2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
54 #include <openssl/rand.h>
55 #include <openssl/objects.h>
56 #include <openssl/evp.h>
57 #include <openssl/md5.h>
58 #include <openssl/dh.h>
59 #include <openssl/bn.h>
60 #include <openssl/engine.h>
62 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
64 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
65 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
66 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
67 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
71 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
77 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
79 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
80 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
81 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
82 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
89 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
95 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
97 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
100 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
101 * ciphersuite or for SRP
103 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
112 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
113 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
114 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
115 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
117 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
118 * (transition not allowed)
120 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
122 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
125 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
126 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
130 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
131 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
132 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
135 switch (st->hand_state) {
139 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
140 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
141 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
146 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
153 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
154 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
157 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
158 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
164 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
165 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
166 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
172 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
173 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
180 /* No valid transition found */
185 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
186 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
187 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
188 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
190 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
191 * (transition not allowed)
193 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
195 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
199 * Note that after a ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
200 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
202 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
203 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
208 switch (st->hand_state) {
212 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
213 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
214 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
218 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
219 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
220 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
226 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
228 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
229 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
230 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
233 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
234 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
238 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
239 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
241 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
242 && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL
243 && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL
244 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
246 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
247 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
248 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
249 * the server is resuming.
252 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
254 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
255 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
256 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
257 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
261 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
262 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
264 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
265 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
266 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
267 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
270 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
271 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
272 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
274 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
275 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
284 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
285 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
287 if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
288 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
293 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
294 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
295 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
296 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
297 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
298 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
299 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
306 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
307 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
308 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
309 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
316 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
317 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
318 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
323 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
324 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
325 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
326 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
329 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
330 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
335 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
336 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
337 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
342 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
343 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
344 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
351 /* No valid transition found */
352 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
353 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
358 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
359 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
362 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
364 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
367 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
368 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
372 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE or TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO,
373 * because we haven't negotiated TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are
374 * handled by ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
376 switch (st->hand_state) {
378 /* Shouldn't happen */
379 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
381 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
382 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
383 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
384 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
387 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
388 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
389 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
390 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
392 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
393 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
394 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
396 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
397 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
398 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
399 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
404 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
405 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
407 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
409 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
412 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
413 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
417 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
419 switch (st->hand_state) {
421 /* Shouldn't happen */
422 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
425 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
427 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
428 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
430 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
432 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
435 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
437 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
438 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
441 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
442 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
443 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
445 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
446 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
449 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
450 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
452 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
454 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
455 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
458 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
459 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
460 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
461 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
463 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
464 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
466 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
468 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
469 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
471 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
473 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
474 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
475 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
477 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
478 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
479 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
481 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
482 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
484 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
488 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
489 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
490 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
491 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
494 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
496 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
497 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
498 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
500 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
503 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
505 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
506 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
508 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
509 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
510 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
516 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
517 * the client to the server.
519 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
521 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
523 switch (st->hand_state) {
525 /* No pre work to be done */
528 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
530 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
531 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
532 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
533 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
539 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
540 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
543 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
544 * messages unless we need to.
548 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
549 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
550 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
556 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
559 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
563 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
564 * client to the server.
566 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
568 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
572 switch (st->hand_state) {
574 /* No post work to be done */
577 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
578 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
581 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
582 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
587 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
588 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
592 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
593 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
594 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
595 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
597 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
598 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
600 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
602 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
605 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
606 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
609 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
610 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
613 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
616 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
621 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
625 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
627 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
629 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
632 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
636 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
639 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
640 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
641 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
647 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
651 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
654 * Valid return values are:
658 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
659 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
661 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
663 switch (st->hand_state) {
665 /* Shouldn't happen */
668 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
670 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
672 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
673 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
676 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
677 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
678 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
682 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
683 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
686 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
687 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
688 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
691 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
692 *confunc = tls_construct_client_verify;
693 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
696 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
697 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
698 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
699 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
702 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
703 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
704 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
712 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
713 * reading. Excludes the message header.
