2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
54 #include <openssl/rand.h>
55 #include <openssl/objects.h>
56 #include <openssl/evp.h>
57 #include <openssl/md5.h>
58 #include <openssl/dh.h>
59 #include <openssl/bn.h>
60 #include <openssl/engine.h>
62 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
64 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
65 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
66 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
67 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
71 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
77 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
79 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
80 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
81 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
82 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
89 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
95 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
97 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
100 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
101 * ciphersuite or for SRP
103 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
112 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
113 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
114 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
115 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
117 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
118 * (transition not allowed)
120 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
122 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
125 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
126 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
130 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
131 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
132 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
135 switch (st->hand_state) {
139 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
140 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
141 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
146 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
153 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
154 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
157 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
158 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
164 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
165 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
166 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
173 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
174 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
176 if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
177 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
182 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
183 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
184 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
191 /* No valid transition found */
196 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
197 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
198 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
199 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
201 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
202 * (transition not allowed)
204 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
206 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
210 * Note that after a ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
211 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
213 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
214 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
219 switch (st->hand_state) {
223 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
224 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
225 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
229 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
230 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
231 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
237 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
239 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
240 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
241 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
244 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
245 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
249 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
250 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
252 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
253 && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL
254 && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL
255 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
257 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
258 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
259 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
260 * the server is resuming.
263 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
265 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
266 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
267 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
268 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
272 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
273 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
275 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
276 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
277 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
278 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
281 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
282 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
283 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
285 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
286 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
295 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
296 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
298 if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
299 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
304 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
305 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
306 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
307 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
308 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
309 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
310 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
317 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
318 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
319 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
320 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
327 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
328 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
329 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
334 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
335 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
336 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
337 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
340 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
341 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
346 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
347 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
348 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
353 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
354 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
362 /* No valid transition found */
363 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
364 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
369 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
370 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
373 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
375 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
378 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
379 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
383 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE or TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO,
384 * because we haven't negotiated TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are
385 * handled by ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
387 switch (st->hand_state) {
389 /* Shouldn't happen */
390 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
392 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
393 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
394 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
395 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
398 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
399 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
400 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
401 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
403 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
404 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
405 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
407 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
408 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
409 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
410 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
415 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
416 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
418 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
420 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
423 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
424 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
428 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
430 switch (st->hand_state) {
432 /* Shouldn't happen */
433 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
436 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
438 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
441 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
443 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
446 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
448 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
449 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
450 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
452 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
453 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
456 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
457 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
460 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
463 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
465 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
466 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
469 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
470 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
471 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
472 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
474 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
475 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
479 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
480 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
482 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
484 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
485 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
488 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
489 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
490 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
492 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
493 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
495 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
497 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
499 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
500 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
501 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
502 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
505 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
507 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
508 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
509 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
511 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
514 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
516 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
517 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
519 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
520 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
521 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
527 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
528 * the client to the server.
530 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
532 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
534 switch (st->hand_state) {
536 /* No pre work to be done */
539 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
541 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
542 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
543 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
544 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
550 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
551 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
554 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
555 * messages unless we need to.
559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
560 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
561 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
567 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
570 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
574 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
575 * client to the server.
577 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
579 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
583 switch (st->hand_state) {
585 /* No post work to be done */
588 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
589 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
592 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
593 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
598 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
599 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
603 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
604 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
605 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
606 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
608 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
609 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
611 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
613 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
616 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
617 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
620 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
621 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
624 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
627 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
632 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
636 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
638 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
640 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
643 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
647 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
650 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
651 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
652 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
658 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
662 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
665 * Valid return values are:
669 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
670 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
672 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
674 switch (st->hand_state) {
676 /* Shouldn't happen */
679 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
681 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
683 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
684 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
687 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
688 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
689 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
693 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
694 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
697 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
698 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
699 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
702 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
703 *confunc = tls_construct_client_verify;
704 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
707 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
708 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
709 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
710 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
713 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
714 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
715 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
723 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
724 * reading. Excludes the message header.
