2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
12 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
13 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
19 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
20 #include "statem_locl.h"
21 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
22 #include <openssl/objects.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include <openssl/x509.h>
27 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
28 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
30 int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
34 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
38 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
40 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
41 * ignore the result anyway
43 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
44 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
48 if (ret == s->init_num) {
50 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
51 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
60 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
64 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
65 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
67 || !WPACKET_finish(pkt))
69 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
75 int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, const char *sender, int slen)
80 if (!WPACKET_init(&pkt, s->init_buf)
81 || !ssl_set_handshake_header(s, &pkt, SSL3_MT_FINISHED)) {
82 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
86 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
88 s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
90 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
94 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
96 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i)) {
97 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
102 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
105 OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
106 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
107 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i;
109 OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
110 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
111 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i;
114 if (!ssl_close_construct_packet(s, &pkt)) {
115 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
121 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
122 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
123 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
127 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
129 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
132 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
137 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
138 * the appropriate error.
140 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
143 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
144 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
146 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
147 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
150 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
153 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
157 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
162 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
164 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
165 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
166 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
168 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
169 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
170 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
171 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
172 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
173 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
174 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
175 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
180 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
181 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
182 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
187 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
188 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
189 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
194 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
195 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
196 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
197 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
201 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
202 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
204 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
205 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
209 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
210 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
213 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
217 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
219 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
220 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
221 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
224 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
228 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
229 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
230 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
231 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
234 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
236 i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
238 if ((unsigned long)i != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
239 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
240 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
244 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) {
245 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
246 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
251 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
254 OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
255 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
256 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i;
258 OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
259 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
260 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i;
263 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
265 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
266 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
267 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
270 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
274 if (!WPACKET_init(&pkt, s->init_buf)
275 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)
276 || !WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
277 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
278 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
279 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
280 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
290 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
294 if (!WPACKET_init(&pkt, s->init_buf)) {
295 /* Should not happen */
296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
300 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, &pkt, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
301 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(&pkt)) {
302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
306 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, &pkt, cpk))
309 if (!WPACKET_close(&pkt) || !ssl_close_construct_packet(s, &pkt)) {
310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
315 WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
319 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
321 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
324 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
326 ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
327 if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
332 /* clean a few things up */
333 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
335 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
337 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
338 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
340 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
344 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
348 if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) {
349 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
354 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
356 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
357 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
359 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
361 s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
363 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
364 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
367 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
368 cb = s->info_callback;
369 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
370 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
373 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
375 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
376 /* done with handshaking */
377 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
378 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
379 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
380 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
384 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
387 int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
389 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
390 int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
394 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
397 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
398 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
400 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
403 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
406 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
408 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
409 * in the middle of a handshake message.
411 if (s->init_num != 0 || i != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
412 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
414 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
417 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
419 s->s3->tmp.message_size = i;
421 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
422 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
423 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
431 if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
433 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
434 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
435 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
438 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
443 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
444 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
445 s->msg_callback_arg);
447 } while (skip_message);
448 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
451 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
453 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
455 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
458 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
459 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
461 l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
462 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
463 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
465 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
466 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
469 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
470 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
471 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
472 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
475 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
477 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
483 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
487 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len)
493 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
494 /* We've already read everything in */
495 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
500 n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
502 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
503 &p[s->init_num], n, 0);
505 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
513 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
515 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
516 * Finished verification.
518 if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
522 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
523 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
524 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
526 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
527 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
532 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
533 (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
535 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
536 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
537 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
538 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
543 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
544 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
545 s->msg_callback_arg);
549 * init_num should never be negative...should probably be declared
552 if (s->init_num < 0) {
553 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
554 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
558 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
562 int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk)
564 if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL)
567 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
571 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
573 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
574 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
579 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
580 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
581 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
582 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
583 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
584 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
589 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
594 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
595 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
596 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
597 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
599 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
600 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
601 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
602 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
603 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
604 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
605 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
606 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
607 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
608 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
609 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
610 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
611 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
612 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
613 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
614 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
615 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
616 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK:
617 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
619 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
620 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
621 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
623 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
624 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
625 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
627 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
628 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
630 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
631 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
632 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
633 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
634 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
636 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
637 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
638 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
639 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
640 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
641 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
642 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
643 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
645 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
646 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
648 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
649 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
652 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
658 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
660 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
662 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
665 static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b)
667 int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s);
672 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
673 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
678 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
679 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
682 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
683 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION.
