2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
52 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
53 #include "statem_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/md5.h>
59 #include <openssl/dh.h>
60 #include <openssl/bn.h>
61 #include <openssl/engine.h>
63 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
64 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
66 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
67 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
68 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
69 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
73 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
79 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
81 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
82 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
83 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
84 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
91 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
97 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
99 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
102 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
103 * ciphersuite or for SRP
105 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
114 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
115 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
116 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
117 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
119 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
120 * (transition not allowed)
122 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
124 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
127 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
128 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
129 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
132 switch (st->hand_state) {
136 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
138 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
139 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
141 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
142 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
154 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
156 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
157 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
161 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
165 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
166 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
172 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
173 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
174 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
180 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
181 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
186 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
187 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
188 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
194 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
195 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
198 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
199 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
205 /* No valid transition found */
210 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
211 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
212 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
213 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
215 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
216 * (transition not allowed)
218 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
220 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
224 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
225 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
227 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
228 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
233 switch (st->hand_state) {
237 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
238 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
239 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
243 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
244 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
245 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
249 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
256 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
258 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
259 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
262 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
263 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
266 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
267 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
272 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
274 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
275 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
276 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
279 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
280 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
284 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
285 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
287 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
288 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
289 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
290 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
292 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
293 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
294 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
295 * the server is resuming.
298 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
300 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
301 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
302 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
303 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
307 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
308 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
310 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
311 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
312 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
313 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
316 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
317 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
318 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
320 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
321 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
330 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
331 * |ext.status_expected| is set
333 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
334 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
339 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
340 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
341 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
342 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
343 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
344 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
345 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
352 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
353 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
354 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
362 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
363 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
364 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
369 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
370 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
371 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
372 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
375 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
376 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
381 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
382 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
383 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
388 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
389 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
390 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
396 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
397 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
404 /* No valid transition found */
405 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
406 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
411 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
412 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
415 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
417 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
420 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
421 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
422 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
424 switch (st->hand_state) {
426 /* Shouldn't happen */
427 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
429 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
430 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
431 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
433 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
434 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
435 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
437 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
438 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
439 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
440 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
442 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
443 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
444 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
446 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
447 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
448 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
449 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
453 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
454 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
455 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
456 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
459 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
460 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
461 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
462 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
464 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
465 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
466 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
468 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
469 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
470 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
471 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
475 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
476 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
477 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
478 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
479 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
482 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
483 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
484 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
487 /* Try to read from the server instead */
488 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
493 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
494 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
496 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
498 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
501 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
502 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
506 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
508 switch (st->hand_state) {
510 /* Shouldn't happen */
511 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
514 if (!s->renegotiate) {
516 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
517 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
519 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
521 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
523 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
526 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
527 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
529 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
530 * actually selected a version yet.
532 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
533 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
536 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
539 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
541 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
542 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
544 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
545 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
546 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
548 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
549 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
550 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
552 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
553 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
556 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
557 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
559 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
561 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
562 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
565 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
566 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
567 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
568 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
570 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
573 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
575 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
576 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
578 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
580 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
581 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
582 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
584 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
585 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
587 hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
589 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
590 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
592 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
594 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
596 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
597 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
598 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
599 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
602 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
604 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
605 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
607 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
610 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
612 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
613 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
615 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
616 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
619 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
621 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
624 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
625 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
626 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
627 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
629 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
630 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
632 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
633 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
638 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
639 * the client to the server.
641 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
643 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
645 switch (st->hand_state) {
647 /* No pre work to be done */
650 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
652 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
653 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
654 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
655 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
661 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
662 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
665 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
666 * messages unless we need to.
670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
671 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
672 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
677 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
679 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
680 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
681 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
683 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
684 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
685 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
688 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
690 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
693 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
697 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
698 * client to the server.
700 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
702 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
706 switch (st->hand_state) {
708 /* No post work to be done */
711 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
712 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
715 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
716 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
720 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
721 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
723 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
724 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
725 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
727 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
728 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
733 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
735 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
736 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
738 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
739 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
742 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
743 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
747 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
748 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
749 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
750 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
752 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
753 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
755 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
757 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
760 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
761 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
764 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
765 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
768 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
771 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
776 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
780 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
781 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
782 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
784 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
787 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
791 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
794 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
795 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
796 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
801 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
802 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
804 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
809 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
813 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
816 * Valid return values are:
820 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
821 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
823 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
825 switch (st->hand_state) {
827 /* Shouldn't happen */
830 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
832 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
834 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
835 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
838 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
839 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
840 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
843 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
844 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
845 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
848 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
854 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
855 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
858 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
859 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
860 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
863 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
864 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
865 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
868 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
869 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
870 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
871 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
874 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
875 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
876 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
879 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
880 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
881 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
889 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
890 * reading. Excludes the message header.
