2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
54 #include <openssl/rand.h>
55 #include <openssl/objects.h>
56 #include <openssl/evp.h>
57 #include <openssl/md5.h>
58 #include <openssl/dh.h>
59 #include <openssl/bn.h>
60 #include <openssl/engine.h>
62 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
64 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
65 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
66 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
67 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
71 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
77 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
79 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
80 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
81 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
82 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
89 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
95 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
97 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
100 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
101 * ciphersuite or for SRP
103 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
112 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
113 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
114 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
115 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
117 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
118 * (transition not allowed)
120 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
122 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
125 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
126 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
130 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
131 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
132 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
135 switch (st->hand_state) {
139 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
140 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
141 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
146 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
153 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
154 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
157 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
158 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
164 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
165 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
166 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
172 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
173 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
178 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
179 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
180 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
186 /* No valid transition found */
191 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
192 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
193 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
194 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
196 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
197 * (transition not allowed)
199 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
201 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
205 * Note that after a ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
206 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
208 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
209 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
214 switch (st->hand_state) {
218 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
219 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
220 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
224 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
225 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
226 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
232 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
234 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
235 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
236 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
239 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
240 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
244 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
245 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
247 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
248 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
249 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
250 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
252 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
253 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
254 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
255 * the server is resuming.
258 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
260 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
261 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
262 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
263 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
267 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
268 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
270 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
271 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
272 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
273 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
276 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
277 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
278 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
280 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
281 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
290 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
291 * |ext.status_expected| is set
293 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
294 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
299 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
300 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
301 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
302 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
303 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
304 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
305 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
312 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
313 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
314 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
315 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
322 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
323 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
324 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
329 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
330 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
331 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
332 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
335 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
336 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
341 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
342 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
343 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
348 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
349 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
350 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
357 /* No valid transition found */
358 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
359 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
364 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
365 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
368 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
370 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
373 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
374 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
378 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE or TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO,
379 * because we haven't negotiated TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are
380 * handled by ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
382 switch (st->hand_state) {
384 /* Shouldn't happen */
385 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
387 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
388 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
389 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
390 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
393 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
394 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
395 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
396 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
398 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
399 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
400 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
402 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
403 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
404 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
405 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
410 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
411 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
413 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
415 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
418 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
419 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
423 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
425 switch (st->hand_state) {
427 /* Shouldn't happen */
428 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
431 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
433 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
434 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
436 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
438 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
441 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
443 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
444 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
445 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
447 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
448 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
449 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
451 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
452 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
455 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
458 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
460 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
461 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
464 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
465 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
466 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
467 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
469 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
470 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
472 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
474 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
475 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
477 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
479 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
480 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
481 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
483 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
484 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
485 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
487 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
488 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
490 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
492 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
494 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
495 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
496 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
497 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
500 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
502 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
503 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
504 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
506 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
509 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
511 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
512 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
514 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
515 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
516 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
522 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
523 * the client to the server.
525 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
527 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
529 switch (st->hand_state) {
531 /* No pre work to be done */
534 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
536 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
537 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
538 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
539 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
545 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
546 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
549 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
550 * messages unless we need to.
554 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
555 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
556 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
562 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
565 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
569 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
570 * client to the server.
571 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
572 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
574 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
576 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
580 switch (st->hand_state) {
582 /* No post work to be done */
585 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
586 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
589 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
590 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
595 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
596 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
600 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
601 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
602 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
603 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
605 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
606 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
608 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
610 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
613 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
614 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
617 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
618 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
621 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
624 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
629 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
633 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
634 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
635 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
637 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
640 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
644 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
647 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
648 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
649 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
655 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
659 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
662 * Valid return values are:
666 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
667 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
669 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
671 switch (st->hand_state) {
673 /* Shouldn't happen */
676 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
678 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
680 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
681 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
684 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
685 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
686 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
690 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
691 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
694 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
695 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
696 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
699 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
700 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
701 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
704 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
705 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
706 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
707 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
710 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
711 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
712 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
720 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
721 * reading. Excludes the message header.
723 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
725 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
727 switch (st->hand_state) {
729 /* Shouldn't happen */
732 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
733 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
735 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
736 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
739 return s->max_cert_list;
741 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
742 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
744 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
745 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
747 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
748 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
750 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
752 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
753 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
754 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
756 return s->max_cert_list;
758 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
759 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
761 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
762 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
764 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
766 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
767 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
769 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
770 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
772 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
773 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
778 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
780 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
782 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
784 switch (st->hand_state) {
786 /* Shouldn't happen */
787 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
789 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
790 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
792 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
793 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
796 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
798 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
799 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
801 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
802 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
804 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
805 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
807 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
808 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
810 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
811 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
813 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
814 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
816 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
817 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
819 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
820 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
822 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
823 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
828 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
831 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
833 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
835 switch (st->hand_state) {
837 /* Shouldn't happen */
840 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
841 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
843 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
844 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
845 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
846 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
847 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
848 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
849 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
850 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
851 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
854 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
855 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
860 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
865 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
866 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
869 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
871 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
872 /* Should not happen */
873 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
877 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
878 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
880 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
884 if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
886 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
887 * "ticket" without a session ID.
