2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
59 #include <openssl/x509.h>
60 #include <openssl/dh.h>
61 #include <openssl/bn.h>
62 #include <openssl/md5.h>
64 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
65 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
68 * ossl_statem_server13_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
69 * handshake state transitions when a TLSv1.3 server is reading messages from
70 * the client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|.
71 * The current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
73 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
74 * (transition not allowed)
76 static int ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
78 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
81 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_BEFORE because at that stage we have
82 * not negotiated TLSv1.3 yet, so that case is handled by
83 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition()
85 switch (st->hand_state) {
89 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
90 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
91 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
96 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
97 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
98 if (mt == SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) {
99 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
106 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
107 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
108 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
109 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
110 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
114 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
115 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
122 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
123 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
124 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
128 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
129 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
135 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
136 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
137 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
144 * Its never ok to start processing handshake messages in the middle of
145 * early data (i.e. before we've received the end of early data alert)
147 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING)
149 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
150 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE;
156 /* No valid transition found */
161 * ossl_statem_server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
162 * handshake state transitions when the server is reading messages from the
163 * client. The message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The
164 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
166 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
167 * (transition not allowed)
169 int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
171 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
173 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
174 if (!ossl_statem_server13_read_transition(s, mt))
179 switch (st->hand_state) {
185 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
186 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
187 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO;
192 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
194 * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either
195 * 1) We didn't request a Certificate
197 * 2) If we did request one then
198 * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned
200 * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0
201 * list if we requested a certificate)
203 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
204 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
205 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
206 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
207 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
209 * This isn't an unexpected message as such - we're just
210 * not going to accept it because we require a client
213 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
214 SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
215 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION,
216 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
219 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
223 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
226 } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
227 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
228 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT;
235 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
236 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH;
241 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
243 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have
244 * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer|
245 * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is
246 * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in
247 * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be
250 if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) {
251 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
253 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
254 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
255 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
256 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
258 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
262 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
263 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY;
269 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
270 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
271 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
276 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
277 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
278 if (s->s3->npn_seen) {
279 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) {
280 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO;
285 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
286 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
289 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
294 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
295 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
296 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
297 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED;
303 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
304 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
305 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE;
312 /* No valid transition found */
313 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
314 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_SERVER_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
319 * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message?
321 * Valid return values are:
325 static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
327 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
330 * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a
331 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
332 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
333 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
334 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
337 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)
339 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
342 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
343 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
344 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK))
345 && s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
346 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
347 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
350 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
351 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
361 * Should we send a CertificateRequest message?
363 * Valid return values are:
367 static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
370 /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
371 s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER
373 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
374 * during re-negotiation:
376 && (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 ||
377 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE))
379 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
380 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
383 && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
385 * ... except when the application insists on
386 * verification (against the specs, but statem_clnt.c accepts
389 || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
390 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
391 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
393 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
396 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) {
404 * ossl_statem_server13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
405 * move to next when a TLSv1.3 server is writing messages to be sent to the
408 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(SSL *s)
410 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
413 * No case for TLS_ST_BEFORE, because at that stage we have not negotiated
414 * TLSv1.3 yet, so that is handled by ossl_statem_server_write_transition()
417 switch (st->hand_state) {
419 /* Shouldn't happen */
420 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
423 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
424 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
425 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
427 /* Try to read from the client instead */
428 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
430 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
431 if (s->hello_retry_request)
432 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
435 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
437 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
438 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
440 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
441 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
442 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
444 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
446 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
447 else if (send_certificate_request(s))
448 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
452 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
454 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
455 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
459 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY;
460 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
462 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
463 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
464 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
466 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
467 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
468 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
470 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
471 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
473 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
475 * Technically we have finished the handshake at this point, but we're
476 * going to remain "in_init" for now and write out the session ticket
478 * TODO(TLS1.3): Perhaps we need to be able to control this behaviour
479 * and give the application the opportunity to delay sending the
482 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
483 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
485 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
486 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
487 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE;
488 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
492 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
493 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
494 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
495 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
500 * ossl_statem_server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move
501 * to next when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client.
503 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s)
505 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
508 * Note that before the ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
509 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
513 return ossl_statem_server13_write_transition(s);
515 switch (st->hand_state) {
517 /* Shouldn't happen */
518 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
521 if (st->request_state == TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ) {
522 /* We must be trying to renegotiate */
523 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ;
524 st->request_state = TLS_ST_BEFORE;
525 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
527 /* Must be an incoming ClientHello */
528 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
529 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
530 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
535 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */
536 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
538 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
539 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
540 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
542 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
543 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified
544 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE))
545 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
547 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO;
548 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
550 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
551 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
553 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
555 if (s->ext.ticket_expected)
556 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
558 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
560 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
561 /* normal PSK or SRP */
562 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
563 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
564 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT;
565 } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
567 } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
568 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
570 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
573 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
576 if (s->ext.status_expected) {
577 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS;
578 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
582 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
583 if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) {
584 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH;
585 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
589 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
590 if (send_certificate_request(s)) {
591 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ;
592 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
596 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
597 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE;
598 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
600 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
601 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
603 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
605 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
606 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
607 } else if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
608 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET;
610 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
612 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
614 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
615 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE;
616 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
618 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
619 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED;
620 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
622 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
624 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
626 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
627 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
632 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
633 * the server to the client.
