2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types.
25 typedef struct x509err2alert_st {
30 /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */
31 const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = {
32 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02,
33 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e,
34 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
38 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
39 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
41 int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
46 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
47 s->init_num, &written);
50 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
52 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
53 * ignore the result anyway
54 * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added
56 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
57 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
58 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE))
59 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
60 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
63 if (written == s->init_num) {
65 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
66 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
70 s->init_off += written;
71 s->init_num -= written;
75 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
79 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
80 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
83 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
89 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s)
91 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
92 /* SSLfatal() already called */
96 /* Reset any extension flags */
97 memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags));
100 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
101 int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0;
104 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
105 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
108 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max) != 0) {
109 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
110 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
113 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
114 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
116 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
117 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) &&
118 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls))
120 } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) {
127 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
128 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
129 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
133 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
134 /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
135 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept);
137 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
138 tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
140 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
143 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
144 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect);
146 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
148 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
149 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
152 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
155 s->statem.use_timer = 1;
162 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
163 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
165 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
166 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
168 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
169 void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
171 static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
172 static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
174 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
177 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
178 memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
179 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
180 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
181 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
182 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
184 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
187 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
188 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
189 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
191 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
192 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
193 memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
194 s->cert_verify_hash_len);
195 hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
196 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
197 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
198 /* SSLfatal() already called */
203 *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
207 retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata);
209 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA,
210 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
219 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
221 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
222 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
223 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
224 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
225 size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
227 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
228 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
229 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg;
231 if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) {
232 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
233 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
236 pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey;
238 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
239 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
240 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
244 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
246 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
247 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
251 /* Get the data to be signed */
252 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
253 /* SSLfatal() already called */
257 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
258 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
259 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
262 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
263 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
265 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
266 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
270 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
276 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
277 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
278 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
279 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
280 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
285 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
286 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
287 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
288 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
289 s->session->master_key)
290 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
292 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
296 } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
304 int pktype = lu->sig;
306 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
307 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
308 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
309 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
313 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
314 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
315 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
319 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
320 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
321 /* SSLfatal() already called */
326 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
330 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
334 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
336 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
337 const unsigned char *data;
338 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
339 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
341 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
345 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
348 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
349 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
350 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
353 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
354 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
358 peer = s->session->peer;
359 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
361 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
362 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
366 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) {
367 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
368 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
372 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
375 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
376 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
380 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) {
381 /* SSLfatal() already called */
385 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
387 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
389 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
393 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
394 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
395 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
399 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
401 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
402 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
405 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)
406 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
407 && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
408 || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256))
409 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128
410 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) {
411 len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
414 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
415 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
416 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
420 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
421 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
422 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
424 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
427 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
428 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
429 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
433 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
434 /* SSLfatal() already called */
439 fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
441 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
442 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
448 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
449 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
450 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
451 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
452 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
453 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
454 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
457 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
463 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
464 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
465 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
466 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
467 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
472 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
473 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
474 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
475 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
476 s->session->master_key)) {
477 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
481 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
482 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
483 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
487 j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen);
489 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
490 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
495 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
497 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
498 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
499 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
500 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
501 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
506 int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
508 size_t finish_md_len;
512 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
513 if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
514 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
517 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
522 && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0
523 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
524 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {;
525 /* SSLfatal() already called */
530 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
531 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
533 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
534 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
537 finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
539 s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
540 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
541 /* SSLfatal() already called */
545 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
547 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
548 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED,
549 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
554 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
555 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
557 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL,
558 s->session->master_key,
559 s->session->master_key_length)) {
560 /* SSLfatal() already called */
565 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
567 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
568 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED,
569 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
573 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
575 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
577 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
579 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
585 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
587 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) {
588 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE,
589 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
593 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
597 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
599 unsigned int updatetype;
601 s->key_update_count++;
602 if (s->key_update_count > MAX_KEY_UPDATE_MESSAGES) {
603 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
604 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES);
605 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
609 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
610 * be on a record boundary.
612 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
613 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
614 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
615 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
618 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype)
619 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
620 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
621 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
622 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
626 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
629 if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
630 && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) {
631 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
632 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
633 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
637 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
638 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
639 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
641 if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)
642 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED;
644 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) {
645 /* SSLfatal() already called */
646 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
649 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
653 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
656 int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
662 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
663 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
665 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
666 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
669 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len =
670 s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen,
671 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
673 if (s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) {
674 /* SSLfatal() already called */
681 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
685 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
687 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
688 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
689 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
691 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
692 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
693 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
694 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
695 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
696 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
697 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
698 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
699 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
703 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
704 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
705 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
706 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
710 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
711 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
712 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
713 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
714 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
717 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
718 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
719 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
720 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
721 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
724 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
725 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
727 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
728 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
730 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
732 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
733 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
736 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
740 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
743 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
748 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
751 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We
752 * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less
755 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
756 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
757 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
758 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
759 /* SSLfatal() already called */
760 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
765 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
766 * message must be on a record boundary.