889 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->ext.tick) ||
890 (sess->not_resumable)) {
891 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
894 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
896 p = s->s3->client_random;
899 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
900 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
902 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
905 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
914 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
918 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
919 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
920 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
921 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
922 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
923 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
924 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
925 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
928 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
929 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
930 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
931 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
932 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
933 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
934 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
935 * know that is maximum server supports.
936 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
937 * containing version 1.0.
939 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
940 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
941 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
942 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
943 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
944 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
945 * the negotiated version.
947 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
948 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
950 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
951 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
952 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
960 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
961 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
962 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
963 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
965 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
966 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
970 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
971 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
972 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
973 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
974 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
975 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
980 /* Ciphers supported */
981 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
985 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
986 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
988 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
994 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
998 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
999 if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1000 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1001 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1002 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1003 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1010 /* Add the NULL method */
1011 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1012 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1016 /* TLS extensions */
1017 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1018 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1019 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1026 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1032 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1033 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1034 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1035 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1039 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1040 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1041 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1042 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1046 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1047 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1048 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1051 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1053 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1055 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1056 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1057 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1060 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1062 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1063 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1064 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1065 size_t session_id_len;
1066 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1067 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1068 unsigned int compression;
1069 unsigned int sversion;
1070 unsigned int context;
1072 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1073 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1077 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1078 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1079 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1083 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1084 if (protverr != 0) {
1085 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1086 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1090 /* load the server hello data */
1091 /* load the server random */
1092 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1093 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1100 /* Get the session-id. */
1101 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1102 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1103 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1107 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1108 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1109 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1110 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1111 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1112 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1116 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1120 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1122 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1127 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
1128 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1129 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1130 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1131 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1132 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
1133 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
1134 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
1135 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
1136 * server wants to resume.
1138 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1139 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1140 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1142 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1143 * backwards compat reasons
1145 int master_key_length;
1146 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1147 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1150 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1151 && master_key_length > 0) {
1152 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1153 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1154 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1156 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1157 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1162 if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1163 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1164 session_id_len) == 0) {
1165 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1166 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1167 /* actually a client application bug */
1168 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1170 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1176 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1177 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1178 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1179 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1180 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1182 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1183 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1184 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1189 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1190 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1191 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1192 if (session_id_len > 0)
1193 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1197 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1198 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1199 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1201 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1202 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1206 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1208 /* unknown cipher */
1209 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1210 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1214 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1217 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1218 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1220 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1221 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1223 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1224 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1229 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1230 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1232 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1233 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1234 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1239 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1240 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1241 * set and use it for comparison.
1243 if (s->session->cipher)
1244 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1245 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1246 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1247 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1248 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1251 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1252 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1254 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1255 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1257 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1264 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1265 if (compression != 0) {
1266 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1268 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1272 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1273 * using compression.
1275 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1280 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1281 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1282 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1283 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1286 if (compression == 0)
1288 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1289 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1293 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1296 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1297 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1298 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1299 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1302 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1306 /* TLS extensions */
1307 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1308 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1309 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1310 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1311 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1315 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1316 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1317 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al)
1318 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1322 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1323 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1324 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1327 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1330 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1331 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1333 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1334 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1336 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1339 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1340 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1341 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1346 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1347 * we're done with this message
1350 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1351 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1352 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)
1353 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1354 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1355 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1356 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1360 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1361 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1363 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1364 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1365 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1366 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1369 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1371 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1372 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1374 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1375 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1376 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1378 unsigned int context = 0;
1380 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1381 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1385 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1387 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1388 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1389 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1390 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1393 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1394 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1395 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1396 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1398 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1402 certstart = certbytes;
1403 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1405 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1406 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1409 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1410 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1411 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1412 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1416 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1417 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1420 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1421 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1422 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1425 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1427 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1428 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al))
1432 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1439 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1441 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1442 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1443 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1444 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1445 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1446 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1447 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1448 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1449 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1450 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1451 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1452 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1454 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1455 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1456 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1457 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1460 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1462 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1463 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1467 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1469 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1470 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1472 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1475 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1478 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1480 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1483 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1484 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1488 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1492 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1493 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1497 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1498 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1499 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1500 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1501 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1503 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1504 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1505 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1508 s->session->peer_type = i;
1510 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1512 s->session->peer = x;
1513 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1516 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1518 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1519 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1520 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1521 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1522 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1526 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1530 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1532 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1535 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1539 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1541 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1542 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1544 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1546 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1547 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1548 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1553 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1554 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1555 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1558 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1559 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1564 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1565 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1566 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1567 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1568 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1569 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1575 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1576 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1581 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1584 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1586 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1587 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1588 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1589 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1590 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1595 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1597 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1598 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1600 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1601 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1603 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1604 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1606 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1607 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1608 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1609 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1613 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1614 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1615 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1619 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1620 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1621 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1625 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1626 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1631 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1633 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1634 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1635 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1638 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1640 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1641 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1642 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1643 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1644 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1648 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1651 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1652 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1657 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1658 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1659 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1661 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1662 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1663 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1664 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1665 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1669 if (BN_is_zero(p) || BN_is_zero(g) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1670 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1671 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1675 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1676 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1677 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1682 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1683 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1684 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1689 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1690 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1691 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1695 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1696 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1701 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