715 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
717 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
719 switch (st->hand_state) {
721 /* Shouldn't happen */
724 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
725 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
727 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
728 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
731 return s->max_cert_list;
733 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
734 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
736 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
737 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
739 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
741 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
742 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
743 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
745 return s->max_cert_list;
747 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
748 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
750 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
751 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
753 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
755 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
756 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
758 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
759 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
761 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
762 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
767 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
769 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
771 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
773 switch (st->hand_state) {
775 /* Shouldn't happen */
776 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
778 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
779 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
781 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
782 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
785 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
787 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
788 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
790 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
791 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
793 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
794 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
796 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
797 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
799 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
800 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
802 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
803 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
805 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
806 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
808 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
809 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
814 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
817 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
819 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
821 switch (st->hand_state) {
823 /* Shouldn't happen */
826 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
827 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
829 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
830 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
831 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
832 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
833 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
834 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
835 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
836 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
837 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
840 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
841 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
846 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
851 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
852 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
855 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
857 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
858 /* Should not happen */
859 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
863 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
864 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
866 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
870 if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
872 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
873 * "ticket" without a session ID.
875 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
876 (sess->not_resumable)) {
877 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
880 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
882 p = s->s3->client_random;
885 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
886 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
888 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
891 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
900 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
904 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
905 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
906 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
907 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
908 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
909 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
910 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
911 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
914 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
915 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
916 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
917 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
918 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
919 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
920 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
921 * know that is maximum server supports.
922 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
923 * containing version 1.0.
925 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
926 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
927 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
928 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
929 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
930 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
931 * the negotiated version.
933 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
934 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
936 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
937 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
938 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
946 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
947 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
948 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
949 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
951 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
952 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
956 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
957 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
958 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
959 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
960 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
961 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
966 /* Ciphers supported */
967 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
968 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
971 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
972 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
974 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
975 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
980 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
984 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
985 if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
986 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
987 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
988 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
989 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
996 /* Add the NULL method */
997 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1002 /* TLS extensions */
1003 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1004 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1012 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1018 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1019 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1020 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1025 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1026 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1027 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1032 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1033 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1037 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1039 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1041 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1042 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1043 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1046 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1048 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1049 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1050 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1051 size_t session_id_len;
1052 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1053 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1054 unsigned int compression;
1055 unsigned int sversion;
1056 unsigned int context;
1058 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1059 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1063 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1064 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1069 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1070 if (protverr != 0) {
1071 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1072 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1076 /* load the server hello data */
1077 /* load the server random */
1078 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1079 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1086 /* Get the session-id. */
1087 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1088 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1089 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1090 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1093 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1094 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1095 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1096 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1097 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1098 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1102 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1106 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1107 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1108 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1113 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
1114 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1115 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1116 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1117 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1118 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
1119 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
1120 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
1121 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
1122 * server wants to resume.
1124 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1125 && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->tlsext_tick) {
1126 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1128 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1129 * backwards compat reasons
1131 int master_key_length;
1132 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1133 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1136 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)
1137 && master_key_length > 0) {
1138 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1139 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1140 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1143 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1148 if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1149 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1150 session_id_len) == 0) {
1151 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1152 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1153 /* actually a client application bug */
1154 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1156 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1162 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1163 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1164 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1165 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1166 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1168 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1169 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1170 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1175 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1176 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1177 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1178 if (session_id_len > 0)
1179 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1183 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1184 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1185 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1187 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1188 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1192 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1194 /* unknown cipher */
1195 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1196 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1200 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1203 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1204 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1206 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1207 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1209 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1210 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1211 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1215 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1216 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1218 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1219 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1225 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1226 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1227 * set and use it for comparison.
1229 if (s->session->cipher)
1230 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1231 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1232 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1233 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1234 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1237 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1238 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1240 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1241 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1243 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1250 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1251 if (compression != 0) {
1252 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1253 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1254 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1258 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1259 * using compression.
1261 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1266 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1267 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1268 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1269 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1272 if (compression == 0)
1274 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1275 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1279 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1282 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1283 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1284 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1285 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1288 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1292 /* TLS extensions */
1293 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1294 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1295 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1296 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1301 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1302 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1303 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al)
1304 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1307 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1308 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1309 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1310 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1313 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1316 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1317 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1319 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1320 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1322 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1325 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1326 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1327 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1332 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1333 * we're done with this message
1336 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1337 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1338 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)
1339 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1340 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1341 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1342 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1346 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1347 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1349 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1350 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1351 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1352 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1355 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1357 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1358 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1360 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1361 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1362 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1364 unsigned int context = 0;
1366 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1367 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1371 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1373 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1374 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1375 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1376 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1379 for (chain = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chain++) {
1380 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1381 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1382 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1383 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1384 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1388 certstart = certbytes;
1389 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1391 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1392 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1395 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1396 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1397 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1398 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1402 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1403 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1406 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1407 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1408 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1411 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1413 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1414 rawexts, x, chain, &al))
1418 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1419 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1425 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1427 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1428 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1429 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1430 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1431 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1432 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1433 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1434 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1435 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1436 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1437 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1438 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1440 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1441 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1442 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1443 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1446 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1448 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1449 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1453 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1455 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1456 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1458 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1461 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1464 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1466 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1469 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1470 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1474 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1479 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1483 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1484 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1485 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1486 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1487 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1489 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1490 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1491 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1494 s->session->peer_type = i;
1496 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1498 s->session->peer = x;
1499 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1502 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1506 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1508 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1511 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1515 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1517 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1518 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1520 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1522 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1523 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1529 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1530 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1531 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1534 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1535 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1536 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1540 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1541 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1542 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1543 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1544 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1545 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1551 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1552 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1557 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1560 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1562 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1563 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1564 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1565 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1566 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1567 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1571 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1573 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1574 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1576 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1577 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1579 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1580 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1582 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1583 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1584 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1585 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1589 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1590 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1591 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1595 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1596 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1597 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1601 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1602 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1607 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1609 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1610 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1611 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1614 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1616 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1617 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1618 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1619 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1620 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1624 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1627 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1628 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1629 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1633 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1634 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1635 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1637 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1638 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1639 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1640 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1645 if (BN_is_zero(p) || BN_is_zero(g) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1646 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1647 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1651 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1652 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1658 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1659 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1660 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1665 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1666 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1667 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1671 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1672 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1673 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1677 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
1680 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1681 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1683 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1684 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1685 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1694 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1699 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1704 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1708 const unsigned char *ecparams;
1710 unsigned int curve_flags;
1711 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1714 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1715 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1716 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1718 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1719 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1720 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1724 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1725 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1727 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1728 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1729 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1733 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
1735 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1736 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1737 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
1738 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1742 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
1743 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
1745 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
1746 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1747 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1751 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
1753 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1754 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
1756 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
1757 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
1758 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
1759 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1761 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1764 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1768 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
1769 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1770 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1774 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
1775 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1776 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
1777 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1778 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1783 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1784 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1787 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
1788 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1789 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
1790 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1791 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1795 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1796 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1801 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1805 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1806 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
1808 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1810 save_param_start = *pkt;
1812 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1813 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
1814 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
1817 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
1818 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
1822 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1823 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1824 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1825 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1827 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1828 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1830 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1831 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1834 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1839 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1843 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1847 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1848 * equals the length of the parameters.
