2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
5 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
6 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
7 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
8 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/x509.h>
21 #include <openssl/trace.h>
24 * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types.
26 typedef struct x509err2alert_st {
31 /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */
32 const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = {
33 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02,
34 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e,
35 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c
39 * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
40 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
42 int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
47 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
48 s->init_num, &written);
51 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
53 * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll
54 * ignore the result anyway
55 * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added
57 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET
58 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE
59 && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE))
60 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
61 (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
64 if (written == s->init_num) {
66 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
67 (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
71 s->init_off += written;
72 s->init_num -= written;
76 int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
80 if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
81 || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
84 s->init_num = (int)msglen;
90 int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s)
92 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
93 /* SSLfatal() already called */
97 /* Reset any extension flags */
98 memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags));
101 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
102 int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0;
105 * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers
106 * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
109 if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) {
110 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
111 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
114 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
115 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
117 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
118 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) &&
119 DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls))
121 } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) {
128 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
129 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
130 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
134 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
135 /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */
136 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept);
138 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
139 tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate);
141 s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 0;
144 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
145 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect);
147 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate);
149 /* mark client_random uninitialized */
150 memset(s->s3.client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3.client_random));
153 s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0;
156 s->statem.use_timer = 1;
163 * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself:
164 * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator
166 #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64
167 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1)
169 static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
170 void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen)
172 static const char *servercontext = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
173 static const char *clientcontext = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
175 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
178 /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */
179 memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE);
180 /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */
181 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
182 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY)
183 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext);
185 strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext);
188 * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake
189 * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because
190 * that includes the CertVerify itself.
192 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY
193 || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) {
194 memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash,
195 s->cert_verify_hash_len);
196 hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len;
197 } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE,
198 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
199 /* SSLfatal() already called */
204 *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
209 retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, hdata);
211 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA,
212 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
221 int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
223 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
224 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
225 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
226 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
227 size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0;
229 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
230 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
231 const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg;
233 if (lu == NULL || s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL) {
234 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
235 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
238 pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey;
240 if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) {
241 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
242 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
246 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
248 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
249 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
253 /* Get the data to be signed */
254 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
255 /* SSLfatal() already called */
259 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) {
260 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
261 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
264 siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
265 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen);
267 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
268 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
272 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
273 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
278 if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
279 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
280 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
281 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
282 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
287 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
288 if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
289 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
290 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
291 s->session->master_key)
292 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
294 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
298 } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
299 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
306 int pktype = lu->sig;
308 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
309 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
310 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
311 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen);
315 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) {
316 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY,
317 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
321 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
322 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
323 /* SSLfatal() already called */
328 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
332 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
336 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
338 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
339 const unsigned char *data;
340 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
341 unsigned char *gost_data = NULL;
343 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
347 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
350 unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
351 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
352 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
355 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
356 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
360 peer = s->session->peer;
361 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer);
363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
364 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
368 if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) {
369 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
370 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
374 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
377 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
382 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) {
383 /* SSLfatal() already called */
386 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
387 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
388 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
392 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
393 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
394 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
398 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
399 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n",
400 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
402 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
404 * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
405 * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2)
407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
408 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)
409 && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64
410 && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
411 || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256))
412 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128
413 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) {
414 len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
417 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
418 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
419 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
423 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
424 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
425 || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
426 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
427 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
430 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
431 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
432 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
436 if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) {
437 /* SSLfatal() already called */
441 OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "Using client verify alg %s\n",
442 md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md));
444 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
449 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
451 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
452 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
453 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
454 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
455 if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) {
456 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
457 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
460 BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len);
466 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
467 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
468 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
469 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
470 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
475 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
476 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0
477 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
478 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
479 s->session->master_key)) {
480 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
484 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
485 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
486 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
490 j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen);
492 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
493 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
499 * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client
500 * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the
501 * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest
502 * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We
503 * want to make sure that SSL_get_peer_certificate() will return the actual
504 * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback.
506 if (!s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1)
507 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
509 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
511 BIO_free(s->s3.handshake_buffer);
512 s->s3.handshake_buffer = NULL;
513 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
514 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
515 OPENSSL_free(gost_data);
520 int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
522 size_t finish_md_len;
526 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
527 if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
528 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
531 * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the
536 && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0
537 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
538 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {;
539 /* SSLfatal() already called */
544 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
545 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
547 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
548 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
551 finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
553 s->s3.tmp.finish_md);
554 if (finish_md_len == 0) {
555 /* SSLfatal() already called */
559 s->s3.tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
561 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
562 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED,
563 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
568 * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for
569 * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that.