768 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
769 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
770 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
771 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
774 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
775 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
776 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
777 SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
778 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
780 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
782 md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
784 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
785 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
786 SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
787 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
790 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
792 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
793 SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
794 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
798 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
800 if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
801 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
802 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
803 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
806 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
808 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
810 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
812 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
816 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
817 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
819 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
821 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED &&
822 !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
823 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
824 /* SSLfatal() already called */
825 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
828 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
829 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
830 &s->session->master_key_length)) {
831 /* SSLfatal() already called */
832 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
834 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
835 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
836 /* SSLfatal() already called */
837 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
839 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
840 /* SSLfatal() already called */
841 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
846 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
849 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
851 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
852 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
853 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
860 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
861 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain)
864 unsigned char *outbytes;
866 len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
868 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET,
872 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
873 || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
874 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET,
875 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
880 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
882 /* SSLfatal() already called */
889 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
890 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
894 STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
895 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
896 X509_STORE *chain_store;
898 if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
904 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
906 if (cpk->chain != NULL)
907 extra_certs = cpk->chain;
909 extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
911 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
913 else if (s->cert->chain_store)
914 chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
916 chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
918 if (chain_store != NULL) {
919 X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
921 if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
922 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,
923 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
926 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
927 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
928 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,
933 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
934 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
935 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
936 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
938 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
939 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
941 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
942 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
945 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
946 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
950 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
951 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
954 chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
955 for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
956 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
958 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) {
959 /* SSLfatal() already called */
960 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
964 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
966 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
968 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
971 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) {
972 /* SSLfatal() already called */
975 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
976 x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
977 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) {
978 /* SSLfatal() already called */
986 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
988 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) {
989 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,
990 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
994 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk))
997 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
998 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,
999 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1007 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
1008 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
1011 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop)
1013 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1016 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1018 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
1019 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1021 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
1024 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) {
1025 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE,
1026 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1032 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server
1033 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
1034 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
1037 * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3
1038 * post handshake exchange
1040 if (s->statem.cleanuphand) {
1041 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1044 s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
1045 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1047 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
1051 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the
1054 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1055 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
1057 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
1058 tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
1059 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
1061 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) {
1063 * We are finishing after the client. We start the timer going
1064 * in case there are any retransmits of our final flight
1067 dtls1_start_timer(s);
1070 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1072 * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once,
1073 * so we remove this one from the cache.
1075 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode
1076 & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0)
1077 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1080 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1083 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
1086 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit);
1088 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
1089 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
1091 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1093 * We are finishing after the server. We start the timer going
1094 * in case there are any retransmits of our final flight
1097 dtls1_start_timer(s);
1101 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1102 /* done with handshaking */
1103 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
1104 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
1105 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
1106 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
1110 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1111 cb = s->info_callback;
1112 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1113 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1115 /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */
1116 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
1119 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
1122 /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */
1123 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1124 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1127 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1130 int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
1132 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1133 int skip_message, i, recvd_type;
1135 size_t l, readbytes;
1137 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1140 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1141 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
1143 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
1146 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1149 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1151 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1152 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1154 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
1155 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1156 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1157 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1160 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE
1161 && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) {
1163 * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is
1164 * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos.
1165 * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do
1166 * not return success until we see the second ClientHello
1167 * with a valid cookie.
1171 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1172 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
1173 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1174 s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes;
1176 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1177 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1178 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1179 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1182 s->init_num += readbytes;
1187 if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK
1188 && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
1190 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1191 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1192 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1195 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
1199 if (s->msg_callback)
1200 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1201 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1202 s->msg_callback_arg);
1204 } while (skip_message);
1205 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1208 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
1210 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1212 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1215 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1216 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1218 l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
1219 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1220 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
1222 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1223 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1226 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1227 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1228 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1229 SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
1232 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
1234 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1241 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
1243 size_t n, readbytes;
1247 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1248 /* We've already read everything in */
1249 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
1254 n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
1256 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
1257 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
1259 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1263 s->init_num += readbytes;
1268 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1269 * Finished verification.
