1 /* ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "statem_locl.h"
154 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
155 #include <openssl/rand.h>
156 #include <openssl/objects.h>
157 #include <openssl/evp.h>
158 #include <openssl/md5.h>
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
160 # include <openssl/dh.h>
162 #include <openssl/bn.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
164 # include <openssl/engine.h>
167 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
168 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
169 static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s);
170 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
171 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
176 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
182 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
184 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
185 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
186 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
187 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
194 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
201 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
203 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
206 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
207 * ciphersuite or for SRP
209 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
218 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
219 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
220 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
221 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
224 * 1: Success (transition allowed)
225 * 0: Error (transition not allowed)
227 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
229 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
232 switch(st->hand_state) {
233 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
234 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
235 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
239 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
240 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
241 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
247 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
249 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
250 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
251 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
254 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
259 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
260 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
262 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
263 && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL
264 && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL
265 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
267 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
268 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
269 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
270 * the server is resuming.
273 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
275 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
276 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
277 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
278 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
282 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
283 if (ske_expected < 0)
285 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
287 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
288 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
289 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
290 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
293 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
294 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
295 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
297 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
298 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
307 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
308 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
310 if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
311 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
316 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
317 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
318 if (ske_expected < 0)
320 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
322 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
323 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
324 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
325 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
332 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
333 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
334 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
335 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
342 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
343 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
344 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
349 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
350 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET && s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
351 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
353 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
354 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
359 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
360 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
361 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
366 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
367 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
368 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
377 /* No valid transition found */
382 * client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next
383 * when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
385 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
387 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
389 switch(st->hand_state) {
391 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
393 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
394 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
396 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
398 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
401 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
403 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
404 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
405 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
407 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
408 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
409 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
411 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
412 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
415 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
416 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
418 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
420 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
421 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
424 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
425 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
426 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
427 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
429 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
430 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
432 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
434 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
435 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
437 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
439 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
440 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
441 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
443 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
444 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
447 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
448 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
450 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
452 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
454 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
455 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
456 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
457 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
460 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
462 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
463 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
464 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
466 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
469 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
471 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
474 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
475 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
476 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
480 /* Shouldn't happen */
481 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
486 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
487 * the client to the server.
489 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
491 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
493 switch(st->hand_state) {
494 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
496 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
497 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
498 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
503 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
505 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
506 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
509 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
510 * messages unless we need to.
514 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
515 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
516 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
519 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
522 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
525 /* No pre work to be done */
529 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
533 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
534 * client to the server.
536 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
538 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
542 switch(st->hand_state) {
543 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
544 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->d1->cookie_len > 0 && statem_flush(s) != 1)
546 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
547 /* Disable buffering for SCTP */
548 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
551 * turn on buffering for the next lot of output
553 if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
554 s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
558 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
559 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
564 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
565 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
569 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
570 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
571 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
572 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
574 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
575 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
577 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
579 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
582 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
583 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
586 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
590 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
593 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
598 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
602 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
604 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
606 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
609 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
613 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
618 /* No post work to be done */
622 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
626 * Construct a message to be sent from the client to the server.
628 * Valid return values are:
632 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s)
634 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
636 switch(st->hand_state) {
637 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
638 return tls_construct_client_hello(s);
641 return tls_construct_client_certificate(s);
643 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
644 return tls_construct_client_key_exchange(s);
646 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
647 return tls_construct_client_verify(s);
649 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
651 return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
653 return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s);
655 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
656 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
657 return tls_construct_next_proto(s);
659 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
660 return tls_construct_finished(s,
662 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
664 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
667 /* Shouldn't happen */
675 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
676 * reading. Excludes the message header.
678 unsigned long ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
680 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
682 switch(st->hand_state) {
683 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
684 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
686 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
687 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
690 return s->max_cert_list;
692 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
693 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
695 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
696 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
698 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
699 /* Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases.
700 * In practice these messages can get quite long if servers are
701 * configured to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
703 return s->max_cert_list;
705 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
706 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
708 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
709 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
711 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
712 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
714 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
715 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
718 /* Shouldn't happen */
726 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
728 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
730 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
732 switch(st->hand_state) {
733 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
734 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
736 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
737 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
740 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
742 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
743 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
745 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
746 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
748 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
749 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
751 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
752 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
754 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
755 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
757 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
758 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
760 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
761 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
764 /* Shouldn't happen */
768 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
772 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
775 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
777 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
779 switch(st->hand_state) {
780 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
781 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
782 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
783 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
784 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
785 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
786 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
787 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
788 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
791 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
792 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
799 /* Shouldn't happen */
804 * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if
805 * the version is currently set to (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION.
