2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
12 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
13 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
19 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
20 #include "statem_locl.h"
21 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
22 #include <openssl/objects.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include <openssl/x509.h>
27 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
28 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
30 int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
35 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
36 s->init_num, &written);
39 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
41 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
42 * ignore the result anyway
44 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
45 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
49 if (written == s->init_num) {
51 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
52 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
56 s->init_off += written;
57 s->init_num -= written;
61 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
65 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
66 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
69 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
75 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s)
77 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s))
81 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
82 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
83 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
85 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
87 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
88 * support secure renegotiation.
90 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
91 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
92 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
95 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
97 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
100 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
101 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
103 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
105 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
106 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
109 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
112 s->statem.use_timer = 1;
119 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
120 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
122 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
123 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
125 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
126 void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
128 static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
129 static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
131 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
134 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
135 memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
136 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
137 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
138 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
139 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
141 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
144 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
145 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
146 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
148 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
149 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
150 memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
151 s->cert_verify_hash_len);
152 hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
153 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
154 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
159 *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
163 retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata);
172 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
174 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
175 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
176 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
177 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
178 size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
180 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
181 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
182 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
184 if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) {
185 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
188 pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
189 md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
191 if (pkey == NULL || md == NULL) {
192 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
196 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
202 /* Get the data to be signed */
203 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
204 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
208 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
209 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
212 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
213 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
215 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
219 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
220 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
221 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
225 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
226 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
227 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
228 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
229 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
232 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
233 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
234 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
235 s->session->master_key)) {
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
241 if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
242 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
248 int pktype = lu->sig;
250 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
251 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
252 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
253 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
257 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
258 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
262 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
263 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
267 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
271 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
272 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
276 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
278 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
279 const unsigned char *data;
280 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
281 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
283 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
287 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
290 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
291 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
292 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
295 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
299 peer = s->session->peer;
300 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
302 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
306 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
308 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
309 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
310 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
311 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
315 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
317 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
318 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0)
320 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
321 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
322 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
327 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
331 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
332 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
335 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
338 } else if (rv == 0) {
339 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
343 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
345 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
346 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
350 md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx);
352 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
353 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
354 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
358 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
359 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
360 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
361 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
362 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
365 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
366 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
367 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
371 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
372 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
377 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
379 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
380 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
381 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
386 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
387 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
388 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
389 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
390 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
391 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
394 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
400 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
401 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
402 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
403 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
407 } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
408 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
409 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
410 s->session->master_key)) {
411 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
415 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
416 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
417 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
422 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
424 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
427 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
428 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
430 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
431 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
432 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
434 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
439 int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
441 size_t finish_md_len;
445 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
447 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
450 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
455 && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0
456 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
457 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
458 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
463 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
464 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
466 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
467 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
470 finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
472 s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
473 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
474 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
478 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
480 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
481 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
486 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
487 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
489 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL,
490 s->session->master_key,
491 s->session->master_key_length))
495 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
498 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
499 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
501 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
503 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
504 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
506 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
511 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
515 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
517 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) {
518 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
522 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
526 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
530 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
533 unsigned int updatetype;
535 s->key_update_count++;
536 if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) {
537 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
538 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES);
543 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
544 * be on a record boundary.
546 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
547 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
548 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
552 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype)
553 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
554 || (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
555 && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)) {
556 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
557 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
562 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
563 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
564 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
566 if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)
567 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED;
569 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) {
570 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
571 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
575 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
577 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
578 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
579 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
582 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
584 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
587 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
592 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
593 * the appropriate error.
595 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
598 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
599 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
601 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
602 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
605 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
608 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
612 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
617 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
619 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
620 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
621 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
623 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
624 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
625 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
626 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
627 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
628 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
629 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
630 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
635 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
636 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
637 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
642 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
643 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
644 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
649 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
650 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
651 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
652 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
656 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
657 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
659 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
660 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
664 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
665 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
668 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
672 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
674 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
675 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
676 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
679 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
681 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
685 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
687 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
690 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
691 * message must be on a record boundary.
