2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/x509.h>
21 #include <openssl/trace.h>
24 * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types.
26 typedef struct x509err2alert_st {
31 /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */
32 const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = {
33 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02,
34 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e,
35 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
39 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
40 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
42 int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
47 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
48 s->init_num, &written);
51 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
53 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
54 * ignore the result anyway
55 * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added
57 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
58 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
59 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE))
60 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
61 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
64 if (written == s->init_num) {
66 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
67 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
71 s->init_off += written;
72 s->init_num -= written;
76 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
80 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
81 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
84 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
90 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s)
92 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
93 /* SSLfatal() already called */
97 /* Reset any extension flags */
98 memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags));
101 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
102 int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0;
105 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
106 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
109 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) {
110 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
111 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
114 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
115 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
117 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
118 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) &&
119 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls))
121 } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) {
128 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
129 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
130 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
134 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
135 /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
136 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept);
138 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
139 tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
141 s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 0;
144 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
145 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect);
147 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
149 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
150 memset(s->s3.client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3.client_random));
153 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
156 s->statem.use_timer = 1;
163 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
164 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
166 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
167 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
169 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
170 void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
172 static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
173 static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
175 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
178 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
179 memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
180 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
181 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
182 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
183 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
185 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
188 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
189 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
190 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
192 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
193 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
194 memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
195 s->cert_verify_hash_len);
196 hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
197 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
198 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
199 /* SSLfatal() already called */
204 *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
209 retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, hdata);
211 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA,
212 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
221 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
223 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
224 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
225 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
226 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
227 size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
229 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
230 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
231 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
233 if (lu == NULL || s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL) {
234 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
235 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
238 pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
240 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
241 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
242 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
246 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
248 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
249 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
253 /* Get the data to be signed */
254 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
255 /* SSLfatal() already called */
259 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
260 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
261 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
264 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
265 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
267 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
268 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
272 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
273 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
278 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
279 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
280 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
281 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
282 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
287 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
288 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
290 * TODO(3.0) Replace this when EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl() is deprecated
291 * with a call to ssl3_digest_master_key_set_params()
293 || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
294 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
295 s->session->master_key) <= 0
296 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
298 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
302 } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
308 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
310 int pktype = lu->sig;
312 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
313 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
314 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
315 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
319 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
320 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
321 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
325 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
326 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
327 /* SSLfatal() already called */
332 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
336 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
340 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
342 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
343 const unsigned char *data;
344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
345 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
347 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
351 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
354 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
355 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
356 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
359 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
360 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
364 peer = s->session->peer;
365 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
367 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
368 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
372 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) {
373 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
374 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
378 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
381 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
382 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
386 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) {
387 /* SSLfatal() already called */
390 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
392 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
396 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
397 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
398 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
402 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
403 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
404 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
406 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
408 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
409 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
412 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)
413 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
414 && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
415 || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256))
416 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128
417 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) {
418 len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
421 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
422 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
423 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
427 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
428 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
429 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
430 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
431 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
434 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
435 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
436 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
440 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
441 /* SSLfatal() already called */
445 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "Using client verify alg %s\n",
446 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
448 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
449 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
455 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
456 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
457 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
458 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
459 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
460 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
461 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
464 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
470 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
471 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
472 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
473 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
479 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
481 * TODO(3.0) Replace this when EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl() is deprecated
482 * with a call to ssl3_digest_master_key_set_params()
484 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
485 || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
486 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
487 s->session->master_key) <= 0) {
488 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
492 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
493 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
494 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
498 j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen);
500 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
501 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
507 * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client
508 * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the
509 * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest
510 * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We
511 * want to make sure that SSL_get_peer_certificate() will return the actual
512 * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback.
