2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
16 #include "statem_locl.h"
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/objects.h>
20 #include <openssl/evp.h>
21 #include <openssl/md5.h>
22 #include <openssl/dh.h>
23 #include <openssl/bn.h>
24 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 #include <internal/cryptlib.h>
27 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
28 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
30 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
31 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
32 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
36 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
42 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
44 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
45 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
46 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
47 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
54 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
60 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
62 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
65 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
66 * ciphersuite or for SRP
68 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
77 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
78 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
79 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
80 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
82 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
83 * (transition not allowed)
85 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
87 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
90 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
91 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
92 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
95 switch (st->hand_state) {
99 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
101 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
102 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
104 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
105 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
110 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
111 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
112 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
117 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
119 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
120 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
124 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
125 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
128 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
129 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
135 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
136 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
137 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
143 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
144 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
149 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
150 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
151 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
157 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
158 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
161 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
165 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
166 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
167 # error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
169 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
170 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
172 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
173 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
174 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
175 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
177 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
178 /* SSLfatal() already called */
181 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
188 /* No valid transition found */
193 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
194 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
195 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
196 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
198 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
199 * (transition not allowed)
201 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
203 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
207 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
208 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
210 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
211 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
216 switch (st->hand_state) {
220 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
221 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
222 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
226 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
227 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
228 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
234 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
236 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
237 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
240 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
241 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
246 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
248 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
249 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
253 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
254 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
258 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
259 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
261 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
262 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
263 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
264 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
266 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
267 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
268 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
269 * the server is resuming.
272 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
274 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
275 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
276 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
277 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
281 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
282 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
284 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
285 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
286 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
287 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
290 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
291 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
292 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
294 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
295 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
304 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
305 * |ext.status_expected| is set
307 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
308 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
313 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
314 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
315 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
316 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
317 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
318 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
319 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
326 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
327 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
328 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
329 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
336 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
337 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
338 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
343 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
344 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
345 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
346 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
349 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
350 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
355 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
356 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
357 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
362 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
363 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
364 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
370 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
371 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
378 /* No valid transition found */
379 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
383 * CCS messages don't have a message sequence number so this is probably
384 * because of an out-of-order CCS. We'll just drop it.
387 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
388 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
389 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
390 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
393 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
394 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION,
395 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
400 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
401 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
404 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
406 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
409 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
410 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
411 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
413 switch (st->hand_state) {
415 /* Shouldn't happen */
416 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
417 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
418 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
419 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
421 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
422 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
423 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
424 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
426 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
427 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
428 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
429 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
430 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
432 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
433 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
434 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
435 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
436 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
437 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
438 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
440 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
441 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
442 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
444 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
445 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
446 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
447 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
451 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
452 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
453 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
454 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
455 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
458 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
459 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
460 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
463 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
464 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
465 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
467 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
468 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
469 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
470 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
474 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
475 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
476 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
478 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
481 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
482 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
483 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
486 /* Try to read from the server instead */
487 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
492 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
493 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
495 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
497 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
500 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
501 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
505 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
507 switch (st->hand_state) {
509 /* Shouldn't happen */
510 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
511 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION,
512 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
513 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
516 if (!s->renegotiate) {
518 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
519 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
521 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
526 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
527 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
529 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
530 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
532 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
533 * actually selected a version yet.
535 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
536 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
538 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
539 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
542 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
545 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
547 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
549 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
550 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
551 * because we did early data.
553 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
554 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
555 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
557 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
558 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
560 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
561 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
563 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
564 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
565 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
567 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
568 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
569 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
572 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
575 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
576 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
578 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
580 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
581 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
584 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
585 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
586 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
587 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
589 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
590 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
592 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
594 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
595 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
597 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
599 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
600 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
601 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
603 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
604 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
605 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
606 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
607 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
609 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
610 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
612 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
613 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
615 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
618 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
620 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
621 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
622 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
623 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
626 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
628 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
629 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
631 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
634 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
636 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
637 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
639 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
640 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
643 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
645 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
648 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
649 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
650 /* SSLfatal() already called */
651 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
653 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
654 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
656 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
657 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
662 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
663 * the client to the server.