693 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
694 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
699 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
700 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
701 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
702 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
705 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
707 md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
709 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
710 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
711 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
715 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
717 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
718 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
723 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
726 OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
727 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
729 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
731 OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
732 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
734 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
738 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
739 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
741 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
743 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
744 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
745 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
749 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
750 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
751 &s->session->master_key_length)) {
752 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
755 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
756 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
757 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
760 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
765 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
767 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
768 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
769 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
772 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
774 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
775 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
776 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
783 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
784 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain,
788 unsigned char *outbytes;
790 len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
793 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
796 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
797 || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
798 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
799 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
804 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
811 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
812 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al)
816 STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
817 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
818 X509_STORE *chain_store;
819 int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
821 if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
827 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
829 if (cpk->chain != NULL)
830 extra_certs = cpk->chain;
832 extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
834 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
836 else if (s->cert->chain_store)
837 chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
839 chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
841 if (chain_store != NULL) {
842 X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
844 if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
845 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
848 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
849 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
854 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
855 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
856 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
857 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
859 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
860 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
862 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
863 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
866 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
868 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
871 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
872 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
875 chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
876 for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
877 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
879 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, &tmpal)) {
880 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
884 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
886 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
891 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, &tmpal))
893 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
894 x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
895 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, &tmpal))
906 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk,
909 int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
911 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
912 || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &tmpal)
913 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
914 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
922 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
923 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
926 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs)
928 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
931 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
933 ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
934 if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
940 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
942 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
943 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
945 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
948 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
952 if (s->statem.cleanuphand) {
953 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
956 s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
958 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
961 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
963 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
964 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
966 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
968 s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
970 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
971 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
974 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
975 cb = s->info_callback;
976 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
977 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
980 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
982 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
983 /* done with handshaking */
984 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
985 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
986 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
987 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
992 * If we've not cleared the buffers its because we've got more work to do,
996 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
998 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
999 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1002 int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
1004 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1005 int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
1007 size_t l, readbytes;
1009 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1012 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1013 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
1015 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
1018 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1021 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1023 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1024 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1026 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
1027 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1029 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1032 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1033 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
1034 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1035 s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes;
1037 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1038 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1042 s->init_num += readbytes;
1047 if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK
1048 && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
1050 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1051 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1052 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1055 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
1059 if (s->msg_callback)
1060 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1061 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1062 s->msg_callback_arg);
1064 } while (skip_message);
1065 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1068 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
1070 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1072 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1075 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1076 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1078 l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
1079 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1080 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
1082 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1083 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1086 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1087 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1088 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1089 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
1092 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
1094 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1100 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1104 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
1106 size_t n, readbytes;
1110 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1111 /* We've already read everything in */
1112 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
1117 n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
1119 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
1120 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
1122 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1126 s->init_num += readbytes;
1130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1132 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1133 * Finished verification.
1135 if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
1139 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1140 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1141 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1144 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1148 if (s->msg_callback)
1149 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
1150 (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1153 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1154 * processing the message
1156 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST
1157 && !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1158 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1160 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1164 if (s->msg_callback)
1165 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
1166 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1167 s->msg_callback_arg);
1174 int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk)
1176 if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL)
1179 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
1183 return SSL_PKEY_RSA;
1185 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
1186 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1188 return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
1190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
1191 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
1192 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
1193 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
1194 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
1195 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
1196 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
1201 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
1206 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
1207 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
1208 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
1209 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
1211 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
1212 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
1213 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
1214 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
1215 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
1216 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
1217 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
1218 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
1219 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
1220 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
1221 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
1222 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
1223 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
1224 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
1225 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
1226 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
1227 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
1228 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK:
1229 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1231 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
1232 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
1233 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1235 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
1236 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
1237 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
1239 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
1240 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
1242 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
1243 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
1244 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
1245 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
1246 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1248 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
1249 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
1250 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
1251 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
1252 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
1253 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
1254 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
1255 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
1257 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
1258 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1260 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
1261 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
1264 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
1270 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
1272 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1274 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
1277 static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b)
1279 int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s);
1284 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
1285 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
1290 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
1291 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
1294 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1295 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1298 /* Must be in order high to low */
1299 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
1300 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1301 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
1303 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1305 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1306 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
1308 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1311 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
1313 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1316 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
1318 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1320 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1321 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
1323 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1328 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1329 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1332 /* Must be in order high to low */
1333 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
1334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1335 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
1337 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1339 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1340 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
1341 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
1343 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1344 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
1350 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1352 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1353 * @method: the intended method.