892 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
894 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
896 switch (st->hand_state) {
898 /* Shouldn't happen */
901 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
902 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
904 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
905 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
907 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
908 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
911 return s->max_cert_list;
913 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
914 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
916 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
917 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
919 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
920 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
922 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
924 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
925 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
926 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
928 return s->max_cert_list;
930 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
931 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
933 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
934 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
936 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
938 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
939 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
941 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
942 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
944 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
945 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
947 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
948 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
953 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
955 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
957 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
959 switch (st->hand_state) {
961 /* Shouldn't happen */
962 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
964 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
965 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
967 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
968 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
970 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
971 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt);
974 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
976 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
977 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
979 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
980 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
982 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
983 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
985 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
986 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
988 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
989 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
991 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
992 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
994 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
995 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
997 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
998 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1000 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1001 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1003 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1004 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1006 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1007 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1012 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1015 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1017 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1019 switch (st->hand_state) {
1021 /* Shouldn't happen */
1024 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1025 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1028 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1029 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
1030 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
1031 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1032 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1033 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1034 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1035 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
1038 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
1039 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1044 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1049 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1050 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1053 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1055 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1056 /* Should not happen */
1057 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1061 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1062 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1063 if (protverr != 0) {
1064 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1068 if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
1070 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
1071 * "ticket" without a session ID.
1073 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->ext.tick) ||
1074 (sess->not_resumable)) {
1075 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
1078 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1080 p = s->s3->client_random;
1083 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1084 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1086 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1089 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1098 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
1102 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1103 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1104 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1105 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1106 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1107 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1108 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1109 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1112 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1113 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1114 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1115 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1116 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1117 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1118 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1119 * know that is maximum server supports.
1120 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1121 * containing version 1.0.
1123 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1124 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1125 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1126 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1127 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1128 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1129 * the negotiated version.
1131 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1132 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1134 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1135 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1136 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1141 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
1144 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1145 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1146 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1147 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
1149 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1150 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1154 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1155 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1156 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1157 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1158 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1164 /* Ciphers supported */
1165 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1169 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1170 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
1172 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1173 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1178 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1179 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1182 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1183 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1184 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1185 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1186 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1187 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1188 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1189 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1196 /* Add the NULL method */
1197 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1202 /* TLS extensions */
1203 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1204 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1212 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1218 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1219 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1220 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1221 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1225 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1226 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1227 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1232 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1233 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1234 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1237 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1239 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1241 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1242 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1243 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1246 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1248 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1249 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1252 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1254 /* unknown cipher */
1255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1259 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1260 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1262 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1267 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1268 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1270 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1271 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1275 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1276 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1277 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1283 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1284 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1285 * set and use it for comparison.
1287 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1288 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1289 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1291 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1294 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1299 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1301 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1302 size_t session_id_len;
1303 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1304 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1305 unsigned int compression;
1306 unsigned int sversion;
1307 unsigned int context;
1309 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1310 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1314 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1315 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1316 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1320 /* We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in */
1321 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1322 if (protverr != 0) {
1323 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1324 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1329 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of the
1330 * message must be on a record boundary.
1332 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1333 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1334 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1338 /* load the server hello data */
1339 /* load the server random */
1340 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1341 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1342 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1346 /* Get the session-id. */
1347 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1348 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1349 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1350 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1353 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1354 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1355 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1356 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1358 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1362 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1366 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1367 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1368 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1372 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1373 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1374 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1375 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1382 /* TLS extensions */
1383 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1384 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1385 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1386 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1391 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1392 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1393 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al, NULL))
1398 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1399 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1400 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1401 EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1402 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1406 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1407 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1408 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1409 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1410 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1411 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1412 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1413 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1414 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1415 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1417 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1418 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1419 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1421 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1422 * backwards compat reasons
1424 int master_key_length;
1425 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1426 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1429 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1430 && master_key_length > 0) {
1431 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1432 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1433 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1435 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1436 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1441 if (session_id_len != 0
1442 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1443 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1444 session_id_len) == 0)
1449 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1450 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1451 /* actually a client application bug */
1452 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1453 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1454 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1459 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1460 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1461 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1462 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1463 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1465 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1467 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1468 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1469 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1470 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1475 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1476 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1477 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1478 if (session_id_len > 0)
1479 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1483 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1484 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1485 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1487 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1488 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1492 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1495 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1496 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1498 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1499 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1503 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1504 if (compression != 0) {
1505 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1506 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1507 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1511 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1512 * using compression.
