2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
52 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
53 #include "statem_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/md5.h>
59 #include <openssl/dh.h>
60 #include <openssl/bn.h>
61 #include <openssl/engine.h>
63 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
65 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
66 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
67 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
68 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
72 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
78 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
80 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
81 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
82 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
83 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
90 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
96 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
98 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
101 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
102 * ciphersuite or for SRP
104 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
113 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
114 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
115 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
116 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
118 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
119 * (transition not allowed)
121 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
123 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
126 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
127 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
131 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
132 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
133 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
136 switch (st->hand_state) {
140 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
141 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
142 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
149 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
150 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
154 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
155 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
158 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
159 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
165 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
166 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
167 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
173 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
174 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
179 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
180 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
181 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
187 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
188 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
194 /* No valid transition found */
199 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
200 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
201 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
202 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
204 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
205 * (transition not allowed)
207 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
209 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
213 * Note that after a ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
214 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
216 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
217 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
222 switch (st->hand_state) {
226 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
227 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
228 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
232 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
233 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
234 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
240 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
242 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
243 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
244 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
247 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
248 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
252 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
253 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
255 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
256 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
257 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
258 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
260 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
261 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
262 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
263 * the server is resuming.
266 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
268 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
269 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
270 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
271 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
275 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
276 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
278 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
279 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
280 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
281 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
284 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
285 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
286 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
288 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
289 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
298 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
299 * |ext.status_expected| is set
301 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
302 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
307 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
308 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
309 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
310 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
311 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
312 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
313 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
320 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
321 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
322 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
323 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
330 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
331 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
332 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
337 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
338 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
339 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
340 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
343 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
344 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
349 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
350 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
351 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
356 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
357 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
358 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
364 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
365 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
372 /* No valid transition found */
373 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
374 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
379 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
380 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
383 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
385 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
388 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
389 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
393 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE or TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO,
394 * because we haven't negotiated TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are
395 * handled by ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
397 switch (st->hand_state) {
399 /* Shouldn't happen */
400 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
402 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
403 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
404 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
405 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
408 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
409 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
410 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
411 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
413 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
414 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
415 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
417 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
418 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
419 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
420 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
421 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
424 /* Just go straight to trying to read from the server */
425 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
430 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
431 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
433 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
435 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
438 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
439 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
443 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
445 switch (st->hand_state) {
447 /* Shouldn't happen */
448 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
451 if (!s->renegotiate) {
453 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
454 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
456 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
458 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
460 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
463 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
465 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
468 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
470 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
471 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
474 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
475 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
476 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
478 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
479 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
482 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
483 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
485 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
487 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
488 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
491 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
492 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
493 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
494 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
496 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
497 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
499 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
501 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
502 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
504 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
506 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
507 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
508 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
510 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
511 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
512 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
514 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
515 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
517 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
519 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
521 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
522 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
523 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
527 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
529 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
530 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
531 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
533 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
536 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
538 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
539 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
541 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
542 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
543 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
546 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
548 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
551 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
552 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
553 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
554 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
556 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
559 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
560 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
566 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
567 * the client to the server.
569 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
571 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
573 switch (st->hand_state) {
575 /* No pre work to be done */
578 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
580 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
581 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
582 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
583 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
589 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
590 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
593 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
594 * messages unless we need to.
598 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
599 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
600 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
606 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
609 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
613 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
614 * client to the server.
615 case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY:
616 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
618 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
620 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
624 switch (st->hand_state) {
626 /* No post work to be done */
629 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
630 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
633 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
634 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
639 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
640 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
644 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
645 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
646 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
647 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
649 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
650 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
652 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
654 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
657 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
658 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
661 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
665 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
668 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
673 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
677 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
678 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
679 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
681 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
684 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
688 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
691 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
692 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
693 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
699 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
703 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
706 * Valid return values are:
710 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
711 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
713 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
715 switch (st->hand_state) {
717 /* Shouldn't happen */
720 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
722 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
724 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
725 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
728 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
729 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
730 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
734 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
735 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
738 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
739 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
740 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
743 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
744 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
745 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
748 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
749 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
750 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
751 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
754 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
755 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
756 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
764 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
765 * reading. Excludes the message header.