1355 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1357 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
1359 int version = method->version;
1361 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
1362 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
1363 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
1364 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1366 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
1367 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
1368 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
1370 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
1371 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1372 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
1373 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
1379 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1382 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1383 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1385 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1387 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version)
1389 const version_info *vent;
1390 const version_info *table;
1392 switch (s->method->version) {
1394 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1395 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
1396 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1397 table = tls_version_table;
1399 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1400 table = dtls_version_table;
1405 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
1407 if (vent->cmeth != NULL &&
1408 version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 &&
1409 ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) {
1417 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1418 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1419 * supported protocol version.
1421 * @s server SSL handle.
1423 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1425 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s)
1427 const version_info *vent;
1428 const version_info *table;
1431 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1432 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1435 if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
1439 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1440 * highest protocol version).
1442 if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
1443 table = tls_version_table;
1444 else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
1445 table = dtls_version_table;
1447 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1451 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1452 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
1453 return s->version == vent->version;
1459 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1460 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1461 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1462 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1464 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1465 * @version: the intended limit.
1466 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1468 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1470 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
1478 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1479 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1480 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1482 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1483 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1484 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1485 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1486 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1488 switch (method_version) {
1491 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1492 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1493 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1494 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1499 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1500 if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION)
1504 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1505 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) ||
1506 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
1515 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1517 if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION
1518 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1519 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2;
1520 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
1521 && (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION)
1522 || ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
1523 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1;
1525 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1530 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1531 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1532 * the version specific method.
1534 * @s: server SSL handle.
1536 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1538 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1541 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1543 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1544 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1546 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1549 int server_version = s->method->version;
1550 int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
1551 const version_info *vent;
1552 const version_info *table;
1554 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
1556 s->client_version = client_version;
1558 switch (server_version) {
1560 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1561 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
1562 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1563 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1565 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1566 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1567 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1568 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1569 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1574 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1575 * a HelloRetryRequest
1577 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1578 table = tls_version_table;
1580 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1581 table = dtls_version_table;
1585 suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
1587 if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1588 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
1589 unsigned int best_vers = 0;
1590 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
1591 PACKET versionslist;
1593 suppversions->parsed = 1;
1595 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
1596 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1597 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1600 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
1601 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1602 if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1603 candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1605 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
1606 * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
1607 * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
1609 if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
1612 vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers;
1615 if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) {
1616 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1618 method = vent->smeth();
1619 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1620 best_vers = candidate_vers;
1621 best_method = method;
1625 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
1626 /* Trailing data? */
1627 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1630 if (best_vers > 0) {
1631 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1633 * We get here if this is after a HelloRetryRequest. In this
1634 * case we just check that we still negotiated TLSv1.3
1636 if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION)
1637 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1640 check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd);
1641 s->version = best_vers;
1642 s->method = best_method;
1645 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1649 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1650 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1652 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
1653 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1656 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1659 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1660 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1662 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
1663 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
1665 method = vent->smeth();
1666 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1667 check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd);
1668 s->version = vent->version;
1674 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1678 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1679 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1680 * the version specific method.