635 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
637 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
639 switch (st->hand_state) {
641 /* No pre work to be done */
644 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
647 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
650 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
652 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
653 dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(s);
654 /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */
659 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
660 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
662 * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and
663 * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now
669 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
671 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
672 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
674 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
676 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
677 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
679 * Actually this is the end of the handshake, but we're going
680 * straight into writing the session ticket out. So we finish off
681 * the handshake, but keep the various buffers active.
683 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0);
684 } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
686 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
687 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer
693 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
694 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
695 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
696 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
699 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
701 * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight
702 * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have
703 * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message,
704 * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't.
708 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
710 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
711 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING)
712 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
716 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
719 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
723 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
724 * server to the client.
726 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
728 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
732 switch (st->hand_state) {
734 /* No post work to be done */
737 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
738 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
742 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
743 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
745 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
746 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
751 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
752 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
754 /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */
755 if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && !ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
756 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
760 * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to
761 * treat like it was the first packet
766 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
767 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
768 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
769 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
770 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
773 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no
776 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
777 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
779 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
780 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
781 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
783 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
787 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
788 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
792 * TODO(TLS1.3): This actually causes a problem. We don't yet know
793 * whether the next record we are going to receive is an unencrypted
794 * alert, or an encrypted handshake message. We're going to need
795 * something clever in the record layer for this.
797 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
798 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
799 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
800 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
803 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED
804 && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
805 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE |SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
810 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
811 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
812 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
814 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
817 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
821 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
822 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
824 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
829 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
832 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
833 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
837 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
838 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
841 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
843 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
846 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
850 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
851 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
852 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
853 &s->session->master_key_length)
854 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
855 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
860 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
861 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
863 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
867 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
868 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && statem_flush(s) != 1)
873 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
877 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
880 * Valid return values are:
884 int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
885 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
887 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
889 switch (st->hand_state) {
891 /* Shouldn't happen */
894 case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE:
896 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
898 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
899 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
902 case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
903 *confunc = dtls_construct_hello_verify_request;
904 *mt = DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
907 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ:
908 /* No construction function needed */
910 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
913 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO:
914 *confunc = tls_construct_server_hello;
915 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
919 *confunc = tls_construct_server_certificate;
920 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
923 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY:
924 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
925 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
929 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH:
930 *confunc = tls_construct_server_key_exchange;
931 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
934 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ:
935 *confunc = tls_construct_certificate_request;
936 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
939 case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE:
940 *confunc = tls_construct_server_done;
941 *mt = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
944 case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET:
945 *confunc = tls_construct_new_session_ticket;
946 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
949 case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS:
950 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_status;
951 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
954 case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED:
955 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
956 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
959 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
964 case TLS_ST_SW_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
965 *confunc = tls_construct_encrypted_extensions;
966 *mt = SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
969 case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
970 *confunc = tls_construct_hello_retry_request;
971 *mt = SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
974 case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE:
975 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
976 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
984 * Maximum size (excluding the Handshake header) of a ClientHello message,
985 * calculated as follows:
987 * 2 + # client_version
988 * 32 + # only valid length for random
989 * 1 + # length of session_id
990 * 32 + # maximum size for session_id
991 * 2 + # length of cipher suites
992 * 2^16-2 + # maximum length of cipher suites array
993 * 1 + # length of compression_methods
994 * 2^8-1 + # maximum length of compression methods
995 * 2 + # length of extensions
996 * 2^16-1 # maximum length of extensions
998 #define CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH 131396
1000 #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048
1001 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514
1004 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
1005 * reading. Excludes the message header.
1007 size_t ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s)
1009 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1011 switch (st->hand_state) {
1013 /* Shouldn't happen */
1016 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1017 return CLIENT_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
1019 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1020 return END_OF_EARLY_DATA_MAX_LENGTH;
1022 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1023 return s->max_cert_list;
1025 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1026 return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
1028 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1029 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1031 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1032 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1033 return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH;
1036 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1037 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1039 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1040 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1042 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1043 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1048 * Process a message that the server has received from the client.