767 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
769 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
771 switch (st->hand_state) {
773 /* Shouldn't happen */
776 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
777 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
779 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
780 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
783 return s->max_cert_list;
785 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
786 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
788 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
789 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
791 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
792 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
794 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
796 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
797 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
798 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
800 return s->max_cert_list;
802 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
803 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
805 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
806 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
808 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
810 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
811 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
813 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
814 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
816 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
817 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
822 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
824 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
826 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
828 switch (st->hand_state) {
830 /* Shouldn't happen */
831 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
833 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
834 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
836 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
837 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
840 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
842 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
843 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
845 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
846 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
848 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
849 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
851 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
852 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
854 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
855 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
857 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
858 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
860 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
861 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
863 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
864 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
866 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
867 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
869 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
870 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
875 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
878 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
880 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
882 switch (st->hand_state) {
884 /* Shouldn't happen */
887 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
888 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
890 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
891 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
892 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
893 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
894 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
895 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
896 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
897 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
898 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
901 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
902 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
907 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
912 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
913 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
916 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
918 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
919 /* Should not happen */
920 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
924 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
925 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
927 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
931 if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
933 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
934 * "ticket" without a session ID.
936 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->ext.tick) ||
937 (sess->not_resumable)) {
938 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
941 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
943 /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */
944 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
946 p = s->s3->client_random;
949 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
950 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
952 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
955 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
964 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
968 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
969 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
970 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
971 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
972 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
973 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
974 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
975 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
978 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
979 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
980 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
981 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
982 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
983 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
984 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
985 * know that is maximum server supports.
986 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
987 * containing version 1.0.
989 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
990 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
991 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
992 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
993 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
994 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
995 * the negotiated version.
997 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
998 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1000 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1001 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1002 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1007 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
1010 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1011 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1012 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1013 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
1015 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1020 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1021 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1022 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1023 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1024 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1030 /* Ciphers supported */
1031 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1032 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1035 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1036 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
1038 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1044 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1048 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1049 if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1050 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1051 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1052 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1053 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1060 /* Add the NULL method */
1061 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1062 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1066 /* TLS extensions */
1067 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1068 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1076 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1082 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1083 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1084 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1085 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1089 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1090 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1091 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1092 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1096 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1097 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1098 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1101 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1103 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1105 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1106 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1107 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1110 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1112 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1113 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1114 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1115 size_t session_id_len;
1116 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1117 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1118 unsigned int compression;
1119 unsigned int sversion;
1120 unsigned int context;
1122 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1127 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1128 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1129 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1133 /* We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in */
1134 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1135 if (protverr != 0) {
1136 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1137 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1141 /* load the server hello data */
1142 /* load the server random */
1143 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1144 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1149 /* Get the session-id. */
1150 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1151 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1152 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1156 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1157 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1158 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1159 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1160 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1161 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1165 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1169 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1170 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1171 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1175 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1176 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1177 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1178 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1185 /* TLS extensions */
1186 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1187 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1188 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1189 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1194 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1195 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1196 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al))
1201 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1202 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1203 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1204 EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1205 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1209 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1210 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1211 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1212 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1213 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1214 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1215 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1216 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1217 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1218 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1220 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1221 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1222 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1224 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1225 * backwards compat reasons
1227 int master_key_length;
1228 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1229 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1232 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1233 && master_key_length > 0) {
1234 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1235 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1236 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1238 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1239 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1244 if (session_id_len != 0
1245 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1246 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1247 session_id_len) == 0)
1252 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1253 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1254 /* actually a client application bug */
1255 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1257 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1262 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1263 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1264 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1265 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1266 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1268 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1270 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1271 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1272 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1273 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1278 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1279 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1280 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1281 if (session_id_len > 0)
1282 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1286 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1287 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1288 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1291 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1295 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1297 /* unknown cipher */
1298 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1303 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1306 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1307 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1309 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1310 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1312 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1313 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1318 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1319 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1321 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1322 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1323 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1328 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1329 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1330 * set and use it for comparison.
1332 if (s->session->cipher)
1333 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1334 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1335 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1337 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1340 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1342 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1343 if (compression != 0) {
1344 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1345 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1346 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1350 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1351 * using compression.
1353 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1358 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1359 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1361 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1364 if (compression == 0)
1366 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1367 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1368 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1371 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1374 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1375 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1376 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1377 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1380 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1384 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1387 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1388 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1389 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1390 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1393 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1396 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1397 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1399 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1400 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1402 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1405 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1406 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1407 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1412 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1413 * we're done with this message
1416 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1417 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1418 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)
1419 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1420 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1421 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1422 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1426 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1427 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1429 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1430 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1431 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1432 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1435 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1437 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1438 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1440 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1441 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1442 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1444 unsigned int context = 0;
1446 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1447 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1451 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1453 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1454 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1455 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1456 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1459 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1460 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1461 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1462 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1463 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1464 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1468 certstart = certbytes;
1469 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1471 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1472 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1475 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1476 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1478 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1482 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1483 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1486 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1487 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1488 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1491 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1493 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1494 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
1495 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1498 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1501 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1502 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1508 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1510 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1511 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1512 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1513 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1514 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1515 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1516 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1517 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1518 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1519 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1520 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1521 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1523 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1524 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1525 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1526 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1529 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1531 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1532 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1536 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1538 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1539 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1541 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1544 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1547 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1549 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1553 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1557 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1561 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1562 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1566 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1567 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1568 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1569 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1570 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1572 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1573 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1574 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1577 s->session->peer_type = i;
1579 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1581 s->session->peer = x;
1582 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1585 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1587 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1588 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1589 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1590 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1595 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1599 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1601 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1604 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1608 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1611 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1613 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1615 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1616 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1617 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1622 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1623 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1624 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1627 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1628 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1629 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1633 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1634 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1635 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1636 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1637 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1638 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1644 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1645 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1650 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1652 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1653 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1655 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1656 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1657 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1658 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1659 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1660 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1664 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1666 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1667 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1669 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1670 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1672 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1673 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1675 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1676 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1677 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1682 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1683 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1684 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1688 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1689 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1690 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1694 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1695 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1700 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1702 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1703 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1704 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1707 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1711 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1712 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1713 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1714 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1715 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1719 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1722 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1723 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1728 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1729 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1730 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1732 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1733 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1734 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1735 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1736 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1740 /* test non-zero pupkey */
1741 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1742 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1743 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1747 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1748 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1749 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1754 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
1755 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1756 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1760 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1761 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1762 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1767 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1768 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1769 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1773 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1774 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1775 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1779 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
1782 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1783 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1785 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1786 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1787 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1796 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
1800 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1801 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1806 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1810 const unsigned char *ecparams;
1812 unsigned int curve_flags;
1813 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1816 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1817 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1818 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1820 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1821 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1822 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1826 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1827 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1829 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1830 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1831 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1835 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
1837 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1838 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1839 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
1840 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1844 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
1845 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
1847 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
1848 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1849 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1853 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
1855 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1856 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
1858 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
1859 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
1860 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
1861 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1863 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1866 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1870 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
1871 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1876 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
1877 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1878 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
1879 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1880 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1885 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1886 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1889 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
1890 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1891 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
1892 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1893 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1897 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1898 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1903 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1905 int al = -1, ispss = 0;
1907 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1908 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
1909 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1910 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
1912 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1914 save_param_start = *pkt;
1916 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1917 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
1918 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
1921 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
1922 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
1926 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1927 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1928 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1929 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1931 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1932 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1934 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1935 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1938 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1943 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1947 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1950 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1951 * equals the length of the parameters.