806 * Returns 1 on success
809 static int ssl_set_version(SSL *s)
811 unsigned long mask, options = s->options;
813 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
815 * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are
816 * some protocols below X enabled. This is required in order
817 * to maintain "version capability" vector contiguous. So
818 * that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favour of
819 * TLS1>=1, it would be insufficient to pass SSL_NO_TLSv1, the
820 * answer is SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3.
822 mask = SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 | SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
823 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
827 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT)
828 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2) {
829 if ((options & mask) != mask) {
830 s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
836 s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
839 if ((options & mask) == mask) {
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
843 s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
846 mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
847 if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1) && (options & mask) != mask)
848 s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
849 mask &= ~SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
850 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL3)
851 if ((options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1) && (options & mask) != mask)
852 s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
855 if (s->version != TLS1_2_VERSION && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
856 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION,
857 SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
861 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && FIPS_mode()) {
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
866 } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
867 /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
868 /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
869 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) {
870 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
871 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION,
872 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
876 * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
878 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) {
879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
883 * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
885 s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
886 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
889 * We only support one version: update method
891 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)
892 s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
893 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
897 s->client_version = s->version;
902 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s)
905 unsigned char *p, *d;
909 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
913 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
915 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
917 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
918 if (ssl_set_version(s) == 0)
921 if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
923 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
924 * "ticket" without a session ID.
926 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
927 (sess->not_resumable)) {
928 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
931 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
933 p = s->s3->client_random;
936 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
937 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
939 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
942 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
951 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
952 sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
955 /* Do the message type and length last */
956 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
959 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
960 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
961 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
962 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
963 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
964 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
965 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
966 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
969 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
970 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
971 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
972 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
973 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
974 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
975 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
976 * know that is maximum server supports.
977 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
978 * containing version 1.0.
980 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
981 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
982 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
983 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
984 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
985 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
986 * the negotiated version.
988 *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
989 *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
992 memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
993 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
999 i = s->session->session_id_length;
1002 if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1003 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1006 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
1010 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1011 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1012 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1013 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1016 *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
1017 memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
1018 p += s->d1->cookie_len;
1021 /* Ciphers supported */
1022 i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]));
1024 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
1027 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
1029 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
1030 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
1033 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
1034 && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
1035 i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
1041 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1045 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
1048 j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1050 for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
1051 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1055 *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
1057 /* TLS extensions */
1058 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1059 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1063 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1065 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1071 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) {
1072 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1079 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1083 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1086 unsigned int cookie_len;
1089 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1090 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1091 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1092 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1096 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1097 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1098 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1099 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1103 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1104 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1105 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1108 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1110 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1112 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1113 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1114 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1117 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1119 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1120 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1122 size_t session_id_len;
1123 unsigned char *cipherchars;
1124 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1125 unsigned int compression;
1126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1130 if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1131 unsigned int sversion;
1133 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1134 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1139 #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
1140 #error Code needs updating for new TLS version
1142 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
1143 if ((sversion == SSL3_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1146 SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
1147 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1150 s->method = SSLv3_client_method();
1153 if ((sversion == TLS1_VERSION) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
1154 s->method = TLSv1_client_method();
1155 } else if ((sversion == TLS1_1_VERSION) &&
1156 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
1157 s->method = TLSv1_1_client_method();
1158 } else if ((sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION) &&
1159 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
1160 s->method = TLSv1_2_client_method();
1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
1163 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1166 s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version;
1168 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
1170 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1173 } else if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1174 /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
1175 unsigned int hversion;
1178 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &hversion)) {
1179 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1180 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1184 options = s->options;
1185 if (hversion == DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
1186 s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
1187 else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1189 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1190 s->version = hversion;
1191 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1193 } else if (hversion == DTLS1_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
1194 s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1197 s->version = hversion;
1198 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1201 s->session->ssl_version = s->version = s->method->version;
1203 unsigned char *vers;
1205 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &vers, 2)) {
1206 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1207 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1210 if ((vers[0] != (s->version >> 8))
1211 || (vers[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
1212 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1213 s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | vers[1];
1214 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1219 /* load the server hello data */
1220 /* load the server random */
1221 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1222 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1223 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1229 /* Get the session-id. */
1230 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1231 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1232 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1235 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1236 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1237 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1238 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1243 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1245 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1250 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
1251 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1252 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1253 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1254 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1255 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
1256 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
1257 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
1258 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
1259 * server wants to resume.