1682 * @s: client SSL handle.
1683 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1684 * @checkdgrd: Whether to check the downgrade sentinels in the server_random
1685 * @al: Where to store any alert value that may be generated
1687 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1689 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, int checkdgrd, int *al)
1691 const version_info *vent;
1692 const version_info *table;
1695 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1696 if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
1697 version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1699 if (s->hello_retry_request && version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1700 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1701 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1704 switch (s->method->version) {
1706 if (version != s->version) {
1707 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1708 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1711 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1712 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1713 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1714 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1715 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1718 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1719 table = tls_version_table;
1721 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1722 table = dtls_version_table;
1726 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1727 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1730 if (vent->cmeth == NULL)
1733 if (highver != 0 && version != vent->version)
1736 method = vent->cmeth();
1737 err = ssl_method_error(s, method);
1739 if (version == vent->version) {
1740 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1747 highver = vent->version;
1749 if (version != vent->version)
1752 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE
1753 /* Check for downgrades */
1755 if (version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > version) {
1756 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
1757 s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1758 - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
1759 sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
1760 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1761 return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
1763 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1764 && version < TLS1_2_VERSION
1765 && highver > version) {
1766 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
1767 s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1768 - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
1769 sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
1770 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1771 return SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
1778 s->version = version;
1782 *al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1783 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1787 * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version
1788 * @s: The SSL connection
1789 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1790 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1792 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1793 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1794 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1795 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1796 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1798 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1799 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1800 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1802 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1803 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1805 int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version,
1810 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
1811 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1812 const version_info *table;
1813 const version_info *vent;
1815 switch (s->method->version) {
1818 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1819 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1820 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1821 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1822 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1824 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
1826 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1827 table = tls_version_table;
1829 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1830 table = dtls_version_table;
1835 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1836 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1837 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1838 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1840 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1841 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1842 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1844 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1845 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1846 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1848 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1849 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1850 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1851 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1852 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1853 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1855 *min_version = version = 0;
1857 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1859 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1860 * "version capability" vector.
1862 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
1866 method = vent->cmeth();
1867 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
1871 *min_version = method->version;
1873 version = (single = method)->version;
1874 *min_version = version;
1879 *max_version = version;
1881 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1883 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
1889 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1890 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
1892 * @s: client SSL handle.
1894 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1896 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
1898 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
1900 ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max);
1905 s->version = ver_max;
1907 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
1908 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION)
1909 ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1911 s->client_version = ver_max;
1916 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
1917 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
1918 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
1919 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
1921 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1922 int check_in_list(SSL *s, unsigned int group_id, const unsigned char *groups,
1923 size_t num_groups, int checkallow)
1927 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
1930 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++, groups += 2) {
1931 unsigned int share_id = (groups[0] << 8) | (groups[1]);
1933 if (group_id == share_id
1935 || tls_curve_allowed(s, groups, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
1944 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
1945 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s)
1947 unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1949 unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
1951 memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
1953 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
1954 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
1955 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) {
1956 SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1960 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
1961 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s))
1964 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
1965 msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH;
1966 msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = hashlen;
1967 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
1968 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) {
1969 SSLerr(SSL_F_CREATE_SYNTHETIC_MESSAGE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1976 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
1978 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
1981 int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1983 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
1984 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
1987 if (ca_sk == NULL) {
1988 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1991 /* get the CA RDNs */
1992 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
1993 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1994 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1998 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
1999 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2000 unsigned int name_len;
2002 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2003 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2004 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2008 namestart = namebytes;
2009 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) {
2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2013 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2014 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2018 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2019 SSLerr(SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2020 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2026 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2027 s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk;
2032 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2034 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2039 int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2041 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
2043 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2044 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt))
2047 if (ca_sk != NULL) {
2050 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) {
2051 unsigned char *namebytes;
2052 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i);
2056 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2057 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2059 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2065 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt))