561 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2564 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2565 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2567 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2568 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2571 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2572 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2573 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2574 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2575 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2576 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2579 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2580 unsigned char workaround_good;
2581 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2582 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2584 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2585 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2586 version_good |= workaround_good;
2590 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2591 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2593 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2596 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2597 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2598 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2599 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2601 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2602 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2603 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2604 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2605 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2608 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2609 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2610 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2611 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2617 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2620 /* Should never happen */
2621 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2622 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2627 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2629 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2630 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2634 const unsigned char *data;
2635 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2638 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2639 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2640 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2641 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2644 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2646 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2647 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2651 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2652 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2653 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2656 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2657 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2658 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2659 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2662 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2663 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2664 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2667 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2668 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2670 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2671 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2672 if (pub_key != NULL)
2677 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2678 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2684 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2685 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2687 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2690 /* Should never happen */
2691 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2692 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2697 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2699 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2700 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2701 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2704 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2705 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2706 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2707 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2711 const unsigned char *data;
2714 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2715 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2718 /* Get encoded point length */
2719 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2720 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2721 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2722 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2725 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2726 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2730 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
2731 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2732 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2737 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2738 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2739 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2744 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2745 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2747 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2751 /* Should never happen */
2752 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2753 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2758 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2760 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2762 const unsigned char *data;
2764 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2765 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2766 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2767 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2770 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2771 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2774 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2775 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2776 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2779 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2780 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2781 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2782 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2786 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2787 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2793 /* Should never happen */
2794 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2795 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2800 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2802 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2803 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2804 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2805 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2806 const unsigned char *start;
2807 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2808 unsigned long alg_a;
2811 size_t sess_key_len;
2812 const unsigned char *data;
2815 /* Get our certificate private key */
2816 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2817 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
2819 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
2821 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
2823 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
2826 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2828 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
2829 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2832 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2833 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2834 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2838 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
2839 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2840 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2844 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2845 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2846 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2847 * client certificate for authorization only.
2849 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2850 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2851 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2854 /* Decrypt session key */
2855 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
2856 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
2857 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2858 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2861 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2862 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
2863 &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
2864 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2865 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2866 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2871 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2872 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2873 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2874 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2877 /* Generate master secret */
2878 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2879 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2880 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2881 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2884 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2885 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2886 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2887 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
2891 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2894 /* Should never happen */
2895 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2896 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2901 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2904 unsigned long alg_k;
2906 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2908 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2909 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2912 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2913 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2914 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2915 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2916 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2917 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2920 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2921 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2922 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2923 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2926 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2927 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2929 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2930 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2932 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2933 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2935 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2936 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2938 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2939 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2942 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2943 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2944 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2948 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2951 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2952 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2953 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2954 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2956 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2957 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2960 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2963 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2964 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2965 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2966 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2968 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2971 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2972 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2974 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2975 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2976 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
2978 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2982 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2983 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2988 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
2990 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2991 /* Are we renegotiating? */
2993 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
2994 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
2995 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
2996 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
2997 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
2998 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
2999 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
3000 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
3003 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
3007 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3009 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3010 * the handshake_buffer
3012 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3013 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3016 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3018 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3019 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3020 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3021 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3025 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3026 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3028 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3029 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3034 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3037 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3039 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3041 unsigned long l, llen;
3042 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3043 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3044 PACKET spkt, context;
3047 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3048 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3052 /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
3053 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context))
3054 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
3055 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
3056 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3057 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3058 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3062 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3063 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3064 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3065 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3067 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3071 certstart = certbytes;
3072 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3074 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3077 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3078 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3079 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3080 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3084 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3085 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3088 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3089 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3090 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