571 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL,
572 s->session->master_key,
573 s->session->master_key_length)) {
574 /* SSLfatal() already called */
579 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
581 if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
582 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED,
583 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
587 memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md,
589 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
591 memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md,
593 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
599 int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
601 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) {
602 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE,
603 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
607 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE;
611 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
613 unsigned int updatetype;
616 * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must
617 * be on a record boundary.
619 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
620 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
621 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
622 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
625 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype)
626 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
627 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
628 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
629 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
633 * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we
636 if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
637 && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) {
638 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE,
639 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
640 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
644 * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
645 * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should
646 * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). We
647 * ignore a request for us to update our sending keys too if we already
650 if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED
651 && (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) == 0)
652 s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED;
654 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) {
655 /* SSLfatal() already called */
656 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
659 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
663 * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen
666 int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
672 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
673 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
675 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
676 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
679 s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len =
680 s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen,
681 s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md);
683 if (s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) {
684 /* SSLfatal() already called */
691 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
695 remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
697 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
698 * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
699 * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
701 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
702 if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
703 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
704 || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
705 && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
706 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
707 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
708 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
709 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
713 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
714 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
715 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
716 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
720 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
721 if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
722 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
723 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
724 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
727 s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 1;
728 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
729 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
730 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
731 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
734 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
735 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
737 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
738 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
742 * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
743 * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
746 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
750 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
753 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
758 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
761 * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We
762 * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less
765 s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID;
766 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
767 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
768 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
769 /* SSLfatal() already called */
770 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
775 * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the
776 * message must be on a record boundary.
778 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
779 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
780 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
781 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
784 /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
785 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3.change_cipher_spec) {
786 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
787 SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
788 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
790 s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 0;
792 md_len = s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
794 if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
795 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
796 SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
797 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
800 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
802 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
803 SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
804 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
808 * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
810 if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
811 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED,
812 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
813 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
816 memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
818 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
820 memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md,
822 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
826 * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
827 * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
829 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
831 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED &&
832 !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
833 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
834 /* SSLfatal() already called */
835 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
838 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
839 s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0,
840 &s->session->master_key_length)) {
841 /* SSLfatal() already called */
842 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
844 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
845 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
846 /* SSLfatal() already called */
847 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
849 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
850 /* SSLfatal() already called */
851 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
856 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
859 int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
861 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
862 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
863 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
870 /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
871 static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain)
874 unsigned char *outbytes;
876 len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
878 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET,
882 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
883 || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
884 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET,
885 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
890 && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
892 /* SSLfatal() already called */
899 /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
900 static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
904 STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
905 STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
906 X509_STORE *chain_store;
908 if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
914 * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
916 if (cpk->chain != NULL)
917 extra_certs = cpk->chain;
919 extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
921 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
923 else if (s->cert->chain_store)
924 chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
926 chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
928 if (chain_store != NULL) {
929 X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
931 if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
932 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,
933 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
936 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
937 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
938 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,
943 * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
944 * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
945 * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
946 * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
948 (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
949 /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
951 chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
952 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
955 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
957 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
958 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
960 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
961 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
964 chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
965 for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
966 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
968 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) {
969 /* SSLfatal() already called */
970 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
974 X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
976 i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
978 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
981 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) {
982 /* SSLfatal() already called */
985 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
986 x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
987 if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) {
988 /* SSLfatal() already called */
996 unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
998 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) {
999 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,
1000 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1004 if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk))
1007 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1008 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN,
1009 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1017 * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result
1018 * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is
1021 WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop)
1023 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1024 int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand;
1027 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1029 * We don't do this in DTLS because we may still need the init_buf
1030 * in case there are any unexpected retransmits
1032 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
1035 if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) {
1036 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE,
1037 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1043 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server
1044 && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
1045 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
1048 * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3
1049 * post handshake exchange
1052 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
1055 s->statem.cleanuphand = 0;
1056 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1058 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
1062 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the
1065 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
1066 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
1068 /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */
1069 tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good);
1070 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept;
1072 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1074 * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once,
1075 * so we remove this one from the cache.
1077 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode
1078 & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0)
1079 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
1082 * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the
1085 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
1088 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit);
1090 s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect;
1091 tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good);
1094 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1095 /* done with handshaking */
1096 s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
1097 s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
1098 s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
1099 dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s);
1103 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1104 cb = s->info_callback;
1105 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1106 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1108 /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */
1109 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
1114 || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
1115 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
1119 /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */
1120 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1121 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
1124 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1127 int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
1129 /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1130 int skip_message, i, recvd_type;
1132 size_t l, readbytes;
1134 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1137 while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) {
1138 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
1140 SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
1143 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1146 if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1148 * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
1149 * in the middle of a handshake message.