1953 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
1954 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
1955 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
1956 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1957 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1961 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1962 unsigned int sigalg;
1965 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
1966 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1967 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1970 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalg, pkey);
1972 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1974 } else if (rv == 0) {
1975 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1978 ispss = SIGID_IS_PSS(sigalg);
1980 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1982 } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
1983 md = EVP_md5_sha1();
1988 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
1989 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1990 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1991 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1994 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1996 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1997 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2002 * Check signature length
2004 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2005 /* wrong packet length */
2006 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2007 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2008 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2012 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2013 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2014 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2015 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2019 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2020 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2021 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2025 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2026 /* -1 here means set saltlen to the digest len */
2027 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1) <= 0) {
2028 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2029 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2033 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2034 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2035 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2036 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2037 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2038 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
2039 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2040 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2043 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2044 PACKET_remaining(&signature)) <= 0) {
2046 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2047 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2050 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2053 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2054 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2055 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2056 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2057 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2058 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2059 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2060 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2062 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2066 /* still data left over */
2067 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2068 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2069 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2074 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2077 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2078 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2079 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2080 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2083 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2085 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2086 unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
2087 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2088 const unsigned char *data;
2089 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2090 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2092 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2097 /* get the certificate types */
2098 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
2099 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
2100 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2101 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2104 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
2105 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
2106 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
2107 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2108 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
2109 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
2110 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2113 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
2114 s->cert->ctype_num = ctype_num;
2115 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
2117 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
2118 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
2120 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2123 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2124 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2125 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2126 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2130 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2131 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2132 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2133 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2135 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2136 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2137 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2138 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2141 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2142 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2143 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2147 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2150 /* get the CA RDNs */
2151 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
2152 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
2153 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2154 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2158 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2159 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
2160 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2161 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2162 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2163 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2167 namestart = namebytes;
2169 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2170 name_len)) == NULL) {
2171 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2172 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2176 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2177 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2178 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2179 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2182 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2183 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2189 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2190 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2191 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2192 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2193 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2196 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2199 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2202 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2206 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2208 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2211 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2214 unsigned int ticklen;
2215 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add;
2216 unsigned int sess_len;
2217 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2219 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2220 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add))
2221 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2222 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2223 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (ticklen == 0
2224 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2225 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2226 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2231 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2232 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2233 * be 0 here in that instance
2236 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2238 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Is this a suitable test for TLS1.3? */
2239 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2240 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2241 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2243 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2246 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2248 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2250 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2253 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2254 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2255 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2259 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2260 s->session = new_sess;
2264 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2265 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2267 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2269 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2270 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2271 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2273 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2274 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2275 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2278 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2279 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2280 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2284 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2285 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2286 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2288 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2291 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2292 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2293 EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2295 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2296 exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
2297 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2303 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2304 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2305 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2306 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2307 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2308 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2309 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2310 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2311 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2314 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2315 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2317 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2318 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2319 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2320 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2323 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2325 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2326 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2327 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2328 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2331 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2333 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2335 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2336 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2340 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2341 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2342 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2344 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2349 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2350 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2351 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2352 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2353 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2356 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2357 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2358 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2359 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2362 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2363 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2364 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2365 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2368 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2369 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2370 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2373 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2379 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2383 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) {
2384 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2385 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2386 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2389 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2393 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2394 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2395 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2398 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2401 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2404 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2405 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2410 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2411 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2412 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2414 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2415 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2416 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2419 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2420 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2421 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2425 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2427 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2431 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2432 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2433 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2434 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2435 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2444 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2446 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2448 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2449 /* should contain no data */
2450 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2451 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2454 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2455 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2456 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2457 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2464 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2466 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2470 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2471 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2472 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2473 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2476 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2479 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2480 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2481 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2484 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2489 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2490 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2493 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2494 size_t identitylen = 0;
2495 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2496 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2497 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2500 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2501 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2502 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2506 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2508 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2509 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2512 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2514 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2516 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2517 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2518 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2519 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2523 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2524 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2525 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2526 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2530 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2531 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2532 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2533 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2534 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2538 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2539 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2540 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2542 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2543 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2546 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2547 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2548 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2555 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2556 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2557 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2558 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2562 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2563 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2568 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2571 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2572 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2573 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2575 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2578 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2580 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2582 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2586 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2587 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2588 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2592 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2593 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2595 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2596 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2600 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2601 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2602 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2603 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2607 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2608 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2609 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2612 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2613 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2614 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2615 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2618 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2619 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2620 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2623 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2626 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2628 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2632 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2633 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2634 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2638 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2639 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2641 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2642 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen))