1514 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1515 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1519 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1520 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1521 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1522 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1525 if (compression == 0)
1527 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1528 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1529 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1532 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1535 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1536 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1537 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1538 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1541 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1545 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1548 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1549 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1550 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1551 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1554 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1557 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1558 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1560 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1561 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1563 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1566 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1567 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1568 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1573 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1574 * we're done with this message
1577 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1578 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1579 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1580 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1585 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1586 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1588 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1589 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1590 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1591 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1594 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1596 unsigned int sversion;
1598 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1599 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1603 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1604 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1605 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1609 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
1611 /* This will fail if it doesn't choose TLSv1.3+ */
1612 errorcode = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1613 if (errorcode != 0) {
1614 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1615 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, errorcode);
1619 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1620 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1621 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1625 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1626 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1630 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1631 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1632 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1636 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1637 &extensions, &al, NULL)
1638 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1639 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1642 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1645 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1646 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1648 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) {
1649 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1654 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1655 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1656 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1659 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1660 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1661 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1662 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1666 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1668 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1669 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1670 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1671 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1674 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1676 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1677 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1679 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1680 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1681 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1683 unsigned int context = 0;
1685 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1690 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1692 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1693 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1694 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1695 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1698 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1699 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1700 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1701 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1703 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1707 certstart = certbytes;
1708 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1710 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1711 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1714 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1715 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1716 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1717 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1721 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1722 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1725 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1726 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1730 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1731 &rawexts, &al, NULL)
1732 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1733 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
1734 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1737 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1740 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1741 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1747 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1749 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1750 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1751 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1752 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1753 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1754 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1755 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1756 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1757 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1758 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1759 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1760 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1762 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1763 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1764 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1765 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1768 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1770 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1771 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1775 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1777 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1778 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1780 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1783 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1786 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1788 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1791 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1792 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1796 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1800 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1801 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1805 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1806 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1809 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1810 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1811 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1812 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1813 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1814 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1816 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1817 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1818 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1822 s->session->peer_type = i;
1824 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1826 s->session->peer = x;
1827 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1830 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1832 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1833 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1834 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1835 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1840 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1844 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1846 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1849 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1853 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1855 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1856 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1858 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1860 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1861 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1862 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1867 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1868 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1869 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1872 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1873 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1874 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1878 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1879 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1880 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1881 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1882 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1883 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1889 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1890 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1895 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1897 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1898 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1900 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1901 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1902 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1903 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1904 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1905 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1909 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1911 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1912 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1914 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1915 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1917 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1918 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1920 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1921 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1922 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1923 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1927 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1928 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1929 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1933 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1934 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1935 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1940 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1945 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1947 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1948 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1949 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1952 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1956 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1957 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1958 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1959 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1960 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1964 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1967 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1968 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1973 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1974 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1975 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1977 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1978 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1979 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1980 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1985 /* test non-zero pupkey */
1986 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1987 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1992 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1993 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1999 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
2000 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2005 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
2006 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2007 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2012 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
2013 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2014 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2018 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2019 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2020 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2024 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2027 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2028 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2030 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2031 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2032 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2041 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2045 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2046 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2051 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
2053 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2055 const unsigned char *ecparams;
2057 unsigned int curve_flags;
2058 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2061 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2062 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
2063 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2065 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
2066 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2067 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2071 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
2072 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
2074 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
2075 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2080 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
2082 if (curve_nid == 0) {
2083 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2084 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2085 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2089 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
2090 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
2092 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
2093 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2098 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2100 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2101 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2103 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2104 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
2105 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2106 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2107 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2108 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2111 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2115 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2116 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2117 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2121 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2122 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2123 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2124 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2125 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2130 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2131 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2134 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2135 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2136 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2137 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2138 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2143 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2148 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2152 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2153 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2154 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2155 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2157 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2159 save_param_start = *pkt;
2161 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2162 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2163 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2166 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2167 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2171 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2172 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2173 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2174 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2176 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2177 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2179 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2180 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2183 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2184 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2188 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2192 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2195 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2196 * equals the length of the parameters.
