2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
52 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
53 #include "statem_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/md5.h>
59 #include <openssl/dh.h>
60 #include <openssl/bn.h>
61 #include <openssl/engine.h>
63 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
65 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
66 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
67 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
68 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
72 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
78 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
80 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
81 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
82 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
83 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
90 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
96 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
98 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
101 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
102 * ciphersuite or for SRP
104 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
113 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
114 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
115 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
116 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
118 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
119 * (transition not allowed)
121 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
123 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
126 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
127 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
131 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
132 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
133 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
136 switch (st->hand_state) {
140 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
141 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
142 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
149 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
150 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
154 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
155 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
158 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
159 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
165 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
166 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
167 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
173 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
174 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
179 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
180 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
181 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
187 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
188 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
194 /* No valid transition found */
199 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
200 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
201 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
202 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
204 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
205 * (transition not allowed)
207 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
209 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
213 * Note that after a ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
214 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
216 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
217 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
222 switch (st->hand_state) {
226 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
227 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
228 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
232 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
233 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
234 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
240 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
242 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
243 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
244 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
247 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
248 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
252 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
253 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
255 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
256 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
257 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
258 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
260 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
261 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
262 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
263 * the server is resuming.
266 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
268 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
269 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
270 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
271 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
275 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
276 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
278 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
279 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
280 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
281 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
284 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
285 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
286 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
288 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
289 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
298 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
299 * |ext.status_expected| is set
301 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
302 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
307 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
308 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
309 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
310 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
311 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
312 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
313 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
320 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
321 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
322 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
323 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
330 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
331 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
332 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
337 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
338 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
339 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
340 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
343 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
344 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
349 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
350 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
351 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
356 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
357 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
358 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
364 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
365 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
372 /* No valid transition found */
373 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
374 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
379 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
380 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
383 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
385 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
388 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
389 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
393 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE or TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO,
394 * because we haven't negotiated TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are
395 * handled by ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
397 switch (st->hand_state) {
399 /* Shouldn't happen */
400 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
402 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
403 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
404 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
405 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
408 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
409 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
410 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
411 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
413 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
414 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
415 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
417 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
418 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
419 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
420 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
421 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
424 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the server */
425 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
430 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
431 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
433 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
435 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
438 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
439 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
443 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
445 switch (st->hand_state) {
447 /* Shouldn't happen */
448 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
451 if (!s->renegotiate) {
453 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
454 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
456 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
458 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
460 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
463 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
465 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
468 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
470 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
471 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
474 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
475 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
476 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
478 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
479 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
482 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
483 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
485 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
487 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
488 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
491 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
492 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
493 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
494 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
496 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
497 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
499 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
501 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
502 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
504 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
506 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
507 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
508 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
510 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
511 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
512 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
514 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
515 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
517 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
519 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
521 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
522 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
523 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
527 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
529 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
530 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
531 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
533 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
536 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
538 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
539 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
541 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
542 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
543 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
546 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
548 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
551 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
552 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
553 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
554 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
556 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
559 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
560 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
566 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
567 * the client to the server.
569 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
571 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
573 switch (st->hand_state) {
575 /* No pre work to be done */
578 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
580 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
581 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
582 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
583 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
589 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
590 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
593 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
594 * messages unless we need to.
598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
599 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
600 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
606 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
609 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
613 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
614 * client to the server.
615 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
616 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
618 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
620 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
624 switch (st->hand_state) {
626 /* No post work to be done */
629 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
630 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
633 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
634 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
639 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
640 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
644 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
645 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
646 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
647 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
649 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
650 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
652 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
654 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
657 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
658 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
661 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
665 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
668 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
673 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
677 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
678 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
679 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
681 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
684 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
688 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
691 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
692 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
693 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
699 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
703 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
706 * Valid return values are:
710 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
711 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
713 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
715 switch (st->hand_state) {
717 /* Shouldn't happen */
720 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
722 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
724 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
725 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
728 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
729 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
730 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
734 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
735 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
738 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
739 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
740 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
743 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
744 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
745 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
748 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
749 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
750 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
751 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
754 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
755 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
756 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
764 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
765 * reading. Excludes the message header.