686 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
687 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
688 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
690 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
692 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
693 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
695 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
697 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
698 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
700 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
702 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
703 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
705 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
710 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
711 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
714 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
715 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
716 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
718 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
720 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
721 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
722 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
724 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
725 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
731 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
733 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
734 * @method: the intended method.
736 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
738 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
740 int version = method->version;
742 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
743 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
744 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
745 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
747 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
748 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
749 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
751 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
752 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
753 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
754 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
755 else if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS) != 0 && FIPS_mode())
756 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE;
762 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
765 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
766 * @version: Protocol version to test against
768 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
770 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version)
772 const version_info *vent;
773 const version_info *table;
775 switch (s->method->version) {
777 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
778 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
779 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
780 table = tls_version_table;
782 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
783 table = dtls_version_table;
788 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
790 if (vent->cmeth != NULL &&
791 version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 &&
792 ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) {
800 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
801 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
802 * supported protocol version.
804 * @s server SSL handle.
806 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
808 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s)
810 const version_info *vent;
811 const version_info *table;
814 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
815 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
818 if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
822 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
823 * highest protocol version).
825 if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
826 table = tls_version_table;
827 else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
828 table = dtls_version_table;
830 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
834 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
835 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
836 return s->version == vent->version;
842 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
843 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
844 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
845 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
847 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
848 * @version: the intended limit.
849 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
851 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
853 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
861 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
862 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
863 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
865 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
866 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
867 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
868 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
869 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
871 switch (method_version) {
874 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
875 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
876 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
877 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
882 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
883 if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION)
887 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
888 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) ||
889 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
899 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
900 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
901 * the version specific method.
903 * @s: server SSL handle.
905 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
907 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s)
910 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
912 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
913 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
915 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
918 int server_version = s->method->version;
919 int client_version = s->client_version;
920 const version_info *vent;
921 const version_info *table;
924 switch (server_version) {
926 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
927 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
929 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
930 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
931 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
932 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
933 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
936 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
937 table = tls_version_table;
939 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
940 table = dtls_version_table;
944 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
945 const SSL_METHOD *method;
947 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
948 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
950 method = vent->smeth();
951 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
952 s->version = vent->version;
958 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
962 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
963 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
964 * the version specific method.
966 * @s: client SSL handle.
967 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
969 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
971 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version)
973 const version_info *vent;
974 const version_info *table;
976 switch (s->method->version) {
978 if (version != s->version)
979 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
981 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
982 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
983 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
984 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
985 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
988 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
989 table = tls_version_table;
991 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
992 table = dtls_version_table;
996 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
997 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1000 if (version != vent->version)
1002 if (vent->cmeth == NULL)
1004 method = vent->cmeth();
1005 err = ssl_method_error(s, method);
1009 s->version = version;
1013 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1017 * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version
1018 * @s: The SSL connection
1019 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1020 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1022 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1023 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1024 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1025 * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1026 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1028 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1029 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1030 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1032 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1033 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1035 int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version,
1040 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
1041 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1042 const version_info *table;
1043 const version_info *vent;
1045 switch (s->method->version) {
1048 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1049 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1050 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1051 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1052 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1054 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
1056 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1057 table = tls_version_table;
1059 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1060 table = dtls_version_table;
1065 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1066 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1067 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1068 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1070 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1071 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1072 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1074 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1075 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1076 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1078 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1079 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1080 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1081 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1082 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1083 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1085 *min_version = version = 0;
1087 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1089 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1090 * "version capability" vector.
1092 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
1096 method = vent->cmeth();
1097 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
1101 *min_version = method->version;
1103 version = (single = method)->version;
1104 *min_version = version;
1109 *max_version = version;
1111 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1113 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
1119 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1120 * the initial ClientHello.
1122 * @s: client SSL handle.
1124 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1126 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
1128 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
1130 ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max);
1135 s->client_version = s->version = ver_max;