1050 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1052 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1054 switch (st->hand_state) {
1056 /* Shouldn't happen */
1057 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1059 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1060 return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt);
1062 case TLS_ST_SR_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
1063 return tls_process_end_of_early_data(s, pkt);
1065 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT:
1066 return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt);
1068 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1069 return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1071 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1072 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1074 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1075 case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO:
1076 return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt);
1079 case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE:
1080 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1082 case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED:
1083 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1085 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_UPDATE:
1086 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1092 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1095 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1097 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1099 switch (st->hand_state) {
1101 /* Shouldn't happen */
1104 case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO:
1105 return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst);
1107 case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH:
1108 return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst);
1110 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
1111 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1112 if ( /* Is this SCTP? */
1113 BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
1114 /* Are we renegotiating? */
1115 && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
1116 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1117 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1118 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1119 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1120 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
1123 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
1126 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1128 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1131 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1132 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
1134 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
1136 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1138 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
1139 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
1140 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
1142 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
1145 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
1146 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
1148 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
1155 int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie,
1158 /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */
1159 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, DTLS1_VERSION)
1160 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, cookie, cookie_len))
1166 int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1168 unsigned int cookie_leni;
1169 if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL ||
1170 s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie,
1171 &cookie_leni) == 0 ||
1172 cookie_leni > 255) {
1173 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,
1174 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1177 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_leni;
1179 if (!dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1180 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1190 * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1191 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |hello|.
1192 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1197 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1198 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1199 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1200 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1202 static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
1204 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1205 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1206 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1207 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1208 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1209 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1210 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1212 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1213 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1214 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1215 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1216 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1217 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1218 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1219 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1220 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1221 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1222 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1223 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1224 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1226 /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
1227 static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
1232 tmppkt = hello->extensions;
1234 if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
1235 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
1236 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
1240 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1243 ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
1244 sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
1246 s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
1249 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1251 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1253 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1254 /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
1255 PACKET session_id, compression, extensions, cookie;
1256 static const unsigned char null_compression = 0;
1257 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello;
1259 clienthello = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*clienthello));
1260 if (clienthello == NULL) {
1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1264 /* Check if this is actually an unexpected renegotiation ClientHello */
1265 if (s->renegotiate == 0 && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1271 * First, parse the raw ClientHello data into the CLIENTHELLO_MSG structure.
1273 clienthello->isv2 = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
1274 PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
1276 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1279 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) || s->hello_retry_request) {
1280 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1281 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1286 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
1287 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
1288 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
1289 * the rest right through. Its format is:
1291 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
1292 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
1294 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
1295 * 7-8 session_id_length
1296 * 9-10 challenge_length
1300 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
1301 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
1303 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
1304 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
1305 * in the first place
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1312 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &clienthello->legacy_version)) {
1313 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1318 /* Parse the message and load client random. */
1319 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1321 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1322 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1323 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected below.
1325 unsigned int ciphersuite_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
1328 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ciphersuite_len)
1329 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
1330 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
1331 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1332 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1333 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1337 if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) {
1338 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1339 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1343 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1345 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->session_id, session_id_len)
1346 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
1347 /* No extensions. */
1348 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1349 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1350 SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1351 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1354 clienthello->session_id_len = session_id_len;
1356 /* Load the client random and compression list. We use SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1357 * here rather than sizeof(clienthello->random) because that is the limit
1358 * for SSLv3 and it is fixed. It won't change even if
1359 * sizeof(clienthello->random) does.
1361 challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1362 ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len;
1363 memset(clienthello->random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1364 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
1365 clienthello->random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
1366 challenge_len, challenge_len)
1367 /* Advertise only null compression. */
1368 || !PACKET_buf_init(&compression, &null_compression, 1)) {
1369 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1370 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1374 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1376 /* Regular ClientHello. */
1377 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1378 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)
1379 || !PACKET_copy_all(&session_id, clienthello->session_id,
1380 SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH,
1381 &clienthello->session_id_len)) {
1382 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1383 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1387 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1388 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
1389 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1390 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1393 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&cookie, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1394 DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH,
1395 &clienthello->dtls_cookie_len)) {
1396 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1401 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
1402 * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
1403 * So check cookie length...