1151 if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
1152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1153 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1154 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1157 if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE
1158 && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) {
1160 * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is
1161 * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos.
1162 * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do
1163 * not return success until we see the second ClientHello
1164 * with a valid cookie.
1168 s->s3.tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
1169 s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
1170 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1171 s->s3.tmp.message_size = readbytes;
1173 } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1174 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1175 SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1176 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1179 s->init_num += readbytes;
1184 if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK
1185 && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST)
1187 * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages --
1188 * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if
1189 * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished'
1192 if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) {
1196 if (s->msg_callback)
1197 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1198 p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1199 s->msg_callback_arg);
1201 } while (skip_message);
1202 /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
1205 s->s3.tmp.message_type = *(p++);
1207 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1209 * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible
1212 * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read
1213 * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read
1215 l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer)
1216 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1217 s->s3.tmp.message_size = l;
1219 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
1220 s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1223 /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */
1224 if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1225 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
1226 SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
1229 s->s3.tmp.message_size = l;
1231 s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH;
1238 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
1240 size_t n, readbytes;
1244 if (s->s3.tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1245 /* We've already read everything in */
1246 *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
1251 n = s->s3.tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
1253 i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
1254 &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
1256 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1260 s->init_num += readbytes;
1265 * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for
1266 * Finished verification.
1268 if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) {
1269 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1274 /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */
1275 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1276 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1278 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1282 if (s->msg_callback)
1283 s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data,
1284 (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1287 * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of
1288 * processing the message
1289 * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished
1292 #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2)
1293 /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */
1294 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
1295 && s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) {
1296 if (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO
1297 || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1298 || memcmp(hrrrandom,
1299 s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET,
1300 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) {
1301 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1302 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1303 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1309 if (s->msg_callback)
1310 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data,
1311 (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
1312 s->msg_callback_arg);
1319 static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = {
1320 {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE},
1321 {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1322 {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1323 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1324 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1325 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1326 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1327 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED},
1328 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1329 {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1330 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED},
1331 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1332 {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR},
1333 {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1334 {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1335 {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1336 {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1337 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1338 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1339 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1340 {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1341 {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1342 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1343 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1344 {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE},
1345 {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1346 {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1347 {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1348 {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1349 {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1350 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1351 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1352 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE},
1353 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1354 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1355 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1356 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1357 {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA},
1358 {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR},
1360 /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */
1361 {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN}
1364 int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err)
1366 const X509ERR2ALERT *tp;
1368 for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp)
1369 if (tp->x509err == x509err)
1374 int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s)
1376 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1378 return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL);
1381 static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b)
1383 int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s);
1388 return a < b ? -1 : 1;
1389 return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1;
1394 const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void);
1395 const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
1398 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != TLS1_3_VERSION
1399 # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
1402 /* Must be in order high to low */
1403 static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
1404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1405 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
1407 {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
1410 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
1412 {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1
1415 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method},
1417 {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1
1420 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method},
1422 {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1425 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method},
1427 {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1432 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
1433 # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION.
1436 /* Must be in order high to low */
1437 static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = {
1438 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2
1439 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method},
1441 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
1444 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method},
1445 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL},
1447 {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
1448 {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL},
1454 * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled.
1456 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1457 * @method: the intended method.
1459 * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure.
1461 static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
1463 int version = method->version;
1465 if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 &&
1466 version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) ||
1467 ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0)
1468 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1470 if (s->max_proto_version != 0 &&
1471 version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0)
1472 return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH;
1474 if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0)
1475 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1476 if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s))
1477 return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE;
1483 * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable
1484 * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured. Otherwise
1487 static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s)
1490 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1496 if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL)
1500 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL)
1503 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1504 /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */
1506 case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
1507 case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
1508 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
1509 case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
1514 if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i))
1516 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1517 if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC)
1520 * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is
1521 * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this
1522 * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446.
1524 eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
1527 curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey));
1528 if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve))
1539 * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by
1542 * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method
1543 * @version: Protocol version to test against
1545 * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0
1547 int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version, const SSL_METHOD **meth)
1549 const version_info *vent;
1550 const version_info *table;
1552 switch (s->method->version) {
1554 /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */
1555 return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0;
1556 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1557 table = tls_version_table;
1559 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1560 table = dtls_version_table;
1565 vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0;
1567 if (vent->cmeth != NULL
1568 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0
1569 && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0
1571 || version != TLS1_3_VERSION
1572 || is_tls13_capable(s))) {
1574 *meth = vent->cmeth();
1582 * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version
1583 * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest
1584 * supported protocol version.