2647 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2648 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2652 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2653 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2658 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2660 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2662 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2663 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2664 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2666 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2670 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2674 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2676 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2679 /* send off the data */
2680 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2681 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2684 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2685 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2689 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2691 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2692 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2696 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2698 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2699 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2700 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2701 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2704 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2706 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2710 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2716 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2717 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2721 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2722 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2724 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2725 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2729 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2730 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2736 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2737 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2740 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2741 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2746 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2749 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2750 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2753 unsigned int md_len;
2754 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2755 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2756 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2757 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2760 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2761 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2764 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2766 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2768 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2769 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2770 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2774 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2775 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2776 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2781 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2782 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2783 * certificate key for key exchange
2786 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2788 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2790 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2795 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2796 /* Generate session key
2797 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2799 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
2800 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2801 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2805 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2808 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2809 if (ukm_hash == NULL
2810 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2811 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2812 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2813 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2814 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2815 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2816 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2817 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2820 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2822 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
2823 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
2824 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2825 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2828 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2830 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2833 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2834 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2835 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2839 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
2840 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
2841 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
2842 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2843 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2847 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2848 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2849 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2853 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2854 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2855 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2858 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2859 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2864 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2866 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2867 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
2869 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
2870 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
2872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2875 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
2877 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2878 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2879 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2880 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2886 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2887 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2892 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2894 unsigned long alg_k;
2897 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2899 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
2900 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2903 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2904 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2906 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2907 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2909 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2910 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2912 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2913 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2915 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2916 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2918 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
2919 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2920 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2927 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2928 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
2929 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2930 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2931 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2932 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2937 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
2939 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2942 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
2943 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
2945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2947 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2948 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
2949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
2950 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2957 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
2958 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2959 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2962 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
2963 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2965 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
2973 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2974 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2975 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2976 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2979 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2982 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2983 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2985 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2986 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2987 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
2990 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2991 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2997 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2998 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3003 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3004 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3005 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3007 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3009 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
3011 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3012 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
3015 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3016 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3018 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3019 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3024 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3027 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3030 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3031 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3032 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3033 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3035 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3039 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3040 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3043 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3045 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3046 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3048 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3052 /* We need to get a client cert */
3053 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3055 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3056 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3058 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3060 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3063 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3064 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3065 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3067 } else if (i == 1) {
3069 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3070 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3074 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3075 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3078 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3079 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3080 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3081 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3083 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3084 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3085 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3086 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3092 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3095 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3099 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3101 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3104 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3107 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3108 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3109 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3112 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3113 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3120 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3122 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3129 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3130 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3132 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3133 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3135 /* we don't have a certificate */
3136 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3139 /* This is the passed certificate */
3141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3142 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3143 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3144 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3151 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3153 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3157 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3158 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3160 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3161 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3163 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3166 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3167 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3169 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3173 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3174 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3175 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3177 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3181 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3182 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3183 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3191 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3195 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3196 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3198 size_t len, padding_len;
3199 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3201 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3202 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3204 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3205 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3206 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3210 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3214 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3219 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3221 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3222 /* should contain no data */
3223 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3224 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
3225 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3226 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3230 * This is a historical discrepancy maintained for compatibility
3231 * reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will attempt
3232 * an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3233 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake.
3238 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3240 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3243 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3245 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3247 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3249 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
3250 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3251 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3255 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3257 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3258 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al))
3261 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3262 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3265 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3266 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3267 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3268 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3271 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3274 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3275 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3276 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3277 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3278 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3283 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3284 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3288 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3291 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen;
3292 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3293 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3294 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3299 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3300 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3301 # error Max cipher length too short
3304 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3305 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3308 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3309 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3312 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3315 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3317 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3320 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3321 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3323 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3324 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3325 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3328 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3329 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3342 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3343 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3344 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3346 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3351 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3352 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3353 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3355 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3356 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);