1850 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
1851 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
1852 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
1853 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1854 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1858 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1859 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1861 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) {
1862 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1863 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1866 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey);
1868 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1870 } else if (rv == 0) {
1871 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1875 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1877 } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
1878 md = EVP_md5_sha1();
1883 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
1884 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1885 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1886 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1889 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1891 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1892 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1897 * Check signature length
1899 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
1900 /* wrong packet length */
1901 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1902 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1903 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1907 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1908 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1909 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1910 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1914 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1915 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1916 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1917 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1918 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1919 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
1920 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
1921 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1922 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1923 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1926 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1927 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
1928 (unsigned int)PACKET_remaining(&signature),
1931 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1932 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1933 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1936 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1938 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
1939 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1940 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
1941 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1942 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
1943 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1944 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1945 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1947 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1951 /* still data left over */
1952 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1953 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1954 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
1959 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1962 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1963 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1964 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1967 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1969 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1970 unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
1971 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
1972 const unsigned char *data;
1973 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
1974 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
1976 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
1977 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1981 /* get the certificate types */
1982 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
1983 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
1984 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1985 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1988 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
1989 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
1990 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
1991 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
1992 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
1993 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
1994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1997 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
1998 s->cert->ctype_num = ctype_num;
1999 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
2001 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
2002 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
2004 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2005 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
2006 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) {
2007 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2009 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2013 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2014 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2015 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2016 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2018 if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) {
2019 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2020 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2021 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2024 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2025 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2030 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2033 /* get the CA RDNs */
2034 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
2035 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
2036 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2037 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2041 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2042 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
2043 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2044 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2045 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2046 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2050 namestart = namebytes;
2052 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2053 name_len)) == NULL) {
2054 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2055 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2059 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2060 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2061 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2062 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2065 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2072 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2073 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2074 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2075 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2076 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2079 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2082 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2085 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2089 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2091 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2094 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2097 unsigned int ticklen;
2098 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
2099 unsigned int sess_len;
2101 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2102 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2103 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) {
2104 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2105 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2109 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
2111 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2113 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2114 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2115 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2117 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2120 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2122 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2124 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2127 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2128 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2129 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2133 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2134 s->session = new_sess;
2137 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
2138 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
2140 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2141 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
2142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2145 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) {
2146 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2147 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2151 s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2152 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
2154 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2155 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2156 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2157 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2158 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2159 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2160 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2161 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2162 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2165 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2166 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2168 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen,
2169 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2170 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2171 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2174 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2175 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2177 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2179 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2180 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2184 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2185 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2186 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2188 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2193 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2194 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2195 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2196 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2197 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2200 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2201 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2202 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2203 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2206 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2207 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
2208 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2209 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2212 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) {
2213 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2214 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2217 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
2223 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2227 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) {
2228 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2229 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2230 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2233 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2237 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2238 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2239 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2242 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2245 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2248 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2249 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2254 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
2255 * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
2256 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2258 if (s->tlsext_status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2259 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) {
2261 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2263 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2264 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2265 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2269 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2270 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2271 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2275 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2276 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2277 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2278 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2279 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2288 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2290 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2292 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2293 /* should contain no data */
2294 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2295 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2298 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2299 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2300 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2301 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2308 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2310 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2313 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2314 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2315 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2316 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2317 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2320 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2323 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2324 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2325 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2328 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2333 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2334 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2337 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2338 size_t identitylen = 0;
2339 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2340 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2341 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2344 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2345 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2346 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2350 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2352 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2353 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2356 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2357 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2358 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2360 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2361 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2362 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2363 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2367 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2368 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2369 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2370 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2374 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2375 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2376 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2377 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2378 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2382 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2383 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2384 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2386 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2387 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2390 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2391 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2392 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2399 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2400 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2401 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2402 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2406 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2407 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2412 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2415 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2416 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2417 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2419 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2422 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2424 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2426 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2430 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2431 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2436 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2437 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2439 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2440 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2444 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2445 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2446 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2447 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2451 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2452 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2453 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2456 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2457 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2458 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2459 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2462 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2463 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2464 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2467 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2470 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2472 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2476 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2477 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2478 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2482 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2483 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2487 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2488 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2492 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2493 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2498 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2500 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2502 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2503 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2504 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2506 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2510 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2514 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2516 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2519 /* send off the data */