665 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
667 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
669 switch (st->hand_state) {
671 /* No pre work to be done */
674 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
676 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
677 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
678 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
679 /* SSLfatal() already called */
685 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
686 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
689 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
690 * messages unless we need to.
694 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
695 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
696 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
697 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
703 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
705 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
706 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
707 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
709 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
710 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
711 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
714 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
715 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
718 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
719 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
722 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
726 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
727 * client to the server.
729 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
731 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
735 switch (st->hand_state) {
737 /* No post work to be done */
740 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
741 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
742 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
744 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
745 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
746 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
748 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
749 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
750 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
751 /* SSLfatal() already called */
755 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
756 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
760 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
761 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
766 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
768 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
769 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
771 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
772 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
775 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
776 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
777 /* SSLfatal() already called */
782 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
783 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
785 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
786 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
788 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
789 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
790 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
792 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
793 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
797 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
798 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
799 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
801 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
802 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
804 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
806 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
807 /* SSLfatal() already called */
811 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
812 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
813 /* SSLfatal() already called */
817 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
818 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
821 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
824 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
829 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
833 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
834 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
835 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
837 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
840 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
844 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
847 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
848 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
849 /* SSLfatal() already called */
852 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
853 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
854 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
855 /* SSLfatal() already called */
862 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
863 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
865 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
866 /* SSLfatal() already called */
872 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
876 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
879 * Valid return values are:
883 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
884 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
886 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
888 switch (st->hand_state) {
890 /* Shouldn't happen */
891 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
892 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
893 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
896 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
898 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
900 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
901 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
904 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
905 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
906 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
909 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
910 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
911 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
914 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
920 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
921 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
924 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
925 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
926 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
929 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
930 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
931 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
934 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
935 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
936 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
937 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
940 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
941 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
942 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
945 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
946 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
947 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
955 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
956 * reading. Excludes the message header.
958 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
960 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
962 switch (st->hand_state) {
964 /* Shouldn't happen */
967 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
968 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
970 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
971 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
974 return s->max_cert_list;
976 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
977 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
979 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
980 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
982 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
983 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
985 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
987 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
988 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
989 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
991 return s->max_cert_list;
993 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
994 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
996 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
997 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
999 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
1001 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1002 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1004 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1005 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
1007 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1008 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
1010 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1011 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1016 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
1018 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1020 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1022 switch (st->hand_state) {
1024 /* Shouldn't happen */
1025 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1026 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1027 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1028 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1030 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1031 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
1033 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1034 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
1036 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1037 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
1039 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1040 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1042 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1043 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
1045 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1046 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1048 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1049 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1051 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1052 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1054 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1055 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1057 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1058 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1060 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1061 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1063 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1064 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1066 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1067 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1069 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1070 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1075 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1078 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1080 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1082 switch (st->hand_state) {
1084 /* Shouldn't happen */
1085 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1086 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1087 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1090 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1091 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1095 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1100 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1103 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1104 unsigned char *session_id;
1106 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1107 /* Should not happen */
1108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1109 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1113 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1114 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1115 if (protverr != 0) {
1116 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1122 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version, NULL)
1123 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1124 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1125 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1126 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1130 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1132 p = s->s3->client_random;
1135 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1136 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1138 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1141 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1148 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1151 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
1152 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1153 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1154 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1159 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1160 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1161 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1162 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1163 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1164 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1165 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1166 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1169 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1170 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1171 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1172 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1173 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1174 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1175 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1176 * know that is maximum server supports.
1177 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1178 * containing version 1.0.
1180 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1181 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1182 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1183 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1184 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1185 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1186 * the negotiated version.
