2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
54 #include <openssl/rand.h>
55 #include <openssl/objects.h>
56 #include <openssl/evp.h>
57 #include <openssl/md5.h>
58 #include <openssl/dh.h>
59 #include <openssl/bn.h>
60 #include <openssl/engine.h>
62 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
63 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
64 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
65 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
69 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
75 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
77 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
78 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
79 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
87 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
93 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
95 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
98 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
99 * ciphersuite or for SRP
101 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
110 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
111 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
112 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
113 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
115 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
116 * (transition not allowed)
118 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
120 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
123 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
124 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
128 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
129 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
130 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
133 switch (st->hand_state) {
137 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
139 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
140 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
144 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
145 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
155 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
156 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
157 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
164 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
165 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
167 if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
168 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
173 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
174 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
175 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
182 /* No valid transition found */
187 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
188 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
189 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
190 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
192 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
193 * (transition not allowed)
195 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
197 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
201 * Note that after a ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
202 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
204 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
205 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
210 switch (st->hand_state) {
214 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
215 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
216 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
220 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
221 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
222 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
228 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
230 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
231 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
232 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
235 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
236 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
240 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
241 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
243 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
244 && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL
245 && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL
246 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
248 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
249 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
250 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
251 * the server is resuming.
254 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
256 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
257 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
258 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
259 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
263 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
264 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
266 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
267 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
268 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
269 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
272 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
273 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
274 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
276 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
277 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
286 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
287 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
289 if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
290 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
295 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
296 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
297 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
298 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
299 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
300 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
301 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
308 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
309 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
310 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
311 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
318 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
319 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
320 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
325 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
326 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
327 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
328 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
331 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
332 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
337 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
338 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
339 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
344 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
345 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
346 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
353 /* No valid transition found */
354 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
355 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
360 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
361 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
364 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
366 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
369 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
370 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
374 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE or TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO,
375 * because we haven't negotiated TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are
376 * handled by ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
378 switch (st->hand_state) {
380 /* Shouldn't happen */
381 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
383 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
384 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
385 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
386 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
389 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
390 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
391 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
392 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
394 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
395 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
396 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
398 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
399 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
400 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
401 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
406 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
407 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
409 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
411 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
414 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
415 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
419 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
421 switch (st->hand_state) {
423 /* Shouldn't happen */
424 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
427 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
429 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
430 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
432 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
434 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
437 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
439 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
440 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
441 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
443 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
444 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
447 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
448 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
451 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
452 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
454 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
456 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
457 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
460 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
461 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
462 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
463 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
465 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
466 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
468 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
470 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
471 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
473 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
475 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
476 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
477 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
479 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
480 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
481 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
483 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
484 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
486 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
488 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
490 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
491 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
492 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
493 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
496 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
498 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
499 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
500 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
502 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
505 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
507 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
508 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
510 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
511 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
512 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
518 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
519 * the client to the server.
521 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
523 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
525 switch (st->hand_state) {
527 /* No pre work to be done */
530 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
532 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
533 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
534 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
535 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
541 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
542 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
545 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
546 * messages unless we need to.
550 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
551 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
552 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
558 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
561 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
565 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
566 * client to the server.
568 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
570 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
574 switch (st->hand_state) {
576 /* No post work to be done */
579 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
580 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
583 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
584 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
589 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
590 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
594 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
595 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
596 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
597 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
599 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
600 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
602 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
604 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
607 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
608 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
611 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
615 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
618 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
623 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
627 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
628 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
629 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
631 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
634 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
638 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
641 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
642 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
643 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
649 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
653 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
656 * Valid return values are:
660 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
661 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
663 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
665 switch (st->hand_state) {
667 /* Shouldn't happen */
670 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
672 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
674 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
675 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
678 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
679 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
680 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
684 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
685 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
688 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
689 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
690 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
693 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
694 *confunc = tls_construct_client_verify;
695 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
698 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
699 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
700 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
701 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
704 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
705 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
706 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
714 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
715 * reading. Excludes the message header.
717 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
719 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
721 switch (st->hand_state) {
723 /* Shouldn't happen */
726 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
727 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
729 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
730 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
733 return s->max_cert_list;
735 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
736 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
738 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
739 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
741 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
743 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
744 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
745 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
747 return s->max_cert_list;
749 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
750 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
752 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
753 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
755 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
757 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
758 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
760 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
761 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
766 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
768 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
770 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
772 switch (st->hand_state) {
774 /* Shouldn't happen */
775 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
777 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
778 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
780 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
781 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
784 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
786 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
787 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
789 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
790 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
792 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
793 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
795 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
796 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
798 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
799 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
801 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
802 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
804 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
805 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
810 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
813 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
815 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
817 switch (st->hand_state) {
819 /* Shouldn't happen */
822 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
823 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
825 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
826 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
827 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
828 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
829 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
830 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
831 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
832 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
833 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
836 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
837 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
842 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
847 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
848 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
851 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
853 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
854 /* Should not happen */
855 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
859 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
860 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
866 if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
868 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
869 * "ticket" without a session ID.
871 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
872 (sess->not_resumable)) {
873 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
876 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
878 p = s->s3->client_random;
881 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
882 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
884 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
887 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
896 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
900 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
901 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
902 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
903 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
904 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
905 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
906 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
907 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
910 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
911 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
912 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
913 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
914 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
915 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
916 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
917 * know that is maximum server supports.
918 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
919 * containing version 1.0.
921 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
922 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
923 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
924 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
925 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
926 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
927 * the negotiated version.
929 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
930 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
932 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
933 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
934 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
942 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
943 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
944 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
945 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
947 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
952 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
953 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
954 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
955 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
956 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
957 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
962 /* Ciphers supported */
963 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
967 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
968 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
970 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
976 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
977 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
980 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
981 if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
982 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
983 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
984 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
985 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
986 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
992 /* Add the NULL method */
993 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
999 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1000 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1003 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1005 * If extensions are of zero length then we don't even add the
1006 * extensions length bytes
1008 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_ABANDON_ON_ZERO_LENGTH)
1009 || !ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al)
1010 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1011 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1012 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1019 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1025 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1026 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1027 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1032 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1033 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1034 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1039 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1040 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1044 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1046 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1048 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1049 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1050 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1053 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1055 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1056 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1058 size_t session_id_len;
1059 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1060 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1061 unsigned int compression;
1062 unsigned int sversion;
1064 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1068 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1069 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1070 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1074 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1075 if (protverr != 0) {
1076 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1077 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1081 /* load the server hello data */
1082 /* load the server random */
1083 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1084 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1085 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1091 /* Get the session-id. */
1092 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1093 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1094 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1098 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1099 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1100 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1101 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1102 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1103 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1110 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1111 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1112 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1117 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
1118 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1119 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1120 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1121 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1122 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
1123 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
1124 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
1125 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
1126 * server wants to resume.
1128 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1129 && s->tls_session_secret_cb && s->session->tlsext_tick) {
1130 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1132 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1133 * backwards compat reasons
1135 int master_key_length;
1136 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1137 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1140 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)
1141 && master_key_length > 0) {
1142 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1143 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1144 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1146 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1147 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1152 if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1153 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1154 session_id_len) == 0) {
1155 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1156 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1157 /* actually a client application bug */
1158 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1160 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1166 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1167 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1168 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1169 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1170 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1172 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1173 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1174 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1179 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1180 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1181 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1182 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1186 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1187 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1188 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1191 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1195 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1197 /* unknown cipher */
1198 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1199 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1203 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1206 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1207 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1209 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1210 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1212 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1213 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1218 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1219 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1221 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1222 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1223 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1228 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1229 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1230 * set and use it for comparison.
1232 if (s->session->cipher)
1233 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1234 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1235 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1237 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1240 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1241 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1243 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1244 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1245 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1246 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1253 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1254 if (compression != 0) {
1255 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1257 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1261 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1262 * using compression.
1264 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1269 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1270 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1271 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1272 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1275 if (compression == 0)
1277 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1278 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1282 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1285 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1286 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1287 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1288 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1291 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1295 /* TLS extensions */
1296 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt)) {
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1301 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1302 /* wrong packet length */
1303 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1304 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1308 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1309 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1310 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1313 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1316 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1317 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1319 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1320 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1322 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1325 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1326 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1327 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1332 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1333 * we're done with this message
1336 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1337 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1338 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)
1339 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1340 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1341 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1342 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1346 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1348 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1350 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1351 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1354 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1356 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1357 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1359 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1360 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1361 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1363 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1368 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1369 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1370 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1371 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1374 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1375 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1376 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1377 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1378 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1379 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1383 certstart = certbytes;
1384 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1386 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1390 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1391 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1392 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1393 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1396 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1403 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1405 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1406 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1407 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1408 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1409 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1410 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1411 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1412 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1413 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1414 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1415 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1416 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1418 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1419 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1420 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1421 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1424 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1426 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1427 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1431 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1433 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1434 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1436 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1439 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1442 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1444 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1447 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1448 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1452 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1456 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1457 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1461 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1462 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1463 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1464 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1465 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1467 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1469 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1472 s->session->peer_type = i;
1474 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1476 s->session->peer = x;
1477 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1480 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1484 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1486 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1489 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1493 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1496 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1498 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1500 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1501 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1502 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1507 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1508 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1509 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1512 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1513 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1514 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1518 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1519 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1520 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1521 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1522 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1523 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1529 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1530 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1535 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1538 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1540 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1541 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1542 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1543 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1544 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1545 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1549 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1551 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1552 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1554 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1555 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1557 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1558 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1560 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1561 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1562 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1563 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1567 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1568 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1573 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1574 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1575 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1579 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1580 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1585 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1587 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1588 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1589 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1592 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1594 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1595 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1596 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1597 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1598 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1602 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1605 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1606 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1611 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1612 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1613 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1615 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1616 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1617 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1618 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1619 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1623 if (BN_is_zero(p) || BN_is_zero(g) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1624 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1625 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1629 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1630 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1631 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1636 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1637 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1643 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1644 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1649 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1650 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1651 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1655 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
1658 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1659 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1661 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1662 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1663 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1672 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1677 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1682 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1684 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1686 const unsigned char *ecparams;
1688 unsigned int curve_flags;
1689 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1692 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1693 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1694 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1696 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1697 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1702 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1703 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1705 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1706 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1707 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1711 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
1713 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1714 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
1716 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1720 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
1721 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
1723 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
1724 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1729 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
1731 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1732 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
1734 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
1735 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
1736 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
1737 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1738 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1739 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1742 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1746 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
1747 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1752 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
1753 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1754 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
1755 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1756 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1761 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1762 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1765 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
1766 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1767 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
1768 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1769 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1773 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1774 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1779 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1783 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1784 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
1786 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1788 save_param_start = *pkt;
1790 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1791 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
1792 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
1795 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
1796 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
1800 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1801 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1802 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1803 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1805 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1806 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1808 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1809 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1812 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1813 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1817 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1821 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1825 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1826 * equals the length of the parameters.
1828 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
1829 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
1830 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
1831 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1832 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1836 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1837 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1839 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) {
1840 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1841 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1844 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey);
1846 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1848 } else if (rv == 0) {
1849 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1853 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1855 } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
1856 md = EVP_md5_sha1();
1861 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
1862 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1863 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1864 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1867 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1869 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1870 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1875 * Check signature length
1877 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
1878 /* wrong packet length */
1879 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1880 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1881 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1885 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1886 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1887 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1888 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1892 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1893 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1894 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1895 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1896 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1897 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
1898 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
1899 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1900 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1901 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1904 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1905 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
1906 (unsigned int)PACKET_remaining(&signature),
1909 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1910 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1911 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1914 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1916 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
1917 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1918 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
1919 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1920 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
1921 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1922 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1923 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1925 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1929 /* still data left over */
1930 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1931 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1932 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
1937 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1940 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1941 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1942 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1945 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1947 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1948 unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
1949 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
1950 const unsigned char *data;
1951 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
1952 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
1954 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
1955 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1959 /* get the certificate types */
1960 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
1961 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
1962 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1966 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
1967 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
1968 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
1969 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
1970 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
1971 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
1972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1975 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
1976 s->cert->ctype_num = ctype_num;
1977 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
1979 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
1980 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
1982 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1983 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
1984 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) {
1985 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1986 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1987 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1991 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
1992 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
1993 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
1994 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
1996 if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) {
1997 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1999 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2002 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2003 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2004 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2008 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2011 /* get the CA RDNs */
2012 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
2013 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
2014 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2015 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2019 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2020 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
2021 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2022 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2023 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2024 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2028 namestart = namebytes;
2030 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2031 name_len)) == NULL) {
2032 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2037 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2038 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2040 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2043 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2050 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2051 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2052 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2053 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2054 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2057 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2060 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2063 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2067 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2069 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2072 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2075 unsigned int ticklen;
2076 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
2077 unsigned int sess_len;
2079 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2080 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2081 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) {
2082 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2083 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2087 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
2089 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2091 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2092 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2093 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2095 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2098 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2100 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2102 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2105 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2106 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2107 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2111 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2112 s->session = new_sess;
2115 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
2116 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
2118 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2119 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
2120 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2123 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) {
2124 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2125 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2129 s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2130 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
2132 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2133 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2134 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2135 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2136 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2137 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2138 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2139 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2140 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2143 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2144 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2146 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen,
2147 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2148 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2149 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2152 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2153 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2155 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2157 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2158 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2161 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2167 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2168 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2169 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2170 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2173 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2174 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2175 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2176 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2179 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2180 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
2181 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2182 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2185 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) {
2186 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2187 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2190 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
2191 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2193 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2194 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2195 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2199 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2200 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2201 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2204 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2207 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2210 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2211 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2216 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
2217 * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
2218 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2220 if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) {
2222 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2224 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2225 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2226 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2230 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2231 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2232 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2236 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2237 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2238 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2239 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2240 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2249 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2251 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2253 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2254 /* should contain no data */
2255 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2259 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2260 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2261 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2262 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2269 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2271 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2275 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2276 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2277 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2278 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2281 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2284 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2285 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2286 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2289 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2291 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2294 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2295 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2298 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2299 size_t identitylen = 0;
