2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
12 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
13 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
19 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
20 #include "statem_locl.h"
21 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
22 #include <openssl/objects.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include <openssl/x509.h>
27 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
28 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
30 int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
34 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
38 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
40 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
41 * ignore the result anyway
43 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
44 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
48 if (ret == s->init_num) {
50 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
51 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
60 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
64 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
65 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
68 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
74 int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
81 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
82 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
84 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
85 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
88 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
90 s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
92 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
96 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
98 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i)) {
99 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
104 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
107 OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
108 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
109 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i;
111 OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
112 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
113 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i;
118 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
122 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
124 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
127 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
132 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
133 * the appropriate error.
135 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
138 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
139 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
141 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
142 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
145 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
148 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
152 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
157 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
159 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
160 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
161 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
163 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
164 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
165 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
166 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
167 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
168 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
169 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
170 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
175 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
176 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
177 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
182 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
183 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
184 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
185 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
189 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
190 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
191 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
192 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
196 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
197 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
199 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
200 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
202 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
204 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
205 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
208 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
212 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
214 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
215 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
216 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
219 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
223 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
224 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
225 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
226 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
229 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
231 i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
233 if ((unsigned long)i != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
234 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
235 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
239 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) {
240 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
241 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
246 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
249 OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
250 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
251 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i;
253 OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
254 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
255 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i;
258 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
260 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
261 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
262 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
265 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
267 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
268 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
269 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
276 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
278 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
279 || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)
280 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
287 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
289 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
291 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
292 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
294 ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
295 if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
300 /* clean a few things up */
301 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
303 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
305 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
306 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
308 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
312 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
316 if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) {
317 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
322 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
324 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
325 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
327 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
329 s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
331 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
332 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
335 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
336 cb = s->info_callback;
337 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
338 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
341 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
343 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
344 /* done with handshaking */
345 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
346 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
347 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
348 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
352 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
355 int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
357 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
358 int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
362 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
365 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
366 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
368 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
371 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
374 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
376 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
377 * in the middle of a handshake message.
379 if (s->init_num != 0 || i != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
380 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
381 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
382 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
385 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
387 s->s3->tmp.message_size = i;
389 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
390 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
391 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
399 if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
401 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
402 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
403 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
406 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
411 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
412 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
413 s->msg_callback_arg);
415 } while (skip_message);
416 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
419 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
421 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
423 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
426 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
427 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
429 l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
430 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
431 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
433 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
434 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
437 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
438 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
439 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
440 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
443 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
445 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
451 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
455 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len)
461 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
462 /* We've already read everything in */
463 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
468 n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
470 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
471 &p[s->init_num], n, 0);
473 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
481 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
483 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
484 * Finished verification.
486 if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
490 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
491 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
492 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
494 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
495 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
500 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
501 (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
503 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
504 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
505 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
506 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
511 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
512 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
513 s->msg_callback_arg);
517 * init_num should never be negative...should probably be declared
520 if (s->init_num < 0) {
521 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
522 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
526 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
530 int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk)
532 if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL)
535 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
539 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
541 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
547 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
548 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
549 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
550 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
551 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
552 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
557 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
562 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
563 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
564 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
565 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
567 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
568 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
569 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
570 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
571 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
572 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
573 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
574 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
575 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
576 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
577 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
578 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
579 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
580 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
581 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
582 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
583 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
584 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK:
585 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
587 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
588 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
589 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
591 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
592 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
593 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
595 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
596 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
598 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
599 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
600 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
601 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
602 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
604 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
605 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
606 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
607 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
608 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
609 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
610 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
611 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
613 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
614 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
616 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
617 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
620 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
626 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
628 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
630 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
633 static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b)
635 int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s);
640 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
641 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
646 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
647 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
650 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
651 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION.
654 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
655 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
656 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
658 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
661 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
663 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
666 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
668 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
671 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
673 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
678 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
679 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
682 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
683 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
684 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
686 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
689 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
690 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
692 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
693 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
699 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
701 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
702 * @method: the intended method.
704 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
706 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
708 int version = method->version;
710 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
711 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
712 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
713 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
715 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
716 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
717 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
719 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
720 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
721 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
722 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
723 else if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS) != 0 && FIPS_mode())
724 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE;
730 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
733 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
734 * @version: Protocol version to test against
736 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
738 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version)
740 const version_info *vent;
741 const version_info *table;
743 switch (s->method->version) {
745 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
746 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
747 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
748 table = tls_version_table;
750 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
751 table = dtls_version_table;
756 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
758 if (vent->cmeth != NULL &&
759 version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 &&
760 ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) {
768 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
769 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
770 * supported protocol version.
772 * @s server SSL handle.
774 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
776 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s)
778 const version_info *vent;
779 const version_info *table;
782 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
783 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
786 if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
790 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
791 * highest protocol version).
793 if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
794 table = tls_version_table;
795 else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
796 table = dtls_version_table;
798 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
802 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
803 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
804 return s->version == vent->version;
810 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
811 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
812 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
813 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
815 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
816 * @version: the intended limit.
817 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
819 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
821 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
829 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
830 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
831 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
833 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
834 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
835 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
836 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
837 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
839 switch (method_version) {
842 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
843 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
844 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
845 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
850 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
851 if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION)
855 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
856 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) ||
857 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
867 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
868 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
869 * the version specific method.
871 * @s: server SSL handle.
873 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
875 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s)
878 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
880 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
881 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
883 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
886 int server_version = s->method->version;
887 int client_version = s->client_version;
888 const version_info *vent;
889 const version_info *table;
892 switch (server_version) {
894 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
895 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
897 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
898 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
899 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
900 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
901 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
904 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
905 table = tls_version_table;
907 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
908 table = dtls_version_table;
912 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
913 const SSL_METHOD *method;
915 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
916 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
918 method = vent->smeth();
919 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
920 s->version = vent->version;
926 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
930 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
931 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
932 * the version specific method.
934 * @s: client SSL handle.
935 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
937 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
939 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version)
941 const version_info *vent;
942 const version_info *table;
944 switch (s->method->version) {
946 if (version != s->version)
947 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
949 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
950 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
951 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
952 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
953 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
956 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
957 table = tls_version_table;
959 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
960 table = dtls_version_table;
964 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
965 const SSL_METHOD *method;
968 if (version != vent->version)
970 if (vent->cmeth == NULL)
972 method = vent->cmeth();
973 err = ssl_method_error(s, method);
977 s->version = version;
981 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
985 * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version
986 * @s: The SSL connection
987 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
988 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
990 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
991 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
992 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
993 * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
994 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
996 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
997 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
998 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1000 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1001 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1003 int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version,
1008 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
1009 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1010 const version_info *table;
1011 const version_info *vent;
1013 switch (s->method->version) {
1016 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1017 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1018 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1019 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1020 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1022 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
1024 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1025 table = tls_version_table;
1027 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1028 table = dtls_version_table;
1033 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1034 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1035 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1036 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1038 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1039 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1040 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1042 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1043 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1044 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1046 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1047 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1048 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1049 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1050 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1051 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1053 *min_version = version = 0;
1055 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1057 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1058 * "version capability" vector.
1060 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
1064 method = vent->cmeth();
1065 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
1069 *min_version = method->version;
1071 version = (single = method)->version;
1072 *min_version = version;
1077 *max_version = version;
1079 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1081 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
1087 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1088 * the initial ClientHello.
1090 * @s: client SSL handle.
1092 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1094 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
1096 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
1098 ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max);
1103 s->client_version = s->version = ver_max;