2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
52 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
53 #include "statem_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/md5.h>
59 #include <openssl/dh.h>
60 #include <openssl/bn.h>
61 #include <openssl/engine.h>
63 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
64 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
66 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
67 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
68 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
69 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
73 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
79 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
81 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
82 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
83 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
84 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
91 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
97 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
99 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
102 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
103 * ciphersuite or for SRP
105 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
114 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
115 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
116 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
117 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
119 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
120 * (transition not allowed)
122 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
124 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
127 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
128 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
132 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
133 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
134 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
137 switch (st->hand_state) {
141 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
143 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
144 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
146 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
147 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
152 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
153 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
154 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
159 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
161 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
166 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
167 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
170 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
171 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
177 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
178 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
179 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
185 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
186 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
191 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
192 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
193 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
199 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
200 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
201 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
204 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
205 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
208 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
209 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
215 /* No valid transition found */
220 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
221 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
222 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
223 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
225 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
226 * (transition not allowed)
228 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
230 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
234 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
235 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
237 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
238 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
243 switch (st->hand_state) {
247 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
248 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
249 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
253 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
254 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
255 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
259 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
260 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
266 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
268 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
269 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
270 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
273 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
274 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
278 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
279 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
281 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
282 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
283 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
284 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
286 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
287 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
288 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
289 * the server is resuming.
292 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
294 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
295 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
296 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
297 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
301 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
302 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
304 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
305 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
306 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
307 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
310 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
311 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
312 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
314 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
315 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
324 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
325 * |ext.status_expected| is set
327 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
328 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
333 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
334 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
335 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
336 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
337 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
338 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
339 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
346 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
347 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
348 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
349 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
356 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
357 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
358 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
363 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
364 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
365 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
366 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
369 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
370 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
375 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
376 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
377 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
382 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
383 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
384 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
390 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
392 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
393 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
396 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
397 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
400 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
401 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
404 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
405 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
412 /* No valid transition found */
413 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
414 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
419 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
420 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
423 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
425 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
428 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
429 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
430 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
432 switch (st->hand_state) {
434 /* Shouldn't happen */
435 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
437 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
438 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
439 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
441 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
442 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
443 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
445 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
446 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
447 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
448 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
451 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
452 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
453 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
454 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
456 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
457 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
458 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
460 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
461 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
462 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
463 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
467 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
468 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
469 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
470 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
471 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
475 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
476 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
477 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
480 /* Try to read from the server instead */
481 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
486 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
487 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
489 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
491 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
494 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
495 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
499 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
501 switch (st->hand_state) {
503 /* Shouldn't happen */
504 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
507 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
509 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
510 * actually selected a version yet.
512 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
514 if (!s->renegotiate) {
516 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
517 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
519 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
521 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
523 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
526 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
527 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
529 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
530 * actually selected a version yet.
532 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
533 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
534 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
537 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
540 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
542 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
543 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
544 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
546 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
547 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
548 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
550 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
551 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
554 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
555 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
557 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
559 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
560 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
563 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
564 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
565 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
566 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
568 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
569 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
573 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
574 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
576 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
578 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
579 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
580 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
582 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
583 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
584 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
586 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
587 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
589 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
591 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
593 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
594 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
595 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
596 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
599 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
601 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
602 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
603 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
605 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
608 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
610 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
611 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
613 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
614 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
615 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
618 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
620 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
623 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
624 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
625 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
626 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
628 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
629 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
631 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
632 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
633 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
638 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
639 * the client to the server.
641 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
643 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
645 switch (st->hand_state) {
647 /* No pre work to be done */
650 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
652 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
653 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
654 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
655 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
661 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
662 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
665 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
666 * messages unless we need to.
670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
671 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
672 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
678 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
681 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
685 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
686 * client to the server.
688 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
690 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
694 switch (st->hand_state) {
696 /* No post work to be done */
699 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
700 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
703 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
704 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
709 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
710 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
714 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
715 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
716 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
717 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
719 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
720 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
722 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
724 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
727 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
728 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
731 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
732 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
735 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
738 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
743 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
747 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
748 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
749 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
751 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
754 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
758 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
761 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
762 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
763 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
768 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
769 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
771 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
776 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
780 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
783 * Valid return values are:
787 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
788 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
790 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
792 switch (st->hand_state) {
794 /* Shouldn't happen */
797 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
799 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
801 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
802 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
805 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
806 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
807 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
811 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
812 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
815 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
816 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
817 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
820 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
821 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
822 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
825 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
826 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
827 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
828 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
831 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
832 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
833 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
836 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
837 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
838 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
846 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
847 * reading. Excludes the message header.
