2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
52 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
53 #include "statem_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/md5.h>
59 #include <openssl/dh.h>
60 #include <openssl/bn.h>
61 #include <openssl/engine.h>
63 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
64 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
66 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
67 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
68 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
69 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
73 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
79 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
81 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
82 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
83 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
84 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
91 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
97 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
99 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
102 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
103 * ciphersuite or for SRP
105 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
114 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
115 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
116 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
117 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
119 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
120 * (transition not allowed)
122 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
124 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
127 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
128 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
132 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
133 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
134 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
137 switch (st->hand_state) {
141 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
143 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
144 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
146 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
147 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
152 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
153 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
154 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
159 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
161 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
166 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
167 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
170 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
171 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
177 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
178 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
179 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
185 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
186 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
191 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
192 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
193 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
199 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
200 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
201 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
204 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
205 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
208 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
209 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
215 /* No valid transition found */
220 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
221 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
222 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
223 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
225 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
226 * (transition not allowed)
228 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
230 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
234 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
235 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
237 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
238 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
243 switch (st->hand_state) {
247 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
248 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
249 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
253 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
254 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
255 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
259 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
260 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
266 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
268 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
269 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
270 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
273 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
274 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
278 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
279 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
281 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
282 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
283 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
284 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
286 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
287 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
288 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
289 * the server is resuming.
292 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
294 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
295 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
296 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
297 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
301 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
302 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
304 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
305 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
306 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
307 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
310 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
311 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
312 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
314 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
315 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
324 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
325 * |ext.status_expected| is set
327 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
328 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
333 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
334 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
335 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
336 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
337 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
338 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
339 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
346 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
347 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
348 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
349 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
356 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
357 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
358 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
363 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
364 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
365 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
366 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
369 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
370 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
375 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
376 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
377 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
382 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
383 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
384 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
390 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
392 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
393 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
396 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
397 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
400 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
401 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
404 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
405 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
412 /* No valid transition found */
413 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
414 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
419 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
420 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
423 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
425 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
428 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
429 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
430 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
432 switch (st->hand_state) {
434 /* Shouldn't happen */
435 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
437 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
438 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
439 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
441 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
442 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
443 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
445 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
446 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
447 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
448 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
451 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
452 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
453 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
454 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
456 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
457 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
458 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
460 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
461 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
462 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
463 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
467 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
468 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
469 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
470 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
471 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
475 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
476 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
477 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
480 /* Try to read from the server instead */
481 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
486 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
487 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
489 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
491 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
494 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
495 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
499 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
501 switch (st->hand_state) {
503 /* Shouldn't happen */
504 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
507 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
509 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
510 * actually selected a version yet.
512 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
514 if (!s->renegotiate) {
516 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
517 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
519 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
521 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
523 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
526 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
527 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
529 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
530 * actually selected a version yet.
532 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
533 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
534 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
537 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
540 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
542 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
543 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
544 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
546 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
547 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
548 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
550 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
551 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
554 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
555 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
557 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
559 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
560 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
563 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
564 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
565 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
566 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
568 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
569 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
573 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
574 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
576 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
578 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
579 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
580 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
582 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
583 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
584 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
586 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
587 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
589 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
591 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
593 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
594 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
595 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
596 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
599 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
601 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
602 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
603 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
605 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
608 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
610 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
611 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
613 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
614 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
615 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
618 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
620 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
623 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
624 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
625 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
626 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
628 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
629 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
631 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
632 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
633 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
638 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
639 * the client to the server.
641 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
643 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
645 switch (st->hand_state) {
647 /* No pre work to be done */
650 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
652 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
653 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
654 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
655 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
661 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
662 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
665 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
666 * messages unless we need to.
670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
671 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
672 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
678 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
681 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
685 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
686 * client to the server.
688 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
690 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
694 switch (st->hand_state) {
696 /* No post work to be done */
699 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
700 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
703 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
704 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
708 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
709 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
711 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
712 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
713 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
715 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
716 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
721 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
722 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
726 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
727 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
728 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
729 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
731 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
732 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
734 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
736 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
739 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
740 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
743 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
747 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
750 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
755 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
759 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
760 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
761 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
763 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
766 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
770 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
773 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
774 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
775 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
780 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
781 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
783 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
788 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
792 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
795 * Valid return values are:
799 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
800 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
802 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
804 switch (st->hand_state) {
806 /* Shouldn't happen */
809 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
811 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
813 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
814 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
817 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
818 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
819 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
823 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
824 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
827 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
828 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
829 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
832 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
833 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
834 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
837 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
838 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
839 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
840 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
843 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
844 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
845 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
848 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
849 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
850 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
858 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
859 * reading. Excludes the message header.
