2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
54 #include <openssl/rand.h>
55 #include <openssl/objects.h>
56 #include <openssl/evp.h>
57 #include <openssl/md5.h>
58 #include <openssl/dh.h>
59 #include <openssl/bn.h>
60 #include <openssl/engine.h>
62 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
63 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
64 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
65 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
69 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
75 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
77 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
78 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
79 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
87 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
93 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
95 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
98 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
99 * ciphersuite or for SRP
101 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
110 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
111 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
112 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
113 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
115 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
116 * (transition not allowed)
118 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
120 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
123 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
124 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
128 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
129 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
130 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
133 switch (st->hand_state) {
137 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
139 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
140 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
144 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
145 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
155 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
156 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
157 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
164 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
165 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
167 if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
168 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
173 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
174 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
175 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
182 /* No valid transition found */
187 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
188 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
189 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
190 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
192 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
193 * (transition not allowed)
195 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
197 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
201 * Note that after a ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
202 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
204 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
205 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
210 switch (st->hand_state) {
214 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
215 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
216 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
220 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
221 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
222 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
228 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
230 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
231 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
232 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
235 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
236 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
240 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
241 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
243 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
244 && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL
245 && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL
246 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
248 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
249 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
250 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
251 * the server is resuming.
254 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
256 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
257 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
258 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
259 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
263 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
264 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
266 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
267 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
268 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
269 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
272 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
273 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
274 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
276 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
277 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
286 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
287 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
289 if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
290 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
295 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
296 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
297 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
298 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
299 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
300 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
301 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
308 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
309 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
310 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
311 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
318 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
319 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
320 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
325 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
326 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
327 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
328 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
331 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
332 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
337 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
338 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
339 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
344 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
345 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
346 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
353 /* No valid transition found */
354 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
355 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
360 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
361 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
364 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
366 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
369 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
370 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
374 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE or TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO,
375 * because we haven't negotiated TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are
376 * handled by ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
378 switch (st->hand_state) {
380 /* Shouldn't happen */
381 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
383 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
384 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
385 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
386 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
389 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
390 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
391 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
392 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
394 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
395 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
396 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
398 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
399 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
400 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
401 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
406 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
407 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
409 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
411 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
414 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
415 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
419 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
421 switch (st->hand_state) {
423 /* Shouldn't happen */
424 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
427 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
429 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
430 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
432 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
434 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
437 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
439 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
440 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
441 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
443 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
444 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
447 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
448 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
451 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
452 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
454 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
456 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
457 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
460 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
461 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
462 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
463 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
465 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
466 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
468 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
470 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
471 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
473 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
475 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
476 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
477 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
479 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
480 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
481 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
483 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
484 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
486 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
488 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
490 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
491 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
492 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
493 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
496 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
498 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
499 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
500 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
502 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
505 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
507 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
508 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
510 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
511 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
512 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
518 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
519 * the client to the server.
521 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
523 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
525 switch (st->hand_state) {
527 /* No pre work to be done */
530 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
532 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
533 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
534 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
535 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
541 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
542 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
545 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
546 * messages unless we need to.
550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
551 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
552 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
558 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
561 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
565 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
566 * client to the server.
568 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
570 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
574 switch (st->hand_state) {
576 /* No post work to be done */
579 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
580 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
583 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
584 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
589 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
590 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
594 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
595 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
596 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
597 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
599 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
600 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
602 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
604 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
607 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
608 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
611 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
615 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
618 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
623 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
627 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
628 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
629 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
631 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
634 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
638 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
641 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
642 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
643 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
649 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
653 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
656 * Valid return values are:
660 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
661 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
663 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
665 switch (st->hand_state) {
667 /* Shouldn't happen */
670 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
672 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
674 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
675 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
678 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
679 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
680 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
684 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
685 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
688 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
689 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
690 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
693 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
694 *confunc = tls_construct_client_verify;
695 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
698 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
699 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
700 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
701 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
704 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
705 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
706 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
714 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
715 * reading. Excludes the message header.
717 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
719 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
721 switch (st->hand_state) {
723 /* Shouldn't happen */
726 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
727 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
729 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
730 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
733 return s->max_cert_list;
735 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
736 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
738 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
739 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
741 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
743 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
744 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
745 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
747 return s->max_cert_list;
749 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
750 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
752 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
753 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
755 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
757 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
758 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
760 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
761 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
766 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
768 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
770 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
772 switch (st->hand_state) {
774 /* Shouldn't happen */
775 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
777 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
778 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
780 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
781 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
784 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
786 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
787 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
789 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
790 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
792 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
793 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
795 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
796 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
798 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
799 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
801 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
802 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
804 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
805 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
810 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
813 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
815 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
817 switch (st->hand_state) {
819 /* Shouldn't happen */
822 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
823 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
825 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
826 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
827 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
828 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
829 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
830 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
831 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
832 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
833 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
836 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
837 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
842 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
847 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
848 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
851 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
853 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
854 /* Should not happen */
855 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
859 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
860 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
866 if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
868 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
869 * "ticket" without a session ID.