726 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
728 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
730 switch (st->hand_state) {
732 /* Shouldn't happen */
735 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
736 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
738 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
739 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
742 return s->max_cert_list;
744 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
745 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
747 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
748 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
750 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
752 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
753 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
754 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
756 return s->max_cert_list;
758 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
759 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
761 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
762 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
764 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
766 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
767 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
769 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
770 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
772 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
773 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
778 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
780 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
782 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
784 switch (st->hand_state) {
786 /* Shouldn't happen */
787 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
789 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
790 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
792 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
793 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
796 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
798 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
799 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
801 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
802 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
804 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
805 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
807 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
808 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
810 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
811 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
813 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
814 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
816 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
817 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
819 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
820 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
825 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
828 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
830 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
832 switch (st->hand_state) {
834 /* Shouldn't happen */
837 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
838 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
841 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
842 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
843 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
844 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
845 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
846 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
847 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
848 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
851 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
852 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
857 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
862 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
866 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
868 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
869 /* Should not happen */
870 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
874 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
875 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
877 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
881 if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
883 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
884 * "ticket" without a session ID.
886 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
887 (sess->not_resumable)) {
888 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
891 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
893 p = s->s3->client_random;
896 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
897 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
899 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
902 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
911 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
915 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
916 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
917 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
918 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
919 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
920 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
921 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
922 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
925 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
926 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
927 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
928 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
929 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
930 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
931 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
932 * know that is maximum server supports.
933 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
934 * containing version 1.0.
936 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
937 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
938 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
939 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
940 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
941 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
942 * the negotiated version.
944 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
945 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
947 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
948 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
957 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
958 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
959 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
960 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
962 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
967 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
968 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
969 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
970 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
971 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
977 /* Ciphers supported */
978 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
979 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
982 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
983 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
985 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
986 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
991 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
995 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
996 if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
997 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
998 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
999 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1000 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1007 /* Add the NULL method */
1008 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1009 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1013 /* TLS extensions */
1014 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, &al)) {
1015 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1023 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1029 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1030 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1031 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1032 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1036 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1037 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1038 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1043 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1044 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1048 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1050 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1052 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1053 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1054 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1057 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1059 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1060 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1061 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1062 size_t session_id_len;
1063 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1064 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1065 unsigned int compression;
1066 unsigned int sversion;
1067 unsigned int context;
1069 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1070 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1074 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1075 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1080 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1081 if (protverr != 0) {
1082 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1083 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1087 /* load the server hello data */
1088 /* load the server random */
1089 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1090 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1097 /* Get the session-id. */
1098 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1099 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1100 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1101 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1104 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1105 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1106 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1107 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1108 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1109 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1116 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1117 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1118 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1123 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
1124 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1125 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1126 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1127 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1128 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
1129 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
1130 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
1131 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
1132 * server wants to resume.
1134 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1135 && s->tls_session_secret_cb && s->session->tlsext_tick) {
1136 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1138 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1139 * backwards compat reasons
1141 int master_key_length;
1142 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1143 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1146 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)
1147 && master_key_length > 0) {
1148 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1149 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1150 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1152 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1153 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1158 if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1159 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1160 session_id_len) == 0) {
1161 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1162 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1163 /* actually a client application bug */
1164 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1166 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1172 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1173 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1174 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1175 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1176 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1178 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1179 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1180 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1185 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1186 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1187 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1188 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1192 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1193 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1194 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1197 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1201 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1203 /* unknown cipher */
1204 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1209 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1212 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1213 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1215 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1216 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1218 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1219 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1224 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1225 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1227 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1228 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1234 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1235 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1236 * set and use it for comparison.
1238 if (s->session->cipher)
1239 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1240 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1241 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1243 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1246 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1247 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1249 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1250 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1251 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1252 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1259 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1260 if (compression != 0) {
1261 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1263 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1267 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1268 * using compression.