1261 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
1262 s->session->tlsext_tick) {
1263 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1264 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1265 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1266 &s->session->master_key_length,
1268 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1269 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1270 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1272 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1273 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1278 if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1279 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1280 session_id_len) == 0) {
1281 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1282 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1283 /* actually a client application bug */
1284 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1285 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1286 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1292 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1293 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1294 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1295 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1296 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1298 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1299 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1304 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1305 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1306 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1310 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1312 /* unknown cipher */
1313 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1317 /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
1318 if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1319 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1321 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
1322 /* Skip TLS v1.0 ciphersuites if SSLv3 */
1323 if ((c->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1) && s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1324 s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1;
1326 * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
1329 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1330 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1331 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1335 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1336 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1338 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1339 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1340 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1345 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1346 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1347 * set and use it for comparison.
1349 if (s->session->cipher)
1350 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1351 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1352 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1354 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1357 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1358 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1360 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1361 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1362 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1365 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1366 if (compression != 0) {
1367 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1368 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1369 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1373 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1374 * using compression.
1376 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1377 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1381 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1382 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1383 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1384 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1387 if (compression == 0)
1389 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1390 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1391 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1394 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1397 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1398 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1399 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1400 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1403 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1407 /* TLS extensions */
1408 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt)) {
1409 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1413 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1414 /* wrong packet length */
1415 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1416 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1420 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1421 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1422 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1423 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1426 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1429 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1430 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1432 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1433 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1435 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0,
1439 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1440 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1441 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1445 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1447 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1449 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1450 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1453 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1455 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1456 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1458 unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1459 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1460 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1462 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1467 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1468 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1469 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1473 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1474 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1475 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1476 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1478 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1482 certstart = certbytes;
1483 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1485 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1486 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1489 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1490 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1491 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1492 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1495 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1496 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1502 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1503 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1504 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1505 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1506 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1509 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1511 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1512 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1516 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1518 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1519 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1521 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1524 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1527 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1529 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1532 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1533 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1537 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1541 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1542 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1546 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1547 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1548 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1549 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1550 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1552 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1553 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1554 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1557 s->session->peer_type = i;
1559 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1561 s->session->peer = x;
1562 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1565 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1569 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1571 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1574 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1578 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1583 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1584 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1585 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1589 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1591 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
1593 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1594 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1595 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1600 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1602 save_param_start = *pkt;
1604 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1605 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
1606 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
1609 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1611 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1614 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1615 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
1616 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1617 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1618 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1623 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1624 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1625 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1628 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1629 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1630 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1634 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1635 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1636 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1637 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1638 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1639 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1644 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1645 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1647 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1649 * Dummy "if" to ensure sane C code in the event of various OPENSSL_NO_*
1654 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1655 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1656 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1657 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1658 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1659 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1660 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1661 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1666 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1667 PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1669 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1670 PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1672 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1673 PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1675 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1676 PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1677 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1681 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1686 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1687 if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
1688 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1690 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1691 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1692 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1693 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1697 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1698 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1699 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1704 s->s3->peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1707 if (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1708 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1713 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(s->s3->peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1714 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1719 if ((dh->p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1720 PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1721 || (dh->g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1722 PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1724 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1725 PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL)) == NULL) {
1726 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1730 if (BN_is_zero(dh->p) || BN_is_zero(dh->g) || BN_is_zero(dh->pub_key)) {
1731 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1735 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1736 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1737 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1740 if (alg_a & (SSL_aRSA|SSL_aDSS))
1741 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1742 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1744 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1747 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1749 unsigned char *ecparams;
1753 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1754 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1755 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1757 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1758 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1762 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1763 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1765 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1770 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2));
1771 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1772 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1773 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1774 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1778 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1779 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
1781 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
1782 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
1783 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
1784 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1785 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1788 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1791 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
1792 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1796 if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->s3->peer_tmp),
1797 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1798 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt), NULL) == 0) {
1799 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1804 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1805 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1809 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1810 else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1811 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1813 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1814 else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1815 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1817 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1819 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1820 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1823 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1825 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1829 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1830 * equals the length of the parameters.