2198 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2199 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2200 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2201 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2202 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2206 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2207 unsigned int sigalg;
2210 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2211 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2212 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2215 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
2217 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2219 } else if (rv == 0) {
2220 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2224 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2226 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2227 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2231 md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx);
2233 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2234 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2235 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2236 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2239 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2241 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2242 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2247 * Check signature length
2249 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2250 /* wrong packet length */
2251 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2252 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2253 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2257 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2258 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2259 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2260 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2264 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2265 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2266 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2269 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2270 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2271 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2272 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2273 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2274 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2278 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2279 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2280 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2281 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2282 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2283 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
2284 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2285 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2288 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2289 PACKET_remaining(&signature)) <= 0) {
2291 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2292 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2295 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2298 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2299 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2300 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2301 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2302 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2303 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2304 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2305 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2307 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2311 /* still data left over */
2312 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2313 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2319 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2322 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2323 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2324 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2325 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2328 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2330 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2331 unsigned int i, name_len;
2332 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2333 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2334 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2337 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2338 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2342 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2345 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2346 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2347 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2348 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2349 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2350 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
2351 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2352 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2358 /* get the certificate types */
2359 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2360 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2361 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2362 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2366 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2367 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2372 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2375 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2376 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2377 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2378 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2382 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2383 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2384 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2385 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2386 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2388 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2391 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2392 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2393 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2398 /* get the CA RDNs */
2399 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2400 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2401 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2405 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2406 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2407 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2408 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2409 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2410 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2414 namestart = namebytes;
2416 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2417 name_len)) == NULL) {
2418 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2419 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2423 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2424 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2425 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2426 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2429 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2430 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2435 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to parse and process extensions, for now ignore */
2436 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2439 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &reqexts)) {
2440 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2441 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2442 SSL_R_EXT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2447 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2448 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2453 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2454 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2455 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2456 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2459 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2462 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2465 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2469 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2471 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2474 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2476 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2477 unsigned int ticklen;
2478 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2479 unsigned int sess_len;
2480 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2482 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2483 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add))
2484 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2485 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2487 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2488 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2493 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2494 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2495 * be 0 here in that instance
2498 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2500 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Is this a suitable test for TLS1.3? */
2501 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2502 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2503 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2505 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2508 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2510 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2512 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2515 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2516 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2517 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2521 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2522 s->session = new_sess;
2526 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2527 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2529 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2531 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2532 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2533 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2535 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2536 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2537 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2540 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2541 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2542 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2546 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2547 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2548 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2550 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2553 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2554 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2555 EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2557 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2558 exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
2559 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2565 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2566 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2567 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2568 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2569 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2570 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2571 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2572 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2573 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2576 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2577 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2579 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2580 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2581 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2582 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2585 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2587 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2588 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2590 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2591 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2594 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2596 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2598 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2600 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2604 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2605 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2606 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2608 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2613 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2614 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2615 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2616 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2617 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2620 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2621 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2622 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2623 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2626 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2627 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2628 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2629 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2632 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2633 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2634 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2637 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2643 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2647 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) {
2648 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2649 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2650 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2653 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2657 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2658 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2659 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2662 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2665 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2668 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2669 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2674 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2675 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2676 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2678 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2679 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2680 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2683 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2684 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2685 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2689 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2690 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2691 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2695 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2696 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2697 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2698 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2699 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2708 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2710 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2712 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2713 /* should contain no data */
2714 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2715 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2718 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2719 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2720 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2728 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2730 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2733 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2734 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2735 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2736 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2737 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2740 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2743 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2744 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2745 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2748 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2753 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2754 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2757 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2758 size_t identitylen = 0;
2759 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2760 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2761 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2764 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2765 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2766 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2770 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2772 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2773 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2776 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2777 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2778 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2780 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2781 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2782 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2783 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2787 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2788 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2789 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2790 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2794 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2795 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2796 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2797 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2798 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2802 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2803 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2804 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2806 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2807 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2810 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2811 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2812 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2819 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2820 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2821 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2822 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2826 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2827 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2832 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2834 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2835 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2836 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2837 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2839 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2842 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2844 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2850 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2851 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2852 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2856 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2857 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2859 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2860 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2864 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2865 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2866 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2867 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2871 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2872 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2873 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2876 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2877 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2878 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2879 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2882 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2883 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2884 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2887 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2890 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2891 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2892 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2896 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2897 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2899 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2900 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen))
2905 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2906 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2910 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2911 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2916 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2920 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2921 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2922 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2924 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2928 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2932 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2934 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2937 /* send off the data */
2938 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2939 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2942 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2943 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2947 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2950 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2954 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2956 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2957 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2958 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2959 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2962 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2964 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2968 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2970 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2974 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2975 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2979 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2980 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2982 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2983 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2987 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2994 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2995 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2998 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2999 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3004 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
3006 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3007 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3008 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3011 unsigned int md_len;
3012 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3013 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3014 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3015 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3018 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3019 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3022 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3024 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3026 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3027 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3028 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3032 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
3033 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3034 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3035 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3039 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3040 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3041 * certificate key for key exchange
3044 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3046 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3048 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3053 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3054 /* Generate session key
3055 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3057 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3058 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3059 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3063 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3066 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3067 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3068 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3069 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
3070 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3071 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
3072 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3073 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3074 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3075 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3078 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3080 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3081 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3082 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3083 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3086 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3088 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3091 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3092 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3097 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3098 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3099 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3100 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3101 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3105 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3106 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3107 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3111 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3112 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3113 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3116 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3117 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3122 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
3124 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3125 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3127 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3128 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3130 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3133 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3135 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3136 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3137 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3138 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3144 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3145 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3150 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3152 unsigned long alg_k;
3155 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3157 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3158 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
3161 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3162 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3164 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3165 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3167 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3168 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3170 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3171 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3173 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3174 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3176 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3177 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3178 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3185 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3186 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3187 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3188 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3189 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3190 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3195 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3197 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3200 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3201 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3203 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3205 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3206 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3207 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3208 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3215 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3216 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3217 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3220 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3221 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3222 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3223 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3231 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3232 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3233 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3234 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3237 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3240 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3241 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3243 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3244 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3245 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
3248 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3249 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3255 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3256 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3261 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3262 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3263 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3265 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3267 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3268 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, NULL) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3271 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3272 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3274 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3275 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3280 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3283 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3286 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3287 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3288 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3289 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3291 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3295 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3296 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3299 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3301 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3302 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3304 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3308 /* We need to get a client cert */
3309 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3311 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3312 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3314 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3316 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3319 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3320 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3321 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3323 } else if (i == 1) {
3325 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3326 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3330 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3331 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3334 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3335 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3336 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3337 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3339 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3340 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3341 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3342 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3348 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3351 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3355 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3357 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3360 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3363 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3364 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3365 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3368 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3373 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3374 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3375 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3376 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3377 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3383 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3387 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3389 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3392 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3396 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3397 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3399 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3400 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3402 /* we don't have a certificate */
3403 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3406 /* This is the passed certificate */
3408 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3409 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3410 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3411 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3418 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3419 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3420 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3424 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3425 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3427 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3428 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3430 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3433 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3434 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3435 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3436 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3441 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3442 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3443 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3444 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3448 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3449 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3450 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3451 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3458 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3463 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3465 size_t len, padding_len;
3466 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3468 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3469 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3471 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3472 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3473 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3477 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3481 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3486 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3488 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3489 /* should contain no data */
3490 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3491 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
3492 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3493 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3497 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3498 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3499 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3500 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3501 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3506 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3508 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3511 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3513 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3515 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3517 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
3518 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3519 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3523 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3524 &rawexts, &al, NULL)
3525 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3526 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al))
3529 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3530 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3533 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3534 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3535 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3536 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3539 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3542 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3543 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3544 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3545 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3546 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3551 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3552 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3556 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3559 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen;
3560 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3561 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3562 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3567 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3568 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3569 # error Max cipher length too short
3572 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3573 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3576 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3577 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3580 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3583 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3585 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3588 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3589 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3591 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3592 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3593 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3596 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3605 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3610 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3611 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3612 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3614 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3615 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3619 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3620 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3621 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3623 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3624 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3633 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3635 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3636 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3637 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3638 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3642 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;