2300 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2301 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2302 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2305 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2306 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2307 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2311 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2313 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2314 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2317 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2318 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2319 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2321 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2322 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2323 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2324 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2328 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2329 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2330 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2331 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2335 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2336 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2337 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2338 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2339 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2343 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2344 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2345 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2347 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2348 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2351 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2352 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2353 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2360 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2361 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2362 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2363 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2367 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2368 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2373 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2375 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2376 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2377 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2378 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2380 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2383 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2385 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2391 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2392 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2393 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2397 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2398 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2401 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2405 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2406 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2407 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2408 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2412 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2413 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2414 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2417 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2418 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2419 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2420 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2423 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2424 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2425 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2428 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2431 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2433 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2437 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2438 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2439 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2443 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2444 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2448 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2449 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2453 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2454 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2459 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2463 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2464 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2465 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2467 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2471 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2475 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2477 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2480 /* send off the data */
2481 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2482 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2485 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2486 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2490 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2492 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2493 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2497 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2499 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2500 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2501 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2502 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2505 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2507 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2511 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2517 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2518 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2522 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2523 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2525 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2530 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2537 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2538 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2542 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2547 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2549 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2550 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2551 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2554 unsigned int md_len;
2555 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2556 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2557 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2558 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2561 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2562 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2565 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2567 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2569 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2570 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2571 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2575 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2576 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2577 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2578 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2582 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2583 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2584 * certificate key for key exchange
2587 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2589 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2591 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2592 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2596 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2597 /* Generate session key
2598 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2600 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
2601 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2606 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2609 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2610 if (ukm_hash == NULL
2611 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2612 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2613 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2614 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2615 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2616 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2617 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2618 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2621 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2623 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
2624 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
2625 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2626 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2629 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2631 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2634 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2635 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2640 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
2641 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
2642 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
2643 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2644 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2648 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2649 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2650 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2654 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2655 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2656 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2659 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2660 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2665 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2667 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2668 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
2670 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
2671 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
2673 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2676 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
2678 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2679 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2680 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2681 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2687 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2688 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2693 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2695 unsigned long alg_k;
2698 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2700 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
2701 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2704 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2705 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2707 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2708 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2710 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2711 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2713 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2714 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2716 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2717 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2719 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
2720 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2728 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2729 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
2730 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2731 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2732 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2733 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2738 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
2740 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2743 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
2744 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
2746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2748 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2749 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
2750 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
2751 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2758 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
2759 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2763 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
2764 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2765 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2766 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
2774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2775 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2776 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2777 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2780 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2783 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2784 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2786 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2787 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2788 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
2791 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2792 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2798 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2799 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2803 int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2806 const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
2807 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
2811 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
2813 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2815 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2818 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2820 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2821 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2822 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2826 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)&& !tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) {
2827 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2831 fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2833 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pkey));
2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2838 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2839 || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
2840 || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2841 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2842 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
2843 s->session->master_key))
2844 || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, sig, &u, pkey)) {
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2848 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2850 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2851 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2852 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2853 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
2854 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, u);
2858 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, u)) {
2859 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2863 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
2864 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
2868 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2872 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2873 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2878 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
2879 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
2880 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
2882 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2884 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
2886 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
2887 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
2890 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
2891 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
2893 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
2894 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
2899 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2902 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2905 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2906 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
2907 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
2908 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2910 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2914 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2915 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2918 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2920 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2921 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2923 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
2927 /* We need to get a client cert */
2928 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2930 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2931 * return(-1); We then get retied later
2933 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
2935 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2938 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2939 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
2940 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
2942 } else if (i == 1) {
2944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2945 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
2949 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2950 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2953 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2954 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
2955 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
2956 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2958 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
2959 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2960 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2961 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2967 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2970 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
2974 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2976 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
2977 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
2979 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2980 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2987 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
2989 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
2992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2996 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2997 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2999 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3000 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3002 /* we don't have a certificate */
3003 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3006 /* This is the passed certificate */
3008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3009 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3010 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3011 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3013 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3018 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3020 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3024 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3025 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3027 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3028 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3030 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3033 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3034 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3036 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3040 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3041 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3042 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3043 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3044 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3048 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3049 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3050 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3058 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3062 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3063 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3065 size_t len, padding_len;
3066 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3068 len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
3069 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3071 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->next_proto_negotiated, len)
3072 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3073 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3077 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3081 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3086 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3089 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3090 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3091 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3092 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3093 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3098 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3099 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3103 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3106 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen;
3107 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3108 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3109 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3114 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3115 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3116 # error Max cipher length too short
3119 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3120 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3123 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3124 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3127 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3130 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3132 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3135 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3136 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3138 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3139 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3140 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3143 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3157 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3158 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3159 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3161 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3166 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3167 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3168 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3170 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);