1586 * @s server SSL handle.
1588 * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise.
1590 int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s)
1592 const version_info *vent;
1593 const version_info *table;
1596 * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version
1597 * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed
1600 if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version)
1604 * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its
1605 * highest protocol version).
1607 if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version)
1608 table = tls_version_table;
1609 else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version)
1610 table = dtls_version_table;
1612 /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */
1616 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1617 if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0)
1618 return s->version == vent->version;
1624 * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS
1625 * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This
1626 * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is
1627 * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well.
1629 * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD.
1630 * @version: the intended limit.
1631 * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated.
1633 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
1635 int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
1643 * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions.
1644 * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions.
1645 * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros.
1647 * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not
1648 * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user
1649 * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's
1650 * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the
1651 * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense.
1653 switch (method_version) {
1656 * XXX For fixed version methods, should we always fail and not set any
1657 * bounds, always succeed and not set any bounds, or set the bounds and
1658 * arrange to fail later if they are not met? At present fixed-version
1659 * methods are not subject to controls that disable individual protocol
1664 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1665 if (version < SSL3_VERSION || version > TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL)
1669 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1670 if (DTLS_VERSION_GT(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL) ||
1671 DTLS_VERSION_LT(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER))
1680 static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1682 if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION
1683 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) {
1684 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2;
1685 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1686 && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
1688 * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2
1689 * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still
1690 * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and
1691 * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is
1692 * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not.
1694 && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) {
1695 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1;
1697 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1702 * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the
1703 * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and
1704 * the version specific method.
1706 * @s: server SSL handle.
1708 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
1710 int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
1713 * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
1715 * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION,
1716 * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL.
1718 * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the
1721 int server_version = s->method->version;
1722 int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
1723 const version_info *vent;
1724 const version_info *table;
1726 RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
1728 s->client_version = client_version;
1730 switch (server_version) {
1732 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1733 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
1734 return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
1735 *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
1737 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1738 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1739 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1740 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1741 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1746 * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after
1747 * a HelloRetryRequest
1750 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1751 table = tls_version_table;
1753 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1754 table = dtls_version_table;
1758 suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
1760 /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */
1761 if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE)
1762 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1764 if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1765 unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
1766 unsigned int best_vers = 0;
1767 const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
1768 PACKET versionslist;
1770 suppversions->parsed = 1;
1772 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
1773 /* Trailing or invalid data? */
1774 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1778 * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION.
1779 * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3:
1780 * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with
1781 * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to
1782 * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert."
1783 * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower.
1784 * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1.
1786 if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION)
1787 return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION;
1789 while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
1790 if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
1792 if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method))
1793 best_vers = candidate_vers;
1795 if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
1796 /* Trailing data? */
1797 return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
1800 if (best_vers > 0) {
1801 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1803 * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we
1804 * negotiated TLSv1.3
1806 if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION)
1807 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1810 check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd);
1811 s->version = best_vers;
1812 s->method = best_method;
1815 return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
1819 * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
1820 * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
1822 if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
1823 client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
1826 * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
1829 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1830 const SSL_METHOD *method;
1832 if (vent->smeth == NULL ||
1833 version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0)
1835 method = vent->smeth();
1836 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
1837 check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd);
1838 s->version = vent->version;
1844 return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW;
1848 * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the
1849 * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and
1850 * the version specific method.
1852 * @s: client SSL handle.
1853 * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO.
1854 * @extensions: The extensions received
1856 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
1858 int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions)
1860 const version_info *vent;
1861 const version_info *table;
1862 int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv;
1865 s->version = version;
1867 /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */
1868 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions,
1869 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1870 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions,
1876 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE
1877 && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1879 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1880 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1884 switch (s->method->version) {
1886 if (s->version != s->method->version) {
1888 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1889 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1890 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1894 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
1895 * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
1896 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
1897 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
1898 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
1901 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
1902 table = tls_version_table;
1904 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
1905 table = dtls_version_table;
1909 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max);
1912 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1913 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, ret);
1916 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min)
1917 : s->version < ver_min) {
1919 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1920 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
1922 } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max)
1923 : s->version > ver_max) {
1925 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1926 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
1930 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0)
1933 /* Check for downgrades */
1934 if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) {
1935 if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
1936 s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1937 - sizeof(tls12downgrade),
1938 sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
1940 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1941 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1942 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1945 } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
1946 && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION
1947 && real_max > s->version) {
1948 if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
1949 s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1950 - sizeof(tls11downgrade),
1951 sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
1953 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1954 SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1955 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
1960 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
1961 if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version)
1964 s->method = vent->cmeth();
1969 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
1970 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
1975 * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version
1976 * @s: The SSL connection
1977 * @min_version: The minimum supported version
1978 * @max_version: The maximum supported version
1979 * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole
1980 * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled
1983 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
1984 * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
1985 * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B
1986 * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here,
1987 * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later.