1270 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1271 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1275 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1276 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1278 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1281 if (compression == 0)
1283 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1284 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1285 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1288 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1291 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1292 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1293 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1294 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1297 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1301 /* TLS extensions */
1302 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1303 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1304 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1305 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1306 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1310 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1311 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1312 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al)
1313 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, &al))
1316 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1317 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1318 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1319 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1322 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1325 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1326 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1328 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1329 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1331 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1334 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1335 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1336 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1341 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1342 * we're done with this message
1345 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1346 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1347 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)
1348 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1349 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1350 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1355 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1356 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1358 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1359 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1360 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1361 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1364 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1366 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1367 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1369 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1370 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1371 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1373 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1374 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1378 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1379 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1380 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1381 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1384 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1385 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1386 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1387 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1388 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1389 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1393 certstart = certbytes;
1394 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1396 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1400 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1401 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1402 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1403 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1406 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1407 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1413 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1415 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1416 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1417 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1418 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1419 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1420 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1421 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1422 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1423 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1424 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1425 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1426 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1428 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1429 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1430 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1431 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1434 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1437 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1441 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1443 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1444 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1446 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1449 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1452 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1454 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1457 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1458 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1462 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1466 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1467 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1471 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1472 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1473 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1474 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1475 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1477 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1479 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1482 s->session->peer_type = i;
1484 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1486 s->session->peer = x;
1487 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1490 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1494 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1496 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1499 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1503 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1505 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1506 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1508 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1510 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1511 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1512 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1517 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1518 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1519 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1522 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1523 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1528 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1529 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1530 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1531 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1532 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1533 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1539 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1540 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1545 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1547 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1548 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1550 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1551 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1552 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1553 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1554 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1555 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1559 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1561 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1562 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1564 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1565 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1567 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1568 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1570 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1571 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1572 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1573 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1577 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1578 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1579 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1583 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1584 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1585 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1589 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1590 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1595 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1597 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1598 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1599 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1602 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1604 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1605 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1606 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1607 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1608 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1612 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1615 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1616 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1617 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1621 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1622 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1623 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1625 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1626 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1627 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1628 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1629 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1633 if (BN_is_zero(p) || BN_is_zero(g) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1634 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1635 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1639 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1640 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1646 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1647 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1648 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1653 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1654 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1655 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1659 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1660 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1661 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1665 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
1668 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1669 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1671 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1672 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1673 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1682 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1687 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1692 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1694 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1696 const unsigned char *ecparams;
1698 unsigned int curve_flags;
1699 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1702 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1703 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1704 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1706 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1707 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1708 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1712 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1713 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1715 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1716 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1717 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1721 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
1723 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1724 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1725 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
1726 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1730 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
1731 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
1733 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
1734 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1735 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1739 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
1741 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1742 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
1744 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
1745 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
1746 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
1747 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1749 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1752 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1756 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
1757 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1758 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1762 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
1763 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1764 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
1765 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1771 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1772 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1775 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
1776 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1777 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
1778 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1779 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1783 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1784 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1789 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1793 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1794 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
1796 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1798 save_param_start = *pkt;
1800 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1801 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
1802 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
1805 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
1806 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
1810 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1811 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1812 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1813 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1815 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1816 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1818 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1819 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1822 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1827 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1831 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1835 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1836 * equals the length of the parameters.