1405 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1406 if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0)
1411 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->ciphersuites)) {
1412 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1417 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1418 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1419 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1423 /* Could be empty. */
1424 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1425 PACKET_null_init(&clienthello->extensions);
1427 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &clienthello->extensions)) {
1428 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1429 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1435 if (!PACKET_copy_all(&compression, clienthello->compressions,
1436 MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE,
1437 &clienthello->compressions_len)) {
1438 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1439 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1443 /* Preserve the raw extensions PACKET for later use */
1444 extensions = clienthello->extensions;
1445 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1446 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts, &al,
1447 &clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len)) {
1448 /* SSLerr already been called */
1451 s->clienthello = clienthello;
1453 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
1455 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1457 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1459 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1460 OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
1462 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1465 static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, int *al)
1472 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1473 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
1475 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1476 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
1477 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL;
1478 CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello = s->clienthello;
1480 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1481 /* Finished parsing the ClientHello, now we can start processing it */
1482 /* Give the early callback a crack at things */
1483 if (s->ctx->early_cb != NULL) {
1485 /* A failure in the early callback terminates the connection. */
1486 code = s->ctx->early_cb(s, al, s->ctx->early_cb_arg);
1490 s->rwstate = SSL_EARLY_WORK;
1495 /* Set up the client_random */
1496 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, clienthello->random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1498 /* Choose the version */
1500 if (clienthello->isv2) {
1501 if (clienthello->legacy_version == SSL2_VERSION
1502 || (clienthello->legacy_version & 0xff00)
1503 != (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
1505 * This is real SSLv2 or something complete unknown. We don't
1508 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
1512 s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1515 * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check
1516 * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later.
1518 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1519 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello);
1520 } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION &&
1521 DTLS_VERSION_LT((int)clienthello->legacy_version, s->version)) {
1522 protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1528 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1529 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
1530 /* like ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
1531 s->version = s->client_version = clienthello->legacy_version;
1533 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1537 /* TLSv1.3 defines that a ClientHello must end on a record boundary */
1538 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1539 *al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1540 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1541 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1545 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1546 /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
1547 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1548 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1549 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, clienthello->dtls_cookie,
1550 clienthello->dtls_cookie_len) == 0) {
1551 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1553 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1555 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1557 /* default verification */
1558 } else if (s->d1->cookie_len != clienthello->dtls_cookie_len
1559 || memcmp(clienthello->dtls_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1560 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1561 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1562 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1565 s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
1567 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1568 protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s, clienthello);
1569 if (protverr != 0) {
1570 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1571 s->version = s->client_version;
1572 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1580 /* We need to do this before getting the session */
1581 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret,
1583 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, al)) {
1584 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1589 * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
1590 * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
1592 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1593 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1594 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1595 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1596 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1597 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1598 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1599 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1600 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1601 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1604 if (clienthello->isv2 ||
1606 (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1607 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1610 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, clienthello, al);
1612 /* previous session */
1614 } else if (i == -1) {
1618 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1623 if (!ssl_cache_cipherlist(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites,
1624 clienthello->isv2, al) ||
1625 !bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &clienthello->ciphersuites, &ciphers, &scsvs,
1626 clienthello->isv2, al)) {
1630 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
1631 /* Check what signalling cipher-suite values were received. */
1632 if (scsvs != NULL) {
1633 for(i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(scsvs); i++) {
1634 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(scsvs, i);
1635 if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
1636 if (s->renegotiate) {
1637 /* SCSV is fatal if renegotiating */
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1639 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
1640 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1643 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
1644 } else if (SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) == SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV &&
1645 !ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) {
1647 * This SCSV indicates that the client previously tried
1648 * a higher version. We should fail if the current version
1649 * is an unexpected downgrade, as that indicates that the first
1650 * connection may have been tampered with in order to trigger
1651 * an insecure downgrade.
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1654 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1655 *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
1661 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1664 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1667 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1669 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1670 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1672 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1673 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1682 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1685 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1687 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1692 for (loop = 0; loop < clienthello->compressions_len; loop++) {
1693 if (clienthello->compressions[loop] == 0)
1697 if (loop >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1699 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1704 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1705 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1706 ssl_check_for_safari(s, clienthello);
1707 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1709 /* TLS extensions */
1710 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1711 clienthello->pre_proc_exts, NULL, 0, al)) {
1712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1717 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1718 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1719 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1720 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1724 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1725 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1730 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
1731 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1733 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1734 * backwards compat reasons
1736 int master_key_length;
1738 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1739 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1740 &master_key_length, ciphers,
1742 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1743 && master_key_length > 0) {
1744 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1746 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1747 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1751 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1752 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1753 pref_cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1754 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1755 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1756 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1757 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1761 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1762 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1763 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1764 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1765 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1770 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1771 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1772 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1774 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1775 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1776 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1777 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1778 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1780 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1781 /* Can't disable compression */
1782 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1784 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1787 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1788 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1789 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1790 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1791 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1795 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1796 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1797 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1800 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1801 for (k = 0; k < clienthello->compressions_len; k++) {
1802 if (clienthello->compressions[k] == comp_id)
1805 if (k >= clienthello->compressions_len) {
1806 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1807 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1808 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1811 } else if (s->hit) {
1813 } else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods
1814 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1815 /* See if we have a match */
1816 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1819 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1820 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1821 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1823 for (o = 0; o < clienthello->compressions_len; o++) {
1824 if (v == clienthello->compressions[o]) {
1833 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1839 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1840 * using compression.