3093 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3095 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3096 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
3097 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3100 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3103 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3110 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3111 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3112 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3113 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3114 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3115 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3118 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3119 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3120 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3121 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3122 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3123 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3126 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3127 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3132 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3134 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3136 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3140 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3141 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3144 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3146 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3147 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3148 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3153 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3154 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3155 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3157 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3158 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3161 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3164 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3165 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3166 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3171 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3172 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3176 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3178 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3179 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3180 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3181 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3182 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3186 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3190 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3191 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3194 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3198 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3200 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
3201 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3204 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3209 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3210 * for the server Certificate message
3212 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3213 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &al)) {
3214 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3215 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3222 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3224 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3225 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3226 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3227 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3228 const unsigned char *const_p;
3229 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3232 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3233 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3234 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3235 int iv_len, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3236 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3238 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3242 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3243 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0)
3245 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
3248 /* get session encoding length */
3249 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3251 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3254 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3255 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3258 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3260 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3264 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3265 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3266 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3272 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3276 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3279 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3282 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3284 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3285 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3286 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3290 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3291 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3294 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3297 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3298 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3300 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3301 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3302 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3307 /* Put timeout and length */
3308 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3309 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3310 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3311 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3315 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3316 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3321 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3323 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3325 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3326 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
3328 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3329 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv))
3331 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
3332 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
3333 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3335 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3336 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3340 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3341 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3342 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3344 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3346 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add))
3347 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3348 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3349 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3350 /* Output key name */
3351 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3353 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3354 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3356 /* Encrypt session data */
3357 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3358 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3359 || encdata1 != encdata2
3360 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3361 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3362 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3363 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3364 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3365 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3366 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3367 macendoffset - macoffset)
3368 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3369 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3370 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3371 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3372 || macdata1 != macdata2
3373 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
3375 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
3376 EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3378 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3381 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3382 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3388 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3389 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3390 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3395 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3396 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3398 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3400 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
3401 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
3402 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
3403 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3410 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3412 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
3413 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3422 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3423 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3425 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3427 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3428 size_t next_proto_len;
3431 * The payload looks like:
3433 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3434 * uint8 padding_len;
3435 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3437 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3438 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3439 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3440 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3444 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
3449 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3451 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3453 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3454 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3458 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3462 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3464 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3465 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3466 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3473 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3475 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
3476 PACKET *cipher_suites,
3477 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3478 int sslv2format, int *al)
3480 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3481 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3483 /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
3484 unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
3486 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3488 n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3490 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
3491 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
3492 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
3496 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
3497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3498 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3499 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3503 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
3505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3506 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3510 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw);
3511 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL;
3512 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
3515 size_t numciphers = PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) / n;
3516 PACKET sslv2ciphers = *cipher_suites;
3517 unsigned int leadbyte;
3521 * We store the raw ciphers list in SSLv3+ format so we need to do some
3522 * preprocessing to convert the list first. If there are any SSLv2 only
3523 * ciphersuites with a non-zero leading byte then we are going to
3524 * slightly over allocate because we won't store those. But that isn't a
3527 raw = OPENSSL_malloc(numciphers * TLS_CIPHER_LEN);
3528 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = raw;
3530 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3533 for (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
3534 PACKET_remaining(&sslv2ciphers) > 0;
3535 raw += TLS_CIPHER_LEN) {
3536 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sslv2ciphers, &leadbyte)
3538 && !PACKET_copy_bytes(&sslv2ciphers, raw,
3541 && !PACKET_forward(&sslv2ciphers, TLS_CIPHER_LEN))) {
3542 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3543 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw);
3544 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL;
3545 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0;
3549 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen += TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
3551 } else if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
3552 &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
3553 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3557 while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
3559 * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
3560 * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
3561 * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
3563 if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
3566 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3567 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3568 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3569 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3570 if (s->renegotiate) {
3571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3572 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3573 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3576 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3580 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3581 if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3582 (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3584 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3585 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3588 if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
3589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3590 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3591 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
3597 /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
3598 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
3600 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3601 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3602 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3607 if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
3608 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3616 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
3620 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3622 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3625 * TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT version before release
3626 * (should be s->version)
3628 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
3629 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
3631 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3632 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3636 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
3637 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);