861 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
863 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
865 switch (st->hand_state) {
867 /* Shouldn't happen */
870 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
871 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
873 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
874 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
876 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
877 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
880 return s->max_cert_list;
882 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
883 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
885 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
886 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
888 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
889 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
891 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
893 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
894 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
895 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
897 return s->max_cert_list;
899 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
900 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
902 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
903 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
905 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
907 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
908 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
910 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
911 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
913 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
914 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
916 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
917 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
922 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
924 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
926 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
928 switch (st->hand_state) {
930 /* Shouldn't happen */
931 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
933 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
934 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
936 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
937 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
939 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
940 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt);
943 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
945 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
946 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
948 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
949 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
951 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
952 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
954 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
955 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
957 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
958 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
960 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
961 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
963 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
964 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
966 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
967 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
969 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
970 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
972 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
973 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
975 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
976 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
981 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
984 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
986 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
988 switch (st->hand_state) {
990 /* Shouldn't happen */
993 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
994 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
996 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
997 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
998 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
999 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
1000 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1001 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1002 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1003 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1004 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
1007 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
1008 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1013 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1018 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1022 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1024 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1025 /* Should not happen */
1026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1030 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1031 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1032 if (protverr != 0) {
1033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1037 if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
1039 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
1040 * "ticket" without a session ID.
1042 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->ext.tick) ||
1043 (sess->not_resumable)) {
1044 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
1047 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1049 p = s->s3->client_random;
1052 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1053 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1055 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1058 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1067 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
1071 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1072 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1073 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1074 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1075 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1076 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1077 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1078 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1081 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1082 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1083 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1084 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1085 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1086 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1087 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1088 * know that is maximum server supports.
1089 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1090 * containing version 1.0.
1092 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1093 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1094 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1095 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1096 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1097 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1098 * the negotiated version.
1100 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1101 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1103 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1104 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1105 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1110 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
1113 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1114 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1115 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1116 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
1118 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1119 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1123 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1124 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1125 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1126 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1127 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1133 /* Ciphers supported */
1134 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1138 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1139 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
1141 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1147 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1151 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1152 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1153 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1154 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1155 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1156 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1157 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1158 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1165 /* Add the NULL method */
1166 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1167 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1171 /* TLS extensions */
1172 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1173 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1174 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1181 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1187 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1188 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1189 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1194 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1195 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1196 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1201 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1202 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1203 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1206 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1208 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1210 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1211 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1212 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1215 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1217 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1218 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1219 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1220 size_t session_id_len;
1221 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1222 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1223 unsigned int compression;
1224 unsigned int sversion;
1225 unsigned int context;
1227 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1228 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1233 * This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end. We set
1234 * this here so that we are after any early_data
1236 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
1238 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1239 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1244 /* We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in */
1245 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1246 if (protverr != 0) {
1247 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1252 /* load the server hello data */
1253 /* load the server random */
1254 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1255 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1260 /* Get the session-id. */
1261 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1262 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1263 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1267 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1268 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1269 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1270 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1271 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1272 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1276 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1280 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1281 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1282 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1286 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1287 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1289 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1296 /* TLS extensions */
1297 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1298 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1299 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1300 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1301 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1305 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1306 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1307 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al, NULL))
1312 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1313 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1314 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1315 EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1316 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1320 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1321 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1322 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1323 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1324 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1325 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1326 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1327 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1328 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1329 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1331 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1332 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1333 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1335 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1336 * backwards compat reasons
1338 int master_key_length;
1339 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1340 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1343 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1344 && master_key_length > 0) {
1345 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1346 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1347 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1349 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1350 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1355 if (session_id_len != 0
1356 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1357 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1358 session_id_len) == 0)
1363 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1364 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1365 /* actually a client application bug */
1366 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1367 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1368 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1373 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1374 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1375 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1376 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1377 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1379 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1381 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1382 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1383 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1384 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1389 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1390 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1391 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1392 if (session_id_len > 0)
1393 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1397 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1398 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1399 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1401 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1402 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1406 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1408 /* unknown cipher */
1409 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1410 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1414 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1417 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1418 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1420 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1421 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1423 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1424 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1425 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1429 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1430 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1432 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1433 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1439 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1440 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1441 * set and use it for comparison.
1443 if (s->session->cipher)
1444 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1445 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1446 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1447 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1448 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1451 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1453 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1454 if (compression != 0) {
1455 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1456 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1457 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1461 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1462 * using compression.
1464 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1465 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1469 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1470 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1471 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1472 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1475 if (compression == 0)
1477 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1478 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1479 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1482 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1485 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1486 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1487 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1488 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1491 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1495 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1499 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1500 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1501 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1504 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1507 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1508 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1510 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1511 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1513 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1516 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1517 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1518 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1523 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1524 * we're done with this message
1527 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1528 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1529 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)
1530 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1531 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1532 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1533 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1537 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1538 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1540 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1541 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1542 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1543 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1546 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1548 unsigned int sversion;
1550 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1554 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1555 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1556 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1560 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
1562 /* This will fail if it doesn't choose TLSv1.3+ */
1563 errorcode = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1564 if (errorcode != 0) {
1565 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1566 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, errorcode);
1570 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1571 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1572 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1576 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1577 &extensions, &al, NULL)
1578 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1579 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1582 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1584 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1586 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1587 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1588 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1589 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1592 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1594 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1595 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1597 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1598 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1599 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1601 unsigned int context = 0;
1603 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1604 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1608 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1610 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1611 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1612 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1613 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1616 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1617 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1618 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1619 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1620 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1621 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1625 certstart = certbytes;
1626 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1628 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1629 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1632 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1633 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1634 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1635 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1639 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1640 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1643 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1644 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1645 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1648 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1649 &rawexts, &al, NULL)
1650 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1651 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
1652 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1655 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1658 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1659 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1665 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1667 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1668 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1669 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1670 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1671 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1672 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1673 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1674 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1675 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1676 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1677 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1678 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1680 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1681 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1683 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1686 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1689 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1693 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1695 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1696 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1698 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1701 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1704 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1706 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1709 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1710 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1714 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1718 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1719 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1723 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1724 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1727 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1728 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1729 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1730 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1731 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1732 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1734 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1735 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1736 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1740 s->session->peer_type = i;
1742 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1744 s->session->peer = x;
1745 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1748 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1750 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1751 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1752 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1753 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1754 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1758 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1762 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1764 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1767 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1771 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1774 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1776 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1778 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1779 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1780 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1785 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1786 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1787 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1790 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1791 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1792 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1796 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1797 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1798 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1799 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1800 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1801 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1807 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1808 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1813 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1815 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1816 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1818 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1819 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1820 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1821 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1822 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1827 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1829 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1830 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1832 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1833 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1835 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1836 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1838 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1839 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1840 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1841 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1845 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1846 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1847 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1851 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1852 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1853 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1857 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1858 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1863 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1865 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1866 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1867 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1870 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1874 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1875 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1876 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1877 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1878 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1882 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1885 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1886 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1887 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1891 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1892 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1893 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1895 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1896 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1897 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1898 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1899 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1903 /* test non-zero pupkey */
1904 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1905 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1906 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1910 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1911 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1912 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1917 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
1918 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1919 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1923 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1924 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1925 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1930 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1931 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1932 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1936 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1937 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1938 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1942 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
1945 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1946 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1948 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1949 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1950 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1959 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
1963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1964 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1969 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1971 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1973 const unsigned char *ecparams;
1975 unsigned int curve_flags;
1976 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1979 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1980 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1981 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1983 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1984 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1985 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1989 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1990 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1992 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1993 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1998 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
2000 if (curve_nid == 0) {
2001 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2003 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2007 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
2008 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
2010 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
2011 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2012 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2016 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2018 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2019 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2021 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2022 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
2023 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2024 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2026 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2029 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2033 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2034 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2039 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2040 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2041 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2042 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2043 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2048 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2049 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2052 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2053 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2054 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2055 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2056 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2060 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2061 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2066 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2070 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2071 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2072 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2073 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2075 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2077 save_param_start = *pkt;
2079 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2080 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2081 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2084 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2085 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2089 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2090 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2091 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2092 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2094 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2095 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2097 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2098 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2101 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2102 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2106 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2110 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2113 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2114 * equals the length of the parameters.