1838 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
1839 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
1840 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
1841 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1842 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1846 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1847 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1849 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) {
1850 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1851 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1854 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey);
1856 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1858 } else if (rv == 0) {
1859 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1863 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1865 } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
1866 md = EVP_md5_sha1();
1871 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
1872 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1873 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1874 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1877 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1879 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1880 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1885 * Check signature length
1887 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
1888 /* wrong packet length */
1889 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1890 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1891 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1895 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1896 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1897 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1898 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1902 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1903 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1904 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1905 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1906 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1907 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
1908 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
1909 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1910 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1911 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1914 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1915 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
1916 (unsigned int)PACKET_remaining(&signature),
1919 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1920 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1921 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1924 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1926 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
1927 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1928 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
1929 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1930 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
1931 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1932 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1933 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1935 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1939 /* still data left over */
1940 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1941 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1942 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
1947 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1950 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1951 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1952 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1955 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1957 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1958 unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
1959 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
1960 const unsigned char *data;
1961 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
1962 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
1964 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
1965 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1969 /* get the certificate types */
1970 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
1971 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
1972 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1976 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
1977 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
1978 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
1979 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
1980 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
1981 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
1982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1985 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
1986 s->cert->ctype_num = ctype_num;
1987 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
1989 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
1990 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
1992 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1993 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
1994 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) {
1995 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1997 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2001 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2002 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2003 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2004 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2006 if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) {
2007 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2009 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2012 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2013 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2014 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2018 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2021 /* get the CA RDNs */
2022 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
2023 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
2024 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2029 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2030 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
2031 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2032 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2034 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2038 namestart = namebytes;
2040 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2041 name_len)) == NULL) {
2042 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2043 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2047 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2048 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2050 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2053 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2060 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2061 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2062 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2063 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2064 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2067 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2070 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2073 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2077 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2079 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2082 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2085 unsigned int ticklen;
2086 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
2087 unsigned int sess_len;
2089 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2090 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2091 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) {
2092 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2097 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
2099 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2101 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2102 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2103 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2105 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2108 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2110 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2112 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2115 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2116 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2117 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2121 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2122 s->session = new_sess;
2125 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
2126 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
2128 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2129 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
2130 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2133 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) {
2134 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2139 s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2140 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
2142 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2143 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2144 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2145 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2146 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2147 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2148 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2149 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2150 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2153 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2154 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2156 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen,
2157 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2158 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2159 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2162 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2163 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2165 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2167 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2168 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2171 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2177 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2178 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2179 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2180 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2183 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2184 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2185 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2186 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2189 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2190 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
2191 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2192 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2195 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) {
2196 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2197 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2200 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
2201 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2203 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2204 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2205 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2209 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2210 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2211 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2214 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2217 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2220 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2221 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2226 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
2227 * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
2228 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2230 if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) {
2232 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2234 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2235 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2236 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2240 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2241 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2242 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2247 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2248 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2249 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2250 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2259 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2261 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2263 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2264 /* should contain no data */
2265 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2266 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2269 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2270 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2271 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2272 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2279 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2281 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2284 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2285 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2286 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2287 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2288 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2291 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2294 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2295 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2296 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2299 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2304 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2305 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2308 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2309 size_t identitylen = 0;
2310 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2311 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2312 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2315 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2316 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2317 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2321 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2323 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2324 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2327 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2328 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2329 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2331 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2332 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2333 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2334 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2338 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2339 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2340 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2341 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2345 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2346 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2347 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2348 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2349 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2353 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2354 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2355 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2357 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2358 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2361 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2362 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2363 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2370 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2371 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2372 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2373 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2377 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2378 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2383 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2385 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2386 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2387 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2388 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2390 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2393 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2395 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2401 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2402 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2403 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2407 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2408 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2410 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2411 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2415 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2416 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2417 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2418 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2422 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2423 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2427 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2428 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2429 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2430 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2433 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2434 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2435 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2438 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2441 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2443 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2447 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2448 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2453 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2454 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2458 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2459 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2463 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2464 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2469 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2471 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2473 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2474 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2475 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2477 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2481 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2485 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2487 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2490 /* send off the data */