2520 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2521 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2524 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2525 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2529 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2532 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2536 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2539 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2540 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2541 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2544 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2550 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2552 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2556 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2557 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2561 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2562 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2564 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2565 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2569 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2570 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2576 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2577 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2580 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2581 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2586 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2588 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2589 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2590 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2593 unsigned int md_len;
2594 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2595 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2596 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2597 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2600 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2601 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2604 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2606 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2608 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2609 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2610 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2614 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2615 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2616 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2617 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2621 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2622 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2623 * certificate key for key exchange
2626 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2628 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2630 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2631 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2635 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2636 /* Generate session key
2637 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2639 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
2640 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2641 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2645 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2648 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2649 if (ukm_hash == NULL
2650 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2651 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2652 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2653 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2654 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2655 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2656 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2657 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2660 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2662 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
2663 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
2664 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2665 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2668 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2670 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2673 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2674 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2675 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2679 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
2680 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
2681 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
2682 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2683 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2687 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2688 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2689 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2693 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2694 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2695 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2699 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2704 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2707 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
2709 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
2710 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2715 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
2717 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2718 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2719 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2720 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2726 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2727 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2732 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2734 unsigned long alg_k;
2737 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2739 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
2740 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2743 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2744 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2746 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2747 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2749 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2750 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2752 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2753 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2755 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2756 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2758 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
2759 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2767 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2768 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
2769 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2770 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2771 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2772 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2777 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
2779 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2782 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
2783 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
2785 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2787 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2788 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
2789 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
2790 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2797 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
2798 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2799 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2802 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
2803 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2804 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2805 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
2813 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2814 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2815 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2816 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2819 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2822 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2823 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2825 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2826 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2827 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
2830 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2831 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2837 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2838 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2842 int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2845 const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
2846 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
2850 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
2852 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2854 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2857 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2859 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2860 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2861 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2865 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)&& !tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) {
2866 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2870 fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2872 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pkey));
2874 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2877 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2878 || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
2879 || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2880 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2881 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
2882 s->session->master_key))
2883 || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, sig, &u, pkey)) {
2884 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2887 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2889 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2890 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2891 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2892 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
2893 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, u);
2897 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, u)) {
2898 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2902 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
2903 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
2907 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2911 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2912 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2917 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
2918 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
2919 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
2921 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2923 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
2925 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
2926 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
2929 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
2930 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
2932 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
2933 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
2938 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2941 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2944 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2945 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
2946 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
2947 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2949 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2953 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2954 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2957 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2959 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2960 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2962 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
2966 /* We need to get a client cert */
2967 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2969 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2970 * return(-1); We then get retied later
2972 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
2974 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2977 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2978 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
2979 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
2981 } else if (i == 1) {
2983 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2984 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
2988 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2989 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2992 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2993 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
2994 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
2995 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2997 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
2998 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2999 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3000 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3006 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3009 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3013 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3015 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3018 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3021 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3022 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3023 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3027 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3034 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3036 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3043 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3044 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3046 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3047 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3049 /* we don't have a certificate */
3050 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3053 /* This is the passed certificate */
3055 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3056 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3057 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3058 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3065 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3066 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3067 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3071 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3072 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3074 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3075 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3077 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3080 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3081 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3083 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3087 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3088 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3089 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3090 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3091 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3095 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3096 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3097 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3105 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3109 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3110 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3112 size_t len, padding_len;
3113 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3115 len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
3116 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3118 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->next_proto_negotiated, len)
3119 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3120 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3124 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3128 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3133 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3135 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3137 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3139 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
3140 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3141 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3145 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3147 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3148 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al))
3151 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3152 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3155 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3156 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3157 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3158 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3161 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3165 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3166 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3167 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3168 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3173 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3174 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3178 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3181 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen;
3182 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3183 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3184 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3189 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3190 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3191 # error Max cipher length too short
3194 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3195 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3198 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3199 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3202 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3205 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3207 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3210 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3211 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3213 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3214 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3215 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3218 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3219 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3232 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3233 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3234 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3236 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3237 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3241 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3242 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3243 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3245 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);