2116 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2117 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2118 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2119 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2120 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2124 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2125 unsigned int sigalg;
2128 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2129 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2130 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2133 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
2135 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2137 } else if (rv == 0) {
2138 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2142 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2144 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2145 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2149 md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx);
2151 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2152 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2153 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2154 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2157 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2159 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2160 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2165 * Check signature length
2167 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2168 /* wrong packet length */
2169 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2170 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2171 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2175 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2176 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2177 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2178 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2182 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2183 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2184 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2187 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2188 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2189 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2190 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2191 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2192 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2196 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2197 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2198 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2199 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2200 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2201 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
2202 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2203 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2206 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2207 PACKET_remaining(&signature)) <= 0) {
2209 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2210 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2213 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2216 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2217 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2218 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2219 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2220 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2221 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2222 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2223 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2225 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2229 /* still data left over */
2230 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2231 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2232 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2237 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2240 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2241 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2242 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2243 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2246 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2248 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2249 unsigned int i, name_len;
2250 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2251 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2252 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2255 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2260 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2263 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2264 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2265 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2266 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2267 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2268 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
2269 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2270 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2276 /* get the certificate types */
2277 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2278 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2279 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2280 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2284 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2285 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2290 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2293 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2294 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2295 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2296 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2300 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2301 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2302 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2303 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2304 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2305 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2306 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2309 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2310 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2311 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2316 /* get the CA RDNs */
2317 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2318 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2323 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2324 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2325 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2326 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2327 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2328 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2332 namestart = namebytes;
2334 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2335 name_len)) == NULL) {
2336 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2337 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2341 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2342 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2343 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2344 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2347 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2348 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2353 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to parse and process extensions, for now ignore */
2354 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2357 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &reqexts)) {
2358 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2359 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2360 SSL_R_EXT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2365 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2366 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2367 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2371 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2372 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2373 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2374 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2377 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2380 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2383 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2387 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2389 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2392 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2394 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2395 unsigned int ticklen;
2396 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2397 unsigned int sess_len;
2398 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2400 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2401 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add))
2402 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2403 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2405 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2406 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2411 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2412 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2413 * be 0 here in that instance
2416 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2418 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Is this a suitable test for TLS1.3? */
2419 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2420 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2421 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2423 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2426 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2428 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2430 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2433 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2434 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2435 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2439 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2440 s->session = new_sess;
2444 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2445 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2447 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2449 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2450 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2451 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2453 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2454 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2455 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2458 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2459 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2460 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2464 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2465 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2466 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2468 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2471 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2472 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2473 EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2475 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2476 exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
2477 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2483 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2484 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2485 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2486 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2487 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2488 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2489 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2490 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2491 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2494 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2495 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2497 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2498 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2499 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2500 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2503 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2505 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2506 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2508 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2509 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2512 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2514 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2516 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2518 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2522 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2523 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2524 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2526 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2531 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2532 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2533 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2535 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2538 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2539 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2540 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2544 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2545 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2546 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2547 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2550 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2551 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2552 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2555 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2561 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2565 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) {
2566 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2567 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2568 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2571 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2575 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2576 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2577 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2580 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2583 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2586 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2587 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2592 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2593 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2594 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2596 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2597 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2598 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2601 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2603 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2607 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2608 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2609 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2613 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2614 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2615 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2616 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2617 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2626 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2628 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2630 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2631 /* should contain no data */
2632 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2633 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2636 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2637 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2638 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2646 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2648 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2651 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2652 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2653 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2654 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2655 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2658 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2661 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2662 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2663 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2666 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2668 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2671 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2672 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2675 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2676 size_t identitylen = 0;
2677 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2678 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2679 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2682 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2683 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2684 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2688 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2690 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2691 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2694 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2696 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2698 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2699 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2700 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2701 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2705 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2706 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2707 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2708 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2712 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2713 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2714 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2715 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2716 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2720 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2721 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2722 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2724 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2725 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2728 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2729 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2730 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2737 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2738 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2739 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2740 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2744 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2745 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2750 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2752 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2753 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2754 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2755 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2757 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2760 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2762 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2768 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2769 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2770 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2774 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2775 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2778 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2782 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2783 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2784 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2785 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2789 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2790 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2794 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2795 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2796 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2797 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2800 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2801 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2802 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2805 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2808 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2809 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2810 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2814 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2815 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2817 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2818 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen))