767 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
769 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
771 switch (st->hand_state) {
773 /* Shouldn't happen */
776 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
777 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
779 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
780 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
783 return s->max_cert_list;
785 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
786 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
788 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
789 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
791 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
792 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
794 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
796 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
797 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
798 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
800 return s->max_cert_list;
802 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
803 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
805 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
806 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
808 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
810 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
811 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
813 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
814 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
816 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
817 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
822 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
824 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
826 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
828 switch (st->hand_state) {
830 /* Shouldn't happen */
831 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
833 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
834 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
836 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
837 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
840 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
842 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
843 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
845 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
846 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
848 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
849 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
851 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
852 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
854 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
855 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
857 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
858 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
860 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
861 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
863 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
864 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
866 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
867 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
869 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
870 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
875 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
878 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
880 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
882 switch (st->hand_state) {
884 /* Shouldn't happen */
887 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
888 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
891 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
892 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
893 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
894 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
895 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
896 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
897 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
898 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
901 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
902 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
907 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
912 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
913 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
916 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
918 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
919 /* Should not happen */
920 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
924 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
925 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
927 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
931 if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
933 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
934 * "ticket" without a session ID.
936 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->ext.tick) ||
937 (sess->not_resumable)) {
938 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
941 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
943 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
944 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
946 p = s->s3->client_random;
949 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
950 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
952 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
955 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
964 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
968 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
969 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
970 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
971 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
972 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
973 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
974 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
975 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
978 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
979 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
980 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
981 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
982 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
983 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
984 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
985 * know that is maximum server supports.
986 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
987 * containing version 1.0.
989 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
990 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
991 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
992 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
993 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
994 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
995 * the negotiated version.
997 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
998 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1000 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1001 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1007 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
1010 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1011 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1012 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1013 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
1015 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1020 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1021 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1022 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1023 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1024 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1030 /* Ciphers supported */
1031 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1032 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1035 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1036 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
1038 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1044 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1048 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1049 if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1050 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1051 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1052 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1053 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1060 /* Add the NULL method */
1061 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1062 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1066 /* TLS extensions */
1067 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1068 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1076 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1082 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1083 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1084 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1085 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1089 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1090 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1091 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1092 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1096 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1097 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1098 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1101 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1103 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1105 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1106 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1107 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1110 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1112 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1113 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1114 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1115 size_t session_id_len;
1116 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1117 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1118 unsigned int compression;
1119 unsigned int sversion;
1120 unsigned int context;
1122 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1127 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1128 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1129 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1133 /* We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in */
1134 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1135 if (protverr != 0) {
1136 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1137 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1141 /* load the server hello data */
1142 /* load the server random */
1143 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1144 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1149 /* Get the session-id. */
1150 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1151 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1152 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1156 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1157 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1158 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1159 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1160 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1161 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1165 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1169 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1170 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1171 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1175 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1176 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1178 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1185 /* TLS extensions */
1186 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1187 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1188 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1189 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1194 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1195 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1196 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al))
1201 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1202 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1203 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1204 EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1205 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1209 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1210 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1211 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1212 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1213 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1214 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1215 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1216 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1217 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1218 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1220 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1221 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1222 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1224 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1225 * backwards compat reasons
1227 int master_key_length;
1228 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1229 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1232 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1233 && master_key_length > 0) {
1234 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1235 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1236 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1239 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1244 if (session_id_len != 0
1245 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1246 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1247 session_id_len) == 0)
1252 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1253 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1254 /* actually a client application bug */
1255 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1257 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1262 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1263 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1264 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1265 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1266 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1268 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1270 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1271 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1272 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1273 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1278 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1279 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1280 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1281 if (session_id_len > 0)
1282 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1286 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1287 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1288 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1291 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1295 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1297 /* unknown cipher */
1298 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1303 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1306 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1307 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1309 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1310 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1312 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1313 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1318 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1319 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1321 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1322 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1323 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1328 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1329 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1330 * set and use it for comparison.