871 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
872 (sess->not_resumable)) {
873 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
876 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
878 p = s->s3->client_random;
881 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
882 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
884 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
887 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
896 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
900 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
901 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
902 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
903 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
904 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
905 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
906 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
907 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
910 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
911 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
912 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
913 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
914 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
915 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
916 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
917 * know that is maximum server supports.
918 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
919 * containing version 1.0.
921 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
922 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
923 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
924 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
925 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
926 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
927 * the negotiated version.
929 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
930 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
932 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
933 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
934 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
942 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
943 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
944 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
945 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
947 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
952 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
953 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
954 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
955 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
956 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
957 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
962 /* Ciphers supported */
963 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
967 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
968 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
970 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
976 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
977 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
980 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
981 if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
982 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
983 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
984 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
985 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
986 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
992 /* Add the NULL method */
993 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
999 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1000 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1003 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1005 * If extensions are of zero length then we don't even add the
1006 * extensions length bytes
1008 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1009 || !ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al)
1010 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1011 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1012 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1019 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1025 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1026 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1027 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1032 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1033 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1034 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1039 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1040 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1044 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1046 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1048 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1049 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1050 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1053 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1055 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1056 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1058 size_t session_id_len;
1059 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1060 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1061 unsigned int compression;
1062 unsigned int sversion;
1064 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1068 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1069 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1070 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1074 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1075 if (protverr != 0) {
1076 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1077 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1081 /* load the server hello data */
1082 /* load the server random */
1083 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1084 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1085 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1091 /* Get the session-id. */
1092 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1093 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1097 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1098 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1099 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1100 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1101 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1105 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1107 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1112 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
1113 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1114 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1115 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1116 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1117 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
1118 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
1119 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
1120 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
1121 * server wants to resume.
1123 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb &&
1124 s->session->tlsext_tick) {
1125 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1127 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1128 * backwards compat reasons
1130 int master_key_length;
1131 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1132 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1135 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)
1136 && master_key_length > 0) {
1137 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1138 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1139 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1142 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1147 if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1148 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1149 session_id_len) == 0) {
1150 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1151 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1152 /* actually a client application bug */
1153 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1155 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1161 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1162 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1163 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1164 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1165 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1167 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1168 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1169 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1174 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1175 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1176 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1177 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1181 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1182 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1183 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1185 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1186 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1190 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1192 /* unknown cipher */
1193 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1198 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1201 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1202 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1204 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1205 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1207 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1208 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1209 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1213 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1214 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1216 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1217 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1223 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1224 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1225 * set and use it for comparison.
1227 if (s->session->cipher)
1228 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1229 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1230 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1232 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1235 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1236 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1238 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1240 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1243 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1244 if (compression != 0) {
1245 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1246 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1247 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1251 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1252 * using compression.
1254 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1255 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1259 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1260 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1261 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1262 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1265 if (compression == 0)
1267 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1268 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1272 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1275 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1276 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1278 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1281 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1285 /* TLS extensions */
1286 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt)) {
1287 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1291 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1292 /* wrong packet length */
1293 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1294 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1297 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1298 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1299 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1300 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1303 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1306 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1307 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1309 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1310 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1312 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1315 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1316 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1317 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1322 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1323 * we're done with this message
1326 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1327 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1328 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)
1329 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1330 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1331 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1332 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1336 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1338 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1340 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1341 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1344 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1346 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1347 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1349 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1350 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1351 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1353 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1358 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1359 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1360 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1361 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1364 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1365 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1366 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1367 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1368 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1369 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1373 certstart = certbytes;
1374 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1376 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1377 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1380 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1381 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1382 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1383 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1386 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1393 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1395 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1396 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1397 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1398 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1399 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1400 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1401 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1402 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1403 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1404 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1405 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1406 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1408 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1409 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1410 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1411 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1414 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1416 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1417 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1421 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1423 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1424 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1426 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1429 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1432 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1434 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1437 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1438 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1442 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1446 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1447 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1451 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1452 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1453 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1454 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1455 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1457 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1458 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1459 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1462 s->session->peer_type = i;
1464 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1466 s->session->peer = x;
1467 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1470 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1474 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1476 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1479 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1483 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1485 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1486 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1488 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1490 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1491 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1492 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1497 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1498 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1499 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1502 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1503 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1504 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1508 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1509 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1510 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1511 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1512 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1513 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1519 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1520 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1525 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1528 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1530 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1531 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1532 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1533 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1534 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1539 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1541 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1542 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1544 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1545 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1547 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1548 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1550 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1551 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1552 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1553 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1557 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1558 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1559 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1563 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1564 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1565 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1570 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1575 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1578 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1579 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1582 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1584 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1585 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1586 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1587 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1588 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1592 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1595 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1596 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1597 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1601 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1602 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1603 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1605 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1606 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1607 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1608 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1609 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1613 if (BN_is_zero(p) || BN_is_zero(g) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1614 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1615 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1619 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1620 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1626 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1627 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1628 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1633 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1634 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1635 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1639 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1640 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1645 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
