2 * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/md5.h>
21 #include <openssl/dh.h>
22 #include <openssl/bn.h>
23 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
26 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
28 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
29 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
30 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
34 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
40 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
42 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
43 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
44 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
45 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
52 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
58 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
60 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
63 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
64 * ciphersuite or for SRP
66 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
75 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
76 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
77 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
78 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
80 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
81 * (transition not allowed)
83 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
85 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
88 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
89 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
90 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
93 switch (st->hand_state) {
97 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
99 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
100 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
102 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
103 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
108 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
109 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
110 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
115 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
117 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
118 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
122 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
126 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
133 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
134 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
135 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
141 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
142 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
156 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
159 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
160 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
163 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
164 #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION
165 # error TODO(DTLS1.3): Restore digest for PHA before adding message.
167 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT) {
168 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUESTED;
170 * In TLS, this is called before the message is added to the
171 * digest. In DTLS, this is expected to be called after adding
172 * to the digest. Either move the digest restore, or add the
173 * message here after the swap, or do it after the clientFinished?
175 if (!tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
176 /* SSLfatal() already called */
179 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
186 /* No valid transition found */
191 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
192 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
193 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
194 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
196 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
197 * (transition not allowed)
199 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
201 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
205 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
206 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
208 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
209 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
214 switch (st->hand_state) {
218 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
219 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
220 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
224 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
225 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
226 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
232 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
234 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
235 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
238 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
239 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
244 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
246 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
247 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
248 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
251 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
252 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
256 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
257 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
259 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
260 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
261 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
262 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
264 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
265 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
266 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
267 * the server is resuming.
270 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
272 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
273 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
274 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
275 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
279 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
280 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
282 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
283 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
284 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
285 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
288 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
289 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
290 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
292 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
293 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
302 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
303 * |ext.status_expected| is set
305 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
306 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
311 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
312 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
313 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
314 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
315 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
316 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
317 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
324 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
325 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
326 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
327 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
334 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
335 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
336 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
341 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
342 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
343 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
344 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
347 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
348 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
353 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
354 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
360 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
361 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
362 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
368 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
369 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
376 /* No valid transition found */
377 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
378 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION,
379 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
384 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
385 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
388 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
390 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
393 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
394 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
395 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
397 switch (st->hand_state) {
399 /* Shouldn't happen */
400 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
401 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
402 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
403 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
405 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
406 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
407 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
410 /* Shouldn't happen - same as default case */
411 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
412 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
413 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
414 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
416 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
417 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
418 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
419 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
420 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
421 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
422 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
424 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
425 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
426 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
428 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
429 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
430 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
431 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
435 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
436 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
437 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
438 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
442 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
443 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
444 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
445 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
447 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
448 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
449 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
451 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
452 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
453 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
454 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
458 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
459 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
460 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
461 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
462 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
465 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
466 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
467 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
470 /* Try to read from the server instead */
471 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
476 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
477 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
479 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
481 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
484 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
485 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
489 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
491 switch (st->hand_state) {
493 /* Shouldn't happen */
494 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
495 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION,
496 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
497 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
500 if (!s->renegotiate) {
502 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
503 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
505 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
510 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
511 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
513 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
514 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
516 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
517 * actually selected a version yet.
519 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
520 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
522 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
523 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
526 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
529 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
531 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
533 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
534 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
535 * because we did early data.
537 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
538 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
539 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
541 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
542 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
544 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
545 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
547 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
548 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
549 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
551 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
552 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
553 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
555 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
556 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
559 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
560 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
562 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
564 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
565 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
568 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
569 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
570 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
571 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
573 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
574 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
576 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
578 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
579 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
583 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
584 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
585 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
587 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
588 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
589 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
590 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
591 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
593 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
594 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
596 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
597 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
599 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
602 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
604 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
605 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
606 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
607 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
610 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
612 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
613 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
615 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
618 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
620 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
621 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
623 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
624 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
627 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
629 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
632 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
633 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
634 /* SSLfatal() already called */
635 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
637 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
638 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
640 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
641 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
646 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
647 * the client to the server.
649 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
651 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
653 switch (st->hand_state) {
655 /* No pre work to be done */
658 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
660 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
661 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
662 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
663 /* SSLfatal() already called */
669 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
670 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
673 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
674 * messages unless we need to.
678 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
679 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
680 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
681 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
687 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
689 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
690 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
691 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
693 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
694 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
695 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
698 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
699 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 0, 1);
702 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
703 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1, 1);
706 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
710 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
711 * client to the server.
713 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
715 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
719 switch (st->hand_state) {
721 /* No post work to be done */
724 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
725 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
726 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
728 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
729 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
730 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
732 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
733 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
734 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
735 /* SSLfatal() already called */
739 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
740 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
744 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
745 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
750 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
752 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
753 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
755 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
756 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
759 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
760 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
761 /* SSLfatal() already called */
766 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
767 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
769 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
770 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
772 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
773 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
774 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
776 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
777 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
781 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
782 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
783 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
785 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
786 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
788 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
790 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
791 /* SSLfatal() already called */
795 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
796 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
797 /* SSLfatal() already called */
801 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
802 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
805 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
808 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
813 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
817 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
818 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
819 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
821 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
824 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
828 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
831 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
832 if (!tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) {
833 /* SSLfatal() already called */
836 if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
837 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
838 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
839 /* SSLfatal() already called */
846 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
847 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
849 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
850 /* SSLfatal() already called */
856 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
860 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
863 * Valid return values are:
867 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
868 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
870 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
872 switch (st->hand_state) {
874 /* Shouldn't happen */
875 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
876 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
877 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
880 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
882 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
884 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
885 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
888 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
889 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
890 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
893 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
894 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
895 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
898 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
904 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
905 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
908 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
909 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
910 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
913 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
914 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
915 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
918 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
919 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
920 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
921 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
924 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
925 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
926 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
929 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
930 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
931 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
939 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
940 * reading. Excludes the message header.
942 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
944 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
946 switch (st->hand_state) {
948 /* Shouldn't happen */
951 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
952 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
954 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
955 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
958 return s->max_cert_list;
960 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
961 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
963 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
964 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
966 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
967 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
969 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
971 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
972 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
973 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
975 return s->max_cert_list;
977 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
978 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
980 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
981 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
983 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
985 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
986 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
988 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
989 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
991 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
992 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
994 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
995 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
1000 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
1002 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1004 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1006 switch (st->hand_state) {
1008 /* Shouldn't happen */
1009 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1010 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1011 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1012 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1014 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
1015 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
1017 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
1018 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
1020 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT:
1021 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
1023 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
1024 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
1026 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
1027 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
1029 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
1030 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
1032 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1033 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1035 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1036 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1038 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1039 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1041 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1042 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1044 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1045 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1047 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1048 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1050 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1051 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1053 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1054 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1059 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1062 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1064 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1066 switch (st->hand_state) {
1068 /* Shouldn't happen */
1069 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1070 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1071 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1074 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1075 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1079 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1084 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1087 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1088 unsigned char *session_id;
1090 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1091 /* Should not happen */
1092 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1093 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1097 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1098 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1099 if (protverr != 0) {
1100 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1106 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version)
1107 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1108 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1109 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1110 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1114 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1116 p = s->s3->client_random;
1119 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1120 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1122 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1125 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1132 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1135 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
1136 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1137 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1138 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1143 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1144 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1145 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1146 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1147 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1148 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1149 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1150 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1153 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1154 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1155 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1156 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1157 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1158 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1159 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1160 * know that is maximum server supports.
1161 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1162 * containing version 1.0.
1164 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1165 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1166 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1167 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1168 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1169 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1170 * the negotiated version.
1172 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1173 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1175 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1176 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1177 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1178 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1183 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1184 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1185 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1186 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1187 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1188 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1189 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1190 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1191 && ssl_randbytes(s, s->tmp_session_id,
1192 sess_id_len) <= 0) {
1193 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1194 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1195 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1202 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1203 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1204 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1205 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1208 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1209 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1210 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1212 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1213 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1214 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1218 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1219 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1220 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1221 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1222 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1223 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1224 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1229 /* Ciphers supported */
1230 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1231 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1232 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1236 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
1237 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1240 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1241 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1242 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1247 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1248 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1249 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1252 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1253 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1254 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1255 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1256 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1257 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1258 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1259 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1260 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1261 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1262 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1268 /* Add the NULL method */
1269 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1270 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1271 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1275 /* TLS extensions */
1276 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1277 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1284 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1289 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1290 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1292 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1293 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1296 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1297 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1298 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1299 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1300 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1303 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1304 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1305 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1306 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1308 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1310 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1313 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1315 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1316 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1319 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1321 /* unknown cipher */
1322 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1323 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1327 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1328 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1330 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1331 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1332 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1336 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1337 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1339 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1340 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1341 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1345 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1346 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1347 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1348 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1349 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1354 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1355 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1356 * set and use it for comparison.
1358 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1359 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1360 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1361 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1363 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1364 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1366 if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
1367 != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1368 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1369 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1370 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1375 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1379 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1383 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1388 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1390 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1391 size_t session_id_len;
1392 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1394 unsigned int compression;
1395 unsigned int sversion;
1396 unsigned int context;
1398 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1399 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1403 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1404 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1405 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1409 /* load the server random */
1410 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1411 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1412 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1413 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1414 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1416 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1417 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1418 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1422 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1424 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1429 /* Get the session-id. */
1430 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1431 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1432 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1435 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1436 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1437 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1438 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1439 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1443 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1444 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1445 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1449 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1450 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1451 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1455 /* TLS extensions */
1456 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1457 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1458 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1459 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1460 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1466 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1467 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1468 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1469 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1470 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1474 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1475 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1480 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1481 if (compression != 0) {
1482 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1483 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1484 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1488 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1489 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1490 session_id_len) != 0) {
1491 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1492 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1498 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1499 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1503 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1507 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1508 * are appropriate for this version.
1510 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1511 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1512 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1513 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1514 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1520 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1522 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1523 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1525 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1526 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1527 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1528 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1532 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1533 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1534 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1535 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1536 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1541 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1542 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1543 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1544 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1545 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1546 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1547 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1548 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1549 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1550 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1552 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1553 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1554 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1556 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1557 * backwards compat reasons
1559 int master_key_length;
1560 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1561 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1564 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1565 && master_key_length > 0) {
1566 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1567 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1568 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1570 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1571 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1576 if (session_id_len != 0
1577 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1578 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1579 session_id_len) == 0)
1584 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1585 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1586 /* actually a client application bug */
1587 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1588 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1589 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1594 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1595 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1596 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1597 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1598 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1600 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1602 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1603 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1604 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss, 1, &discard,
1605 s->session_ctx->lock);
1606 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1607 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1612 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1614 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1615 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1616 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1617 * used for resumption.
1619 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1620 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1621 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1622 if (session_id_len > 0)
1623 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1628 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1629 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1630 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1631 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1635 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1638 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1639 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1641 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1642 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1646 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1647 if (compression != 0) {
1648 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1649 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1653 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1654 * using compression.
1656 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1657 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1658 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1662 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1663 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1664 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1667 if (compression == 0)
1669 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1670 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1671 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1674 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1677 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1678 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1679 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1682 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1686 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1687 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1691 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1692 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1693 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1694 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1697 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1700 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1701 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1703 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1704 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1706 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1707 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1708 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1712 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1713 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1714 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1719 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1720 * we're done with this message
1723 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1724 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1725 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1726 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1730 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1731 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1733 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1734 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1737 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
1740 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1743 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1744 * should not be used.
1746 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1747 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1749 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1750 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1751 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1752 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1753 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1757 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1760 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
1761 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1762 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL
1766 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1767 * ClientHello will not change
1769 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1770 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1771 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1776 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1777 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1779 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) {
1780 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1785 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1786 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1787 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1790 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1791 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1792 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1796 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1798 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1799 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1802 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1805 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1806 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1808 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1809 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1810 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1811 size_t chainidx, certidx;
1812 unsigned int context = 0;
1813 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1815 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1816 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1817 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1821 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1823 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1824 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1825 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1826 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1827 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1830 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1831 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1832 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1833 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1834 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1835 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1839 certstart = certbytes;
1840 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1842 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
1843 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1846 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1847 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1848 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1849 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1853 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1854 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1857 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1858 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1859 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1863 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1864 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1865 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1866 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1867 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1868 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1869 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1870 /* SSLfatal already called */
1873 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1876 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1877 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1878 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1879 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1885 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1887 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1888 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1889 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1890 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1891 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1892 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1893 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1894 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1895 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1896 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1897 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1898 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1900 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1901 SSLfatal(s, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result),
1902 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1903 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1906 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1908 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1909 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1913 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1915 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1916 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1918 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1921 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1923 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1925 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1926 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1930 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1932 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1933 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1934 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1938 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1939 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1942 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1943 if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1945 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1946 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1947 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1951 s->session->peer_type = certidx;
1953 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1955 s->session->peer = x;
1956 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1959 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1961 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1962 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1963 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1964 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1968 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1972 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1976 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1978 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1979 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1981 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1983 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1984 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1985 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1990 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1991 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1992 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1995 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1996 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1997 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1998 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2002 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
2003 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2004 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
2005 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
2006 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
2007 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2008 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2014 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2015 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2020 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2022 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2023 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
2025 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2026 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2027 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
2028 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
2029 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2030 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2034 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
2036 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
2037 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
2039 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
2040 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
2042 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2043 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2045 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2046 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2047 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2052 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2053 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2057 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2058 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2059 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2063 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2064 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2069 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2071 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2072 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2073 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2076 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2080 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2081 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2082 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2083 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2084 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2088 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
2091 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
2092 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2093 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2097 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2098 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2099 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2101 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2102 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2103 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2104 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2109 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2110 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
2111 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2112 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2116 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
2117 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2123 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
2124 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2125 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2129 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
2130 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2136 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
2137 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2138 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2142 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2143 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2148 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2151 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2152 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2154 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2155 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2156 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2165 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2169 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2170 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2175 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2177 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2179 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2182 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2183 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2184 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2186 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2187 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2188 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2192 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2193 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2195 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id)) {
2196 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2201 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) {
2202 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2203 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2207 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2208 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2209 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2213 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2214 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2215 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2216 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2222 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2223 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2226 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2227 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2228 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2229 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2230 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2234 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2235 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2240 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2243 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2244 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2245 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2246 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2248 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2250 save_param_start = *pkt;
2252 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2253 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2254 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2257 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2258 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2259 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2264 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2265 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2266 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2267 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2268 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2271 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2272 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2273 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2276 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2277 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2278 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2282 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2283 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2287 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2291 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2297 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2298 * equals the length of the parameters.
2300 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2301 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2302 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2304 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2308 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2309 unsigned int sigalg;
2311 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2312 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2313 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2316 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2317 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2320 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2321 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2322 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2326 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2327 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2328 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2332 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2333 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2336 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2337 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2338 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2339 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2342 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2344 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2345 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2350 * Check signature length
2352 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2353 /* wrong packet length */
2354 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2355 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2359 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2360 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2361 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2362 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2366 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2367 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2371 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2372 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2373 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2374 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2375 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2376 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2380 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2381 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2383 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2387 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2388 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2392 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2395 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2398 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2399 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2400 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2401 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2402 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2403 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2406 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2409 /* still data left over */
2410 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2411 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2412 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2417 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2419 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2420 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2423 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2427 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2428 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2429 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2431 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2432 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2433 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2435 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2436 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2437 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2438 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2439 OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context);
2440 s->pha_context = NULL;
2442 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx) ||
2443 !PACKET_memdup(&reqctx, &s->pha_context, &s->pha_context_len)) {
2444 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2445 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2446 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2447 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2450 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2451 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2452 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2454 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2456 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2457 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2459 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2460 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2461 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2462 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2463 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2465 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2466 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2467 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2468 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2470 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2475 /* get the certificate types */
2476 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2477 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2478 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2479 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2480 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2483 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2484 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2485 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2486 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2487 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2490 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2493 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2494 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2495 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2496 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2497 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2501 * Despite this being for certificates, preserve compatibility
2502 * with pre-TLS 1.3 and use the regular sigalgs field.
2504 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs, 0)) {
2505 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2506 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2507 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2508 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2510 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2511 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2512 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2513 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2514 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2518 /* get the CA RDNs */
2519 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2520 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2521 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2525 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2526 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2527 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2528 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2529 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2532 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2533 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2535 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2538 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2540 unsigned int ticklen;
2541 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2542 unsigned int sess_len;
2543 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2546 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2548 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2549 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)
2550 || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce, &s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
2551 &s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
2552 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2553 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2555 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2557 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2562 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2563 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2564 * be 0 here in that instance
2567 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2570 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2571 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2572 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2573 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2574 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2577 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2578 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2579 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2581 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2584 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2585 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2586 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2587 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2591 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2593 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2595 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2598 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2599 s->session = new_sess;
2603 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2604 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2606 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2608 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2609 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2610 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2612 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2613 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2614 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2615 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2618 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2619 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2620 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2624 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2625 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2626 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2628 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2631 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2632 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
2633 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2634 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2636 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2637 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2638 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2639 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2645 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2646 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2647 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2648 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2649 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2650 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2651 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2652 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2653 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2656 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2657 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2659 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2660 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2661 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2666 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2668 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2669 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2671 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2672 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2675 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2678 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2682 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2683 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2685 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2690 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2691 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2692 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2693 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2696 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2697 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2698 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2699 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2702 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2703 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2705 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2708 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2709 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2710 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2713 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2719 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2721 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2722 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2723 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2726 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2730 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2731 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2732 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2735 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
2738 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2741 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2742 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2747 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2748 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2749 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2751 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2752 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2753 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2756 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2757 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2758 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2762 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2763 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2764 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2768 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2769 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2770 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2771 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2772 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2781 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2783 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2784 /* should contain no data */
2785 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2786 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2787 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2790 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2791 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2792 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2794 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2799 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2800 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2801 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2804 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2807 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2812 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2813 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2816 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2817 size_t identitylen = 0;
2818 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2819 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2820 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2823 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2824 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2825 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2829 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2831 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2832 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2835 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2836 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2837 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2839 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2840 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2841 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2842 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2846 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2847 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2848 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2849 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2853 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2854 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2855 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2856 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2857 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2861 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2862 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2863 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2865 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2866 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2869 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2870 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2871 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2878 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2879 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2880 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2881 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2885 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2886 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2891 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2893 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2894 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2895 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2896 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2898 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2901 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2903 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2905 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2906 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2910 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2911 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2912 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2913 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2917 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2918 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2920 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2921 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2925 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2926 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2927 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2928 if (ssl_randbytes(s, pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2929 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2930 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2934 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2935 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2936 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2937 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2940 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2941 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2942 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2943 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2947 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2948 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2949 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2950 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2953 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2956 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2957 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2958 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2959 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2963 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2964 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
2965 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2969 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2970 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2974 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2975 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2979 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2980 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2985 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2987 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2989 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2990 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2991 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2993 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2995 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2996 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3000 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3002 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3003 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3007 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
3009 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
3010 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3011 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3015 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3016 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3020 /* send off the data */
3021 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
3022 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key),
3024 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3025 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3029 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
3030 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3034 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3037 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
3038 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3043 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3045 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3046 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
3047 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
3048 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3051 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
3053 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3054 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3058 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3060 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3061 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3065 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3066 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3070 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3071 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3073 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3074 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3079 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3080 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3081 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3087 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3088 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3091 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3092 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3097 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3099 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3100 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3101 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3104 unsigned int md_len;
3105 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3106 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3107 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3108 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3111 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3112 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3115 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3117 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3119 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3120 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3124 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
3125 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3126 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3127 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3131 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3132 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3133 * certificate key for key exchange
3136 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3138 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3140 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3141 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3145 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3146 /* Generate session key
3147 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3149 || ssl_randbytes(s, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3150 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3151 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3155 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3158 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3159 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3160 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3161 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
3162 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3163 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
3164 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3165 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3166 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3167 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3170 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3172 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3173 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3174 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3178 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3180 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3183 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3184 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3189 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3190 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3191 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3192 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3193 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3197 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3198 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3199 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3203 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3204 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3205 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3208 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3209 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3214 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3216 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3217 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3219 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3220 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3222 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3223 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3226 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3228 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3229 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3230 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3231 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3232 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3238 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3239 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3244 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3246 unsigned long alg_k;
3248 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3251 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3252 * no need to do so here.
3254 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3255 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3258 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3259 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3261 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3262 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3264 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3265 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3267 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3268 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3270 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3271 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3273 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3274 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3275 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3281 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3282 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3283 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3284 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3285 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3290 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3292 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3295 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3296 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3298 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3300 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3301 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3302 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3309 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3310 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3311 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3314 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3315 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3316 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3324 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3325 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3326 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3327 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3330 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3333 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3334 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3336 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3337 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3338 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3339 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3340 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3341 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3345 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3346 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3352 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3353 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3358 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3359 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3360 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3362 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3364 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3365 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3368 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3369 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3371 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3372 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3377 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3380 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3383 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3384 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3385 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3386 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3388 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3392 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3393 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3394 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3397 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3399 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) {
3400 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) {
3401 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3403 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3406 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3410 /* We need to get a client cert */
3411 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3413 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3414 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3416 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3418 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3421 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3422 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3423 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3425 } else if (i == 1) {
3427 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3428 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3432 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3433 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3436 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3437 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3438 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3439 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3441 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3442 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3443 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3449 if (s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
3450 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
3451 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3454 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3455 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3456 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3460 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3462 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
3463 if (s->pha_context == NULL) {
3464 /* no context available, add 0-length context */
3465 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3466 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3467 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3470 } else if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->pha_context, s->pha_context_len)) {
3471 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3472 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3476 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3477 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3479 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3484 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3485 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3486 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3488 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3489 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3491 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3492 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3499 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3501 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3505 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3506 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3508 /* we don't have a certificate */
3509 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3512 /* This is the passed certificate */
3513 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3515 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3516 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3517 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3518 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3519 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3523 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3524 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3525 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3528 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3532 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3533 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3534 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3535 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3536 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3540 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3541 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3542 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3543 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3551 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3552 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3554 size_t len, padding_len;
3555 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3557 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3558 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3560 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3561 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3562 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO,
3563 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3567 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3573 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3575 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3576 /* should contain no data */
3577 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ,
3578 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3579 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3582 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3583 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3584 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3588 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3589 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3590 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3591 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3592 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3597 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3599 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3602 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3605 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3607 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3608 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3609 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3610 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3614 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3615 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3617 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3618 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3619 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3623 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3624 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3627 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3628 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3631 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3634 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3635 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3636 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3637 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3638 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3643 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3644 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3648 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3651 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3652 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3654 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3655 if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) {
3656 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3657 SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
3662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3663 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3667 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3668 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3669 # error Max cipher length too short
3672 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3673 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3676 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3677 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3680 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3683 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3685 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3688 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3689 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3691 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3692 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3693 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3696 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3697 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3698 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3702 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3704 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3705 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3706 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
3709 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
3710 && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3718 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3719 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3720 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3723 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3730 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3731 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3732 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3734 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3735 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3736 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3740 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3741 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3742 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3744 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3745 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3746 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3755 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3757 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3758 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3759 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3760 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3761 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3765 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;