1271 if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) {
1272 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1277 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1278 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1279 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1281 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1285 if (s->msg_callback)
1286 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
1287 (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1290 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1291 * processing the message
1292 * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished
1295 #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2)
1296 /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */
1297 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
1298 && s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) {
1299 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
1300 || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1301 || memcmp(hrrrandom,
1302 s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET,
1303 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) {
1304 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1305 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1306 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1312 if (s->msg_callback)
1313 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
1314 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1315 s->msg_callback_arg);
1322 static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = {
1323 {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE},
1324 {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1325 {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1326 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1327 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1328 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1329 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1330 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED},
1331 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1332 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1333 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1334 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1335 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1336 {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1337 {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1338 {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1339 {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1340 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1341 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1342 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1343 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1344 {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1345 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1346 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1347 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE},
1348 {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1349 {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1350 {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1351 {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1352 {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1353 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1354 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1355 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1356 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1357 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1358 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1359 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1360 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1361 {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1363 /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */
1364 {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN}
1367 int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err)
1369 const X509ERR2ALERT *tp;
1371 for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp)
1372 if (tp->x509err == x509err)
1377 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
1379 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1381 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
1384 static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b)
1386 int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s);
1391 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
1392 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
1397 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
1398 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
1401 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
1402 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1405 /* Must be in order high to low */
1406 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
1407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1408 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
1410 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1412 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1413 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
1415 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1417 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1418 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
1420 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1422 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1423 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
1425 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1427 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1428 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
1430 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1435 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1436 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1439 /* Must be in order high to low */
1440 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
1441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1442 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
1444 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1446 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1447 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
1448 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
1450 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1451 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
1457 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1459 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1460 * @method: the intended method.
1462 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1464 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
1466 int version = method->version;
1468 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
1469 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
1470 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
1471 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1473 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
1474 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
1475 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
1477 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
1478 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1479 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
1480 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
1486 * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable
1487 * certificate type, or has PSK configured. Otherwise returns 0.
1489 static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s)
1493 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1494 if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL)
1498 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL)
1501 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1502 /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */
1504 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1505 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1506 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1507 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1512 if (ssl_has_cert(s, i))
1520 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1523 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1524 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1526 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1528 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version, const SSL_METHOD **meth)
1530 const version_info *vent;
1531 const version_info *table;
1533 switch (s->method->version) {
1535 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1536 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
1537 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1538 table = tls_version_table;
1540 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1541 table = dtls_version_table;
1546 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
1548 if (vent->cmeth != NULL
1549 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0
1550 && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0
1552 || version != TLS1_3_VERSION
1553 || is_tls13_capable(s))) {
1555 *meth = vent->cmeth();
1563 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1564 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1565 * supported protocol version.
1567 * @s server SSL handle.
1569 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1571 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s)
1573 const version_info *vent;
1574 const version_info *table;
1577 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1578 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1581 if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
1585 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1586 * highest protocol version).
1588 if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
1589 table = tls_version_table;
1590 else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
1591 table = dtls_version_table;
1593 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1597 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1598 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
1599 return s->version == vent->version;
1605 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1606 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1607 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1608 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1610 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1611 * @version: the intended limit.
1612 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1614 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1616 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
1624 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1625 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1626 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1628 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1629 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1630 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1631 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1632 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1634 switch (method_version) {
1637 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1638 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1639 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1640 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1645 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1646 if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION)
1650 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1651 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) ||
1652 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
1661 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1663 if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION
1664 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) {
1665 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2;
1666 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
1667 && (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)
1668 || ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL))) {
1669 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1;
1671 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1676 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1677 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1678 * the version specific method.
1680 * @s: server SSL handle.
1682 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1684 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1687 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1689 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1690 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
1692 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1695 int server_version = s->method->version;
1696 int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
1697 const version_info *vent;
1698 const version_info *table;
1700 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
1702 s->client_version = client_version;
1704 switch (server_version) {
1706 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1707 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
1708 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1709 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1711 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1712 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1713 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1714 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1715 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1720 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1721 * a HelloRetryRequest
1724 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1725 table = tls_version_table;
1727 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1728 table = dtls_version_table;
1732 suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
1734 /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */
1735 if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE)
1736 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1738 if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1739 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
1740 unsigned int best_vers = 0;
1741 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
1742 PACKET versionslist;
1743 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1744 unsigned int orig_candidate = 0;
1746 suppversions->parsed = 1;
1748 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
1749 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1750 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1754 * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION.
1755 * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3:
1756 * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with
1757 * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to
1758 * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert."
1759 * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower.
1760 * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1.
1762 if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION)
1763 return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION;
1765 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
1766 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1767 if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
1768 || candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT_27
1769 || candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT_26) {
1770 if (best_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION
1771 && orig_candidate > candidate_vers)
1773 orig_candidate = candidate_vers;
1774 candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION;
1775 } else if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1776 /* Don't actually accept real TLSv1.3 */
1780 * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
1781 * whether to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
1782 * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
1784 if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
1786 if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method))
1787 best_vers = candidate_vers;
1789 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
1790 /* Trailing data? */
1791 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1794 if (best_vers > 0) {
1795 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1797 * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we
1798 * negotiated TLSv1.3
1800 if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION)
1801 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1804 check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd);
1805 s->version = best_vers;
1806 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
1807 if (best_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION)
1808 s->version_draft = orig_candidate;
1809 s->method = best_method;
1812 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1816 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1817 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1819 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
1820 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1823 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1826 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1827 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1829 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
1830 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
1832 method = vent->smeth();
1833 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1834 check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd);
1835 s->version = vent->version;
1841 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1845 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1846 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1847 * the version specific method.