1648 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1649 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1651 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1652 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1653 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1662 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1667 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1672 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1674 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1676 const unsigned char *ecparams;
1678 unsigned int curve_flags;
1679 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1682 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1683 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1684 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1686 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1687 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1692 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1693 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1695 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1696 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1701 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
1703 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1704 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1705 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
1706 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1710 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
1711 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
1713 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
1714 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1719 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
1721 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1722 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
1724 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
1725 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
1726 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
1727 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1728 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1729 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1732 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1736 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
1737 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1738 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1742 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
1743 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1744 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
1745 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1746 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1751 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1752 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1755 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
1756 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1757 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
1758 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1759 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1763 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1764 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1769 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1773 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1774 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
1776 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1778 save_param_start = *pkt;
1780 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1781 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
1782 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
1785 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
1786 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
1790 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1791 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1792 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1793 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1795 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1796 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1798 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1799 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1802 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1803 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1807 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1811 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1815 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1816 * equals the length of the parameters.
1818 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
1819 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
1820 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
1821 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1822 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1826 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1827 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1829 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) {
1830 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1834 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey);
1836 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1838 } else if (rv == 0) {
1839 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1843 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1845 } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
1846 md = EVP_md5_sha1();
1851 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
1852 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1853 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1854 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1857 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1859 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1860 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1865 * Check signature length
1867 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
1868 /* wrong packet length */
1869 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1870 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1871 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1875 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1876 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1877 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1882 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1883 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1884 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1885 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1886 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1887 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
1888 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
1889 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1890 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1891 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1894 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1895 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
1896 (unsigned int)PACKET_remaining(&signature),
1899 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1900 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1901 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1904 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1906 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
1907 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1908 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
1909 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1910 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
1911 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1912 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1913 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1915 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1919 /* still data left over */
1920 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1921 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1922 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
1927 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1930 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1931 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1932 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1935 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1937 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1938 unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
1939 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
1940 const unsigned char *data;
1941 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
1942 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
1944 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
1945 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1949 /* get the certificate types */
1950 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
1951 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
1952 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1953 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1956 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
1957 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
1958 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
1959 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
1960 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
1961 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
1962 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1965 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
1966 s->cert->ctype_num = ctype_num;
1967 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
1969 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
1970 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
1972 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1973 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
1974 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) {
1975 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1976 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1977 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1981 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1982 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1983 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
1984 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1986 if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) {
1987 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1989 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
1992 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
1993 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1998 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2001 /* get the CA RDNs */
2002 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
2003 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
2004 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2009 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2010 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
2011 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2012 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2013 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2014 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2018 namestart = namebytes;
2020 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2021 name_len)) == NULL) {
2022 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2023 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2027 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2028 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2029 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2030 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2033 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2040 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2041 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2042 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2043 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2044 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2047 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2050 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2053 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2057 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2059 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2062 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2065 unsigned int ticklen;
2066 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
2067 unsigned int sess_len;
2069 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2070 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2071 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) {
2072 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2073 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2077 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
2079 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2081 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2082 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2083 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2085 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2088 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2090 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2092 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2095 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2096 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2097 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2101 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2102 s->session = new_sess;
2105 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
2106 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
2108 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2109 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
2110 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2113 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) {
2114 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2115 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2119 s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2120 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
2122 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2123 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2124 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2125 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2126 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2127 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2128 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2129 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2130 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2133 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2134 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2136 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen,
2137 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2138 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2139 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2142 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2143 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2145 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2147 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2148 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2151 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2157 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2158 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2159 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2160 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2163 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2164 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2165 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2166 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2169 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2170 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
2171 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2172 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2175 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) {
2176 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2177 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2180 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
2181 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2183 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2184 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2185 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2189 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2190 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2191 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2194 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2197 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2200 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2201 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2206 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
2207 * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
2208 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2210 if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) {
2212 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2214 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2215 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2216 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2220 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2221 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2222 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2226 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2227 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2228 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2229 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2230 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2239 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2241 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2243 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2244 /* should contain no data */
2245 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2246 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2249 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2250 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2251 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2252 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2259 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2261 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2264 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2265 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2266 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2267 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2268 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2271 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2274 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2275 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2276 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2279 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2281 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2284 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2285 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2288 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2289 size_t identitylen = 0;