1842 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1843 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1849 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1853 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1854 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1856 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1858 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1859 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1860 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1861 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1866 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_EARLY_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1872 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1873 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
1874 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1875 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
1876 s->clienthello = NULL;
1879 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1881 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1882 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs);
1883 OPENSSL_free(clienthello->pre_proc_exts);
1884 OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello);
1885 s->clienthello = NULL;
1891 * Call the status request callback if needed. Upon success, returns 1.
1892 * Upon failure, returns 0 and sets |*al| to the appropriate fatal alert.
1894 static int tls_handle_status_request(SSL *s, int *al)
1896 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1899 * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
1900 * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
1901 * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
1902 * influence which certificate is sent
1904 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing && s->ctx != NULL
1905 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
1908 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1909 if (s->s3->tmp.cert != NULL) {
1911 * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
1912 * et al can pick it up.
1914 s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
1915 ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
1917 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1918 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1919 s->ext.status_expected = 0;
1921 /* status request response should be sent */
1922 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1923 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp)
1924 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1926 /* something bad happened */
1927 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1929 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1938 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1940 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1941 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1943 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
1944 int rv = tls_early_post_process_client_hello(s, &al);
1946 /* SSLErr() was already called */
1953 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
1955 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1956 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1957 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1959 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1960 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1961 SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1965 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1968 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1971 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1973 if (cipher == NULL) {
1974 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
1975 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1978 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1979 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != cipher->id) {
1981 * A previous HRR picked a different ciphersuite to the one we
1982 * just selected. Something must have changed.
1984 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1985 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_CIPHER);
1988 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
1989 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, &al))
1991 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1992 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1993 s->session->not_resumable =
1994 s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, ((cipher->algorithm_mkey
1995 & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
1997 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1998 /* do not send a session ticket */
1999 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
2001 /* Session-id reuse */
2002 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
2006 * we now have the following setup.
2008 * cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
2009 * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
2010 * compression - basically ignored right now
2011 * ssl version is set - sslv3
2012 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
2013 * s->hit - session reuse flag
2014 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
2018 * Call status_request callback if needed. Has to be done after the
2019 * certificate callbacks etc above.
2021 if (!tls_handle_status_request(s, &al)) {
2022 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2023 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2029 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2030 if (wst == WORK_MORE_C) {
2032 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
2034 * callback indicates further work to be done
2036 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2039 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
2041 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
2042 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
2044 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
2045 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2046 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
2048 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
2049 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2055 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
2057 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2058 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2062 int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2064 int compm, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2068 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT conditional before release */
2069 version = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT : s->version;
2070 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, version)
2072 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
2073 * tls_process_client_hello()
2075 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
2076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2081 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
2082 * back in the server hello:
2083 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
2084 * we send back the old session ID.
2085 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
2086 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
2087 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
2088 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
2090 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
2091 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
2092 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
2093 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
2096 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
2097 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
2099 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
2101 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
2102 if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
2103 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2107 /* set up the compression method */
2108 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
2111 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
2114 compm = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
2117 if ((!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2118 && !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->session->session_id, sl))
2119 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
2120 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
2121 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, compm))
2122 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
2124 ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
2125 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO,
2127 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2131 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)
2132 && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2133 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2139 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2143 int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2145 if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2146 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2147 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2154 int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2156 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2157 EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL;
2159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2160 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2161 size_t encodedlen = 0;
2164 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
2165 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i;
2168 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2169 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2170 size_t paramlen, paramoffset;
2172 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, ¶moffset)) {
2173 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2177 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2178 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2182 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2184 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
2185 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2186 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
2187 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2189 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
2190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2191 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2192 CERT *cert = s->cert;
2194 EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL;
2197 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
2198 DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
2199 pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new();
2200 if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) {
2202 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2203 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2206 EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp);
2209 pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp;
2211 if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
2212 DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024);
2213 pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp);
2215 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2216 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2221 if (pkdhp == NULL) {
2222 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2223 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2224 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2227 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
2228 EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) {
2229 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2230 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2231 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2234 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2235 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2236 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2240 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp);
2242 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2243 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2247 dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2249 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2252 DH_get0_pqg(dh, &r[0], NULL, &r[1]);
2253 DH_get0_key(dh, &r[2], NULL);
2256 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2257 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2260 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
2261 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2262 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2266 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
2267 nid = tls1_shared_group(s, -2);
2268 curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
2269 if (curve_id == 0) {
2270 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2271 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
2274 s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
2275 /* Generate a new key for this curve */
2276 if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) {
2277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2281 /* Encode the public key. */
2282 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->tmp.pkey,
2284 if (encodedlen == 0) {
2285 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2290 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
2291 * can set these to NULLs
2298 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2300 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
2301 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
2302 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
2303 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
2304 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2305 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
2308 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
2309 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
2310 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
2311 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
2315 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2316 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2317 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
2321 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) != 0)
2322 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) != 0) {
2324 } else if (lu == NULL) {
2325 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2330 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
2331 size_t len = (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2332 ? 0 : strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
2335 * It should not happen that len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN - we already
2336 * checked this when we set the identity hint - but just in case
2338 if (len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN
2339 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
2341 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2342 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2348 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2349 unsigned char *binval;
2352 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2353 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2354 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt);
2357 res = WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt);
2360 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2361 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2367 * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS
2368 * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length
2371 if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK))) {
2372 size_t len = BN_num_bytes(r[0]) - BN_num_bytes(r[2]);
2375 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &binval)) {
2376 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2377 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2380 memset(binval, 0, len);
2384 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, BN_num_bytes(r[i]), &binval)
2385 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2386 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2387 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2391 BN_bn2bin(r[i], binval);
2394 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2395 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2397 * We only support named (not generic) curves. In this situation, the
2398 * ServerKeyExchange message has: [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
2399 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by the actual encoded
2402 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
2403 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
2404 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, curve_id)
2405 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
2406 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2407 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2410 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2411 encodedPoint = NULL;
2417 EVP_PKEY *pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
2418 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
2419 unsigned char *sigbytes1, *sigbytes2;
2422 if (pkey == NULL || md == NULL) {
2423 /* Should never happen */
2424 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2425 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2426 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2430 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2431 * points to the space at the end.
2434 /* Get length of the parameters we have written above */
2435 if (!WPACKET_get_length(pkt, ¶mlen)) {
2436 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2437 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2440 /* send signature algorithm */
2441 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg))
2444 * Create the signature. We don't know the actual length of the sig
2445 * until after we've created it, so we reserve enough bytes for it
2446 * up front, and then properly allocate them in the WPACKET
2449 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2450 if (!WPACKET_sub_reserve_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes1)
2451 || EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2452 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2453 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2456 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
2457 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2458 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2459 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2464 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2465 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2466 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2467 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2468 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(md_ctx,
2469 s->init_buf->data + paramoffset,
2471 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(md_ctx, sigbytes1, &siglen) <= 0
2472 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, siglen, &sigbytes2)
2473 || sigbytes1 != sigbytes2) {
2474 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2475 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2480 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2483 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2485 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2486 EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh);
2488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2489 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2491 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2495 int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2498 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2500 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2501 /* TODO(TLS1.3) for now send empty request context */
2502 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
2503 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2504 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2508 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2509 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
2510 || !ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2511 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2512 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2517 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2518 const uint16_t *psigs;
2519 size_t nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs);
2521 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
2522 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
2523 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, psigs, nl)
2524 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2525 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2526 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2531 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2532 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2533 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2537 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2539 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2540 unsigned char *namebytes;
2541 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2545 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2546 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2548 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2549 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2550 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2555 /* else no CA names */
2556 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2557 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2561 * TODO(TLS1.3) implement configurable certificate_extensions
2562 * For now just send zero length extensions.
2564 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
2565 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2569 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
2573 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2577 static int tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2579 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2580 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2582 PACKET psk_identity;
2584 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
2585 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2586 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2589 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2590 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2591 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2594 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2595 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2596 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2600 if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
2601 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2606 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2609 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2610 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2611 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2613 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2615 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2617 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2618 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2619 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2623 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2624 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2625 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2627 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2628 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2629 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2633 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2637 /* Should never happen */
2638 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2644 static int tls_process_cke_rsa(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2647 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2649 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2650 size_t j, padding_len;
2651 PACKET enc_premaster;
2653 unsigned char *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
2656 rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA].privatekey);
2658 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2659 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2663 /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
2664 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2665 enc_premaster = *pkt;
2667 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
2668 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2669 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2670 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2676 * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
2677 * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
2678 * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
2679 * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
2681 if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2682 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2683 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
2687 rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
2688 if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
2689 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2690 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2695 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2696 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2697 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2698 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2699 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2702 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2706 * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of
2707 * the timing-sensitive code below.
2709 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2710 decrypt_len = (int)RSA_private_decrypt((int)PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
2711 PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
2712 rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
2713 if (decrypt_len < 0)
2716 /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */
2719 * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys
2720 * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures
2721 * PS is at least 8 bytes.
2723 if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2724 *al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2725 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2729 padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2730 decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[0], 0) &
2731 constant_time_eq_int_8(rsa_decrypt[1], 2);
2732 for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) {
2733 decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[j]);
2735 decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len - 1]);
2738 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2739 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2740 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2741 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2742 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2743 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2746 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2747 (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2749 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2750 (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2753 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2754 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2755 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2756 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2757 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2758 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2761 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2762 unsigned char workaround_good;
2763 workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len],
2764 (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2766 constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[padding_len + 1],
2767 (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2768 version_good |= workaround_good;
2772 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2773 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2775 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2778 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2779 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2780 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2781 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2783 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2784 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j] =
2785 constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good,
2786 rsa_decrypt[padding_len + j],
2787 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2790 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt + padding_len,
2791 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
2792 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2793 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2799 OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
2802 /* Should never happen */
2803 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2804 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2809 static int tls_process_cke_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2811 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2812 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2816 const unsigned char *data;
2817 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2820 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
2821 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2822 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE,
2823 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2826 skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2828 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2829 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2833 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2834 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2838 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2839 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2840 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2841 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2844 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2845 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) {
2846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2849 cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2850 pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2852 if (pub_key == NULL || !DH_set0_key(cdh, pub_key, NULL)) {
2853 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2854 if (pub_key != NULL)
2859 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2860 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2861 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2866 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2867 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2869 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2872 /* Should never happen */
2873 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2874 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2879 static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2881 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2882 EVP_PKEY *skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey;
2883 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL;
2886 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
2887 /* We don't support ECDH client auth */
2888 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2889 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2893 const unsigned char *data;
2896 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2897 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2900 /* Get encoded point length */
2901 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
2902 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2903 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2904 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2907 ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
2908 if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
2909 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2912 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, data, i) == 0) {
2913 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2914 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2919 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
2920 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2926 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey);
2927 s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL;
2929 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2933 /* Should never happen */
2934 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2940 static int tls_process_cke_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2942 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2944 const unsigned char *data;
2946 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
2947 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
2948 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2952 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2953 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2956 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2957 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2958 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2961 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2962 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2963 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2968 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2975 /* Should never happen */
2976 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2977 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2982 static int tls_process_cke_gost(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2984 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2985 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2986 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2987 unsigned char premaster_secret[32];
2988 const unsigned char *start;
2989 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2990 unsigned long alg_a;
2993 size_t sess_key_len;
2994 const unsigned char *data;
2997 /* Get our certificate private key */
2998 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2999 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) {
3001 * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too
3003 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey;
3005 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey;
3008 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3010 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) {
3011 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
3014 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
3015 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3016 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3017 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3020 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) {
3021 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3022 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3026 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
3027 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
3028 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
3029 * client certificate for authorization only.
3031 client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3032 if (client_pub_pkey) {
3033 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
3036 /* Decrypt session key */
3037 sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
3038 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
3039 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3040 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3043 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
3044 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
3045 &Tclass, (long)sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
3046 || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
3047 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3048 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3053 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
3054 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
3055 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
3059 /* Generate master secret */
3060 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
3061 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
3062 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3063 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3066 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
3067 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
3068 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
3069 s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1;
3073 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3076 /* Should never happen */
3077 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3078 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3083 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3086 unsigned long alg_k;
3088 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3090 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
3091 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && !tls_process_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
3094 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
3095 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
3096 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3097 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3098 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3099 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3102 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
3103 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
3104 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3105 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3108 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3109 if (!tls_process_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3111 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3112 if (!tls_process_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3114 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3115 if (!tls_process_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3117 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3118 if (!tls_process_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3120 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3121 if (!tls_process_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3124 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3125 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3126 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
3130 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
3133 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3134 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3135 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3136 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3138 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3139 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3142 WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3144 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3145 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3146 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3147 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3148 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3150 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3153 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3154 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3156 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3157 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3158 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
3160 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3164 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3165 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3170 if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
3172 && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
3173 /* Are we renegotiating? */
3175 /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
3176 && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify)
3177 && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
3178 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
3179 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
3180 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
3181 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
3182 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
3185 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
3189 if (s->statem.no_cert_verify || !s->session->peer) {
3191 * No certificate verify or no peer certificate so we no longer need
3192 * the handshake_buffer
3194 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3195 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3198 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3200 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
3201 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3202 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3203 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3207 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
3208 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
3210 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3211 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3216 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3219 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3221 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3223 unsigned long l, llen;
3224 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
3225 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3226 PACKET spkt, context;