1832 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
1833 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
1834 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
1835 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1840 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1841 unsigned char *sigalgs;
1843 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) {
1844 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1847 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey);
1854 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1856 } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
1857 md = EVP_md5_sha1();
1862 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
1863 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1864 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1867 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1869 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1874 * Check signature length
1876 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)j) {
1877 /* wrong packet length */
1878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1881 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1882 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1883 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1884 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1885 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1886 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
1887 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
1888 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1889 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1892 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
1893 PACKET_remaining(&signature), pkey) <= 0) {
1895 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1896 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1900 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
1901 if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
1902 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1903 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
1904 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1905 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1908 /* still data left over */
1909 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1910 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
1914 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1915 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1917 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1919 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1923 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1925 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1926 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1927 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1930 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1932 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1933 unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
1934 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
1935 unsigned char *data;
1936 unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
1937 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
1939 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
1940 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1944 /* get the certificate types */
1945 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
1946 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
1947 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1951 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
1952 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
1953 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
1954 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
1955 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
1956 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
1957 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1960 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
1961 s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
1962 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
1964 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
1965 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
1967 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1968 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
1969 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) {
1970 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1972 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1976 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1977 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1978 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
1979 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1981 if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) {
1982 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1983 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1984 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
1987 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1988 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1993 ssl_set_default_md(s);
1996 /* get the CA RDNs */
1997 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
1998 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
1999 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2000 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2004 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2005 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
2006 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2007 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2009 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2013 namestart = namebytes;
2015 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2016 name_len)) == NULL) {
2017 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2018 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2022 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2023 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2024 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2025 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2028 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2029 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2034 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2035 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2036 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2037 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2038 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2041 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2044 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2046 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2050 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2052 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2055 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2058 unsigned int ticklen;
2059 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
2061 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2062 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2063 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) {
2064 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2069 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
2071 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2073 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2074 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2075 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2077 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2080 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2082 * Remove the old session from the cache
2084 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) {
2085 if (s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
2086 s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb(s->session_ctx,
2089 /* We carry on if this fails */
2090 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2094 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2095 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2096 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2100 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2101 s->session = new_sess;
2104 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
2105 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
2107 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2108 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
2109 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2112 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) {
2113 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2114 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2118 s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2119 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
2121 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2122 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2123 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2124 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2125 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2126 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2127 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2128 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2129 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2131 EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen,
2132 s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
2133 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
2134 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2136 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2138 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2139 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2142 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2145 unsigned long resplen;
2148 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2149 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2150 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2151 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2154 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &resplen)
2155 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2156 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2157 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2160 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2161 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
2162 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2163 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2166 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) {
2167 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2171 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
2172 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2174 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2175 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2176 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2179 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2181 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2182 /* should contain no data */
2183 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2184 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2185 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2186 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2189 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2190 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2191 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2192 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2193 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2194 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2195 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2201 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2204 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2205 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2206 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2207 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2211 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
2212 * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
2213 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2215 if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) {
2217 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2219 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
2220 SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2221 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2222 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2223 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2226 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2227 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2228 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2232 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2233 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2234 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2235 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2236 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2239 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2242 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2247 size_t pskhdrlen = 0;
2249 unsigned long alg_k;
2250 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2252 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2253 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2255 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2256 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2258 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2259 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2260 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
2262 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2264 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2266 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2270 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2273 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2274 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2277 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2279 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2282 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2283 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2284 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2288 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2290 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2291 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2294 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2295 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2296 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2298 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2300 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2303 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2304 s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2305 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2307 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2308 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2312 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2313 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2314 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2315 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2316 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2319 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2320 s->session->psk_identity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2321 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2322 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2326 s2n(identitylen, p);
2327 memcpy(p, identity, identitylen);
2328 pskhdrlen = 2 + identitylen;
2332 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2334 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2338 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2343 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2347 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2349 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2350 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2354 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2356 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2358 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2359 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2363 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2364 if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2365 || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2366 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2367 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2371 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2372 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2373 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
2377 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2378 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
2380 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2381 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2382 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2383 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2387 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, p, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2388 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2389 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2393 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2396 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2398 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2402 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2403 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2410 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2412 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2414 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2415 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2418 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey, NID_undef);
2419 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2421 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
2422 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2423 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2428 /* send off the data */
2429 n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