849 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
851 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
853 switch (st->hand_state) {
855 /* Shouldn't happen */
858 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
859 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
861 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
862 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
864 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
865 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
868 return s->max_cert_list;
870 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
871 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
873 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
874 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
876 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
877 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
879 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
881 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
882 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
883 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
885 return s->max_cert_list;
887 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
888 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
890 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
891 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
893 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
895 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
896 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
898 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
899 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
901 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
902 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
904 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
905 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
910 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
912 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
914 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
916 switch (st->hand_state) {
918 /* Shouldn't happen */
919 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
921 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
922 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
924 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
925 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
927 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
928 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt);
931 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
933 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
934 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
936 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
937 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
939 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
940 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
942 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
943 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
945 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
946 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
948 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
949 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
951 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
952 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
954 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
955 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
957 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
958 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
960 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
961 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
963 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
964 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
969 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
972 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
974 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
976 switch (st->hand_state) {
978 /* Shouldn't happen */
981 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
982 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
984 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
985 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
986 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
987 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
988 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
989 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
990 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
991 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
992 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
995 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
996 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1001 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1006 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1007 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1010 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1012 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1013 /* Should not happen */
1014 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1018 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1019 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1020 if (protverr != 0) {
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1025 if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
1027 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
1028 * "ticket" without a session ID.
1030 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->ext.tick) ||
1031 (sess->not_resumable)) {
1032 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
1035 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1037 p = s->s3->client_random;
1040 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1041 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1043 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1046 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1055 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
1059 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1060 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1061 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1062 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1063 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1064 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1065 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1066 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1069 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1070 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1071 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1072 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1073 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1074 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1075 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1076 * know that is maximum server supports.
1077 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1078 * containing version 1.0.
1080 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1081 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1082 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1083 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1084 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1085 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1086 * the negotiated version.
1088 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1089 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1091 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1092 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1098 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
1101 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1102 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1103 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1104 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
1106 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1107 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1111 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1112 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1113 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1114 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1115 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1116 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1121 /* Ciphers supported */
1122 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1123 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1126 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1127 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
1129 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1135 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1139 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1140 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1141 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1142 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1143 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1144 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1145 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1146 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1153 /* Add the NULL method */
1154 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1159 /* TLS extensions */
1160 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1161 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1169 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1175 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1176 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1177 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1178 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1182 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1183 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1184 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1185 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1189 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1190 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1194 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1196 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1198 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1199 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1200 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1203 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1205 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1206 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1207 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1208 size_t session_id_len;
1209 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1210 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1211 unsigned int compression;
1212 unsigned int sversion;
1213 unsigned int context;
1215 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1221 * This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end. We set
1222 * this here so that we are after any early_data
1224 s->statem.cleanuphand = 1;
1226 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1227 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1232 /* We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in */
1233 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1234 if (protverr != 0) {
1235 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1240 /* load the server hello data */
1241 /* load the server random */
1242 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1243 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1248 /* Get the session-id. */
1249 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1250 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1251 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1252 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1255 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1256 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1257 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1258 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1259 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1260 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1264 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1268 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1269 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1270 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1274 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1275 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1277 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1284 /* TLS extensions */
1285 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1286 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1287 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1288 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1289 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1293 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1294 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1295 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al, NULL))
1300 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1301 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1302 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1303 EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1304 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1308 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1309 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1310 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1311 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1312 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1313 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1314 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1315 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1316 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1317 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1319 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1320 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1321 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1323 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1324 * backwards compat reasons
1326 int master_key_length;
1327 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1328 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1331 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1332 && master_key_length > 0) {
1333 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1334 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1335 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1338 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1343 if (session_id_len != 0
1344 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1345 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1346 session_id_len) == 0)
1351 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1352 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1353 /* actually a client application bug */
1354 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1355 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1356 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1361 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1362 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1363 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1364 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1365 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1367 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1369 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1370 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1371 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1372 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1377 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1378 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1379 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1380 if (session_id_len > 0)
1381 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1385 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1386 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1387 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1389 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1390 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1394 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1396 /* unknown cipher */
1397 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1398 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1402 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1405 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1406 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1408 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1409 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1411 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1412 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1413 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1417 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1418 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1420 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1421 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1422 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1427 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1428 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1429 * set and use it for comparison.