1704 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1705 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1707 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1708 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1709 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1718 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
1722 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1723 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1728 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1730 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1732 const unsigned char *ecparams;
1734 unsigned int curve_flags;
1735 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1738 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1739 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1740 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1742 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1743 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1744 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1748 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1749 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1751 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1752 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1753 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1757 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
1759 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1760 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1761 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
1762 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1766 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
1767 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
1769 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
1770 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1775 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
1777 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1778 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
1780 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
1781 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
1782 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
1783 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1784 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1785 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1788 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1792 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
1793 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1794 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1798 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
1799 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1800 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
1801 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1802 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1807 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1808 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1811 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
1812 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1813 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
1814 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1815 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1819 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1820 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1825 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1829 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1830 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
1832 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1834 save_param_start = *pkt;
1836 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1837 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
1838 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
1841 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
1842 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
1846 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1847 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1848 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1849 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1851 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1852 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1854 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1855 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1858 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1859 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1863 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1867 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1871 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1872 * equals the length of the parameters.
1874 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
1875 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
1876 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
1877 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1882 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1883 unsigned int sigalg;
1886 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
1887 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1888 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1891 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalg, pkey);
1893 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1895 } else if (rv == 0) {
1896 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1900 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1902 } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
1903 md = EVP_md5_sha1();
1908 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
1909 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1910 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1911 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1914 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1916 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1917 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1922 * Check signature length
1924 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
1925 /* wrong packet length */
1926 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1927 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1928 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1932 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1933 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1934 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1935 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1939 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1940 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1941 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1942 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1943 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1944 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
1945 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
1946 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1947 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1948 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1951 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1952 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
1953 (unsigned int)PACKET_remaining(&signature),
1956 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1957 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1958 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1961 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1963 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
1964 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1965 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
1966 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1967 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
1968 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1969 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1970 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1972 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1976 /* still data left over */
1977 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1978 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1979 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
1984 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1987 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1988 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1989 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1992 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1994 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1995 unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
1996 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
1997 const unsigned char *data;
1998 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
1999 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2001 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2006 /* get the certificate types */
2007 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
2008 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
2009 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2010 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2013 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
2014 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
2015 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
2016 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2017 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
2018 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
2019 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2022 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
2023 s->cert->ctype_num = ctype_num;
2024 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
2026 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
2027 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
2029 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2032 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2033 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2035 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2039 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2040 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2041 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2042 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2044 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2045 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2046 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2047 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2050 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2051 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2052 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2056 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2059 /* get the CA RDNs */
2060 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
2061 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
2062 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2063 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2067 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2068 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
2069 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2070 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2071 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2072 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2076 namestart = namebytes;
2078 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2079 name_len)) == NULL) {
2080 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2081 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2085 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2086 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2087 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2088 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2091 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2092 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2098 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2099 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2100 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2101 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2102 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2105 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2108 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2111 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2115 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2117 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2120 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2123 unsigned int ticklen;
2124 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
2125 unsigned int sess_len;
2127 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2128 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2129 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) {
2130 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2131 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2135 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
2137 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2139 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2140 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2141 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2143 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2146 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2148 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2150 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2153 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2154 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2155 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2159 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2160 s->session = new_sess;
2163 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2164 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2165 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2167 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2168 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2169 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2172 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2173 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2174 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2178 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2179 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2181 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2182 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2183 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2184 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2185 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2186 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2187 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2188 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2189 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2192 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2193 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2195 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2196 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2197 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2201 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2202 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2204 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2206 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2207 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2211 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2212 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2213 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2215 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2220 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2221 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2222 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2223 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2224 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2227 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2228 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2229 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2230 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2233 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2234 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2235 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2236 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2239 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2240 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2241 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2244 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2250 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2254 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) {
2255 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2256 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2257 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2260 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2264 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2265 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2266 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2269 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2272 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2275 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2276 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2281 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2282 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2283 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2285 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2286 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2287 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2290 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2291 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2292 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2296 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2297 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2298 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2302 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2303 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2304 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2305 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2306 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2315 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2317 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2319 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2320 /* should contain no data */
2321 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2322 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2325 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2326 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2327 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2328 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2335 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2337 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2340 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2341 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2342 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2343 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2344 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2347 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2350 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2351 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2352 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2355 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2360 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2361 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2364 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2365 size_t identitylen = 0;