2431 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
2433 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2438 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2439 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2441 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
2442 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2444 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2445 skey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2447 || (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
2448 || (skey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2450 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2455 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey, NID_undef);
2457 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey) == 0) {
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2462 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2463 encoded_pt_len = EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey),
2464 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2465 &encodedPoint, NULL);
2467 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2468 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2472 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2477 *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
2478 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2480 /* copy the point */
2481 memcpy(p, encodedPoint, n);
2482 /* increment n to account for length field */
2485 /* Free allocated memory */
2486 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2488 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2490 else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2491 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2492 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2495 unsigned int md_len;
2496 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2497 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
2498 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2499 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2500 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2504 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2509 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2511 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2514 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2518 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2519 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2521 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2525 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2526 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2527 * certificate key for key exchange
2530 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2532 if (pkey_ctx == NULL
2533 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2534 /* Generate session key */
2535 || RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2536 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2537 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2538 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2542 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2544 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
2545 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2546 (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
2548 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2555 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2558 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2559 if (EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
2560 EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2561 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2562 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2563 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2564 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2565 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2566 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2567 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2568 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2571 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2572 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2573 (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
2575 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2579 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2581 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2583 *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
2585 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2586 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2590 if (msglen >= 0x80) {
2592 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2595 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2598 memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
2599 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2600 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2601 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
2602 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2603 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
2605 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2610 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2611 if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
2612 /* send off the data */
2613 n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
2615 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
2618 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2619 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2622 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2623 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2624 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2625 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2626 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2632 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2633 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2641 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
2642 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2643 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2648 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2649 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2654 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2655 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2657 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2658 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2659 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2660 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2663 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2665 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2666 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2668 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2669 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2670 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2672 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2676 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
2678 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2681 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2683 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2684 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
2685 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
2686 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2692 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
2693 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
2695 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
2696 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2697 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2700 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
2701 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2702 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2707 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2708 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2709 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2712 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2715 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2716 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2718 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2719 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2720 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
2723 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2724 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2730 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2731 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2735 int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s)
2739 const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
2742 unsigned long n = 0;
2746 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2748 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2752 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2753 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2755 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2756 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2757 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2760 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2761 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
2762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2769 fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2771 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2772 || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
2773 || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2774 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2775 s->session->master_key_length,
2776 s->session->master_key))
2777 || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2781 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2782 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2783 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2784 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) {
2785 BUF_reverse(p + 2, NULL, u);
2791 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
2792 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
2794 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
2795 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2799 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2802 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2807 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
2808 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
2809 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
2811 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2813 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
2815 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
2816 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
2819 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
2820 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
2822 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
2823 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
2828 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2831 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2834 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2835 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
2836 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
2837 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2839 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2843 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2844 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2847 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2849 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2850 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2852 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
2856 /* We need to get a client cert */
2857 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2859 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2860 * return(-1); We then get retied later
2862 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
2864 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2867 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2868 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
2869 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
2871 } else if (i == 1) {
2873 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2874 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
2878 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2879 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2882 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2883 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
2884 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
2885 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2887 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
2888 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2889 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2890 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2896 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2899 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
2903 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2905 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
2906 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
2907 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
2908 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2909 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2910 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2917 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
2919 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
2922 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2926 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2927 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2929 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2930 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2932 /* we don't have a certificate */
2933 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
2936 /* This is the passed certificate */
2938 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2939 idx = s->session->peer_type;
2940 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
2941 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
2943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
2948 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
2949 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
2950 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
2952 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2953 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT);
2957 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2958 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
2960 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
2961 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2962 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
2963 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
2966 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2967 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2968 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
2969 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
2973 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2974 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
2975 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
2976 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
2977 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
2981 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2982 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
2983 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2984 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2991 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2995 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
2996 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s)
2998 unsigned int len, padding_len;
3001 len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
3002 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3003 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3005 memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
3006 d[5 + len] = padding_len;
3007 memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
3008 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
3009 l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
3010 s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
3017 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3020 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3021 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3022 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3023 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3024 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3029 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3030 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3034 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
3040 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3041 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3042 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3048 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) {
3049 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3050 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3051 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3053 #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
3054 if (c->id == SSL3_CK_SCSV) {
3055 if (!empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3058 empty_reneg_info_scsv = 0;
3061 j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, p);
3065 * If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. Otherwise, add
3069 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3070 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3071 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3073 j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);
3075 #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
3077 "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n");
3080 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3081 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3082 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3084 j = s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, p);