1989 * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled,
1990 * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol
1991 * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1.
1993 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
1994 * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
1996 int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version,
1999 int version, tmp_real_max;
2001 const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
2002 const SSL_METHOD *method;
2003 const version_info *table;
2004 const version_info *vent;
2006 switch (s->method->version) {
2009 * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't
2010 * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope
2011 * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol
2012 * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return
2013 * ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
2015 *min_version = *max_version = s->version;
2017 * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version
2020 if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL))
2021 return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2023 case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
2024 table = tls_version_table;
2026 case DTLS_ANY_VERSION:
2027 table = dtls_version_table;
2032 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols
2033 * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version
2034 * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method
2035 * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole".
2037 * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above
2038 * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above
2039 * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet.
2041 * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes
2042 * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single"
2043 * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0.
2045 * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared,
2046 * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit
2047 * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else
2048 * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too.
2049 * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes
2050 * selected, as we start from scratch.
2052 *min_version = version = 0;
2054 if (real_max != NULL)
2057 for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
2059 * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
2060 * "version capability" vector.
2062 if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
2067 method = vent->cmeth();
2069 if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0)
2070 tmp_real_max = vent->version;
2072 if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
2076 *min_version = method->version;
2078 if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0)
2079 *real_max = tmp_real_max;
2080 version = (single = method)->version;
2081 *min_version = version;
2086 *max_version = version;
2088 /* Fail if everything is disabled */
2090 return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE;
2096 * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
2097 * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
2099 * @s: client SSL handle.
2101 * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
2103 int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
2105 int ver_min, ver_max, ret;
2108 * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent
2109 * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated.
2111 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
2114 ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL);
2119 s->version = ver_max;
2121 /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
2122 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION)
2123 ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
2125 s->client_version = ver_max;
2130 * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is
2131 * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be
2132 * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is
2133 * 1) or 0 otherwise.
2135 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2136 int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups,
2137 size_t num_groups, int checkallow)
2141 if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0)
2144 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
2145 uint16_t group = groups[i];
2147 if (group_id == group
2149 || tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) {
2158 /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */
2159 int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval,
2160 size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr,
2163 unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2164 unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH];
2166 memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr));
2168 if (hashval == NULL) {
2169 hashval = hashvaltmp;
2171 /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */
2172 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
2173 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp),
2175 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2180 /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */
2181 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
2182 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2186 /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */
2187 msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH;
2188 msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen;
2189 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)
2190 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) {
2191 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2196 * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted
2197 * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after
2198 * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie.
2201 && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen)
2202 || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
2203 s->s3.tmp.message_size
2204 + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) {
2205 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2212 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2214 return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
2217 int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2219 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
2220 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2223 if (ca_sk == NULL) {
2224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2225 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2228 /* get the CA RDNs */
2229 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2231 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2235 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2236 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2237 unsigned int name_len;
2239 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2240 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2241 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2242 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2246 namestart = namebytes;
2247 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) {
2248 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2252 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2253 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2254 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2258 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES,
2260 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2266 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2267 s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk;
2272 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2277 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL *s)
2279 const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;;
2282 ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2283 if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0)
2288 ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
2293 int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, WPACKET *pkt)
2295 /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
2296 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
2298 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2302 if (ca_sk != NULL) {
2305 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) {
2306 unsigned char *namebytes;
2307 X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i);
2311 || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0
2312 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen,
2314 || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) {
2315 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
2316 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2322 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2323 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
2324 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2331 /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */
2332 size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs,
2333 const void *param, size_t paramlen)
2335 size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen;
2336 unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen);
2339 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS,
2340 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2343 memcpy(tbs, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2344 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
2346 memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen);
2353 * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth,
2354 * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once
2356 int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s)
2358 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2359 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1))
2360 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2363 s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2364 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2365 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2366 SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
2367 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2370 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst,
2371 s->s3.handshake_dgst)) {
2372 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2373 SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
2374 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2382 * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest
2383 * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request
2385 int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s)
2387 if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) {
2388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2389 SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
2390 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2393 if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3.handshake_dgst,
2395 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2396 SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA,
2397 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);