3229 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3230 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3234 /* TODO(TLS1.3): For now we ignore the context. We need to verify this */
3235 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context))
3236 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
3237 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
3238 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3239 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3240 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3244 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0; chainidx++) {
3245 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3246 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3247 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3248 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3249 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3253 certstart = certbytes;
3254 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3259 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3260 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3261 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3262 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3266 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3267 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3270 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &extensions)) {
3271 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3272 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
3275 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3276 &rawexts, &al, NULL)
3277 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3278 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
3279 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3282 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3285 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3286 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3292 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3293 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3294 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3295 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3296 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3297 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3300 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3301 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3302 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3303 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3304 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3305 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED;
3308 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3309 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3314 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3316 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3317 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3318 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3322 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3323 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3326 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3328 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3329 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3330 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3335 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3336 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3337 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3339 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3340 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3343 * Freeze the handshake buffer. For <TLS1.3 we do this after the CKE
3346 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
3347 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3348 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3353 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3354 * certificate, while we do include it in statem_clnt.c
3358 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
3360 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
3361 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
3362 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
3363 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3364 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3368 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3372 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3373 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3376 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3380 int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3382 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert;
3383 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3386 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3391 * In TLSv1.3 the certificate chain is always preceded by a 0 length context
3392 * for the server Certificate message
3394 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3395 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &al)) {
3396 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3397 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3404 int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3406 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3407 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
3408 HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
3409 unsigned char *p, *encdata1, *encdata2, *macdata1, *macdata2;
3410 const unsigned char *const_p;
3411 int len, slen_full, slen, lenfinal;
3414 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
3415 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3416 unsigned char key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH];
3417 int iv_len, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3418 size_t macoffset, macendoffset;
3420 unsigned char age_add_c[sizeof(uint32_t)];
3424 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3425 if (RAND_bytes(age_add_u.age_add_c, sizeof(age_add_u)) <= 0)
3427 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add_u.age_add;
3428 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
3429 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
3430 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.alpn_selected);
3431 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
3432 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
3433 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
3434 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3435 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3438 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
3440 s->session->ext.max_early_data = s->max_early_data;
3443 /* get session encoding length */
3444 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3446 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3449 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3450 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3453 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3455 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3459 ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
3460 hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
3461 if (ctx == NULL || hctx == NULL) {
3462 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3467 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3471 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3474 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3477 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3479 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3480 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3481 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3485 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3486 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3489 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3492 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3493 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3495 if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
3496 /* if 0 is returned, write an empty ticket */
3497 int ret = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx,
3502 /* Put timeout and length */
3503 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)
3504 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
3505 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3506 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3510 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3511 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3516 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
3518 const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
3520 iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
3521 if (RAND_bytes(iv, iv_len) <= 0)
3523 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL,
3524 tctx->ext.tick_aes_key, iv))
3526 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
3527 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
3528 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3530 memcpy(key_name, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
3531 sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name));
3535 * Ticket lifetime hint: For TLSv1.2 this is advisory only and we leave this
3536 * unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity).
3537 * In TLSv1.3 we reset the "time" field above, and always specify the
3540 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt,
3541 (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
3542 ? 0 : s->session->timeout)
3544 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, age_add_u.age_add))
3545 /* Now the actual ticket data */
3546 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
3547 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macoffset)
3548 /* Output key name */
3549 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, key_name, sizeof(key_name))
3551 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, iv, iv_len)
3552 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH,
3554 /* Encrypt session data */
3555 || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, encdata1, &len, senc, slen)
3556 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, len, &encdata2)
3557 || encdata1 != encdata2
3558 || !EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, encdata1 + len, &lenfinal)
3559 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, lenfinal, &encdata2)
3560 || encdata1 + len != encdata2
3561 || len + lenfinal > slen + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
3562 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &macendoffset)
3563 || !HMAC_Update(hctx,
3564 (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + macoffset,
3565 macendoffset - macoffset)
3566 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &macdata1)
3567 || !HMAC_Final(hctx, macdata1, &hlen)
3568 || hlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
3569 || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hlen, &macdata2)
3570 || macdata1 != macdata2
3571 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
3573 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt,
3574 EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
3576 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3579 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3580 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3585 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3587 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
3588 HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
3589 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3594 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
3595 * create a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
3597 int tls_construct_cert_status_body(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3599 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.status_type)
3600 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp,
3601 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len)) {
3602 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3609 int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3611 if (!tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
3612 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3619 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3621 * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3622 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3624 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3626 PACKET next_proto, padding;
3627 size_t next_proto_len;
3630 * The payload looks like:
3632 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3633 * uint8 padding_len;
3634 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3636 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
3637 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
3638 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3639 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3643 if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->ext.npn, &next_proto_len)) {
3648 s->ext.npn_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
3650 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3652 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3653 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3657 static int tls_construct_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3661 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3663 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3664 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3665 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3672 static int tls_construct_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3674 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3678 * TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the DRAFT version before release
3679 * (should be s->version)
3681 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
3682 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt, &len)
3683 || !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
3685 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3689 /* Ditch the session. We'll create a new one next time around */
3690 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
3695 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
3696 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
3698 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s))
3703 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3707 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3709 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3711 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3712 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3713 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3714 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3715 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3718 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING
3719 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) {
3720 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3725 * EndOfEarlyData signals a key change so the end of the message must be on
3726 * a record boundary.
3728 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
3729 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3730 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3731 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
3735 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING;
3736 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3737 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
3738 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3742 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3744 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3745 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3746 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;