514 if (!s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1)
515 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
517 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
519 BIO_free(s->s3.handshake_buffer);
520 s->s3.handshake_buffer = NULL;
521 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
522 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
523 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
528 int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
530 size_t finish_md_len;
534 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
535 if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
536 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
539 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
544 && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0
545 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
546 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {;
547 /* SSLfatal() already called */
552 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
553 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
555 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
556 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
559 finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
561 s->s3.tmp.finish_md);
562 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
563 /* SSLfatal() already called */
567 s->s3.tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
569 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
570 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED,
571 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
576 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
577 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
579 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL,
580 s->session->master_key,
581 s->session->master_key_length)) {
582 /* SSLfatal() already called */
587 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
589 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
590 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED,
591 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
595 memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md,
597 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
599 memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md,
601 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
607 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
609 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) {
610 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE,
611 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
615 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
619 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
621 unsigned int updatetype;
624 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
625 * be on a record boundary.
627 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
628 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
629 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
630 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
633 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype)
634 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
635 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
636 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
637 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
641 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
644 if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
645 && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) {
646 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
647 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
648 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
652 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
653 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
654 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop).
656 if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)
657 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED;
659 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) {
660 /* SSLfatal() already called */
661 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
664 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
668 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
671 int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
677 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
678 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
680 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
681 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
684 s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len =
685 s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen,
686 s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md);
688 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) {
689 /* SSLfatal() already called */
696 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
700 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
702 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
703 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
704 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
706 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
707 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
708 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
709 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
710 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
711 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
712 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
713 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
714 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
718 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
719 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
720 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
721 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
725 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
726 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
727 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
728 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
729 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
732 s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 1;
733 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
734 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
735 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
736 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
739 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
740 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
742 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
743 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
745 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
747 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
748 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
751 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
755 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
758 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
763 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
766 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We
767 * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less
770 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
771 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
772 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
773 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
774 /* SSLfatal() already called */
775 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
780 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
781 * message must be on a record boundary.
783 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
785 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
786 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
789 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
790 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3.change_cipher_spec) {
791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
792 SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
793 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
795 s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 0;
797 md_len = s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
799 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
800 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
801 SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
802 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
805 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
807 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
808 SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
809 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
813 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
815 if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
816 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
817 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
818 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
821 memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
823 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
825 memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
827 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
831 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
832 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
834 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
836 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED &&
837 !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
838 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
839 /* SSLfatal() already called */
840 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
843 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
844 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
845 &s->session->master_key_length)) {
846 /* SSLfatal() already called */
847 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
849 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
850 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
851 /* SSLfatal() already called */
852 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
854 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
855 /* SSLfatal() already called */
856 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
861 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
864 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
866 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
867 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
868 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
875 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
876 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain)
879 unsigned char *outbytes;
881 len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
883 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET,
887 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
888 || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
889 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET,
890 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
895 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
897 /* SSLfatal() already called */
904 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
905 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
909 STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
910 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
911 X509_STORE *chain_store;
913 if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
919 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
921 if (cpk->chain != NULL)
922 extra_certs = cpk->chain;
924 extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
926 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
928 else if (s->cert->chain_store)
929 chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
931 chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
933 if (chain_store != NULL) {
934 X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
936 if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
937 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,
938 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
941 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
942 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
943 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,
948 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
949 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
950 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
951 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
953 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
954 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
956 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
957 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
960 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
961 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
962 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
965 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
966 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
969 chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
970 for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
971 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
973 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) {
974 /* SSLfatal() already called */
975 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
979 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
981 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
983 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
986 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) {
987 /* SSLfatal() already called */
990 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
991 x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
992 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) {
993 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1001 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
1003 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) {
1004 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,
1005 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1009 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk))
1012 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1013 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,
1014 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1022 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
1023 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
1026 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop)
1028 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1029 int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand;
1032 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1034 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
1035 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1037 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
1040 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) {
1041 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE,
1042 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1048 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server
1049 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
1050 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
1053 * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3
1054 * post handshake exchange
1057 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1060 s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
1061 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1063 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
1067 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the
1070 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1071 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
1073 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
1074 tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
1075 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
1077 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1079 * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once,
1080 * so we remove this one from the cache.