1431 if (s->session->cipher)
1432 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1433 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1434 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1435 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1436 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1439 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1441 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1442 if (compression != 0) {
1443 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1444 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1445 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1449 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1450 * using compression.
1452 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1453 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1457 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1458 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1460 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1463 if (compression == 0)
1465 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1466 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1467 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1470 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1473 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1474 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1475 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1476 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1479 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1483 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1486 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1487 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1488 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1489 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1492 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1495 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1496 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1498 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1499 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1501 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1504 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1505 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1506 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1511 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1512 * we're done with this message
1515 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1516 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1517 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)
1518 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1519 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1520 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1521 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1525 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1526 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1528 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1529 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1530 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1531 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1534 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1536 unsigned int sversion;
1538 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1542 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1543 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1544 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1548 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
1550 /* This will fail if it doesn't choose TLSv1.3+ */
1551 errorcode = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1552 if (errorcode != 0) {
1553 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1554 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, errorcode);
1558 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1559 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1564 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1565 &extensions, &al, NULL)
1566 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1567 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1570 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1572 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1574 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1575 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1576 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1577 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1580 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1582 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1583 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1585 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1586 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1587 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1589 unsigned int context = 0;
1591 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1592 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1596 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1598 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1599 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1600 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1601 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1604 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1605 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1606 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1607 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1608 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1609 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1613 certstart = certbytes;
1614 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1616 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1617 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1620 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1621 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1622 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1623 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1627 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1628 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1631 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1632 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1633 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1636 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1637 &rawexts, &al, NULL)
1638 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1639 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
1640 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1643 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1646 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1653 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1655 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1656 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1657 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1658 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1659 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1660 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1661 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1662 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1663 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1664 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1665 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1666 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1668 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1669 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1670 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1671 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1674 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1677 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1681 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1683 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1684 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1686 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1689 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1692 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1694 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1698 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1702 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1706 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1707 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1711 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1712 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1715 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1716 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1717 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1718 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1719 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1720 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1722 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1723 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1724 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1728 s->session->peer_type = i;
1730 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1732 s->session->peer = x;
1733 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1736 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1738 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1739 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1740 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1741 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1742 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1746 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1750 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1752 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1755 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1759 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1762 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1764 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1766 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1767 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1768 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1773 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1774 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1775 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1778 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1779 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1780 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1784 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1785 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1786 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1787 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1788 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1789 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1795 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1796 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1801 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1803 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1804 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1806 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1807 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1808 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1809 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1810 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1811 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1815 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1817 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1818 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1820 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1821 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1823 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1824 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1826 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1827 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1828 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1829 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1833 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1834 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1839 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1840 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1841 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1845 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1846 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1851 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1853 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1854 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1855 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1858 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1862 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1863 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1864 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1865 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1866 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1870 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1873 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1874 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1875 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1879 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1880 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1881 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1883 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1884 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1885 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1886 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1887 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1891 /* test non-zero pupkey */
1892 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1893 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1894 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1898 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1899 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1900 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1905 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
1906 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1907 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1911 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1912 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1913 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1918 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1919 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1920 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1924 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1925 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1930 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
1933 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1934 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1936 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1937 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1938 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1947 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
1951 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1952 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1957 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1959 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1961 const unsigned char *ecparams;
1963 unsigned int curve_flags;
1964 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1967 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1968 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1969 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1971 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1972 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1977 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1978 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1980 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1981 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1986 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
1988 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1989 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
1991 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1995 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
1996 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
1998 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
1999 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2000 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2004 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2006 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2007 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2009 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2010 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
2011 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2012 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2013 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2014 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2017 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2021 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2022 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2023 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2027 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2028 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2029 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2030 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2036 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2037 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2040 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2041 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2042 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2043 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2044 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2048 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2049 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2054 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2058 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2059 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2060 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2061 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2063 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2065 save_param_start = *pkt;
2067 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2068 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2069 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2072 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2073 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2077 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2078 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2079 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2080 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2082 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2083 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2085 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2086 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2089 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2090 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2094 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2098 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2101 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2102 * equals the length of the parameters.
