2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
12 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
13 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project.
19 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
20 #include "statem_locl.h"
21 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
22 #include <openssl/objects.h>
23 #include <openssl/evp.h>
24 #include <openssl/x509.h>
27 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
28 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
30 int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
35 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
36 s->init_num, &written);
39 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
41 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
42 * ignore the result anyway
44 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
45 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
49 if (written == s->init_num) {
51 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
52 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
56 s->init_off += written;
57 s->init_num -= written;
61 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
65 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
66 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
69 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
75 int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
82 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
83 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
85 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
86 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
89 finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
91 s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
92 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
93 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
97 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
99 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
100 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
105 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
108 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
109 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
111 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
113 OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
114 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
116 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
121 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
127 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
130 static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
135 * If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
136 * the appropriate error.
138 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
141 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
142 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
144 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
145 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
148 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
151 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
155 static int compare_extensions(const void *p1, const void *p2)
157 const RAW_EXTENSION *e1 = (const RAW_EXTENSION *)p1;
158 const RAW_EXTENSION *e2 = (const RAW_EXTENSION *)p2;
159 if (e1->type < e2->type)
161 else if (e1->type > e2->type)
168 * Gather a list of all the extensions. We don't actually process the content
169 * of the extensions yet, except to check their types.
171 * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
172 * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
173 * This function returns 1 if all extensions are unique and we have parsed their
174 * types, and 0 if the extensions contain duplicates, could not be successfully
175 * parsed, or an internal error occurred.
177 int tls_parse_raw_extensions(PACKET *packet, RAW_EXTENSION **res,
178 size_t *numfound, int *ad)
180 PACKET extensions = *packet;
181 size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
182 RAW_EXTENSION *raw_extensions = NULL;
184 /* First pass: count the extensions. */
185 while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
188 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
189 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
190 *ad = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
196 if (num_extensions > 0) {
197 raw_extensions = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(RAW_EXTENSION) * num_extensions);
198 if (raw_extensions == NULL) {
199 *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
200 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_RAW_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
204 /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
205 for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
206 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(packet, &raw_extensions[i].type) ||
207 !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(packet,
208 &raw_extensions[i].data)) {
209 /* This should not happen. */
210 *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
211 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_RAW_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
216 if (PACKET_remaining(packet) != 0) {
217 *ad = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
218 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_RAW_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
221 /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
222 qsort(raw_extensions, num_extensions, sizeof(RAW_EXTENSION),
224 for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
225 if (raw_extensions[i - 1].type == raw_extensions[i].type) {
226 *ad = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
232 *res = raw_extensions;
233 *numfound = num_extensions;
237 OPENSSL_free(raw_extensions);
243 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
248 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
250 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
251 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
252 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
254 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
255 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
256 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
257 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
258 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
259 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
260 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
261 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
266 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
268 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
273 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
274 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
275 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
276 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
280 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
281 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
282 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
283 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
287 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
288 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
290 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
291 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
293 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
295 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
296 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
299 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
303 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
305 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
306 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
307 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
310 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
315 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
316 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
317 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
318 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
321 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
323 md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
325 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
326 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
327 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
331 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
333 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
334 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
339 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
342 OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
343 memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
345 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
347 OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
348 memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
350 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
353 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
355 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
356 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
357 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
360 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
362 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
363 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
364 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
371 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
373 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
374 || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)
375 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
382 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
384 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
387 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
389 ret = dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
390 if (ret != WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE)
395 /* clean a few things up */
396 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
398 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
400 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
401 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
403 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
407 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
411 if (!s->server || s->renegotiate == 2) {
412 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
417 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
419 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
420 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
422 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
424 s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
426 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
427 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
430 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
431 cb = s->info_callback;
432 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
433 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
436 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
438 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
439 /* done with handshaking */
440 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
441 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
442 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
443 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
447 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
450 int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
452 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
453 int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
457 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
460 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
461 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
463 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
466 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
469 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
471 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
472 * in the middle of a handshake message.
474 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
475 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
476 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
477 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
480 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
481 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
482 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
483 s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes;
485 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
486 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
487 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
490 s->init_num += readbytes;
495 if (p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
497 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
498 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
499 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
502 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
507 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
508 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
509 s->msg_callback_arg);
511 } while (skip_message);
512 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
515 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++);
517 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
519 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
522 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
523 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
525 l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
526 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
527 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
529 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
530 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
533 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
534 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
535 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
536 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
539 s->s3->tmp.message_size = l;
541 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
547 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
551 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
557 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
558 /* We've already read everything in */
559 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
564 n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
566 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
567 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
569 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
573 s->init_num += readbytes;
577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
579 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
580 * Finished verification.