1082 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode
1083 & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0)
1084 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1087 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1090 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
1093 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit);
1095 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
1096 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
1099 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1100 /* done with handshaking */
1101 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
1102 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
1103 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
1104 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
1108 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1109 cb = s->info_callback;
1110 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1111 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1113 /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */
1114 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
1119 || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
1120 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
1124 /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */
1125 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1126 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1129 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1132 int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
1134 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1135 int skip_message, i, recvd_type;
1137 size_t l, readbytes;
1139 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1142 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1143 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
1145 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
1148 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1151 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1153 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1154 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1156 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
1157 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1158 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1159 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1162 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE
1163 && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) {
1165 * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is
1166 * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos.
1167 * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do
1168 * not return success until we see the second ClientHello
1169 * with a valid cookie.
1173 s->s3.tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1174 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
1175 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1176 s->s3.tmp.message_size = readbytes;
1178 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1179 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1180 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1181 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1184 s->init_num += readbytes;
1189 if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK
1190 && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
1192 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1193 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1194 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1197 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
1201 if (s->msg_callback)
1202 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1203 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1204 s->msg_callback_arg);
1206 } while (skip_message);
1207 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1210 s->s3.tmp.message_type = *(p++);
1212 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1214 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1217 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1218 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1220 l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
1221 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1222 s->s3.tmp.message_size = l;
1224 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1225 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1228 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1229 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1231 SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
1234 s->s3.tmp.message_size = l;
1236 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1243 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
1245 size_t n, readbytes;
1249 if (s->s3.tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1250 /* We've already read everything in */
1251 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
1256 n = s->s3.tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
1258 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
1259 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
1261 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1265 s->init_num += readbytes;
1270 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1271 * Finished verification.
1273 if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) {
1274 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1279 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1280 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1281 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1283 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1287 if (s->msg_callback)
1288 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
1289 (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1292 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1293 * processing the message
1294 * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished
1297 #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2)
1298 /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */
1299 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
1300 && s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) {
1301 if (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
1302 || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1303 || memcmp(hrrrandom,
1304 s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET,
1305 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) {
1306 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1307 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1308 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1314 if (s->msg_callback)
1315 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
1316 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1317 s->msg_callback_arg);
1324 static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = {
1325 {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE},
1326 {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1327 {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1328 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1329 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1330 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1331 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1332 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED},
1333 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1334 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1335 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1336 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1337 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1338 {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1339 {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1340 {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1341 {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1342 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1343 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1344 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1345 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1346 {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1347 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1348 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1349 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE},
1350 {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1351 {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1352 {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1353 {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1354 {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1355 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1356 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1357 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1358 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1359 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1360 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1361 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1362 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1363 {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1365 /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */
1366 {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN}
1369 int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err)
1371 const X509ERR2ALERT *tp;
1373 for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp)
1374 if (tp->x509err == x509err)
1379 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
1381 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1383 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
1386 static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b)
1388 int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s);
1393 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
1394 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
1399 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
1400 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
1403 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != TLS1_3_VERSION
1404 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1407 /* Must be in order high to low */
1408 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
1409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1410 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
1412 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1415 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
1417 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1420 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
1422 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1425 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
1427 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1429 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1430 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
1432 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1437 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1438 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1441 /* Must be in order high to low */
1442 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
1443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1444 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
1446 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1449 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
1450 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
1452 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1453 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
1459 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1461 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1462 * @method: the intended method.
1464 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1466 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
1468 int version = method->version;
1470 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
1471 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
1472 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
1473 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1475 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
1476 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
1477 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
1479 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
1480 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1481 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
1482 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
1488 * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable
1489 * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured. Otherwise
1492 static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s)
1495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1500 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1501 if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL)
1505 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL)
1508 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1509 /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */
1511 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1512 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1513 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1514 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1519 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i))
1521 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1522 if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC)
1525 * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is
1526 * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this
1527 * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446.