2104 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2105 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2106 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2107 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2108 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2112 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2113 unsigned int sigalg;
2116 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2117 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2118 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2121 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
2123 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2125 } else if (rv == 0) {
2126 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2130 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2132 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2133 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2137 md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx);
2139 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2140 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2141 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2145 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2147 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2148 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2153 * Check signature length
2155 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2156 /* wrong packet length */
2157 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2158 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2159 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2163 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2164 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2165 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2166 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2170 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2171 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2172 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2175 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2176 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2177 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2178 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2179 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2180 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2184 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2185 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2186 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2187 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2188 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2189 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
2190 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2191 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2194 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2195 PACKET_remaining(&signature)) <= 0) {
2197 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2201 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2204 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2205 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2206 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2207 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2208 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2209 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2210 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2211 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2213 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2217 /* still data left over */
2218 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2219 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2225 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2228 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2229 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2230 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2231 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2234 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2236 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2237 unsigned int i, name_len;
2238 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2239 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2240 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2243 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2244 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2248 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2251 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2252 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2253 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2254 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2255 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2256 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
2257 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2258 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2264 /* get the certificate types */
2265 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2266 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2267 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2268 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2272 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2273 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2278 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2281 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2282 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2283 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2284 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2288 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2289 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2290 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2291 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2292 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2294 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2297 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2298 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2304 /* get the CA RDNs */
2305 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2306 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2307 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2311 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2312 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2313 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2314 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2315 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2316 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2320 namestart = namebytes;
2322 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2323 name_len)) == NULL) {
2324 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2325 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2329 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2330 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2331 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2332 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2335 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2341 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to parse and process extensions, for now ignore */
2342 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2345 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &reqexts)) {
2346 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2347 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2348 SSL_R_EXT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2353 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2354 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2355 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2359 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2360 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2361 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2362 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2365 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2368 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2371 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2375 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2377 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2380 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2382 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2383 unsigned int ticklen;
2384 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2385 unsigned int sess_len;
2386 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2388 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2389 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add))
2390 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2391 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2393 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2394 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2399 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2400 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2401 * be 0 here in that instance
2404 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2406 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Is this a suitable test for TLS1.3? */
2407 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2408 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2409 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2411 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2414 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2416 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2418 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2421 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2422 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2423 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2427 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2428 s->session = new_sess;
2432 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2433 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2435 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2437 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2438 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2439 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2441 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2442 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2443 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2446 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2447 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2452 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2453 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2454 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2456 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2459 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2460 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2461 EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2463 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2464 exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
2465 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2471 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2472 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2473 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2474 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2475 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2476 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2477 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2478 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2479 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2482 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2483 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2485 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2486 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2487 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2488 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2491 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2493 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2494 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2496 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2497 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2500 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2502 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2504 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2506 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2510 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2511 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2512 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2514 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2519 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2520 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2521 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2523 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2526 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2527 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2528 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2529 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2532 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2533 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2534 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2538 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2539 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2540 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2543 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2549 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2553 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) {
2554 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2555 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2556 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2559 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2563 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2564 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2565 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2568 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2571 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2574 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2575 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2580 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2581 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2582 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2584 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2585 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2586 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2589 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2590 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2591 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2595 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2596 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2597 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2601 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2602 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2603 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2604 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2605 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2614 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2616 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2618 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2619 /* should contain no data */
2620 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2621 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2624 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2625 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2626 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2634 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2636 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2640 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2641 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2642 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2643 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2646 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2649 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2650 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2651 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2654 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2656 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2659 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2660 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2663 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2664 size_t identitylen = 0;
2665 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2666 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2667 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2670 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2671 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2672 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2676 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2678 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2679 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2682 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2683 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2684 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2686 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2687 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2688 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2689 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2693 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2694 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2696 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2700 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2701 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2702 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2704 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2708 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2709 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2710 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2712 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2713 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2716 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2717 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2718 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2725 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2726 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2727 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2728 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2732 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2733 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2738 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2740 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2741 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2742 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2743 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2745 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2748 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2750 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2752 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2756 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2757 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2762 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2763 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2765 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2766 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2770 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2771 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2772 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2773 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2777 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2778 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2782 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2783 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2784 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2788 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2789 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2790 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2793 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2796 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2797 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2798 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2802 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2803 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2805 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2806 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen))