1332 if (s->session->cipher)
1333 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1334 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1335 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1337 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1340 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1342 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1343 if (compression != 0) {
1344 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1345 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1346 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1350 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1351 * using compression.
1353 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1358 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1359 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1361 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1364 if (compression == 0)
1366 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1367 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1368 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1371 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1374 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1375 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1376 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1377 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1380 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1384 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1387 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1388 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1389 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1390 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1393 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1396 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1397 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1399 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1400 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1402 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1405 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1406 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1407 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1412 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1413 * we're done with this message
1416 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1417 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1418 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)
1419 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1420 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1421 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1422 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1426 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1427 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1429 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1430 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1431 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1432 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1435 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1437 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1438 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1440 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1441 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1442 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1444 unsigned int context = 0;
1446 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1447 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1451 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1453 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1454 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1455 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1456 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1459 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1460 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1461 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1462 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1464 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1468 certstart = certbytes;
1469 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1471 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1472 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1475 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1476 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1478 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1482 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1483 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1486 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1487 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1488 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1491 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1493 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1494 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
1495 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1498 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1501 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1502 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1508 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1510 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1511 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1512 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1513 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1514 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1515 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1516 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1517 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1518 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1519 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1520 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1521 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1523 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1524 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1525 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1526 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1529 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1532 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1536 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1538 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1539 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1541 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1544 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1547 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1549 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1553 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1557 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1561 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1562 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1566 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1567 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1570 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1571 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1572 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1573 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1574 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1575 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1577 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1578 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1579 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1583 s->session->peer_type = i;
1585 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1587 s->session->peer = x;
1588 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1591 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1593 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1594 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1595 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1596 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1597 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1601 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1605 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1607 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1610 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1614 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1616 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1617 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1619 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1621 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1622 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1623 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1628 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1629 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1630 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1633 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1634 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1635 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1639 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1640 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1641 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1642 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1643 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1644 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1651 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1656 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1659 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1661 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1662 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1663 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1664 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1665 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1670 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1672 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1673 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1675 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1676 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1678 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1679 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1681 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1682 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1683 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1684 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1688 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1689 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1690 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1694 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1695 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1696 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1700 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1701 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1706 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1709 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1710 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1713 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1717 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1718 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1719 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1720 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1721 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1725 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1728 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1729 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1730 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1734 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1735 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1736 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1738 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1739 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1740 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1741 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1746 /* test non-zero pupkey */
1747 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1748 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1749 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1753 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1754 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1755 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1760 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
1761 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1766 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1767 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1773 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1774 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1775 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1779 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1780 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1785 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
1788 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1789 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1791 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1792 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1793 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1802 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
1806 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1807 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1812 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1814 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1816 const unsigned char *ecparams;
1818 unsigned int curve_flags;
1819 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1822 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1823 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1824 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1826 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1827 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1832 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1833 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1835 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1836 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1841 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
1843 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1844 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1845 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
1846 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1850 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
1851 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
1853 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
1854 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1855 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1859 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
1861 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1862 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
1864 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
1865 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
1866 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
1867 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1868 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1869 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1872 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1876 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
1877 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1882 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
1883 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1884 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
1885 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1886 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1891 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1892 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1895 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
1896 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1897 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
1898 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1899 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1903 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1904 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1909 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1913 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1914 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
1915 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1916 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
1918 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1920 save_param_start = *pkt;
1922 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1923 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
1924 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
1927 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
1928 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
1932 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1933 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1934 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1935 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1937 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1938 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1940 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1941 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1944 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1945 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1949 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1953 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1956 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1957 * equals the length of the parameters.