1529 eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
1532 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey));
1533 if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve))
1544 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1547 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1548 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1550 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1552 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version, const SSL_METHOD **meth)
1554 const version_info *vent;
1555 const version_info *table;
1557 switch (s->method->version) {
1559 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1560 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
1561 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1562 table = tls_version_table;
1564 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1565 table = dtls_version_table;
1570 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
1572 if (vent->cmeth != NULL
1573 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0
1574 && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0
1576 || version != TLS1_3_VERSION
1577 || is_tls13_capable(s))) {
1579 *meth = vent->cmeth();
1587 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1588 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1589 * supported protocol version.
1591 * @s server SSL handle.
1593 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1595 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s)
1597 const version_info *vent;
1598 const version_info *table;
1601 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1602 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1605 if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
1609 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1610 * highest protocol version).
1612 if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
1613 table = tls_version_table;
1614 else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
1615 table = dtls_version_table;
1617 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1621 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1622 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
1623 return s->version == vent->version;
1629 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1630 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1631 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1632 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1634 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1635 * @version: the intended limit.
1636 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1638 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1640 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
1648 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1649 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1650 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1652 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1653 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1654 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1655 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1656 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1658 switch (method_version) {
1661 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1662 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1663 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1664 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1669 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1670 if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL)
1674 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1675 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL) ||
1676 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
1685 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1687 if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION
1688 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) {
1689 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2;
1690 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1691 && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
1693 * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2
1694 * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still
1695 * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and
1696 * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is
1697 * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not.
1699 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) {
1700 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1;
1702 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1707 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1708 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1709 * the version specific method.
1711 * @s: server SSL handle.
1713 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1715 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1718 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1720 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1721 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL.
1723 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1726 int server_version = s->method->version;
1727 int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
1728 const version_info *vent;
1729 const version_info *table;
1731 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
1733 s->client_version = client_version;
1735 switch (server_version) {
1737 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1738 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
1739 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1740 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1742 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1743 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1744 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1745 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1746 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1751 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1752 * a HelloRetryRequest
1755 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1756 table = tls_version_table;
1758 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1759 table = dtls_version_table;
1763 suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
1765 /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */
1766 if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE)
1767 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1769 if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1770 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
1771 unsigned int best_vers = 0;
1772 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
1773 PACKET versionslist;
1775 suppversions->parsed = 1;
1777 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
1778 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1779 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1783 * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION.
1784 * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3:
1785 * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with
1786 * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to
1787 * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert."
1788 * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower.
1789 * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1.
1791 if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION)
1792 return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION;
1794 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
1795 if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
1797 if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method))
1798 best_vers = candidate_vers;
1800 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
1801 /* Trailing data? */
1802 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1805 if (best_vers > 0) {
1806 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1808 * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we
1809 * negotiated TLSv1.3
1811 if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION)
1812 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1815 check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd);
1816 s->version = best_vers;
1817 s->method = best_method;
1820 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1824 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1825 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1827 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
1828 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1831 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1834 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1835 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1837 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
1838 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
1840 method = vent->smeth();
1841 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1842 check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd);
1843 s->version = vent->version;
1849 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1853 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1854 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1855 * the version specific method.
1857 * @s: client SSL handle.