2823 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2824 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2829 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2834 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2836 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2838 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2839 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2840 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2842 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2846 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2850 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2852 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2855 /* send off the data */
2856 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2857 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2860 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2861 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2865 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2868 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2872 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2874 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2875 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2876 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2877 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2880 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2882 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2886 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2888 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2892 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2893 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2897 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2898 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2900 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2901 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2905 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2906 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2912 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2913 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2916 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2917 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2922 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2924 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2925 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2926 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2929 unsigned int md_len;
2930 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2931 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2932 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2933 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2936 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2937 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2940 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2942 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2944 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2945 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2946 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2950 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2951 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2952 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2953 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2957 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2958 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2959 * certificate key for key exchange
2962 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2964 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2966 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2967 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2971 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2972 /* Generate session key
2973 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2975 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
2976 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2977 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2981 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2984 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2985 if (ukm_hash == NULL
2986 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2987 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2988 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2989 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2990 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2991 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2992 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2993 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2996 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2998 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
2999 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3000 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3004 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3006 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3009 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3010 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3011 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3015 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3016 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3017 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3018 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3019 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3023 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3024 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3025 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3029 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3030 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3031 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3034 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3035 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3040 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
3042 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3043 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3045 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3046 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3048 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3051 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3053 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3054 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3055 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3062 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3063 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3068 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3070 unsigned long alg_k;
3073 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3075 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3076 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
3079 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3080 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3082 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3083 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3085 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3086 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3088 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3089 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3091 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3092 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3094 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3095 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3096 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3103 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3104 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3105 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3106 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3107 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3108 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3113 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3115 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3118 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3119 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3121 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3123 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3124 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3125 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3126 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3133 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3134 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3138 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3139 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3140 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3141 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3149 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3150 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3151 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3152 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3155 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3158 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3159 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3161 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3162 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3163 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
3166 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3167 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3173 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3174 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3179 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3180 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3181 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3183 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3185 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3186 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, NULL) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3189 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3190 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3192 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3193 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3198 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3201 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3204 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3205 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3206 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3207 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3209 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3213 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3214 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3217 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3219 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3220 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3222 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3226 /* We need to get a client cert */
3227 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3229 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3230 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3232 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3234 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3237 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3238 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3239 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3241 } else if (i == 1) {
3243 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3244 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3248 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3249 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3252 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3253 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3254 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3255 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3257 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3258 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3259 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3260 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3266 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3269 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3273 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3275 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3278 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3281 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3282 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3283 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3286 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3287 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3294 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3296 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3299 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3303 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3304 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3306 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3307 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3309 /* we don't have a certificate */
3310 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3313 /* This is the passed certificate */
3315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3316 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3317 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3318 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3325 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3327 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3331 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3332 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3334 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3335 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3337 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3340 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3341 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3342 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3343 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3348 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3349 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3351 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3355 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3356 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3357 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3358 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3365 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3370 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3372 size_t len, padding_len;
3373 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3375 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3376 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3378 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3379 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3380 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3384 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3388 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3393 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3395 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3396 /* should contain no data */
3397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3398 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
3399 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3400 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3404 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3405 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3406 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3407 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3408 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3413 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3415 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3418 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3420 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3422 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3424 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
3425 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3426 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3430 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3431 &rawexts, &al, NULL)
3432 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3433 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al))
3436 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3437 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3440 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3441 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3442 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3443 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3446 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3449 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3450 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3451 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3452 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3453 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3458 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3459 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3463 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3466 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen;
3467 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3468 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3469 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3474 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3475 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3476 # error Max cipher length too short
3479 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3480 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3483 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3484 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3487 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3490 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3492 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3495 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3496 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3498 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3499 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3500 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3503 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3512 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3517 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3518 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3519 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3521 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3526 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3527 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3528 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3530 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);