1959 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
1960 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
1961 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
1962 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1967 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1968 unsigned int sigalg;
1971 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
1972 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1976 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
1978 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1980 } else if (rv == 0) {
1981 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1984 md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx);
1986 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1988 } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
1989 md = EVP_md5_sha1();
1994 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
1995 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1996 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1997 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2000 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2002 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2003 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2008 * Check signature length
2010 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2011 /* wrong packet length */
2012 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2013 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2014 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2018 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2019 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2020 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2021 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2025 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2026 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2027 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2030 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2031 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2032 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2033 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2034 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2039 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2040 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2041 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2042 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2043 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2044 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
2045 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2046 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2049 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2050 PACKET_remaining(&signature)) <= 0) {
2052 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2053 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2056 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2059 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2060 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2061 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2062 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2063 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2064 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2065 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2068 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2072 /* still data left over */
2073 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2074 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2075 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2080 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2083 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2084 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2085 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2086 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2089 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2091 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2092 unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
2093 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2094 const unsigned char *data;
2095 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2096 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2098 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2099 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2103 /* get the certificate types */
2104 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
2105 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
2106 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2107 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2110 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
2111 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
2112 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
2113 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2114 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
2115 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
2116 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2119 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
2120 s->cert->ctype_num = ctype_num;
2121 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
2123 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
2124 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
2126 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2129 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2130 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2131 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2132 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2136 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2137 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2138 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2139 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2141 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2142 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2143 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2144 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2147 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2148 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2149 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2153 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2156 /* get the CA RDNs */
2157 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
2158 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
2159 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2160 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2164 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2165 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
2166 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2167 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2168 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2169 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2173 namestart = namebytes;
2175 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2176 name_len)) == NULL) {
2177 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2178 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2182 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2183 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2184 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2185 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2188 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2189 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2195 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2196 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2197 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2198 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2199 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2202 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2205 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2208 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2212 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2214 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2217 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2219 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2220 unsigned int ticklen;
2221 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2222 unsigned int sess_len;
2223 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2225 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2226 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add))
2227 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2228 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2230 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2231 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2236 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2237 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2238 * be 0 here in that instance
2241 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2243 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Is this a suitable test for TLS1.3? */
2244 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2245 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2246 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2248 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2251 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2253 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2255 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2258 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2259 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2260 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2264 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2265 s->session = new_sess;
2269 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2270 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2272 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2274 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2275 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2276 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2278 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2279 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2280 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2283 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2284 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2285 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2289 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2290 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2291 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2293 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2296 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2297 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2298 EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2300 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2301 exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
2302 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2308 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2309 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2310 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2311 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2312 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2313 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2314 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2315 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2316 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2319 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2320 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2322 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2323 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2324 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2325 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2328 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2330 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2331 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2333 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2334 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2337 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2339 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2341 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2343 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2347 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2348 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2349 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2351 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2356 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2357 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2358 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2359 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2360 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2363 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2364 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2365 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2366 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2369 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2370 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2371 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2375 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2376 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2377 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2380 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2386 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2390 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) {
2391 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2392 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2393 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2396 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2400 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2401 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2402 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2405 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2408 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2411 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2412 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2417 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2418 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2419 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2421 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2422 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2423 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2426 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2428 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2432 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2434 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2438 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2439 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2440 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2441 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2442 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2451 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2453 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2455 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2456 /* should contain no data */
2457 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2461 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2462 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2463 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2464 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2471 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2473 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2476 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2477 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2478 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2479 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2480 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2483 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2486 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2487 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2488 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2491 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2493 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2496 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2497 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2500 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2501 size_t identitylen = 0;
2502 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2503 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2504 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2507 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2508 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2509 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2513 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2515 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2516 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2519 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2520 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2521 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2523 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2524 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2525 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2526 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2530 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2531 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2532 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2533 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2537 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2538 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2539 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2540 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2541 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2545 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2546 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2547 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2549 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2550 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2553 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2555 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2562 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2563 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2564 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2565 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2569 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2570 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2575 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2577 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2578 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2579 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2580 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2582 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2585 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2587 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2589 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2593 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2594 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2595 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2599 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2600 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2603 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2607 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2608 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2609 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2610 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2614 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2615 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2616 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2619 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2620 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2621 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2622 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2625 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2626 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2630 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2633 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2635 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2639 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2640 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2641 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2645 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2646 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2648 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2649 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen))