582 if (*s->init_buf->data == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
586 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
587 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
588 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
590 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
591 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
596 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
597 (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
599 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
600 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
601 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
602 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
607 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
608 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
609 s->msg_callback_arg);
616 int ssl_cert_type(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *pk)
618 if (pk == NULL && (pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x)) == NULL)
621 switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
625 return SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC;
627 return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
628 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
632 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
633 case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
634 return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
635 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
636 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
637 case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
638 return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
643 int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type)
648 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
649 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL:
650 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER:
651 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
653 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE:
654 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE:
655 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY:
656 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
657 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
658 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD:
659 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD:
660 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
661 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID:
662 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED:
663 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED:
664 case X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH:
665 case X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH:
666 case X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH:
667 case X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH:
668 case X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
669 case X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL:
670 case X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK:
671 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
673 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
674 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE:
675 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
677 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
678 case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED:
679 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED;
681 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED:
682 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED;
684 case X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED:
685 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
686 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL:
687 case X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP:
688 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
690 case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
691 case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
692 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
693 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE:
694 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG:
695 case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED:
696 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA:
697 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA;
699 case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION:
700 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
702 case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE:
703 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
706 al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN;
712 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
714 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
716 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
719 static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b)
721 int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s);
726 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
727 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
732 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
733 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
736 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
737 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
740 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
742 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
744 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
747 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
749 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
752 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
754 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
757 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
759 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
762 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
764 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
769 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
770 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
773 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
775 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
777 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
779 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
780 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
781 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
783 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
784 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
790 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
792 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
793 * @method: the intended method.
795 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
797 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
799 int version = method->version;
801 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
802 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
803 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
804 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
806 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
807 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
808 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
810 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
811 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
812 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
813 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
814 else if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS) != 0 && FIPS_mode())
815 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_0_NEEDED_IN_FIPS_MODE;
821 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
824 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
825 * @version: Protocol version to test against
827 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
829 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version)
831 const version_info *vent;
832 const version_info *table;
834 switch (s->method->version) {
836 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
837 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
838 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
839 table = tls_version_table;
841 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
842 table = dtls_version_table;
847 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
849 if (vent->cmeth != NULL &&
850 version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 &&
851 ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0) {
859 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
860 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
861 * supported protocol version.
863 * @s server SSL handle.
865 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
867 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s)
869 const version_info *vent;
870 const version_info *table;
873 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
874 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
877 if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
881 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
882 * highest protocol version).
884 if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
885 table = tls_version_table;
886 else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
887 table = dtls_version_table;
889 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
893 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
894 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
895 return s->version == vent->version;
901 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
902 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
903 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
904 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
906 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
907 * @version: the intended limit.
908 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
910 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
912 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
920 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
921 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
922 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
924 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
925 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
926 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
927 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
928 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
930 switch (method_version) {
933 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
934 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
935 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
936 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
941 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
942 if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION)
946 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
947 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) ||
948 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
958 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
959 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
960 * the version specific method.
962 * @s: server SSL handle.
964 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
966 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
969 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
971 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
972 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION.
974 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
977 int server_version = s->method->version;
978 int client_version = hello->version;
979 const version_info *vent;
980 const version_info *table;
983 s->client_version = client_version;
985 switch (server_version) {
987 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
988 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
990 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
991 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
992 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
993 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
994 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
997 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
998 table = tls_version_table;
1000 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1001 table = dtls_version_table;
1005 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1006 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1008 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
1009 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
1011 method = vent->smeth();
1012 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1013 s->version = vent->version;
1019 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1023 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1024 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1025 * the version specific method.
1027 * @s: client SSL handle.
1028 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1030 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1032 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version)
1034 const version_info *vent;
1035 const version_info *table;
1037 switch (s->method->version) {
1039 if (version != s->version)
1040 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1042 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1043 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1044 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1045 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1046 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1049 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1050 table = tls_version_table;
1052 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1053 table = dtls_version_table;
1057 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1058 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1061 if (version != vent->version)
1063 if (vent->cmeth == NULL)
1065 method = vent->cmeth();
1066 err = ssl_method_error(s, method);
1070 s->version = version;
1074 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1078 * ssl_get_client_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum client version
1079 * @s: The SSL connection
1080 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1081 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1083 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1084 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1085 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1086 * or FIPS_mode() constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1087 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1089 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1090 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1091 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1093 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1094 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1096 int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version,
1101 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
1102 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1103 const version_info *table;
1104 const version_info *vent;
1106 switch (s->method->version) {
1109 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1110 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1111 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1112 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1113 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1115 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
1117 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1118 table = tls_version_table;
1120 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1121 table = dtls_version_table;
1126 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
1127 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
1128 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
1129 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
1131 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
1132 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
1133 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
1135 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
1136 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
1137 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
1139 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
1140 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
1141 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
1142 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
1143 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
1144 * selected, as we start from scratch.
1146 *min_version = version = 0;
1148 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1150 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
1151 * "version capability" vector.
1153 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
1157 method = vent->cmeth();
1158 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
1162 *min_version = method->version;
1164 version = (single = method)->version;
1165 *min_version = version;
1170 *max_version = version;
1172 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
1174 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
1180 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
1181 * the initial ClientHello.
1183 * @s: client SSL handle.
1185 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1187 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
1189 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
1191 ret = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max);
1196 s->client_version = s->version = ver_max;