2811 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2812 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2816 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2817 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2822 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2824 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2826 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2827 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2828 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2830 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2834 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2838 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2840 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2843 /* send off the data */
2844 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2845 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2848 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2849 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2853 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2855 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2856 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2860 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2862 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2863 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2864 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2865 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2868 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2870 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2874 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2876 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2880 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2881 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2885 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2886 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2888 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2889 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2893 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2894 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2900 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2901 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2904 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2905 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2910 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2912 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2913 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2914 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2917 unsigned int md_len;
2918 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2919 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2920 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2921 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2924 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2925 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2928 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2930 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2932 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2933 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2934 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2938 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2939 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2940 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2941 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2945 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2946 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2947 * certificate key for key exchange
2950 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2952 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2954 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2955 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2959 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2960 /* Generate session key
2961 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2963 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
2964 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2965 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2969 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2972 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2973 if (ukm_hash == NULL
2974 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2975 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2976 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2977 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2978 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2979 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2980 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2984 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2986 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
2987 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
2988 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2992 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2994 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2997 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2998 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2999 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3003 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3004 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3005 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3006 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3007 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3011 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3012 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3013 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3017 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3018 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3019 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3022 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3023 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3028 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
3030 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3031 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3033 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3034 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3036 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3039 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3041 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3042 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3043 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3044 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3050 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3051 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3056 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3058 unsigned long alg_k;
3061 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3063 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3064 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
3067 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3068 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3070 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3071 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3073 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3074 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3076 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3077 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3079 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3080 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3082 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3083 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3084 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3091 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3092 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3093 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3094 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3095 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3096 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3101 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3103 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3106 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3107 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3111 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3112 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3113 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3114 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3121 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3122 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3123 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3126 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3127 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3128 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3129 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3137 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3138 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3139 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3140 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3143 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3146 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3147 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3149 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3150 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3151 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
3154 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3155 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3161 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3162 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3167 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3168 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3169 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3171 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3173 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3174 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, NULL) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3177 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3178 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3180 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3181 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3186 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3189 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3192 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3193 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3194 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3195 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3197 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3201 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3202 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3205 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3207 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3208 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3210 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3214 /* We need to get a client cert */
3215 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3217 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3218 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3220 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3222 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3225 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3226 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3227 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3229 } else if (i == 1) {
3231 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3232 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3236 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3237 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3240 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3241 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3242 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3243 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3245 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3246 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3247 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3248 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3254 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3257 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3261 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3263 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3266 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3269 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3270 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3271 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3274 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3275 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3282 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3284 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3287 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3291 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3292 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3294 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3295 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3297 /* we don't have a certificate */
3298 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3301 /* This is the passed certificate */
3303 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3304 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3305 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3306 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3313 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3315 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3319 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3320 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3322 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3323 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3324 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3325 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3328 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3329 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3331 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3335 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3336 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3337 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3339 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3343 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3344 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3345 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3346 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3353 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3357 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3358 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3360 size_t len, padding_len;
3361 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3363 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3364 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3366 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3367 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3368 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3372 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3376 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3381 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3383 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3384 /* should contain no data */
3385 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3386 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
3387 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3388 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3392 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3393 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3394 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3395 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3396 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3401 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3403 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3406 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3408 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3410 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3412 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
3413 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3414 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3418 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3419 &rawexts, &al, NULL)
3420 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3421 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al))
3424 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3425 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3428 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3429 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3430 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3431 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3434 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3437 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3438 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3439 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3440 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3441 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3446 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3447 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3451 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3454 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen;
3455 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3456 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3457 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3462 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3463 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3464 # error Max cipher length too short
3467 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3468 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3471 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3472 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3475 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3478 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3480 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3483 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3484 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3486 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3487 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3488 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3491 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3505 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3506 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3507 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3509 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3514 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3515 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3516 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3518 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);