2366 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2367 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2368 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2371 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2373 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2377 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2379 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2380 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2383 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2384 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2385 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2387 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2388 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2389 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2390 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2394 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2395 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2396 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2397 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2401 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2402 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2403 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2405 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2409 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2410 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2411 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2413 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2414 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2417 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2418 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2419 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2426 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2427 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2428 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2429 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2434 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2439 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2442 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2443 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2444 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2446 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2449 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2451 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2453 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2457 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2458 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2459 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2463 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2464 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2466 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2467 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2471 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2472 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2473 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2474 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2478 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2479 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2480 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2483 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2484 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2485 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2486 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2489 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2490 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2491 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2494 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2497 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2499 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2503 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2504 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2505 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2509 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2510 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2514 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2515 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2519 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2520 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2525 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2527 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2529 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2530 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2531 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2533 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2537 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2541 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2543 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2546 /* send off the data */
2547 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2548 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2551 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2552 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2556 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2558 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2559 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2563 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2565 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2566 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2567 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2568 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2571 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2573 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2577 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2579 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2583 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2584 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2588 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2589 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2591 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2592 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2596 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2597 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2603 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2604 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2607 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2608 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2613 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2615 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2616 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2617 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2620 unsigned int md_len;
2621 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2622 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2623 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2624 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2627 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2628 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2631 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2633 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2635 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2637 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2641 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2642 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2643 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2644 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2648 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2649 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2650 * certificate key for key exchange
2653 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2655 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2657 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2658 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2662 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2663 /* Generate session key
2664 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2666 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
2667 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2668 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2672 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2675 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2676 if (ukm_hash == NULL
2677 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2678 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2679 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2680 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2681 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2682 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2683 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2684 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2687 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2689 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
2690 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
2691 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2692 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2695 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2697 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2700 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2701 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2702 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2706 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
2707 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
2708 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
2709 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2710 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2714 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2715 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2716 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2720 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2721 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2722 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2725 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2726 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2731 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2733 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2734 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
2736 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
2737 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
2739 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2742 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
2744 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2745 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2746 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2747 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2753 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2754 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2759 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2761 unsigned long alg_k;
2764 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2766 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
2767 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2770 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2771 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2773 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2774 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2776 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2777 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2779 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2780 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2782 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2783 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2785 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
2786 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2787 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2794 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2795 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
2796 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2797 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2798 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2799 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2804 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
2806 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2809 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
2810 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
2812 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2814 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2815 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
2816 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
2817 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2824 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
2825 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2826 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2829 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
2830 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2832 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
2840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2841 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2842 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2843 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2846 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2849 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2850 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2852 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2853 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2854 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
2857 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2858 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2864 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2865 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2870 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
2871 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
2872 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
2874 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2876 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
2878 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
2879 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
2882 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
2883 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
2885 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
2886 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
2891 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2894 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2897 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2898 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
2899 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
2900 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2902 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2906 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2907 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2910 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2912 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2913 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2915 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
2919 /* We need to get a client cert */
2920 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2922 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2923 * return(-1); We then get retied later
2925 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
2927 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2930 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2931 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
2932 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
2934 } else if (i == 1) {
2936 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2937 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
2941 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2942 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2945 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2946 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
2947 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
2948 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2950 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
2951 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2952 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2953 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2959 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2962 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
2966 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2968 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2971 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
2974 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
2975 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
2976 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
2979 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2980 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2987 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
2989 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
2992 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2996 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2997 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2999 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3000 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3002 /* we don't have a certificate */
3003 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3006 /* This is the passed certificate */
3008 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3009 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3010 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3011 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3013 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3018 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3020 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3024 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3025 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3027 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3028 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3030 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3033 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3034 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3035 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3036 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3040 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3041 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3042 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3043 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3044 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3048 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3049 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3050 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3058 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3062 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3063 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3065 size_t len, padding_len;
3066 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3068 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3069 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3071 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3072 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3073 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3077 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3081 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3086 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3088 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3090 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3092 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
3093 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3098 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3100 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3101 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al))
3104 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3105 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3108 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3109 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3110 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3111 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3114 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3117 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3118 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3119 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3120 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3121 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3126 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3127 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3131 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3134 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen;
3135 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3136 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3137 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3142 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3143 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3144 # error Max cipher length too short
3147 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3148 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3151 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3152 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3155 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3158 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3160 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3163 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3164 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3166 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3167 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3168 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3171 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3185 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3186 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3187 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3189 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3194 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3195 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3196 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3198 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);