2290 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2291 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2292 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2295 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2296 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2297 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2301 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2303 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2304 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2307 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2308 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2309 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2311 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2312 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2313 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2314 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2318 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2319 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2320 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2321 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2325 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2326 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2327 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2328 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2329 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2333 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2334 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2335 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2337 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2338 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2341 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2342 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2343 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2350 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2351 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2352 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2353 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2357 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2358 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2363 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2365 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2366 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2367 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2368 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2370 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2373 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2375 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2377 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2381 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2382 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2383 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2387 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2388 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2390 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2391 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2395 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2396 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2397 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2398 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2402 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2403 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2407 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2408 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2409 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2410 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2413 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2414 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2415 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2418 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2421 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2423 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2427 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2428 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2429 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2433 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2434 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2438 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2439 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2443 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2444 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2449 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2451 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2453 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2454 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2455 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2457 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2461 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2465 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2467 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2470 /* send off the data */
2471 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2472 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2475 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2476 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2480 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2482 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2483 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2487 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2489 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2490 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2491 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2492 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2495 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2497 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2501 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2503 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2507 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2512 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2513 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2515 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2516 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2520 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2521 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2527 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2528 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2532 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2537 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2539 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2540 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2541 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2544 unsigned int md_len;
2545 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2546 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2547 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2548 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2551 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2552 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2555 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2557 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2559 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2560 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2561 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2565 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2566 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2567 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2568 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2572 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2573 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2574 * certificate key for key exchange
2577 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2579 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2581 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2582 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2586 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2587 /* Generate session key
2588 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2590 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
2591 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2592 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2596 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2599 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2600 if (ukm_hash == NULL
2601 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2602 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2603 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2604 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2605 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2606 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2607 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2608 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2611 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2613 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
2614 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
2615 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2616 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2619 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2621 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2624 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2625 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2626 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2630 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
2631 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
2632 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
2633 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2634 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2638 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2639 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2640 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2644 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2645 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2646 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2649 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2650 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2655 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2658 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
2660 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
2661 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
2663 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2666 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
2668 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2669 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2670 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2671 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2677 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2678 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2683 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2685 unsigned long alg_k;
2688 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2690 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
2691 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2694 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2695 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2697 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2698 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2700 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2701 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2703 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2704 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2706 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2707 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2709 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
2710 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2711 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2718 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2719 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
2720 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2721 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2722 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2723 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2728 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
2730 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2733 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
2734 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
2736 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2738 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2739 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
2740 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
2741 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2748 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
2749 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2753 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
2754 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2755 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2756 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
2764 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2765 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2766 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2767 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2770 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2773 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2774 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2776 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2777 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2778 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
2781 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2782 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2788 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2789 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2793 int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2796 const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
2797 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
2801 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
2803 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2805 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2808 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2810 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2811 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2812 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2816 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)&& !tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) {
2817 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2821 fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2823 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pkey));
2825 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2828 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2829 || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
2830 || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2831 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2832 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
2833 s->session->master_key))
2834 || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, sig, &u, pkey)) {
2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2838 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2840 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2841 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2842 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2843 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
2844 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, u);
2848 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, u)) {
2849 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2853 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
2854 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
2858 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2862 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2863 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2868 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
2869 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
2870 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
2872 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2874 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
2876 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
2877 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
2880 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
2881 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
2883 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
2884 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
2889 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2892 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2895 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2896 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
2897 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
2898 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2900 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2904 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2905 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2908 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2910 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2911 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2913 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
2917 /* We need to get a client cert */
2918 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2920 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2921 * return(-1); We then get retied later
2923 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
2925 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2928 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2929 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
2930 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
2932 } else if (i == 1) {
2934 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2935 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
2939 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2940 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2943 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2944 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
2945 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
2946 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2948 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
2949 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2950 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2951 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2957 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2960 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
2964 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2966 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
2967 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
2969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2970 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2977 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
2979 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
2982 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2986 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2987 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2989 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2990 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2992 /* we don't have a certificate */
2993 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
2996 /* This is the passed certificate */
2998 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2999 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3000 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3001 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3008 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3010 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3014 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3015 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3017 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3018 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3020 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3023 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3024 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3026 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3030 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3031 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3032 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3034 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3038 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3039 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3040 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3048 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3052 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3053 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3055 size_t len, padding_len;
3056 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3058 len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
3059 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3061 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->next_proto_negotiated, len)
3062 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3063 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3067 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3071 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3076 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3079 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3080 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3081 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3082 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3083 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3088 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3089 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3093 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3096 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen;
3097 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3098 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3099 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3104 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3105 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3106 # error Max cipher length too short
3109 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3110 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3113 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3114 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3117 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3120 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3122 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3125 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3126 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3128 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3129 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3130 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3133 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3147 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3148 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3149 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3151 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3156 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3157 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3158 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3160 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3161 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);