2491 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2492 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2495 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2496 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2500 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2502 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2503 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2507 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2509 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2510 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2511 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2512 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2515 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2517 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2521 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2523 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2527 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2532 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2533 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2535 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2536 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2540 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2547 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2548 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2551 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2552 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2557 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2560 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2561 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2564 unsigned int md_len;
2565 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2566 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2567 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2568 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2571 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2572 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2575 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2577 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2579 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2580 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2581 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2585 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2586 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2587 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2588 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2592 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2593 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2594 * certificate key for key exchange
2597 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2599 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2601 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2606 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2607 /* Generate session key
2608 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2610 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
2611 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2612 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2616 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2619 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2620 if (ukm_hash == NULL
2621 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2622 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2623 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2624 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2625 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2626 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2627 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2628 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2631 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2633 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
2634 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
2635 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2639 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2641 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2644 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2645 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2646 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2650 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
2651 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
2652 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
2653 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2654 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2658 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2659 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2660 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2664 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2665 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2666 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2669 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2670 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2675 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2677 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2678 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
2680 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
2681 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
2683 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2686 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
2688 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2689 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2690 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2691 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2697 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2698 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2703 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2705 unsigned long alg_k;
2708 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2710 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
2711 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2714 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2715 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2717 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2718 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2720 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2721 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2723 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2724 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2726 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2727 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2729 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
2730 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2731 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2738 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2739 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
2740 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2742 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2743 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2748 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
2750 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2753 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
2754 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
2756 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2758 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2759 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
2761 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2768 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
2769 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2770 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2773 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
2774 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2775 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2776 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
2784 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2785 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2786 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2787 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2790 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2793 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2794 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2796 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2797 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2798 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
2801 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2802 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2808 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2809 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2813 int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2816 const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
2817 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
2821 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
2823 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2825 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2828 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2830 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2831 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2832 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2836 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)&& !tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) {
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2841 fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2843 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pkey));
2845 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2848 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2849 || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
2850 || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2851 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2852 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
2853 s->session->master_key))
2854 || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, sig, &u, pkey)) {
2855 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2858 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2860 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2861 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2862 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2863 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
2864 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, u);
2868 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, u)) {
2869 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2873 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
2874 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
2878 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2882 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2883 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2888 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
2889 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
2890 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
2892 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2894 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
2896 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
2897 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
2900 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
2901 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
2903 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
2904 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
2909 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2912 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2915 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2916 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
2917 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
2918 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2920 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2924 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2925 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2928 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2930 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2931 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2933 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
2937 /* We need to get a client cert */
2938 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2940 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2941 * return(-1); We then get retied later
2943 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
2945 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2948 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2949 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
2950 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
2952 } else if (i == 1) {
2954 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2955 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
2959 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2960 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2963 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2964 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
2965 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
2966 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2968 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
2969 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2970 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2971 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2977 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2980 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
2984 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2986 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
2987 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
2989 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2990 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2997 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
2999 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3002 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3006 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3007 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3009 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3010 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3012 /* we don't have a certificate */
3013 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3016 /* This is the passed certificate */
3018 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3019 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3020 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3021 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3023 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3028 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3030 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3034 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3035 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3037 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3038 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3039 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3040 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3043 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3044 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3046 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3050 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3051 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3052 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3054 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3058 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3059 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3060 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3068 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3072 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3073 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3075 size_t len, padding_len;
3076 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3078 len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
3079 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3081 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->next_proto_negotiated, len)
3082 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3083 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3087 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3091 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3096 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3098 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3100 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3102 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
3103 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3109 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we are processing Encrypted Extensions and
3110 * Certificate extensions as part of this one message. Later we need to
3111 * split out the Certificate extensions into the Certificate message
3113 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3114 EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
3115 | EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts, &al)
3116 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
3117 EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
3118 | EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
3122 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3123 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3126 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3127 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3128 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3129 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3132 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3135 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3136 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3137 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3138 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3139 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3144 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3145 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3149 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3152 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen;
3153 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3154 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3155 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3160 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3161 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3162 # error Max cipher length too short
3165 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3166 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3169 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3170 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3173 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3176 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3178 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3181 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3182 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3184 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3185 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3186 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3189 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3190 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3203 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3204 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3205 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3207 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3212 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3213 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3214 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3216 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3217 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);