1849 * @s: client SSL handle.
1850 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1851 * @extensions: The extensions received
1853 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
1855 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions)
1857 const version_info *vent;
1858 const version_info *table;
1863 s->version = version;
1865 /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */
1866 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions,
1867 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1868 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions,
1874 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE
1875 && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1877 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1878 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1882 switch (s->method->version) {
1884 if (s->version != s->method->version) {
1886 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1887 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1888 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1892 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1893 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1894 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1895 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1896 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1899 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1900 table = tls_version_table;
1902 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1903 table = dtls_version_table;
1907 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1908 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1911 if (vent->cmeth == NULL)
1914 if (highver != 0 && s->version != vent->version)
1917 if (highver == 0 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) != 0)
1918 highver = vent->version;
1920 method = vent->cmeth();
1921 err = ssl_method_error(s, method);
1923 if (s->version == vent->version) {
1925 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1926 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, err);
1933 highver = vent->version;
1935 if (s->version != vent->version)
1938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE
1939 /* Check for downgrades */
1940 if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > s->version) {
1941 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
1942 s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1943 - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
1944 sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
1946 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1947 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1948 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1951 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1952 && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION
1953 && highver > s->version) {
1954 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
1955 s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1956 - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
1957 sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
1959 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1960 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1961 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1972 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1973 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
1978 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
1979 * @s: The SSL connection
1980 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1981 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1983 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1984 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1985 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1986 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1987 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1989 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1990 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1991 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1993 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1994 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1996 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version)
2000 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
2001 const SSL_METHOD *method;
2002 const version_info *table;
2003 const version_info *vent;
2005 switch (s->method->version) {
2008 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
2009 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
2010 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
2011 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
2012 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
2014 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
2016 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
2017 table = tls_version_table;
2019 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
2020 table = dtls_version_table;
2025 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
2026 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
2027 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
2028 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
2030 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
2031 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
2032 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
2034 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
2035 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
2036 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
2038 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
2039 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
2040 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
2041 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
2042 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
2043 * selected, as we start from scratch.
2045 *min_version = version = 0;
2047 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
2049 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
2050 * "version capability" vector.
2052 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
2056 method = vent->cmeth();
2057 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
2061 *min_version = method->version;
2063 version = (single = method)->version;
2064 *min_version = version;
2069 *max_version = version;
2071 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
2073 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
2079 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
2080 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
2082 * @s: client SSL handle.
2084 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
2086 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
2088 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
2091 * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent
2092 * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated.
2094 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
2097 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max);
2102 s->version = ver_max;
2104 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
2105 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION)
2106 ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
2108 s->client_version = ver_max;
2113 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
2114 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
2115 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
2116 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
2118 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2119 int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups,
2120 size_t num_groups, int checkallow)
2124 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
2127 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
2128 uint16_t group = groups[i];
2130 if (group_id == group
2132 || tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
2141 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
2142 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval,
2143 size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr,
2146 unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2147 unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
2149 memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
2151 if (hashval == NULL) {
2152 hashval = hashvaltmp;
2154 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2155 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
2156 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp),
2158 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2163 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2164 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
2165 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2169 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2170 msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH;
2171 msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen;
2172 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
2173 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) {
2174 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2179 * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted
2180 * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after
2181 * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie.
2184 && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen)
2185 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
2186 s->s3->tmp.message_size
2187 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) {
2188 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2195 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2197 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
2200 int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2202 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
2203 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2206 if (ca_sk == NULL) {
2207 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2208 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2211 /* get the CA RDNs */
2212 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2213 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2214 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2218 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2219 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2220 unsigned int name_len;
2222 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2223 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2225 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2229 namestart = namebytes;
2230 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) {
2231 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2235 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2236 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2237 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2241 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2242 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2243 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2249 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2250 s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk;
2255 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2260 int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2262 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
2264 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2265 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
2267 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2271 if (ca_sk != NULL) {
2274 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) {
2275 unsigned char *namebytes;
2276 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i);
2280 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2281 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2283 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2284 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
2285 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2291 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2292 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
2293 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2300 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2301 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs,
2302 const void *param, size_t paramlen)
2304 size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen;
2305 unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen);
2308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS,
2309 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2312 memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2313 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2315 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen);
2322 * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth,
2323 * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once
2325 int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s)
2327 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2328 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1))
2329 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2332 s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2333 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2334 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2335 SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
2336 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2339 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst,
2340 s->s3->handshake_dgst)) {
2341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2342 SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
2343 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2351 * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest
2352 * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request
2354 int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s)
2356 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2357 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2358 SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
2359 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2362 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst,
2364 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2365 SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
2366 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);