1858 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1859 * @extensions: The extensions received
1861 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
1863 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions)
1865 const version_info *vent;
1866 const version_info *table;
1867 int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv;
1870 s->version = version;
1872 /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */
1873 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions,
1874 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1875 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions,
1881 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE
1882 && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1884 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1885 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1889 switch (s->method->version) {
1891 if (s->version != s->method->version) {
1893 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1894 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1895 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1899 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1900 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1901 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1902 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1903 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1906 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1907 table = tls_version_table;
1909 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1910 table = dtls_version_table;
1914 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max);
1917 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1918 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, ret);
1921 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min)
1922 : s->version < ver_min) {
1924 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1925 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
1927 } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max)
1928 : s->version > ver_max) {
1930 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1931 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
1935 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0)
1938 /* Check for downgrades */
1939 if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) {
1940 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
1941 s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1942 - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
1943 sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
1945 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1946 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1947 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1950 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1951 && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION
1952 && real_max > s->version) {
1953 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
1954 s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1955 - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
1956 sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
1958 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1959 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1960 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1965 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1966 if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version)
1969 s->method = vent->cmeth();
1974 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1975 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
1980 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
1981 * @s: The SSL connection
1982 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1983 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1984 * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole
1985 * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled
1988 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1989 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1990 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1991 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1992 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1994 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1995 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1996 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1998 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1999 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
2001 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version,
2004 int version, tmp_real_max;
2006 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
2007 const SSL_METHOD *method;
2008 const version_info *table;
2009 const version_info *vent;
2011 switch (s->method->version) {
2014 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
2015 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
2016 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
2017 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
2018 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
2020 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
2022 * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version
2025 if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL))
2026 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2028 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
2029 table = tls_version_table;
2031 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
2032 table = dtls_version_table;
2037 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
2038 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
2039 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
2040 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
2042 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
2043 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
2044 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
2046 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
2047 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
2048 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
2050 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
2051 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
2052 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
2053 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
2054 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
2055 * selected, as we start from scratch.
2057 *min_version = version = 0;
2059 if (real_max != NULL)
2062 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
2064 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
2065 * "version capability" vector.
2067 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
2072 method = vent->cmeth();
2074 if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0)
2075 tmp_real_max = vent->version;
2077 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
2081 *min_version = method->version;
2083 if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0)
2084 *real_max = tmp_real_max;
2085 version = (single = method)->version;
2086 *min_version = version;
2091 *max_version = version;
2093 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
2095 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
2101 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
2102 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
2104 * @s: client SSL handle.
2106 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
2108 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
2110 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
2113 * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent
2114 * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated.
2116 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
2119 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL);
2124 s->version = ver_max;
2126 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
2127 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION)
2128 ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
2130 s->client_version = ver_max;
2135 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
2136 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
2137 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
2138 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
2140 int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups,
2141 size_t num_groups, int checkallow)
2145 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
2148 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
2149 uint16_t group = groups[i];
2151 if (group_id == group
2153 || tls_group_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
2161 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
2162 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval,
2163 size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr,
2166 unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2167 unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
2169 memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
2171 if (hashval == NULL) {
2172 hashval = hashvaltmp;
2174 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2175 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
2176 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp),
2178 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2183 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2184 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
2185 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2189 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2190 msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH;
2191 msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen;
2192 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
2193 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) {
2194 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2199 * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted
2200 * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after
2201 * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie.
2204 && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen)
2205 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
2206 s->s3.tmp.message_size
2207 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) {
2208 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2215 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2217 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
2220 int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2222 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
2223 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2226 if (ca_sk == NULL) {
2227 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2228 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2231 /* get the CA RDNs */
2232 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2233 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2234 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2238 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2239 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2240 unsigned int name_len;
2242 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2243 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2244 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2245 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2249 namestart = namebytes;
2250 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) {
2251 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2255 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2256 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2257 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2261 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2262 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2263 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2269 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2270 s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk;
2275 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2280 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL *s)
2282 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;;
2285 ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2286 if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0)
2291 ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
2296 int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, WPACKET *pkt)
2298 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2299 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2300 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
2301 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2305 if (ca_sk != NULL) {
2308 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) {
2309 unsigned char *namebytes;
2310 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i);
2314 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2315 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2317 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2318 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
2319 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2325 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2326 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
2327 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2334 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2335 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs,
2336 const void *param, size_t paramlen)
2338 size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen;
2339 unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen);
2342 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS,
2343 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2346 memcpy(tbs, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2347 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2349 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen);
2356 * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth,
2357 * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once
2359 int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s)
2361 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2362 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1))
2363 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2366 s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2367 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2368 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2369 SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
2370 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2373 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst,
2374 s->s3.handshake_dgst)) {
2375 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2376 SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
2377 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2385 * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest
2386 * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request
2388 int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s)
2390 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2392 SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
2393 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2396 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3.handshake_dgst,
2398 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2399 SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
2400 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);