1188 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1189 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1191 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1192 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1193 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1194 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1199 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1200 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1201 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1202 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1203 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1204 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1205 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1206 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1207 && RAND_bytes(s->tmp_session_id, sess_id_len) <= 0) {
1208 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1209 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1210 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1217 assert(s->session->session_id_length <= sizeof(s->session->session_id));
1218 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1219 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1220 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1221 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1224 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1225 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1227 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1228 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1229 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1234 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1235 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1236 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1237 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1238 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1239 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1244 /* Ciphers supported */
1245 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1246 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1247 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1251 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
1252 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1255 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1256 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1257 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1262 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1263 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1264 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1267 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1268 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1269 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1270 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1271 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1272 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1273 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1274 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1275 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1276 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1277 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1283 /* Add the NULL method */
1284 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1285 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1286 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1290 /* TLS extensions */
1291 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1292 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1299 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1304 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1305 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1306 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1307 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1308 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1311 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1312 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1313 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1314 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1315 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1318 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1319 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1320 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1321 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1323 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1325 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1328 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1330 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1331 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1334 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1336 /* unknown cipher */
1337 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1338 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1342 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1343 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1345 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1346 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1347 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1351 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1352 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1354 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1355 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1356 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1360 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1361 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1362 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1364 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1369 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1370 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1371 * set and use it for comparison.
1373 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1374 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1375 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1376 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1378 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1379 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1381 if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
1382 != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1383 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1384 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1385 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1390 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1393 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1394 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1398 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1403 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1405 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1406 size_t session_id_len;
1407 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1409 unsigned int compression;
1410 unsigned int sversion;
1411 unsigned int context;
1413 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1414 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1418 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1420 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1424 /* load the server random */
1425 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1426 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1427 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1428 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1429 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1431 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1432 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1433 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1437 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1438 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1439 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1444 /* Get the session-id. */
1445 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1446 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1447 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1450 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1451 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1452 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1453 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1454 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1458 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1459 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1460 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1464 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1465 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1466 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1470 /* TLS extensions */
1471 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1472 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1473 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1474 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1475 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1481 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1482 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1483 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1484 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1485 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1489 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1490 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1495 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1496 if (compression != 0) {
1497 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1498 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1499 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1503 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1504 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1505 session_id_len) != 0) {
1506 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1507 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1513 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1514 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1518 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1522 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1523 * are appropriate for this version.
1525 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1526 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1527 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1528 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1529 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1535 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1537 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1538 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1540 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1541 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1542 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1543 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1547 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1548 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1549 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1550 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1551 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1556 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1557 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1558 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1559 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1560 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1561 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1562 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1563 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1564 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1565 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1567 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1568 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1569 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1571 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1572 * backwards compat reasons
1574 int master_key_length;
1575 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1576 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1579 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1580 && master_key_length > 0) {
1581 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1582 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1583 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1585 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1586 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1591 if (session_id_len != 0
1592 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1593 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1594 session_id_len) == 0)
1599 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1600 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1601 /* actually a client application bug */
1602 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1603 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1604 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1609 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1610 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1611 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1612 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1613 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1615 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1617 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1618 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1619 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss, 1, &discard,
1620 s->session_ctx->lock);
1621 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1622 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1627 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1629 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1630 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1631 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1632 * used for resumption.
1634 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1635 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1636 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1637 if (session_id_len > 0)
1638 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1643 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1644 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1645 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1646 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1650 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1653 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1654 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1656 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1657 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1661 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1662 if (compression != 0) {
1663 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1664 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1668 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1669 * using compression.
1671 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1672 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1673 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1677 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1678 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1679 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1682 if (compression == 0)
1684 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1685 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1686 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1689 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1692 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1693 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1694 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1697 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1701 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1702 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1706 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1707 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1708 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1709 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1712 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1715 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1716 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1718 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1719 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1721 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1722 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1723 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1727 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1728 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1729 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1734 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1735 * we're done with this message
1738 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1739 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1740 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1741 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1745 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1746 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1748 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1749 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1752 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
1755 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1758 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1759 * should not be used.
1761 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1762 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1764 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1765 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1766 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1767 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1768 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1772 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1775 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
1776 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1777 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL
1781 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1782 * ClientHello will not change
1784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1785 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1786 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1791 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1792 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1794 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
1795 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1800 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1801 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1802 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1805 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1806 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1807 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1811 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1813 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1814 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1817 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1820 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1821 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1823 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1824 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1825 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1826 size_t chainidx, certidx;
1827 unsigned int context = 0;
1828 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1830 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1831 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1832 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1836 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1838 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1839 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1840 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1841 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1842 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1845 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1846 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1847 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1848 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1849 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1850 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1854 certstart = certbytes;
1855 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1857 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
1858 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1861 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1862 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1863 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1864 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1868 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1869 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1872 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1874 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1878 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1879 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1880 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1881 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1882 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1883 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1884 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1885 /* SSLfatal already called */
1888 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1891 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1892 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1893 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1894 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1900 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1902 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1903 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1904 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1905 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1906 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1907 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1908 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1909 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1910 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1911 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1912 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1913 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1915 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1916 SSLfatal(s, ssl_x509err2alert(s->verify_result),
1917 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1918 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1921 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1923 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1924 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1928 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1930 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1931 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1933 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1936 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1938 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1940 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1941 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1945 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1947 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1948 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1949 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1953 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1954 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1957 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1958 if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1960 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1961 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1962 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1966 s->session->peer_type = certidx;
1968 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1970 s->session->peer = x;
1971 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1974 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1976 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1977 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1978 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1979 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1983 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1987 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1991 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1993 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1994 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1996 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1998 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1999 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2000 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2005 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
2006 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
2007 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
2010 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2011 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2012 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2013 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2017 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
2018 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2019 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
2020 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
2021 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
2022 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2023 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2029 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2030 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2035 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2037 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2038 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
2040 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2041 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2042 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
2043 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
2044 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2045 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2049 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
2051 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
2052 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
2054 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
2055 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
2057 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2058 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2060 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2061 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2062 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2067 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2068 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2072 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2073 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2074 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2078 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2079 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2084 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2086 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2087 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2088 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2091 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2095 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2096 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2097 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2098 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2099 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2103 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
2106 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
2107 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2108 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2112 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2113 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2114 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2116 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2117 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2118 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2119 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2124 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2125 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
2126 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2127 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2131 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
2132 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2138 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
2139 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2140 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2144 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
2145 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2151 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
2152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2153 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2157 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2158 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2163 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2166 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2167 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2169 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2170 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2171 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2180 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2184 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2185 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2190 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2192 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2194 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2197 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2198 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2199 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2201 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2202 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2203 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2207 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2208 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2210 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE
2211 || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id, 1)) {
2212 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2217 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) {
2218 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2219 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2223 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2225 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2229 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2230 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2231 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2232 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2238 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2239 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2242 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2243 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2244 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2245 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2246 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2250 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2251 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2256 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2259 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2260 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2261 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2262 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2264 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2266 save_param_start = *pkt;
2268 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2269 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2270 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2273 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2274 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2275 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2280 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2281 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2282 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2283 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2284 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2287 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2288 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2289 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2292 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2293 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2294 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2298 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2299 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2303 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2307 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2313 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2314 * equals the length of the parameters.
2316 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2317 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2318 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2319 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2320 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2324 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2325 unsigned int sigalg;
2327 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2328 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2329 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2332 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2333 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2336 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2337 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2338 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2342 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2343 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2344 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2348 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2349 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2352 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2353 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2354 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2355 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2358 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2360 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2361 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2366 * Check signature length
2368 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2369 /* wrong packet length */
2370 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2371 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2375 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2376 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2377 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2378 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2382 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2383 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2387 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2388 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2389 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2390 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2392 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2396 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2397 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2399 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2403 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2404 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2407 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2408 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2411 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2414 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2415 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2416 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2417 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2418 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2422 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2425 /* still data left over */
2426 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2427 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2428 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2433 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2435 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2436 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2439 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2443 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2444 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2445 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2447 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2448 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2449 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2451 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2452 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2453 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2454 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2455 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2456 s->pha_context = NULL;
2458 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
2459 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
2460 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2461 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2462 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2463 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2466 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2467 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2468 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2470 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2472 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2473 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2475 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2476 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2477 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2478 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2479 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2481 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2482 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2483 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2484 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2486 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2491 /* get the certificate types */
2492 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2493 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2494 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2495 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2496 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2499 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2500 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2501 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2502 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2503 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2506 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2509 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2510 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2511 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2512 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2513 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2517 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2518 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2520 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
2521 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2522 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2523 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2524 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2526 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2528 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2529 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2530 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2534 /* get the CA RDNs */
2535 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2536 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2537 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2541 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2542 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2543 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2544 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2545 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2548 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2549 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2551 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2554 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2556 unsigned int ticklen;
2557 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2558 unsigned int sess_len;
2559 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2562 PACKET_null_init(&nonce);
2564 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2566 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2567 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)))
2568 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2569 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen)
2570 : PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)) {
2571 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2572 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2577 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2578 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2579 * be 0 here in that instance
2582 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2585 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2586 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2587 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2588 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2589 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2592 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2593 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2596 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2599 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2600 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2601 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2602 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2606 if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0
2607 && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2609 * In TLSv1.2 and below the arrival of a new tickets signals that
2610 * any old ticket we were using is now out of date, so we remove the
2611 * old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2613 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2616 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2617 s->session = new_sess;
2621 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2622 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2624 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2626 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2627 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2628 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2630 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2631 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2632 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2633 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2636 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2637 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2638 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2642 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2643 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2644 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2646 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2649 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2650 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2651 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2652 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2653 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2657 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2658 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, &exts,
2660 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2661 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2662 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2663 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2669 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2670 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2671 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2672 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2673 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2674 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2675 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2676 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2677 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2680 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2681 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2683 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2684 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2685 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2686 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2690 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2691 s->session->not_resumable = 0;
2693 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2694 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2695 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s);
2696 int hashleni = EVP_MD_size(md);
2698 static const unsigned char nonce_label[] = "resumption";
2700 /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
2701 if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) {
2702 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2703 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2704 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2707 hashlen = (size_t)hashleni;
2709 if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->resumption_master_secret,
2711 sizeof(nonce_label) - 1,
2712 PACKET_data(&nonce),
2713 PACKET_remaining(&nonce),
2714 s->session->master_key,
2716 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2719 s->session->master_key_length = hashlen;
2722 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2723 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2726 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2729 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2733 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2734 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2736 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2741 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2742 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2743 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2744 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2747 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2748 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2749 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2750 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2753 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2754 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2755 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2756 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2759 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2760 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2761 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2764 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2770 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2772 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2773 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2774 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2777 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2781 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2782 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2783 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2786 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
2789 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2792 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2793 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2798 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2799 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2800 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2802 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2803 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2804 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2807 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2808 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2809 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2813 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2814 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2815 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2819 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2820 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2821 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2822 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2823 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2832 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2834 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2835 /* should contain no data */
2836 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2837 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2838 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2841 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2842 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2843 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2845 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2850 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2851 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2852 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2855 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2858 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2860 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2863 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2864 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2867 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2868 size_t identitylen = 0;
2869 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2870 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2871 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2874 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2875 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2876 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2880 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2882 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2883 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2886 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2887 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2888 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2890 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2891 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2892 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2893 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2897 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2898 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2899 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2900 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2904 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2905 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2906 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2907 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2908 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2912 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2913 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2914 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2916 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2917 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2920 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2921 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2922 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2929 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2930 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2931 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2932 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2936 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2937 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2942 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2944 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2945 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2946 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2947 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2949 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2952 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2954 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2956 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2957 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2961 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2962 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2963 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2964 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2968 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2969 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2971 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2972 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2976 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2977 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2978 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2979 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2980 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2981 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2985 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2986 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2987 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2988 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2991 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2992 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2993 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2994 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2998 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2999 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3000 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3001 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
3004 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3007 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
3008 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
3009 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3010 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3014 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
3015 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