2654 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2655 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2659 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2660 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2665 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2667 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2669 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2670 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2671 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2673 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2677 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2681 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2683 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2686 /* send off the data */
2687 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2688 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2691 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2692 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2696 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2699 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2703 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2705 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2706 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2707 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2708 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2711 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2713 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2717 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2719 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2723 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2724 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2728 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2729 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2731 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2732 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2736 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2737 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2743 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2744 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2747 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2748 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2753 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2756 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2757 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2760 unsigned int md_len;
2761 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2762 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2763 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2764 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2767 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2768 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2771 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2773 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2775 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2776 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2777 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2781 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2782 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2783 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2784 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2788 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2789 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2790 * certificate key for key exchange
2793 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2795 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2797 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2802 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2803 /* Generate session key
2804 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2806 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
2807 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2808 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2812 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2815 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2816 if (ukm_hash == NULL
2817 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2818 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2819 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2820 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2821 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2822 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2823 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2824 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2827 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2829 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
2830 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
2831 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2832 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2835 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2837 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2840 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2841 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2842 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2846 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
2847 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
2848 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
2849 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2850 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2854 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2855 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2856 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2860 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2861 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2862 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2865 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2866 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2871 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2873 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2874 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
2876 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
2877 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
2879 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2882 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
2884 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2885 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2886 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2887 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2893 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2894 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2899 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2901 unsigned long alg_k;
2904 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2906 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
2907 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2910 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2911 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2913 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2914 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2916 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2917 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2919 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2920 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2922 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2923 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2925 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
2926 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2927 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2934 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2935 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
2936 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2937 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2938 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2939 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2944 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
2946 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2949 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
2950 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
2952 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2954 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2955 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
2956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
2957 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2964 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
2965 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2966 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2969 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
2970 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2972 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
2980 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2981 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2982 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2983 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2986 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2989 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2990 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2992 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2993 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2994 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
2997 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2998 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3004 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3005 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3010 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3011 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3012 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3014 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3016 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
3018 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3019 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
3022 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3023 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3025 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3026 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3031 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3034 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3037 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3038 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3039 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3040 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3042 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3046 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3047 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3050 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3052 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3053 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3055 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3059 /* We need to get a client cert */
3060 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3062 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3063 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3065 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3067 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3070 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3071 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3072 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3074 } else if (i == 1) {
3076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3077 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3081 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3082 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3085 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3086 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3087 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3088 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3090 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3091 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3092 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3093 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3099 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3102 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3106 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3108 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3111 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3114 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3115 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3116 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3119 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3120 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3127 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3129 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3136 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3137 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3139 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3140 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3142 /* we don't have a certificate */
3143 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3146 /* This is the passed certificate */
3148 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3149 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3150 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3151 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3153 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3158 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3159 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3160 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3164 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3165 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3167 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3168 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3170 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3174 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3176 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3180 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3181 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3182 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3184 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3189 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3190 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3198 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3202 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3203 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3205 size_t len, padding_len;
3206 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3208 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3209 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3211 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3212 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3213 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3217 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3221 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3226 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3228 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3229 /* should contain no data */
3230 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3231 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
3232 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3233 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3237 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3238 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3239 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3240 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3241 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3246 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3248 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3251 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3253 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3255 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3257 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
3258 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3259 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3263 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3265 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3266 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al))
3269 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3270 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3273 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3274 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3275 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3276 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3279 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3283 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3284 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3285 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3286 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3291 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3292 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3296 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3299 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen;
3300 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3301 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3302 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3307 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3308 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3309 # error Max cipher length too short
3312 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3313 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3316 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3317 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3320 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3323 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3325 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3328 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3329 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3331 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3332 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3333 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3336 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3350 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3351 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3352 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3354 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3359 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3360 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3361 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3363 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);