3016 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3020 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3021 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3025 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3026 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3030 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
3031 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3036 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3038 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3040 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
3041 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3042 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
3044 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
3046 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3047 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3051 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3053 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3054 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3058 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3060 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
3061 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3062 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3066 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3067 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3071 /* send off the data */
3072 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
3073 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key),
3075 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3076 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3080 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
3081 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3085 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3088 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3089 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3094 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3096 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3097 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
3098 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
3099 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3102 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
3104 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3105 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3109 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3111 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3112 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3116 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3117 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3121 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3122 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3124 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3125 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3130 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3131 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3132 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3138 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3139 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3142 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3143 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3148 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3150 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3151 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3152 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3155 unsigned int md_len;
3156 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3157 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3158 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3159 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3162 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3163 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3166 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3168 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3170 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3171 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3175 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
3176 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3177 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3178 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3182 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3183 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3184 * certificate key for key exchange
3187 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3189 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3191 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3192 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3196 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3197 /* Generate session key
3198 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3200 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3201 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3202 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3206 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3209 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3210 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3211 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3212 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
3213 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3214 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
3215 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3216 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3217 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3218 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3221 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3223 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3224 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3225 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3229 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3231 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3234 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3240 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3241 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3242 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3243 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3244 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3248 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3249 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3250 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3254 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3255 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3256 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3260 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3265 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3267 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3268 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3270 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3271 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3273 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3274 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3277 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3279 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3280 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3281 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3282 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3283 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3289 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3290 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3295 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3297 unsigned long alg_k;
3299 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3302 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3303 * no need to do so here.
3305 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3306 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3309 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3310 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3312 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3313 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3315 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3316 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3318 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3319 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3321 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3322 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3324 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3325 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3326 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3332 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3333 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3335 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3336 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3341 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3343 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3346 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3347 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3351 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3352 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3353 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3360 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3361 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3362 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3365 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3366 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3367 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3375 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3376 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3377 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3378 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3381 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3384 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3385 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3387 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3388 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3389 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3390 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3391 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3392 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3396 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3397 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3403 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3404 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3409 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3410 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3411 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3413 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3415 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3416 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3419 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3420 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3422 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3423 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3428 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3431 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3434 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3435 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3436 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3437 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3439 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3443 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3444 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3445 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3448 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3450 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
3451 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3452 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3454 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3457 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3461 /* We need to get a client cert */
3462 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3464 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3465 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3467 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3469 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3472 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3473 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3474 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3476 } else if (i == 1) {
3478 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3479 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3483 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3484 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3487 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3488 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3489 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3490 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3492 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3493 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3494 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3500 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
3501 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3502 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3505 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3506 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3507 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3511 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3513 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3514 if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
3515 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3516 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3517 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3518 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3521 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
3522 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3523 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3527 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3528 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3530 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3535 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3536 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3537 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3539 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3540 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3542 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3543 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3550 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3552 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3556 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3557 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3559 /* we don't have a certificate */
3560 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3563 /* This is the passed certificate */
3564 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3566 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3567 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3568 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3569 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3570 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3574 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3575 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3576 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3578 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3579 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3584 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3585 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3586 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3587 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3591 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3592 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3593 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3594 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3603 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3605 size_t len, padding_len;
3606 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3608 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3609 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3611 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3612 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3613 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO,
3614 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3618 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3624 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3626 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3627 /* should contain no data */
3628 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ,
3629 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3630 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3633 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3634 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3635 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3639 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3640 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3641 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3642 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3643 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3648 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3650 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3653 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3656 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3658 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3659 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3660 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3661 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3665 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3666 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3668 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3669 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3670 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3674 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3675 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3678 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3679 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3682 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3685 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3686 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3687 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3688 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3689 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3694 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3695 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3699 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3702 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3703 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3705 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3706 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
3707 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3708 SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
3713 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3714 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3718 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3719 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3720 # error Max cipher length too short
3723 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3724 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3727 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3728 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3731 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3734 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3736 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3739 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3740 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3742 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3743 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3744 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3747 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3748 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3749 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3753 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3755 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3756 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3757 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
3760 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
3761 && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3769 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3770 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3771 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3774 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3781 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3782 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3783 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3785 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3786 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3787 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3791 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3792 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3793 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3795 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3796 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3797 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3806 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3808 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3809 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3810 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3811 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3812 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3816 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;